

## THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: FOSTERING MULTILATERALISM

23-24 September 2019, The Czernin Palace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

DAY 1

23 SEPTEMBER 2019

9:15–9:45      **Opening Remarks** (Great Hall)

- **Ondřej Ditrych** (Director of the Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Aleš Chmelař** (Deputy Foreign Minister for European Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic)
- **Alica Kizeková** (Program Chair of the International Symposium, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)

That multilateralism needs to be considered a primary national interest was the focus of **Ondřej Ditrych's** introduction. Referring to the evolution of our world and the growing interconnectedness of the domestic with the international, he pointed to the fact that collective global challenges require collective solutions. From global inequality and climate change to rising isolationism and post-factuality around the world, he hailed dialogue as the answer: a multilateral dialogue that would foster cooperation and understanding. Director Ditrych painted a picture of a world in transition, a world questioning established principles of liberalism and objective reality. And while such a world is rife with danger, it also has the freedom to reinvent itself using its diversity and complexity not as a source of divisiveness and conflict, but as a basis for complex and global solutions. The call to action was clear: to work together, to communicate, to figure out a way to turn the tide. The Symposium was a space where such action could begin - and continue - to materialise.

The welcome at the Czernin Palace by **Aleš Chmelař** was tied to the significance of the venue as a place where ideas meet policy-making in a productive debate. The Deputy Minister echoed Director Ditrych's assertion that the world is transitioning from one state of equilibrium to another, and he reminded the audience that as members of a rules-based international society we have the duty to ensure that this transition is a peaceful one. He cautioned against repeating the disruption of the world wars, and indirectly admonished unnamed actors on the world stage who violated the rules that kept the world stable. As this year was a moment of reflection for the Czech

Republic due to numerous anniversaries, including those of the Velvet Revolution, the accession to NATO and the entry into the European Union, it seemed more than fitting to see multilateralism as the best and a necessary strategy for the future. Multilateralism was once again hailed as the winning principle in keeping stability and finding a new equilibrium. Deputy Minister Chmelař concluded by pointing out the importance of trust to the process of forging multilateral bonds and establishing a harmonious international society. He wished the participants a lot of energy and original ideas in the debates to come.

On behalf of the organisers, the Program Chair of the Symposium Alica Kizeková thanked the Deputy Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their hospitality and acknowledged the contributions of the volunteers and coordinators who helped prepare and run the conference. She expressed her gratitude to the pool of diverse participants, who had arrived from all over the world and teased the upcoming debates by outlining the issue areas: the Balkans, Africa, Asia, Syria, and the Visegrad Group. Her thoughts on the topic of the Symposium were anchored in her own experience of living through the transformation of an isolated socialist environment into a cosmopolitan one. Quoting Masaryk, the first Czechoslovakian president, she reminded us that “democracy is a dialogue built on trust” and agreed with the view that democracy is a work in progress. She expressed her hope that this diverse and rich conference could be the vehicle for such a dialogue in order to build trust and move the global “democracy” forward. Her final note was her wish that the younger generation – the volunteers present – would be inspired by experiencing the debates in their future careers.

**09:45-10:30 Keynote Speech: How Much Multilateralism Is Right, and How Do We Know? Lessons from Visegrad’s Many Experiences (Great Hall)**

Keynote Speaker:

- **Rick Fawn** (Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, UK)

In his speech, **Rick Fawn** pointed out the regional impact of the Visegrad Group (V4) on multilateral relations between states. He mentioned its strengths and weaknesses, and achievements and failures throughout its history. Professor Fawn stated that the V4 is remarkable because it is a strong political alliance with historical roots and that it is much more than a geographical region. In the beginning, the V4 encountered some domestic problems and regional issues but ultimately it morphed into a dynamic and progressive entity that is very engaged in regional affairs. Since one of the essential features of multilateralism is to be outspoken, the V4 has proven that it is active and openly voices its views on important topics, such as the Euro-Atlantic security and increasing NATO’s power in Central and Eastern Europe.

There are a few widely-used tools that international and regional actors use in order to get recognition, and these were utilised by the Visegrad Group as well. These tools include: public activism, brand activities, strong political leadership, and holding a plurality of diverse public opinions. Mr. Fawn also pointed out that the V4 was institutionalised in a different way than regular international organisations; for instance: there is a constant communication between the

national coordinators, and all the ministries have their own dynamics. Another feature that makes the Visegrad Group different from other organisations is its exclusive membership. This aided the success of the V4, according to Professor Fawn, as it implied a certain power of attraction for non-member states aiming to gain access to the V4 through regional bodies.

The V4 has become known for its inclusive forums, which contributed to its involvement not only in regional affairs but also in international matters. It possesses much experience in identifying partners (not necessarily from the same region) that could help it achieve its goals. Another specific pattern is the V4 + format (which enables the V4 to cooperate with South Korea, Japan, etc). Organisations cannot solve and get involved in all problems but what Visegrad has proven is that the framework was good at connecting it with others in regard to various questions.

Mr. Fawn also tackled the role of history in creating regional cooperation for the long term, specifically in aspects which defined the V4 relationship. The group's origins stemmed from the meetings of leaders from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland held in the Hungarian castle-town of Visegrad in 1991. Visegrad was chosen as the location for the 1991 meeting as an intentional allusion to the medieval Congress of Visegrad in 1335 between the rulers of Bohemia, Hungary and Poland. In his view, falsifying history in a good way and using positive myths was one of the inclusive options for states to become more committed to a common cause and eventually create a working body.

He mentioned the importance of spreading values and the impact that these values have on a local and an international level. For instance, we have seen the position of the Visegrad countries regarding migration, which brought out reactions of irresponsibility and ignorance from states such as Hungary, as they disregarded the common values that the V4 has safeguarded for years. Different opinions on certain problems inside of such a special alliance as the Visegrad Group could disconnect countries and reduce their engagement in regional cooperation. In order to avoid risks, the V4 should take into consideration the interests of all the members and adopt a common position while at the same time taking a step back from domestic issues.

#### **10:45-12:30 Session 1: The V4 in the EU: A Successful Interest Group, or an Odd Bunch of Trouble-makers? (Great Hall)**

Panelists:

- **Jakub Eberle** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Tomáš Strážay** (Director, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovakia)
- **Sándor Gyula Nagy** (Deputy Director of Research, the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hungary)
- **Pavčina Janebová** (Deputy Research Director, Association for International Affairs, Czechia)
- **Tomasz Żornaczuk** (Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Poland)

During this session, the speakers explored the position of the Visegrad Group within the European Union since 2015. In his introductory remarks, **Jakub Eberle** emphasised the increased political coordination of the V4, ranging from various working groups to functional political meetings. Likewise, since 2015 it has gained a greater visibility that is related to its negotiations with other partners and the general public. In this regard, Eberle mentioned that the more we hear about the V4, the more we question its purpose and seek the best way to work with it. In connection with this, there were several key questions raised during these sessions:

- What are the main achievements and failures of the V4 within the EU since 2015?
- On what topics do the V4 countries agree and where do they differ?
- What are the most important opportunities and risks connected to the V4 cooperation, as seen from each of the member states?

**Tomáš Strážay** described the Visegrad Group as a pragmatic and informal regional coalition. According to Strážay, the V4 had become more politicised and recognised since 2015. There occurred an increase of attention to the V4 in domestic areas of the member states. Whereas previously this regional coalition was mostly in the hands of ministers of foreign affairs, nowadays it is more associated with prime ministers. According to Strážay, the V4 is a coalition of countries with similar historical experiences and geographical dispositions which chose to cooperate on certain topics. It should not be perceived as an alternative to the EU or NATO. The V4 does not have any separate institutions either. Due to this rather informal structure, the V4 is flexible. This could be demonstrated by its frequent joint declarations from negotiations, and the differing positions and future perspectives of its members. Tomáš Strážay concluded with the point that the V4 has a fairly successful sectoral agenda and faces no competition from other regional initiatives.

**Sándor Gyula Nagy** highlighted the close connectedness of prime ministers of the V4. On the other hand, he continued by saying that finding such a connectedness could prove more difficult on the lower levels of specific ministries. He stressed that one of the key achievements of the V4 lies in its added weight during negotiations. This added weight should be smartly utilised. Joint negotiations are used to voice the common interests of the V4 members and on many occasions, this has proven to be fruitful. Nagy offered the dual quality of many products, including foodstuffs – an issue previously investigated by the European Commission – as an example. However, Nagy also talked about the limited cooperation in the field of research and innovation, where the innovations in the industrial area should receive more attention.

**Pavína Janebová** talked about the bittersweet visibility of the V4 after 2015. This was due to the V4 gaining attention due to the platform's position vis-à-vis the EU's solutions to the migration crisis. This position was lacking solidarity towards those EU member states which received the largest numbers of migrants. Also, according to Janebová, the sense of unity within the V4 may be false since its members were not united on every topic. Pavína Janebová called for a more helpful stance towards the enlargement of the EU and a stronger effort to democratise processes within



the EU. The different position of Slovakia was addressed; Slovakia is the smallest of the Visegrad Group members and has the Euro as its currency. Janebová underscored the risks of perceiving the V4 as a homogenous entity. This could prove precarious for the Czech Republic in comparison with Poland and Hungary, which both have democratic deficits. Janebová warned that Hungary tended to abuse the V4 to show its priorities and also tended to place the V4 in opposition to the EU. The Visegrad Group would do better if it could be more inclusive and cooperated with Austria and Germany.

**Tomasz Żornaczuk** focused on presenting the Polish perspective of the Visegrad Group and described it as the main regional platform for political consultations. According to him, the common policy of the V4 members towards the migration crisis had been a success for the Polish conservative government and, in return, had enhanced the view of the V4 in the domestic arena. The Polish government had the ambition to strengthen the position of the V4. At the same time, there had been an increase in joint V4 think-tanks. Żornaczuk proceeded to talk about the differing stances of the member states. These include their different positions towards the Western Balkan enlargement of the EU, Nord Stream, policy towards climate, and Eastern Europe and Russia. Żornaczuk addressed the new composition of the European Commission and concluded that while there was a general agreement with the new president of the European Commission some were dissatisfied with the Czech commissioner Věra Jourová in particular.

**Jakub Eberle** asked the speakers the following additional questions:

- What is the current position of the Visegrad Group in the European Commission? Did the V4 members manage to negotiate strong portfolios?
  - Is the V4 only a political coalition? Will it integrate more closely within the EU?
- (Questions for Tomáš Strážay)

**Tomáš Strážay** answered that the V4 is sometimes perceived as having more power than it actually has. The portfolio distribution in the European Commission had led to competition among the V4 members. Strážay said that he expects the V4 commissioners to be under strict scrutiny during their hearings. This may be so due to the accusations against the V4 countries when it came to rule of law probes and democratic deficiencies. Tomáš Strážay also highlighted the dissimilarities among the V4 countries. Nevertheless, these countries are conscious of common interests in the region and therefore would utilise the Visegrad Group.

- Is industry a V4 problem rather than a domestic problem of each of the member states? Would the V4 offer any added value? (Question for Sándor Guyla Nagy)

**Sándor Guyla Nagy** stated that cooperation in the area of innovations of the industrial sphere might have limits, although it would be positive to focus on this cooperation. He continued by reflecting on the popularity of the Czech commissioner Věra Jourová, who would be in charge of

the rule of law and could proceed against Poland and Hungary. At the same time, he mentioned that the V4 countries had been pushed to take climate policy more seriously.

- How does the Czech Republic stand out from the V4? Is it passive or active? Does the Czech Republic have any strategy for the future conduct of the V4? (Question for Pavlína Janebová)

**Pavlína Janebová** answered that the V4 had not been strong enough in the negotiations for the portfolios they wanted. She added that during these negotiations the V4 had not presented itself as a unified coalition. She said that she expects some opposition from the European Parliament. Janebová assessed the Czech strategy for the V4 and concluded that Czech foreign policy as a whole is reactive and lacking in original ideas.

- What are the levels of solidarity and effectiveness of problem-solving on the V4 level? (Question for Tomasz Żornaczuk)

**Tomasz Żornaczuk** mentioned the “effective solidarity” proposals made by the V4 countries, which are comprised of measures to be carried out in the source countries of migration to mitigate the migration crisis. However, there was a lack of unity in details and media abuse. Żornaczuk added that the V4 countries focused on the post-Soviet space.

#### **10:45-12:30      Session 2: Multilateralism and Asia: Measuring Rewards and Risks in the Era of the Belt and Road Initiative (Mirror Hall)**

##### **Panelists:**

- **Alica Kizeková** (Chair, Senior Researcher, the Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Alfred Gerstl** (Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellow, the Department of Asian Studies, Palacky University in Olomouc, Czechia)
- **Bruno Hellendorff** (Joint Research Fellow, the Egmont Institute and European Policy Centre, Belgium)
- **Rudolf Fürst** (Head of the Centre for EU-Asia Relations, the Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Alan Chong** (Associate Professor and Acting Head, the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, NTU RSIS, Singapore)
- **Gaye Christoffersen** (Resident Professor of International Politics, John Hopkins University, SAIS, Nanjing Centre, China)
- **Pushpa Thambipillai** (Associate Fellow, the ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak Institute, Singapore)

A distinguished roundtable of Asia experts organised in a collaboration between the IIR's Center for EU-Asia Relations and the Sinofon project of Palacky University in Olomouc met to share their thoughts on multilateral cooperation through various frameworks and in relation to China's

activities under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Their reflections focused on local interactions in the Czech Republic and within the regional collaboration of 16+1 (17+1); there was an examination of EU-China relations, and the specific cases of Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The discussion uncovered ongoing changes and prospects for global governance in certain areas, such as energy or space policies. The panelists tapped into their expertise and the latest findings and also attempted to answer the following questions:

- What are the rewards and risks of participating in the China-led multilateral cooperation and are there consequences for not embracing the visions of certain countries or organisations?
- Do regional collaborative frameworks require reforms and if so, how likely are the participating states to find an agreeable consensus?
- What is the role for the selected country / multilateral framework in fostering multilateral cooperation, considering the broader context, in the area of joint interests?

**Alfred Gerstl** began by discussing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He stated that it is very similar to the European Union, despite ASEAN being an inter-governmental organisation and the EU being a supranational organisation. Among the similarities, he listed both organisations' need to integrate the economies of their member states into a single market and production platform. He spoke about the two main disputes: those in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. He stated that in the South China Sea, we could clearly see China act as a multilateral player, which was rooted in the nature of the conflict.

**Bruno Hellendorff** spoke at length about politisation, securisation, and weaponisation as three processes that are currently shaping the world order. He mentioned that the leaders of the European Union firmly wanted strategic political autonomy. He discussed current trade conflicts in the world and stated that he considered the fear surrounding the trade war between China and the United States as important.

**Rudolf Fürst** focused mainly on the 16+1 initiative. He outlined the characteristics of the initiative, as well as its influence on the Czech foreign policy. He stated that the 16+1 initiative had the same multilateral format as the similar initiatives in Africa and Latin America. He also spoke about how the initiative became the 17+1 initiative with Greece joining it.

**Alan Chong** spoke more on the Belt and Road initiative and its ties to the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. In relation to the Philippines, he stated that the BRI coincided with the Golden Age of Infrastructure initiative of President Rodrigo Duterte. He mentioned that the Philippine government stated that 0,66% of their national debt was owed to China and 9% to Japan. According to Professor Chong, in the current world order, economics is ahead of politics, or at least that is the image currently projected. He also mentioned that Singapore could grow with the BRI if the business potential of Western and other Asian countries' firms was clarified within the BRI. Likewise, he said that the Chinese agenda was feared to be an extension of China's rivalry

with the United States, into which Vietnam could be drawn as a pawn, seeing how Vietnam had been China's historical rival, but also its occasional cooperator.

**Gaye Christoffersen** outlined several paths to China's energy leadership role. She mentioned 2006 as the year that energy diplomacy was added to China's foreign policy. She said that in 2015, during the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, China realised its potential for a leadership role. She stated that China has been currently using the energy order in its search for a political framework, seeing as how the BRI does not have a political framework of its own. Professor Christoffersen mentioned how the BRI's Ice Silk Road in the Arctic was a grand discourse power pathway to global energy leadership. In 2013, China was admitted to the Arctic Council as a non-arctic state observer, despite Russia and Canada's doubts. This may just give China a chance to extend the BRI into the Arctic. She spoke about China's position evolution from a passive rule-follower to a regional rule-maker. In conclusion, Professor Christoffersen stated that Beijing's calls for policy coordination among BRI countries had already started.

**Pushpa Thambipillai** explored the relation between China and Malaysia. She stated that China's BRI strategy has more of a network approach than a collective approach. She talked about the BRI's evolving connections to EU countries but said that it is unfair to connect or compare the European Union with the Belt and Road Initiative. Dr. Thambipillai also stated that China is trying to explore its bilateral strengths vis-à-vis individual SEA countries, but it is also forming a network that will link it to various states without any formal multilateral commitments.

**10:45-12:30 Session 3: The EU Policies of Central and Eastern European States:  
Mezinárodní vztahy/ Czech Journal of International Relations Workshop (Music Hall)**

Chair and Discussant:

- **Jan Daniel** (Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Tomáš Dopita** (Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)

Panelists:

- **Lucie Macková** (Palacký University, Olomouc, Czechia) ZLE MENO
- **Zuzana Buroňová** (Metropolitan University Prague, Czechia)
- **Ondřej Olšanský** (CEVRO Institute Prague, Czechia)
- **Kateřina Kočí** (Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)

This workshop was held under the supervision of **Jan Daniel** and **Tomáš Dopita**. The purpose of the workshop was for researchers to introduce potential contributions to the Czech Journal of International Relations.

**Lucie Macková** spoke about "Immigration in the Czech Republic". Her study discussed policies that sought to attract skilled workers. In her view, the EU policies changed immigration policy in the Czech Republic with creating new programs and new possibilities from 2005 to 2019.

However, the reality differed for the Czech Republic due to the bureaucracy, immigration cards and the long duration of the process (over 90 days).

**Zuzana Buroňová's** presentation was framed by a topic of "Central and Eastern Europe in the age of terrorism within the EU". She researched the threats these countries were facing, the attacks in-home, abroad, and attacks since joining the EU. She concluded that a small portion of countries were troublemakers and that it was because of their stance on immigration and secondly that all the terrorist attacks had declined since joining the EU.

**Ondřej Olšanský** discussed "The Return of Geopolitics between EU and Ukraine". His focus was on the return of geopolitics within the scope of international politics.

The last project was made by Gladysz, Kayevska and Zajaczkowski and **Kateřina Kočí**, who presented the topic at the workshop. The focus was on the transformation of the Eastern Partnership. She stated that this agreement was a pragmatic turn in EU foreign policy, as it was characterized by differentiation, stabilisation, and resilience. Her focus was, firstly, on the perception of individual member states or partners, the main challenges in the EaP initiative and the possible future scenarios.

After the presentations, Mr. Dopita and Mr. Daniel gave some feedback on the projects of the speakers.

### 13:00-14:00    **Special Talk: The Value of Economic Diplomacy** (Great Hall)

#### **Panelists:**

- **Alica Kizeková** (Program Chair of the International Symposium, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Martin Tlapa** (Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic)

**Martin Tlapa** began the talk by explaining the essence of economic diplomacy. Before moving into the specifics of the Czech economic diplomacy, he mentioned that it was important to have a good understanding of national interests, as bilateral and multilateral forums had often been used as means of promoting the position of the Czech Republic. Therefore, the value of economic diplomacy should be considered at both national level (citizens, interest groups, parties) and multinational level (the EU). Then the deputy minister discussed how the practice of diplomacy changed from "club diplomacy" into "net diplomacy" (also known as "networking diplomacy"). According to Mr. Tlapa, after World War II, the number of business players increased as more countries became independent, and nongovernmental groups were considered as well. Moreover, the flow of information improved and could be accessed by more people. After that, the deputy minister proceeded to discuss multilateralism. In his opinion, the Czech Republic is a medium size country and it has been supporting the multilateral system because the economy should not be favorable to only big countries. However, the current structure of multilateralism needs to be changed. He mentioned that the operation of the WTO had not met the expectations of many

countries, and there have been demands for changes of the WTO for nearly 20 years. Nevertheless, Mr. Tlapa acknowledged that it could be difficult to make big changes in this regard, but he also stressed that it is within our reach to make necessary initiatives to prevent the collapse of the multilateral system. For his last points, the deputy minister stated that diplomacy was difficult to measure, and more importantly, he emphasised the importance of explaining the purpose and function of economic diplomacy to the public.

Alica Kizeková concluded the session with a Q&A.

#### 14:00-15:30 Session 1: Re-Making the World Trade Order (Great Hall)

##### Panelists:

- **Daniel Šitera** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Arne Melchior** (Senior Research Fellow, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway)
- **Vilém Semerák** (Senior Lecturer, the Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Czechia)
- **Juraj Sipko** (Director of the Institute of Economic Research, the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia)
- **Tereza Novotná** (Marie-Sklodowska Curie Fellow at Freie University, Berlin, Germany)

The WTO-based order has found itself in an institutional inertia since the mid-2000s. To resolve this inertia, several free trade agreements were signed, among them CETA and TTIP. Negotiating these agreements made the EU trade policy one of the main frontrunners in the asymmetric deepening of trade and investment relations. Since the mid-2010s, the liberal trade order has been openly questioned by a range of protectionist measures. Besides the unilateral threats of import tariffs, real bilateral trade wars, and Brexit contradictions, a long-awaited reform of the WTO was under discussion.

The key questions for the session were:

- What is the likely course of WTO reform?
- Can the reform debate remedy the current state of its inertia and protectionism or reinforce it in case it fails?
- What role is Europe likely to play in the reform debate and the broader remaking of the world order? Can the principle of multilateralism be saved?
- Can multilateralism coexist with alternative visions of global peace?

In his speech, **Juraj Sipko** summarised the general trends in global trade after World War II. A period of worldwide economic expansion beginning after World War II and ending with the 1973–75 recession occurred. It was precisely after WW2 that many of the financial and trade organisations were created to support international trade. Their intentions and agendas grew as

they gained more members. Sipko recounted the main schools of thought in the economy that shaped the international organisations. He emphasised the role of international trade organisations in dispute settlement. Since 2001, however, this international system has been stagnating. Therefore, a need for new prospective development arose. In his opinion, the future international system must take digitalisation and climate change into consideration as well, particularly in connection with macroeconomics and financial policy.

**Arne Melchior** assessed the current state of crisis of the WTO. In his presentation, he talked about the many successes and failures of the WTO. The WTO succeeded in playing a key role in functional peaceful dispute settlements and the imposition of rules with a global reach. Although the WTO may rule the world in terms of the trade of goods, it lacks progress in the trade of services, which nowadays dominate the world. According to Melchior, the WTO lacks a vision and/or a strategy for the future. Dr. Melchior then proceeded to talk about the US-China conflict. Even though the USA was one of the founders of the WTO, it has recently adopted a more opposing position regarding multilateralism and even threatened to leave the WTO. Meanwhile, China currently faces severe problems with intellectual property rights and state enterprises. The question is how far China could reform its trade and economic policies without breaking its communist system. According to Melchior, the solution to the Chinese-US disputes lies in the hands of the US. The US would not experience any economic deficit without China. Also, there may not be any quick fix for the long-term issues. Melchior also stated that China should participate in the WTO system. In his conclusion, Dr. Melchior regarded the WTO as a successful project that should be retained, and said that he believes that China should participate in it. Ideally, this participation would be based on reciprocity.

**Vilém Semerák** claimed that the WTO is not a failure. Nevertheless, it is important to debate about how to change its nature and attitude towards international trade. Semerák continued by discussing the current state of mistrust among the WTO members and the need for reform in China and Russia. The primary focus of Semerák's presentation was on the options for the EU.

**Tereza Novotná** assessed the topic from the perspective of a political scientist. She identified three key challenges: the politicisation of trade, nationalisation, and regionalism. She proceeded to describe the listed phenomena on examples from Asia, Europe, and the US. Novotná saw a stronger push for multilateralism as a solution. She also stated that she believes that it is important for the EU to stay neutral in relation to the US-China conflict and become a stronger and more relevant player.

The subsequent discussion revolved around these topics:

- Can the USA abuse its economic hegemony to bend the rules? Is the framework of the WTO diminishing?
- Where does the UK stand in the new trade world order? What should open small economics do?



**Arne Melchior** talked about the global imbalance of economic growth and how China has fared in this respect. In his view, it is necessary to re-establish the faith in the world trade system and accept China into it. This way, obligations could be imposed on China. Melchior also proposed an initiation of projects akin to the Marshall Plan. **Tereza Novotná** responded with a call to create more coalitions of willing parties - e.g. a CETA between the EU and Canada. **Vilém Semerák** emphasised that not everyone is benefiting from the globalised world, and that it is convenient to secure regional trade blocks. **Juraj Sipko** talked about the hyper-connectivity of the modern world. He recommended recognising and paying more attention to small enterprises since these hugely contribute at the national level. Also, in his view, future trade and economic policy should consider climate change since a lot of money is spent on remedying its consequences, and action must be taken against corruption and tax havens.

**14:00-15:30 Session 2: Opportunities for Change in EU-Western Balkans Relations**  
(Mirror Hall)

**Panelists:**

- **Jakub Eberle** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Tomáš Dopita** (Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **James Ker-Lindsay** (Visiting Professor, the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)
- **Ioannis Armakolas** (Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics of South East Europe, the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia)
- **Jana Juzová** (Research Fellow, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Czechia)

This panel dealt with the opportunities for the EU-Western Balkans relations. Jana Juzová spoke about the desired reconciliation in the Western Balkans and how this could be achieved. Tomáš Dopita spoke about the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. James Ker-Lindsay spoke about the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia and finally, Ioannis Armakolas spoke about the Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia.

**Jana Juzová** insisted that there is a hint of reconciliation in the Western Balkans but it is not moving as fast as it should be. There are problems on three levels. These include: the civil society level, the political level, and the national level. In terms of civil society, the issues and stereotypes within the countries of the Western Balkans are not being dealt with. The prejudices and hatred are strong, and the practical goal is to achieve unity. On the political level, the leaders are devoted to regional cooperation and they are not placing enough importance on reconciliation. Finally, on the national level, there is no progress because of the destabilisation of the region. The European Commission unveiled a strategy for the Western Balkans with two flagships: more funding and more political stability. Although these efforts are very important for the region, efforts for

reconciliation are missing. The EU representatives must be stricter and tell the truth about reconciliation.

**Tomáš Dopita** elaborated on Bosnia and Herzegovina. He spoke about how the international community was trying to stabilise the political situation in Bosnia. Although there are international institutions and interventions in this regard, Mr. Dopita expressed his belief that they are not being used. At this time, the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very strange because the parliament was closed after the election due to a dispute over the NATO membership between the parties. SDS and PDP are currently in power so that they could keep SNSD out of the government. Mr. Dopita insisted that the only time we did not have a political blockade in Bosnia was in 2014-2016. There was a time when Bosnia came out of eight years of political turmoil and afterwards adopted many reforms in an effort to start the EU accession process. In his view, to ensure a productive political process we must set the right external incentives, facilitate cooperation between the Bosnians and the Croats in the Federation and ensure the cooperation of civil societies across Bosnia. However, as he stated, the problems in Bosnia are extensive. These include the problems of the EU and NATO, issues with Kosmic's Presidency, favourable conditions for SDS and PDP and problems with the Constitutional Court (due to its power to outvote anything). In the end, Mr. Dopita asked: "What can we do about Bosnia?" He answered this question through four different levels. The first level was how NATO and the EU could manage Bosnia but also how Bosnia could manage NATO and the EU. The second level was the biggest cooperation between the Croats and the Bosnians, the third level was the cooperation at the state level and the fourth level was the reform of the Constitutional Court.

**James Ker-Lindsay** stated that Kosovo is not the same as Bosnia. He explained that the international community is very divided by its stances on Kosovo. Serbia did not recognise Kosovo's independence, but Kosovo is a member of many international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, and within these organisations it has been gaining momentum. Because of the aggressive stance of Serbia in regard to Kosovo, Kosovo put tariffs on Serbia and Mr. Ker-Lindsay said that now Kosovo is stuck on how to navigate the talks between the EU and Serbia. Serbia is trying to prevent Kosovo being recognised by organisations such as Interpol. In 2018, there was an indication of promoting a deal between Serbia and Kosovo, but Serbia did not accept the deal, which had been approved by the US administration. At this time, Kosovo was doing anything it could to achieve recognition from Serbia, which resulted in a deadlock.

The final speaker was **Ioannis Armakolas**, who was very optimistic about the Western Balkans region due to the Prespa Agreement. He insisted that during his lecture he was not going to talk about how the dispute between Greece and North Macedonia could be solved. He focused only on what was going to happen after the Prespa Agreement. He thought that what happened with the Prespa Agreement was a major development, despite some problems.

He explained, firstly, that the international community did not give enough support to the agreement, secondly, that the breakthrough of the Prespa Agreement was still not occurring, thirdly, that the European Council did not demonstrate enough support for this agreement and, finally, that North Macedonia had not yet begun its accession. The talks between North

Macedonia and the EU were frozen. Mr. Armakolas said that big things were happening in North Macedonia, where corruption and scandals are major problems, in addition to a general election, in which Zoran Zaev (Prime Minister of North Macedonia) would win. In Greece, a new government recently took over. The party New Democracy, before taking over the government, denounced the Prespa Agreement but more recently they said they would implement it.

During the Q&A, there were remarks made in relation to the key arguments of the speakers. It was brought up that there were more issues with the reconciliation than previously mentioned, such as the problem of communication between young and old people in societies. In response to some remarks from the audience, Mr. Dopita defended his position on NATO and the EU in relation to Bosnia because he believed that the accessions to these organisations were the biggest reforms that this country should make. Mr. Ker-Lindsay said that the 2013 agreement between Kosovo and Serbia declared that they would not block each other in the EU integration but Serbia has been blocking Kosovo since then. In relation to his topic, Mr. Armakolas added that North Macedonia has problems with Bulgaria rather than Greece. The problems started when Bulgaria blocked the accession of North Macedonia in the EU, and their differences were about cultural disagreements. There is a triangle, as he said, between Greece, Bulgaria and North Macedonia, a triangle of “history”, and Greece and Bulgaria were blocking North Macedonia’s accession because of this historical problem. Mr. Armakolas stated that this is a policy of the past, however, and this problem could be solved by civil society.

A representative of the Hungarian Embassy asked what the panelists thought about the Western Balkans Fund developed by the Visegrad Group. All the speakers said that the fund is a good idea for fostering the region of the Western Balkans but the grants are small and there is more to be done. When asked about the NATO and EU paths of the Western Balkan countries, Mr. Dopita said that this is a very sensitive issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The pro-Serbian parties are in favor of a more European path, but the pro-Bosnian parties are not. Mr. Ker-Lindsay said that we could not offer these countries a European path at this moment because, for example, Spain did not recognise Kosovo and he believed that the situation would get worse. Mr. Armakolas stated that the NATO accession of Bosnia is a very difficult thing now because of all the political turmoil that is taking place. According to him, the EU accession of North Macedonia was not the end of all the problems. He said that we need to support democratic institutions in the Western Balkans. Mr. Dopita said that members of the V4 should do as much as possible for the Western Balkan countries; for example, the Czech Republic should change its stance on the recognition of Kosovo.

#### **14:00-15:30 Session 3: Africa and Europe in Global Architecture: Emerging Partnerships or Postcolonial Business as Usual? (Music Hall)**

Panelists:

- **Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia).
- **Tereza Němečková** (Deputy Head, Department of International Business, Metropolitan University Prague, Czechia)

- **Niels Keijzer** (Researcher, the German Development Institute, Germany)
- **Tighisti Amare** (Assistant Head, the Africa Programme at Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK)
- **Imane Hmiddou** (Ecole de Gouvernance et d'Economie de Rabat, Morocco).

**Tereza Němečková** focused on Africa's ongoing changes, underlining the necessity for a parallel EU adjustment to its approach to development and cooperation. She talked about the "New Scramble for Africa" as the continent is once again in the international spotlight for investment opportunities. Some particularly successful examples of development were mentioned: Morocco's primacy in solar-powered energy, Kenya's booming digitalisation market and Ghana's record as the fastest growing economy in the world. Regarding multilateralism, visible efforts were made at the regional level by the attempt to unify trade and currency. Moreover, since Morocco re-joined it, the African Union finally includes all the countries that could join it. Another mentioned example was ECOWAS, where a visa-free zone was introduced; it is now comparable to the EU common market or to the integration examples in the East European Community. However, there are two different monetary unions on the African continent. Němečková also outlined the challenges that African countries need to face but that nonetheless present fruitful opportunities for development and cooperation with the EU. First, innovation needs to be improved. The second challenge is keeping up with technological changes. Third, Africa has the youngest population in the world, and it continues to grow, but it is essential to turn it into a trained population to insert into the job market. The fourth challenge is urban growth. Fifth, climate change needs to be effectively countered as many countries still rely on fuels as a primary energy resource.

In conclusion, she said it is necessary to focus on the present by looking at successful examples and issues to be tackled. More importantly, the EU approach should focus on helping Africa find its own way to development. The way to do so includes keeping the continent unified, as it has been divided too many times already, and especially pursuing a win-win partnership. Europe's relationship with African countries should not be one of donors and recipients but one of equal partners. Finally, Němečková said we should also start thinking about gradually limiting development and cooperation as foreign aid creates dependency.

**Neils Keijzer** began his presentation by arguing that Africa is changing, and so is the leadership of the European Union, with the election of the new president of the Commission. Mr. Keijzer emphasised the role of the new commissioner for international partnerships, also pointing out that she is the first woman in this role. He also revealed a part of the content of one of the first letters that the commissioner received from the president; it pertained to working on a strategy for Africa. As stated in the letter and the quotes mentioned, the president's wish was for African states to comply with the European wishes and interests, and if this would not happen, then cuts to the current funds should be imposed in his view.

In his remarks, Mr. Keijzer also mentioned the EU global strategy, the necessity of a broader scope for EU foreign policy, and the need to modernise relations and partnerships. According to the Mr. Keijzer, if we observe the general discourse, it appears the EU wants to have more control over its development policy in order to use it for its broader strategic interests. The reason for the

existence of the EU's development policy is the former colonial occupation of African countries by France, Italy and Belgium; not all the founding members were in favor of the development policy (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands opposed it) and this lack of consensus brought about the creation of the development fund as a basis for financial support for African countries that is external to the EU budget, which was an alternative to putting them in the common market.

Mr. Keijzer also recalled what happened after 2000, when the African countries started viewing themselves as one, and new initiatives of the EU for Africa also emerged. The increase in the EU's ambitions in this respect was reflected in the EU Trust Fund of 2015, for example. He concluded the presentation with a paradox: The European Union wants to negotiate with Sub-Saharan Africa about cooperation with the whole of Africa. According to him, the new commissioners would work on a comprehensive project with Africa, a very important one for the region, but also for the EU, as it would help it to get out of the situation that the EU states basically created for themselves.

**Tighisti Amare** spoke about the complications between the EU and Africa and the models to pursue in order to improve the situation. She said that the EU's renewed attention to Africa had been welcomed by the African Union as it fitted well with the African countries' ambition to diversify their economies. Particularly, they aimed to attract FDI and enhance cooperation in both development and security. However, there was a stress on the relationship being an equal relationship rather than a mere recipient-donor one. The OAU has been very prominent in representing Africa in international negotiations even if its action was complicated by the different stages of development and institution building of its member states. Even so, singular African countries are relatively weak and too dependent on external support to have enough weight on the international stage. Therefore, the OAU's multilateralism is more effective in representing African interests internationally.

Ms. Amare said that the main problems could be identified by looking at Western Africa. First, ethnic conflicts caused the internal displacement of three million people in Ethiopia. Second, a key issue is job creation. In Ethiopia, two million people of a young age enter the job market every year, whilst in Kenya the corresponding figure is one million, of which only 10% end up being employed. She also emphasised the need for a political framework that would define the relationship between the EU and Africa. At the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, a long-awaited strategy of continent-to-continent dialogue was set up that would be in accordance with the type of language that the AU was asking for. Despite the language, however, fragmentation persisted between the North and the South. In fact, the relevant EU agreements were mainly directed towards ACP countries. Conversely, North African countries did not show interest in joining the ACP group and they also remained skeptical towards the continent-to-continent strategy.

**Imane Hmiddou** highlighted the features of the relationship between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco. She believed that a more moderate approach and economic instruments were needed to correctly assess the current situation and how it could be maintained in the long term. She explained that the EU is Morocco's largest trading partner, especially for its phosphate exports,

which are used as a fertiliser. Trade has also been increasing in agriculture, where a lot of technological changes had been put in place to evolve production. In the late 1960s, the country received grants from the EU to achieve its production goals, and a part of those grants had to be spent on agriculture. A free-trade zone was also established in the North of the Kingdom, and a lot of multinationals benefitted from it.

Speaking about security, Ms. Hmiddou emphasised the need for an ongoing cooperation between the EU and Morocco in order to counter terrorism. Morocco has, in fact, one of the best governmental departments in the fight against terrorism, and several meetings have been carried out between the two actors. The migration crisis has also been an object of their collaboration due to Morocco's strategic location as a bridge between Africa and Europe, meaning that it could be an ally in dealing with the issue. However, Hmiddou stated that the EU should take better measures to assure that the migrants are safely re-established in their home countries.

In conclusion, she said that the EU could assist Morocco in various fields, especially the educational and the liberal economic one. The idea was that by increasing competition in the market, production grows, and migrants' returns would be encouraged as well, thus taking migration pressure away from the EU as well, which is an issue that should also be better discussed in the African Union in her opinion. Finally, she stated that although Morocco maintains a privileged position in its relationship with the EU, there were still a lot of failures in this regard.

#### **15:45-17:15      Global Perspectives on Multilateralism (Great Hall)**

##### **Panelists:**

- **Jan Hornát** (Chair, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Alan Chong** (Associate Professor and Acting Head, the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, NTU RSIS, Singapore)
- **John Cloud** (Professor, the National Security Department, the U.S. Naval War College, USA)
- **Mats Braun** (Associate Professor and Head of the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Czechia)
- **Joseph Siracusa** (Professor of Human Security and International Diplomacy, the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University Melbourne, Australia)

The final discussion on Monday, 23<sup>rd</sup> September dealt with global perspectives on multilateralism. Fostering and maintaining a world order based on multilateral decision-making and diplomacy is not only in the interests of small states but also important for powerful countries which gain their legitimacy through their actions and the compliance of smaller states if they follow the rules established by multilateral institutions.

In the beginning of the session, the Chair **Jan Hornát** stated that the Trump administration broke with the revisionist perspective on worldwide multilateralism. And the reaction was the question “What is going on? What could we do with multilateralism?” Basically, there are common challenges and common threats to nation states around the world and it is important that each state is included in dialogues. Multilateralism also decreased the costs of actions for all actors by pooling resources – a crucial aspect especially as the world faces economic, environmental and security challenges that require large investments and inter-state coordination. These issues were the subject of this panel and thanks to the participation of representatives from other world regions than the US and the EU, we were able to listen to these regions’ views on multilateralism.

The first panellist, **Alan Chong**, mentioned the competition between the US and China; he pointed out that the US efforts to carry out the “America first” policy in this competition resulted in an erosion of trust between the two states. Regarding China, pragmatism was highlighted, as was the quiet modernisation connected with the South China Sea militarisation and gunboat diplomacy actions. During the discussion ASEAN’s centrality and rules-based order were also mentioned as inclusive regional security architecture, and it was also stated that this platform represented the middle ground between China and the USA. According to him, China is a wild card and it appears that India has taken a leaf out of Trump’s book when it comes to its populist policies. Due to this populism the free trade is under threat.

**John Cloud** talked about living in a new world era. He compared the policies and decisions of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump and discussed the “Great Power” competition between the USA, China and Russia. China seems to be a major player and determinant in the future multilateral system, but today it has a lack of respect for multilateral decisions - for example, its failure to comply with the South China Sea arbitration or anything that goes against its “national interests”. Some questions posed by Mr. Cloud were “How would organisations like the EU act in the future?”; “How should we see multilateralism - as a tool or a goal?”; and “Was it the process in itself or the outcome that the states wanted to achieve?” According to Mr. Cloud multilateralism provides us with the means to build consensus.

**Mats Braun** discussed the issue of the EU. According to him, multilateralism is seen as a fundamental goal of the EU, and the discussion about what the nature of multilateralism is, or what the promises of multilateralism are, is not new. Nowadays, the most important question is “What is happening inside the EU?” In this part of the discussion, the importance was placed on the issue of Brexit, which is seen as a potential challenge.

Regarding the Australian position toward multilateral system, **Joseph Siracusa** stated that Australia was multilateral to the core. He also said that the discussion about multilateralism and bilateralism became really politicised.

The panel ended with some enquiries on the particularities of multilateralism. One question was “Multilateralism could work, but does it have the instruments to face particular crises?” John



Cloud answered that we should re-educate children and the general public about world problems and explain to them the major issues of crisis, and we should present the value of multilateralism. And as he stated, we are going to have to come together, because if we do not, to quote Benjamin Franklin, “[w]e’re either going to hang together or we’re going to hang apart“.

**15:45-17:45 Book Launch: The Politics of Recognition and Engagement; EU Member State Relations with Kosovo** (Mirror Hall)

**Panelists:**

- **Tomáš Dopita** (Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Ioannis Armakolas** (Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics of South East Europe, the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia)
- **James Ker-Lindsay** (Visiting Professor, the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)

**Ioannis Armakolas** opened the panel by explaining the emergence of the book, which was originally published in the form of a report entitled “Lack of Engagement”. More policy-oriented than the book, it explained why it took Kosovo eight years to consolidate its statehood, and how it had reached a plateau in terms of engagement. He explained that the book focuses more on the path of state recognition of Kosovo and why Kosovo’s efforts worked in some cases and did not work in others. It also examines the nuances of three different cases of state recognition, establishing that the issue is not black and white and that there are both hard and soft recognisers and non-recognisers.

**James Ker-Lindsay** explained that the book emerged from a desire to produce something useful for officials in the administration in Pristina. The question of recognition had become interesting to scholars of IR; however, scholars tend to think of recognition in binary terms, when in fact it is far more complicated. He explained that there are different types of (non-)recognisers. The first category is hard recognisers, who recognise and engage with the state by setting up embassies in and engaging in trade with it. Secondly, there are the weak recognisers, who recognise the state on paper but do little beyond that. Thirdly, there are soft non-recognisers, who officially do not recognise the state but still engage with it. And then there are hard non-recognisers such as Spain and Cyprus, who have absolutely no relations with the state.

**Tomas Dopita** explained the position of the Czech Republic towards Kosovo. Characterised as a reluctant and disengaged recogniser, the Czech Republic has two different directions of behaviour: the long-term engagement of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Kosovo on a diplomatic, international and multilateral level, and the position of the direct opponents of the recognition of Kosovo, which include(d) many Members of Parliament and the last two Czech presidents.

**James Ker-Lindsay** illuminated his work related to the UK's support of Kosovo. A Kosovo supporter since 1999 (then under Prime Minister Tony Blair), the UK was the first public declarer of the newly-independent Kosovo. However, in recent years, the UK's support for Kosovo has declined due to a myriad of reasons. These reasons include the shrinking list of states recognised by the UK, the political turmoil in Kosovo, the changing international environment and Brexit. All of these forces led to the UK's lessening engagement with Kosovo.

**Ioannis Armakolas** elaborated on Greece's relationship with Kosovo. Greece has been a persistent non-recogniser of Kosovo, but it engaged fully with the state in every respect except for actual recognition. Having more in common with the Balkans than any other non-recogniser, Greece has had very extensive relations with the region. There is also no obvious minority problem when it comes to the issue of a possible secession in Greece, which is in stark contrast to its neighbour Cyprus, which influences the way Greece sees other foreign policy problems. However, Greek policy-makers have kept a low profile about the engagement with Kosovo, and most of the Greek population was kept in the dark about it.

DAY 2

24 SEPTEMBER 2019

**9:15-10:45 Security and Multilateralism: How to Meet New Challenges Effectively** (Great Hall)

**Panelists:**

- **Matůš Halás** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Jan Jireš** (Defence Counsellor, the Permanent Delegation of the Czech Republic to NATO in Brussels)
- **John Cloud** (Professor, the National Security Department, the U.S. Naval War College, USA)
- **Werner Fasslabend** (President, the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, Austria)
- **Magdalena Jakubowska** (Vice President and Director of Operations, Res Publica, Poland)

**Matůš Halás** opened the discussion by stating that he believed multilateralism would have to be redefined at some point. He spoke of the policy of disadvantage, soft power without hard power and how there has been a history of great powers engaging in multilateral cooperation, which is exactly what we need right now.

**John Cloud** started his remarks by stating that the Cold War period either ended or is still coming to an end. He spoke about institutions and how the key institutions had survived, albeit

they may not currently operate as they were initially intended to. As an example, he brought up the United Nations Security Council and how in the wake of the Gaddafi killing, there were disagreements in the Council as to how the operation was carried out. He also spoke about the European Union and its big expansion in 2004, but he alluded to the fact that the very same expansions may be the cause for why these institutions “are not doing as well as they’d have hoped”, despite the strong efforts of many of their members. Moreover, he stated that China is a force to be reckoned with, both militarily and economically, and that Russia had just made its big military comeback. Later, in the Q&A session, he also stated that “China is a competitor, not necessarily a threat, and if we treat it as such, it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” He commented on the G powers and stated that he “seriously doubted” that any future G2/G3 would be anything more than a nuke comparison exercise. He also stated that multilateralism is an opportunity for both great and small countries to speak out. He also made it a point to say that the strength of the United States is inextricably linked to the strength of its cooperation with other nations. In his own words, the United States is neither unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, but pragmatic. He said that in this regard, the US is like the EU in the sense of using multilateralism as a tool when it is suitable.

**Werner Fasslabend** made some more comments about China and the Belt and Road Initiative and how 90% of the world trade is happening by sea. He stated that there is a multilateral interest and China is acting against it. He said that everyone would look at their own interest and not at multilateral issues when trying to find a solution to this problem. He stated that there is a need for multilateral regulations and that there is a chance to enforce them too. Should everyone in every field where there is a common global interest decide to work with that common goal in mind, there would be a chance for a multilateral resolution. As examples, he brought up climate change and cybersecurity. He also mentioned organised crime and terrorism but clarified that these are very different issues. He stated that the reason we do not have any good regulations and missile deals is because everyone looks at their own strategic situation and not from a multilateral perspective. Mr. Fasslabend also made it a point to say that the climate change sector is worth reaching a multilateral deal. Conclusively, he stated that everything would work out if we tried hard enough, regardless of whether the issue is China, North Korea or some smaller problems. He concluded by saying that “between 0 and 100 there are 99 possibilities and it makes quite a difference”.

**Magdalena Jakubowska** started her presentation by saying that Russia, to some extent, created a new security environment. It became aggressive and assertive. It started to carry out exercises on NATO borders, it breached the chemical weapons deal and in doing so, it tested NATO nearly on a daily basis. She stated that NATO managed to take important steps to adapt to these situations. However, the dialogue and cooperation with Russia were seemingly put on hold. Ms. Jakubowska stated that she believed it is important that NATO invests in development, especially in cyber-space, and she also stated that NATO is still a very strong moderator. Ms. Jakubowska spoke at

length about security challenges and how women act toward them. She stated that many researchers at NATO believe that women are significantly not concerned by key security challenges of the world, and that women stay away from issues like terrorism and North Korea. She also stated that women are just not interested in such issues, which was a challenge to NATO. She said that women are a huge part of peace processes and she believes that putting together all the relevant efforts, including the efforts of women, is very important.

The speaker **Jan Jireš** spoke further about NATO as an institution and its peculiarities. He stated that there are strong elements of bilateralism within NATO and that it truly is a unique organisation. He said that it is both an organisation and an alliance. More specifically, it is a collection of US alliances. He stated that a distinctive feature of NATO is that it deals with both collective defence and collective security, and at the same time, NATO has features that are quintessentially multilateral. He said that there is a strong peer-pressure upon NATO, or a pressure that is not so much “peer”. Everything there is pre-negotiated. He detailed that using multilateral institutions to put pressure on dealing with bilateral issues had been done before, but he also stressed that should this go on, it could have damaging consequences for NATO. Mr. Jireš stated that NATO is a hybrid organisation that combines multilateralism with bilateralism. If done well, the elements of bilateralism would undermine NATO’s multilateralism.

#### 11:00-12:30    **Session 1: Multilateralism as Viewed by Politicians (Debate)** (Great Hall)

##### **Panelists:**

- **Alica Kizeková** (Chair, Senior Researcher in the Institute of International Relations Prague)
- **Karel Schwarzenberg** (TOP 09)
- **Alexandr Vondra** (ODS)
- **Jan Lipavský** (Piráti)
- **Jan Hamáček** (ČSSD)
- **Václav Hampl** (KDÚ-ČSL)

This discussion was about the foreign policies of the participating Czech political parties but also the state of democracy in the Czech Republic 30 years after the Velvet Revolution. Each speaker first introduced the ideology of their party and later spoke about their foreign policy priorities. The remarks were followed up with questions from the audience.

The first speaker was **Jan Hamáček**, the Minister of Interior (from 2018), who briefly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2018) and was the previous Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (2013-2017). He is also the leader of the Social-Democratic Party (ČSSD). Firstly, he explained that the difference between “policy” and “foreign policy” is that in “policy”, a party is trying to survive until the next elections, but in “foreign policy”, the issue

is surviving until the next century. He continued and said that there is a broad consensus on the pillars of the Czech foreign policy, and it came about with the restoration of democracy after the Velvet Revolution. After the Velvet Revolution, Czechia was able to achieve important reforms and join NATO and the EU. He stated that it is impossible for a country of Czechia's size to face all the stressing issues that had surfaced in the recent period by itself, and that the only viable option for it is to join forces with other countries and try solving these issues together with them. Regarding Brexit, he mentioned that it is very important for people to realise the necessity of working in tandem in this regard. He also briefly touched on the Eurozone, saying that there are serious decisions being made regarding the reforms surrounding the monetary union. Mr. Hamáček was quite adamant when saying that there is a need to redefine the odd relationship that the European Union currently has with the US. He stated that the last NATO Summit in Brussels was a sobering moment considering the US's recent actions on the foreign stage. He mentioned twitter diplomacy and how it is important to find a way to cope with such a phenomenon. He discussed China's rapid growth and the fact that Russia is gaining footing on the international stage. He said that the situation warranted attention and action, but it is also very important to "keep our values" without risking the relationships built with multilateral cooperation. He also stated that the Czech government should finally form a position towards climate change.

The second speaker was **Alexandr Vondra**. He previously served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2006-2007), the Minister for European Affairs (2007-2009) and the Minister of Defence (2010-2012). He belongs to the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), a liberal-conservative party. He has also served as an MEP for this party since 2019. He stated that the Czech Republic currently needs a strong foreign policy more than it did any time in the last 10 years. He mentioned his role in formulating the ideas for the first Czech foreign policy decades ago. He said that Czech foreign policy is like a table with four legs. The first leg is the European Union, the second leg is NATO, the third leg is the neighborhood of the Czech Republic (particularly Germany) and the fourth leg is the Visegrad Group. He expressed his belief that the EU is under attack from some leaders of Western countries, with one of the reasons being Brexit; NATO is under attack from the lack of interest of the USA; and the V4 Group is under attack from other countries' leaders who believe the Visegrad Group is toxic. He finished his speech by stating that while previously the foreign policy was more based on a defensive agenda, nowadays, it is based more on a protective agenda.

The third speaker was **Karel Schwarzenberg** from the liberal-conservative party "Tradition Responsibility Prosperity" (TOP 09). Mr. Karel Schwarzenberg previously served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2009, 2010-2013). He insisted that TOP 09 was the only Czech party with a clear European agenda. He expressed his belief that the most important aspect of foreign policy is European policy. He said that the Czech Republic should protect NATO because without NATO, the European Union could not function to the best of its ability. In his view, the most important Czech foreign partners are the USA and Turkey. He stated that the Czech Republic should preserve the Visegrad Group but that the Czechs should be clearer in their views concerning democracy and the rule of law. They should not keep up with Hungary's rhetoric but distinguish themselves from it.

The fourth speaker was **Václav Hampl** from the Christian-Democratic Party (KDU). He serves as the Chair of the Senate's Committee on European Union Affairs. He insisted that there was a lot of mutual agreement between the political parties in the panel, as it regarded foreign policy. KDU has many of the same positions as the German CDU. They believe that the Czech Republic has a very important role in the EU and NATO, namely its active role in creating the proposals and regulations of the EU. He said that it is important for the Czech Republic to support the enlargement of the EU and support the Western Balkan countries in this big step, but we need to find a way to govern the EU because the enlargement would bring more difficulties to the EU's operating on a governing level. He also stated that to stay out of the Eurozone is not in the interests of the country, although this proposal is very unpopular with the Czech citizens.

The final speaker was **Jan Lipavský** from the Czech Pirate Party. He introduced the principles of the Pirate Party, which are liberty in thinking and human freedom, but also realism. The priorities of the Pirate Party in foreign policy are NATO and the EU as very important institutions, and many institutions like the Council of Europe, which, according to the party, the Czech Republic should take a greater leadership role in. Also, he said that the Czech Republic should have a clear orientation inside the EU and NATO. In his view, it is important to isolate Viktor Orban but stay in the Visegrad Group.

Following the remarks, the politicians answered questions from the audience.

- Why wasn't the United Nations brought up more in the discussion on multilateralism?

Most of the speakers agreed that the UN is a good platform for discussion but that the organisation can not achieve anything and can not solve problems. Mr. Vondra said that the UN never helped the Czech Republic. In contrast, Mr. Lipavský said that we have to listen to what the UN says and not isolate the Czech Republic from this institution.

- What role does the Czech Republic take in assisting developing countries?

The speakers agreed that the Czech Republic is making a good effort to help some countries in Africa and the Middle East, and it should keep helping.

- How optimistic are you in regard the new leadership of the European Commission?

The majority of the politicians were skeptical about the future processes within the EU.

The last question was:

- How should the Czech Republic deal with Viktor Orban and Poland?

**Mr. Hamáček** said that we should not isolate him, but rather speak to him, and the EU should speak to him also. **Mr. Vondra** said that he may not agree with his policies, but the left-wing media in Western Europe had spread propaganda against Viktor Orban, and Mr. Vondra insisted that the majority of the leaders of Europe do not have a problem with Viktor Orban. **Mr. Schwarzenberg** said that we should isolate Orban but the case of Poland is different because in

Poland there is free press and free media, there are NGOs and there is an opposition to the government—all things that do not exist in Hungary. **Mr. Hampl** said that in Poland the situation is precarious and that the Czech Republic has to make a stand against Viktor Orbán. **Mr. Lipanský** from the Pirate Party was on the same page as Mr. Hampl, and he also agreed with Mr. Schwarzenberg in relation to the points made about the situation in Poland.

**11:00-12:30 Session 2: New Technology as an Enabler of Global Governance in Space**  
(Mirror Hall)

**Panelists:**

- **Petr Boháček** (Chair, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University, Czechia)
- **Pete Worden** (Chairman, the Breakthrough Prize Foundation, USA)
- **Joan Johnson-Freese** (Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval War College, Newport, USA)
- **Nikola Schmidt** (Researcher and Lecturer, the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University, Czechia)

The world power balance is visible in space. Technologies that allowed an increasing number of nations to reach the universe and explore its resources are starting to be owned by private actors as well. This fact brought forward many questions such as what form of space governance is the most likely to be pushed ahead, how can we considerably utilise space resources or what are the ethical aspects of expansion into space.

In his opening speech, **Petr Boháček** elaborated on the change in the relationship between the private and state actors. He underscored that while during the Cold War states were the bearers of technological development, nowadays it is the private sector that spearheads this advancement. State actors might be even forced to rely upon private ones. Boháček introduced some scenarios of how space might be utilised in the future, including the usage of robots. He continued by raising questions about the prospective level of commercialisation of space – whether there would be a true space economy. He also said that another important challenge lies in what kind of governance and legislation should be imposed in space.

The questions for discussion were as follows:

- What type of governance will such technological advances, the increasing power of non-state actors, and the growing number of space-faring countries bring?
- Will advanced space technology provide new means for great power competition or unlock new forms of global governance in the spatially unconstrained area?

**Joan Johnson-Freese** emphasised that the new space technological advancement went hand in hand with the advancement in military equipment. While past trends suggest that originally military exclusive technology later expanded to the civilian sector, today many airspace devices



developed by the private civilian sector may be converted to military weapons. Johnson-Freese proceeded to talk about a possible future competition which would ultimately lead to the dominance of a single great power. As part of this space arms race, adversaries might develop more muscular and offensive foreign policies. This hypothesis was described in more detail by using the example of the US and China's space policy since 2013. Part of the risk would be a hidden weaponisation of space. According to Joan Johnson-Freese's proposals, space must be regarded as akin to a normal terrestrial area in the question of its oncoming governance. An increased need for pushing the international security community towards inclusive multilateral efforts is, therefore, arising.

**Pete Worden** stated that space would continue to be dominated by the competition of super-powers. Recently, the interests of private actors were coming into play. Worden underscored that space is integral to a lot of nations. Also, space technologies are becoming available for smaller states; Luxembourg serves as an example of this. As a result, power dynamics in space are prone to imminent change. Pete Worden continued by elaborating on how technological breakthroughs in space would affect surveillance and secret intelligence. According to Worden's proposition, space governance in the future should be inspired by the codes of international oceans.

In his address, **Nikola Schmidt** spoke about the low predictability of the entry of the private actor into space affairs. In accordance with Pete Worden, he highlighted that the space factor added a new potential dimension of security on national and cosmopolitan level. Schmidt then compared outer space to cyberspace. To clarify, both are highly dangerous environments with a lack of rules. Schmidt also urged for more inclusive international research regarding space. In his view, global institutions such as the UN should play a key role in policy setting and mediating communication in regard to space. Small countries could still take part in space-related activities since they could excel in their niches. Nikola Schmidt's model of space governance is comprised of an international consortium which would frame projects for further space development. According to his opinion, it matters not that technologies could have both military and civilian purposes. It is the role of civilians in shaping the space sector that is vital. Hypothetically, this sector may expand beyond the borders of national governments.

In the subsequent discussions, the main topics included the management of strategic areas in space, resources and new technologies in military regimes. Another integral topic was how politics apply to science development.

**Joan Johnson-Freese** estimated that the ethics of acquisition of resources in space, e.g. mining asteroids, would in practice be in accordance with "pirate's treasure" ethics – whoever discovers the resource would possess it. State actors would push forward their national interests in this regard. Johnson-Freese expressed her belief that a common rational interest could force multiple parties to cooperate. On the other hand, various groups' influence and lobbying would upset the balance of power. For this reason, states must invest more into planetary security and support diplomatic efforts. Intergovernmental organisations such as the UN could be endowed with a new space security agenda. Joan Johnson-Freese remained pessimistic about the future use of space – in the short term it would not be possible to forge a global cooperation in regard to it.

**Pete Worden** called for attention to the need for new legal protocols which would be respected by private non-state actors as well. In his view, small countries should also follow their interests using diplomatic means. It is advisable to form specialised working groups among small countries. Worden underscored the necessity of an intergovernmental organisation to frame these processes and indicated that governance of the seas is an example of how such a practice could be viable.

**Nikola Schmidt** talked about how some entities are powerful enough to dictate their own rules. Nevertheless, in his view, states should strive for inclusive global governance. If small countries want to shape the international discourse, they must unite, excel in their niches and develop their ideas and technology. To compensate for a lack of financial resources, small states could establish partnerships. But another question is whether people would be able to share their successes, and who would arbitrate potential disputes.

In conclusion, all the speakers agreed on the necessity for cooperation and united work towards rational goals. Competition may prove to be ineffective in the long term. By way of illustration, the US is an important contributor to CERN, although it is not its member, and pursues its own research. Due to political reasons, it would be difficult to come to a consensus. The initiative may come from private actors and create a “coalition of the willing”. But it would be more practical if states could do it instead since they already established communication channels with one another and have the needed authority.

#### **11:00-12:30    Session 3: Rebuilding Syria: Actors, Politics, Approaches** (Music Hall)

##### **Panelists:**

- **Jan Daniel** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Muriel Asseburg** (Senior Fellow at SWP, the German Institute for International & Security Affairs, Germany)
- **Petr Hladík** (Director of the Department of the Middle East and North Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic)
- **Petr Kostohryz** (Member of the Board, People in Need, Czechia)
- **Lenka Filípková** (Humanitarian Practitioner with field experience from Turkey, Syria and Palestine, Czechia)

**Jan Daniel**, the Chair, addressed the speakers with three questions:

- What are the most pressing needs in Syria and what kind of external assistance is required?
- What is the state of Syria’s reconstruction on the international stage?
- What practical forms of engagement should be undertaken by small EU states such as the Czech Republic in regard to Syria?

The first speaker of the panel, **Muriel Asseburg**, outlined the various dimensions and incentives of the Syrian reconstruction process: humanitarian interests, political and economic stability, the returns of refugees and IDPs and de-radicalisation. She discussed the various problems that characterise today's reconstruction efforts. These problems are centered around the fact that the Syrian regime has de facto lost its sovereignty to Russia and Iran, with Turkey occupying parts of the North. This resulted in contradictions between international, regional and local actors' interests, and a reconciliation of the parties is unlikely to occur. This is due to the fact that the regime would not undertake an inclusive approach – instead it would consolidate its power through the incorporation of the militia, repression and the utilisation of patronage networks.

After emphasising the urgent humanitarian needs of the Syrian population and the widespread deteriorating conditions that are plaguing its citizens, Asseburg also described the various actors that are engaged in the reconstruction and their different approaches to the cause. These include the Syrian government, Russia, Iran, the United States, Turkey and the EU. In particular, the EU has been the largest donor to the humanitarian and recovery aid, with its total contribution being 17 billion USD. However, this has not served its desired aims and objectives, and the EU position of not engaging in reconstruction while Assad is in power is under threat of unravelling due to the urgent needs of the Syrian population.

The second speaker, **Lenka Filipek**, brought attention to the current statistics of Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries where they are situated. In particular, she focused on Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. She stated that 11.7 million Syrian people are in need of humanitarian assistance in all sectors of life, and that the humanitarian responses vary, depending on the area of Syria. She also emphasised that a large-scale reconstruction of Syria is only possible after a political solution is found. She explained that the notion of the returning of refugees is misguided and stated that it is hardly possible under the current circumstances of the Assad regime – which include killings, torture and persecution of refugees who return to Syria.

**Petr Kostohryz** stressed the urgency of one of the most dramatic consequences of the Syrian conflict - namely, the international displacement, both internal and external. The speaker affirmed that people's resilience would help them restore and rebuild their lives. Mosul might provide an example, as the city which was controlled by ISIS until two years ago and re-boostered its economy thanks to the people who returned to it. As for the state of the reconstruction, there seemed to be some serious thinking in the Syrian government, whose Ministry of Interior was supposed to report to the international community on 1<sup>st</sup> November about how the state was supposed to rehabilitate the country and the internally displaced. However, the time-frame is going to be very different from what certain actors would like it to be.

To summarise, all the speakers emphasised the need for immediate action in terms of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. In their view, humanitarian assistance should not be politicised, and moving forward, it is of utmost importance to put mechanisms in place that would facilitate inclusive assistance and reconstruction.

**11:00 - 12:30 Session 4: Open Digital Science in the Study of International Politics?**  
(Orient Hall)

**Panelist:**

- **Tomáš Dopita** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)

This workshop reflected on the possibilities of advanced digital data management in the study of international politics. The Chair Tomáš Dopita discussed this topic with more than five participants and tried to answer several questions.

The first question was:

- Where does the study of international politics stand in comparison with other scientific fields and the study of humanities?

**Tomáš Dopita's** answer to the question was that the digital study of international politics is heavily underdeveloped in comparison to other scientific fields and the humanities - for example, digital natural sciences like medicine, geography or weather forecasting and so on. During the workshop Mr. Dopita presented a comparison of Digital Social Science and Digital Humanities. According to him, there is no material infrastructure in digital international studies. That means that there are no journals or professors in it, which is in stark contrast to Digital Humanities, where we can find courses, as well as professors, institutes, and centres (e.g. Digital Humanities Graz or Index Thomisticus with its long history). He gave us a good example of Digital Social Science when he mentioned the work of Florian Schneider - China's Digital Nationalism and the Quill Project. This project studies the history of negotiated texts. Using the records of the processes that created constitutions, treaties, or legislation, it offers a recreation of the contexts within which decisions were made; its visualisations allow the process of negotiation to be understood and explored, and it also provides commentary on specific points of interest.

Another important question was:

- Why are digital international studies so underdeveloped?

**Mr. Dopita** answered that international studies are fragmented along national lines and much less interlinked than other fields. Digital Humanities and Social Sciences are centred on the individual, but IR/IS has a strong tendency to focus on the system, structures or identities. According to **Ioannis Armakolas**, political science is much more digitised than IR.

**Mr. Dopita** also mentioned the statement of [Johanna Drucker from 2011](#) in which she urged humanist researchers to develop means of visualisation that would not be based on the principles and practices of natural science. These tools carry with them the assumptions of knowledge being observer-independent and certain, rather than observer co-dependent and interpretive. Instead by

using objectivised data to produce graphs and charts, Drucker proposed to treat data as *capta*, meaning as a collection constructed with particular assumptions and providing for a specific kind of interpretation.

According to **Petr Kypr**, one of the participants of this workshop, the question concerning us was “How to structure the chain of information stemming from science to professionals, to politicians, thus allowing effective actions?”

The next questions which had to be discussed were:

- How to make the research data in our field more findable?
- How to enhance the accessibility and interoperability of this type of research for ourselves as well as for the audiences we hope to inform, i.e. policy and decision makers, students, or the media?

Most of the data were not published and the research thus can not be built on or corrected. As **Mr. Dopita** stated, the digital world already provides pathways for gathering and managing data by making it computer readable, but we must develop the technical capabilities to gather data, as well as the analytical capabilities to understand it. [XML](#) – eXtensible Markup Language - and the [TEI Guidelines](#) were mentioned as very helpful in this way.

- Are there any methods, utilities, or applications that seem to be useful for the purposes of digital study of international politics?

As examples, the web pages of [voyant-tool.org](#), [atlasti.com](#) and [gephi.org](#) were presented as useful tools for this process. In this part **Mr. Dopita** also presented his own project through the special schema RAW.

And the last question was about the funding opportunities:

- What are the options for this kind of funding?

Mr. Dopita stated that there is a lot of funding available in the field of digital humanities, but not much competition.

At the end of the workshop Mr. Dopita announced the call for *Integrating and opening research infrastructures of European interest, and [Integrating Activities for Starting Communities](#)*. The reason for the initiative is that European researchers need effective and convenient access to the best research infrastructures in order to conduct research for the advancement of knowledge and technology. The aim of this action is to bring together key national and regional research infrastructures, integrate them on a European scale and open them up to all European researchers from both academia and industry, while ensuring their optimal use and joint development. However, as Jan Martin Rolenc stated, the main issue here is whether there should be a public demand for these kinds of inventions.

**From 15:30                    The Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe: Searching for Effective Mechanisms in Resolving Long-Term Conflicts**

**Panelists:**

- **Matúš Halás** (Chair, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)
- **Peter Weiss** (Ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Prague)
- **Marek Varga** (Head of the Political–Military Dimension and Conflicts Unit, Department of Political and Security Affairs, Directorate General for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship)
- **Ivo Šrámek** (Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations, the OSCE and Other International Organisations in Vienna)
- **Míla O’Sullivan** (Researcher, Institute of International Relations Prague, Czechia)

The Slovak Embassy in Prague, the Slovak Institute in Prague and the Institute of International Relations (IIR) hosted the special event “Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe: Searching for an Effective Mechanism for Solving Long-Term Conflicts” on 24 September 2019. With this session, the Slovak Institute and the IIR hoped to contribute to solving long-term conflicts. The event was prepared and overseen by Alica Kizeková from the IIR.

The event was held in the context of the Slovak chairmanship of the OSCE and the bilateral Czech-Slovak collaboration.

The Chair, **Matúš Halás**, invited the speakers to evaluate the current state of affairs in the OSCE. The key question for the session was raised: What needs to be done to make the OSCE more effective in reaching its goals and how can it augment its tool for conflict mediation?

**Marek Varga** opened his speech by explaining what makes the OSCE important. According to Varga, the OSCE represents a platform for a dialogue where even opposing sides can meet and lead a discussion. The OSCE missions were named as important tools for conflict mediation. Mr. Varga underscored that one of the conditions for a mission to work is cooperation with local people and offices. This cooperation must have a democratic basis and the local population needs to be accepting of the presence of the mission. Mr. Varga further elaborated on the challenge that the Ukrainian-Russian conflict poses for the OSCE. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict affected the inner decision-making processes of the OSCE since both Ukraine and Russia are its members. This conflict has also proven to be difficult in terms of finding the best course of action. Varga reflected on the situation in Georgia. According to him, it is currently difficult to find any place for concessions on the South Ossetian side.

**Ivo Šrámek** started his presentation by elaborating on the nature of the OSCE. The OSCE operates on a consensual basis and can not impose sanctions. This might create an impression of

this organisation having a weak mandate. On the contrary, the OSCE has managed to turn this supposed weakness into its strength. The OSCE has the authority to interfere in internal matters of participating states affected by its missions. According to Šrámek's opinion, the OSCE is nowadays facing huge problems because its pre-existent tools are not enough. The reason for these problems lies in the geopolitical nature of conflicts. Ivo Šrámek elaborated that the OSCE could continue to serve as a platform for discussion and support negotiations, but it may not truly solve the problems.

**Míla O'Sullivan** dedicated her contributing speech to gender security questions and initiated it by mentioning resolution 2025 of the Security Council of the UNO. This strategic document has led to the creation of several national and international action plans which aim at increasing women's participation in peace-making. These action plans have been largely opposed by Russia. According to O'Sullivan, this was one of the symptoms of the penalisation of the OSCE, a part of a larger picture of internal dissent. The key to solving this penalisation lies in everyday multilateralism and the continuation of the mutual dialogue. The OSCE has the advantage of a more comprehensive security dimension in comparison to other international organisations. Gender and climate have long been neglected in the political and military dimensions. Míla O'Sullivan referred to similar gaps in scientific research. On the other hand, she praised the support for the work of gender advisors by OSCE missions. O'Sullivan then proceeded to talk about the relationship between armed conflicts and gender-based violence. She also mentioned that during the ongoing conflict with Russia, Ukraine adopted an action plan that would monitor gender-based violence and help its victims.

The subsequent discussion focused on the following topic:

What can the OSCE do to create stronger mandates for its missions? How can the missions be prolonged?

**Marek Varga** answered that to consider the prolonging of an ongoing mission the host nation needs to be satisfied with it. Unless we cooperate with the local population the mission may not be effective at all. Varga also talked about budgetary restraints and inner political penalisation.

**Míla O'Sullivan** stated that satisfaction with a mission could be improved by training the police in recognising gender-based violence and effectively helping its victims.

**Ivo Šrámek** responded that the OSCE has tools of pressure and isolation at its disposal as well. He accentuated the potential problems and dangers of working with representations of, e.g., rogue states and separatist regions. This kind of negotiation could lead to a presumption official that this kind of representation is recognised. Šrámek stressed that the OSCE may be abused for the political purposes of its members. According to Šrámek, the OSCE could theoretically become the main body of European security. But for this to be accomplished, the tools would have to be updated. He added that certain complications could arise when dealing with China.

**The Report was compiled by the interns of the Institute of International Relations Prague and was given an expert check by Alica Kizekova, the main coordinator of the conference.**