

Non-Western Reflection on Politics

November 13, 2012

Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic

The conference was officially opened by Professor **Petr Drulák**, who stated that the goal of this conference was to contribute to a genuine global dialogue. In his brief introduction, Professor Drulák spoke about the necessity of a common language for successful dialogue, but that non-Western ideas needed to be considered in order to maintain a truly global atmosphere. He then gave a few examples, such as non-Western political ideology or Western developments that changed over time in non-Western locations, and become new ideas. Professor Drulák then introduced the speakers of the first panel and their particular topics of expertise, and finished by affirming that these speakers give small but important insights into different parts of the world and different ways of thinking.

Panel I: Non-Western Alternatives to Political Concepts

Wang Fan, Assistant President of the China Foreign Affairs University and Director of CFAU Institute of International Relations

Francis B. Nyamnjoh, Head of Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town

Bahgat Korany, Professor of Political Science, The American University in Cairo; Director of the AUC Forum

Paulo Esteves, Assistant Professor at the International Relations Institute, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

Moderator: **Petr Drulák**, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Prague

Debate

Professor **Wang Fan** began the first panel by speaking about traditional Chinese culture and the “reverse security dilemma”, as well as the Chinese concepts of “zilu” (self-restraint), “zixing (self-rethinking), and “jianjing (graduation). He stated that Chinese culture tends to take a holistic view regarding any challenges, and that it uses its own history and tradition to solve problems rather than merely follow another’s example. Professor Fan then described the Western approach, and said that even though the West faces complex global challenges, it has often overshot its high bar. Furthermore, contrary to the individualism that is a part of Western tradition, the importance of collectivism and its beneficial role in international relations is understood in China. Professor Fan emphasized that there is an imbalance between the two cultures; he likewise stated that Chinese culture should not replace Western culture, but rather that these two cultures should integrate and form a new global balance.

Professor Fan then turned to a discussion of dialectical thinking in his country, and the importance of the “golden mean”. According to him, the golden mean essentially dictates that not everyone different is an enemy, and that interaction and flexibility are important values in any Chinese sphere. Professor Fan also said that the Chinese way involves disciplining oneself; it also does not mean ignoring reasons and courses, but rather attaching importance to complex thinking. Furthermore, China has a macro view of history, and thus longer foresight. In comparison to the West, Professor Fan stated that treaty problems can more easily be solved by China, since the Chinese are more interested in putting aside differences and seeking common results. Also, there is not always a clear line between friend and enemy in China, unlike in the West.

Professor Fan concluded by reiterating that the goal of interaction is pluralism between the two cultures, and that anti-game thinking should be promoted (as opposed to zero-sum game thinking). Self-discipline should be practiced in the West, since it is an effective way to reduce errors and prevent people from sliding into unattractive alternatives. Finally, altruism is a key to the relationship between the self and others, which leads China to advocate a win-win foreign policy in its interactions with the West.

Following Professor Fan, Professor **Francis B. Nyamnjoh** spoke about Cameroonian politics and the lessons the West can learn from it. He focused on the one of the main aspects of politics in Cameroon, which is known as “Politics na Njangi”, which roughly translates into ‘you scratch my back and I scratch your back’. The central idea according to Professor Nyamnjoh is trust in politics, since you cannot allow a perfect stranger to ‘scratch your back’. The relationships at the political level are really a game of trust; for example if you give money to someone “Politics na Njangi” means they will feel obligated to pay you back somehow. Turning to the concept of the ‘big man’ or patron in African politics, Professor Nyamnjoh explains that they are referred to as ‘big’ because they eat up everything and everyone in society. He then adds that this is a caricature of African politics, since the reality is that individual success alone is not enough. Instead, success in African politics largely depends on how much you redistribute and give back to the community. The system functions through an intricate set of relationships; a leader can be seen as a patron on one level of politics, but at the same time they are clients in their other relationships.

Professor Nyamnjoh continues his speech by providing another example in Nigerian politics. There is a common misconception that the group of ‘godfathers’ at the top dominate Nigerian politics, but in reality the one man in power would not survive without the network of connections and interactions he or she makes. Professor Nyamnjoh concluded his discussion by reminding the audience that power is fluid, and that in “Politics na Njangi” there is no such thing as disinterested politics. Rather, there is a need for conflicted interests to be managed through interdependence instead of immediate gratification. In Africa, the system is as much about achievement through cooperation than about pursuits and actions. Ultimately, the West could use this practice as an entry point into a more universal politics of interdependence.

Professor **Bahgat Korany** focused his discussion on the limits of psychological reductionism in Third World foreign policy analysis. He began by describing two ways to look at Western international relations theory. The first is to decide that all international relations theory up to

now is nonsense and to start from scratch. The second way does not involve an outright rejection of the body of literature currently available, but instead putting it to critical analysis and see where it is good and where it misses the point. Either way, Professor Korany stated that the goal should be a truly universal international relations theory. He also agreed with Professor Nyamnjoh that the 'big man' theory of politics is misleading; while it is not without merit it is an incomplete and biased outlook on politics.

Professor Korany then turned to an analysis of the three pillars of international relations theory, and why he thinks the generally accepted international relations theories are incomplete. Starting with the first pillar, he said that in his opinion 'realism' is an inadequate theory, and that the national interest is not the most important aspect of global politics. However, the perception of the decision makers regarding the national interest should be studied. The second pillar focuses on the operational environment (the 'real world'), with the idea that you can look to the person and their actions at the top of the pyramid in order to explain foreign policy. The third pillar (also known as the James Rosenau theory) establishes different types and sizes of countries creating foreign policy, but in the Third World it all comes down to the man at the top.

Professor Korany reiterated that these theories are incomplete; according to him they blind you with scientific analysis but deep down they are actually misleading. Professor Korany concluded by stating his main criticisms of the established theories, especially regarding political leaders. First, the theories generally exclude operational environments in a given system; this includes for example the idea that a leader behaves with total freedom in his domain. A second problem exists with data collection, since it is impossible to ascertain exactly what motivates a leader. Furthermore, attitudes and behaviors of a leader that are 'out of character' are generally ignored instead of analyzed. Another problem stems from the fact that leaders often disappear, but their policies and institutions remain. Professor Korany concluded that the psychological school of international relations is guilty of functional logic, and that it often ignores extenuating factors. Thus, he called for a universal IR theory that goes beyond easy answers and looks deeply at both social processes and economic problems.

Professor **Paulo Esteves** concluded the first panel by speaking about 'modernity', cordiality and the rhetoric of 'backwardness'. According to Professor Esteves, the concept of cordiality was developed by Brazilian sociologists. He began by discussing the 'roots of Brazil', or the main cultural and sociological foundations for Brazilian behavior, given its background and history. Specifically, what distinguishes Brazil from the European countries such as Portugal, and what makes it a part of Western civilization? The debate was first framed in a racialist framework in the 19th century; it revolved around the myth of 'three races' that were ranked in Brazilian society. In the 20th century this shifted to the idea that structural conditions, both cultural and social, were preventing development. The contemporary question is how does Brazil become a modern nation? Professor Esteves identified several ideas in Brazilian society, including the ethic of work, or instrumental rationality, and the ethic of adventure. He stated that Brazilian colonization was not a rational project but rather an enterprise orchestrated by adventure. These ideal types are also reflected in the Brazilian sense of modernity, civility, and its others, such as cordiality, the pattern of human togetherness, and the amalgamation of the public and private.

Professor Esteves then provided a critique of two theories from sociologists applied to the Brazilian case. In the first theory, Sérgio Holanda condemned Brazil to be a backward society, and sought to identify obstacles that stand in the way of Brazilian modernization and democratization. In the Brazilian case, Holanda argued for an amalgamation between civility and cordiality where cordiality limits civility. In his view, modernity is not necessarily a positive thing, since it could lead to episodes such as totalitarianism. In the second theory, Edward Banfield focused on amorality and the 'moral basis of a backward society'. He also sought to understand the main causes of poverty and backwardness. His conclusions were that citizens were unable to act in a common good or perform actions that transcended the immediate goals of the nuclear family, and that obedience to the law was a matter of cost-benefit analysis. If a society wanted to be modern, Banfield theorized that intervention from the West was necessary. Professor Esteves strongly rejected both arguments, and stated that there is a lack of civility in each. He concluded the first panel by stating that Brazil should not necessarily follow the model of the West, but instead work to find a solution that takes into account its own unique history and culture.

Panel II: Political Theory in Non-Western

Chair: Šárka Moravcová, Institute of International Relations, Prague

Miloš Mendel, *Specialist on Arab and Islamic Issues: Geopolitical concepts in Political Theory of Classical Islam and their Contemporary Ideological Reflections*

Petr Skalník, *Department of Political Science, University of Hradec Králové: Political culture in Africa in pre-contact era and during the colonial and post-colonial times*

Zora Hesová, *Association for International Affairs: The question of universality of rights in Islamist political discourse after the Arab Spring*

Michal Kolmaš, *Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University: Multilateralism between Japan and the United States*

Miloš Mendel's presentation examines religious Islam as an ideological and hence political framework. Islam, like Christianity, sees itself destined to be the only rightful religion that can treat the conversion of others as an obligation to carry out God's plan for mankind. Unlike Christianity however, it uses tools that are seen by the western world as perhaps archaic, backward and unacceptable to the current norms of international coexistence.

In an Islamic worldview all concepts and ideas are interconnected and anchored to the religious law of Islam, *Sharia*. One of the most important distinctions that Islamic law makes is the division of the world into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*. *Dar al-Islam* refers to all those territories where Islamic rituals, political practices and the rule of law persist and Muslims live under public protection of an Islamic society. On the other hand *Dar al-Harb* stands for countries that are not adhered to Islamic law and the lives of Muslims are not secured by surrounding religious society. Therefore, it is an area where non-Muslim religion prevails and for Muslims living in *Dar al-Harb*, the recommended course of action is an emigration to *Dar al-Islam*. However, *Dar al-Harb* is always potentially to become *Dar al-Islam* and *Jihad*, in its broadest meaning, is a sophisticated mean of *Dar al-Islam* to attain new areas. This classical geopolitical concept of division is, according to Mr. Mendel, one of the most important issues of Islamic political theory incorporated into Islamic law.

It is important to note that this concept of divisions is neither present in the Koran, nor in the Sunna. In the first place it was developed by early Islamic jurists during the age of expansion. *Dar al-Islam* in this sense signifies a geopolitical unit, which is to be developed and expanded. In this space Islam is clearly identified as a state religion – a set of instructions of how to rule society of believers. The geopolitical concept of the two worlds was no doubt relevant in early medieval times when the Muslim conquests took place. However, in the 12th century, when the Islamic empire was crumbling down into a series of smaller caliphates, the notion of unified Muslim world was effectively dead, and thus there was no need for improving the concept. As late as in the 19th and 20th century and as a reaction to colonial expansion, several Islamic political religious movements resurrected the concept and appealed to Muslims to leave Islamic countries, which have fallen under foreign influence.

Mr. Mendel argues that the concepts of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb* are still alive and can be taken into consideration in contemporary conditions. An idea closely related to this issue is the view that Muslims living with non-Muslims under their juridical norms are not Muslims to the full and citizenship in such countries create a problem, as it implies a voluntary acceptance of non-Muslim rule (at least in the juridical sense). Although this view doesn't seem to be held by the vast majority of Muslims living under non-Muslim rule, it has significant appeal to at least to a Muslims minority. The spread of such views can be mostly attributed to radical Islamic preachers and political activists.

Petr Skalník begins his presentation with a notion that most Africans see the world mainly through religious ideas and in turn religious ideas provide them the means to express their social and political views. Therefore, there's a strong understanding of the relationship between religion and politics in Africa. As a coincidence the main question in Mr. Skalník's paper is if the inherent characteristic of Africa, namely the political culture, is responsible for the weak position that Africa occupies today.

Skalník refers to Kenyan historian Bethwell Ogot, who examines whether the values of institutionalized chieftain, inherited from the time of pre-European Africa, could still be realized in contemporary African states. In addition, Ogot identifies a few ideals that he believes were typical to African cultures. The principal ideal is a metaphysical hierarchy of governance, where God and the founding fathers of different tribes establish the leadership. Despite evident antidemocratic tendencies in many authoritarian and militaristic countries, Ogot argues, that democracy itself was not originally imported from Europe, but was in fact founded in Africa. Therefore, the reason for the interruption of the tradition was the fact that Africa was colonized and native institutions were subordinated to colonial officers. Hence in the dawn of their new independence, many African leaders turned their back on the traditional rule, which makes Ogot wonder, if this statist and authoritarian order could suit to the modern dynamic governances. A number of African leaders think, that it is enough to convert the traditional African institutions into the prevailing ones – to substitute chiefs for presidents, tribes for nations, metaphysical hierarchies for one-party systems and African communalism for socialism. There can be found a good example of attempts to substitute new institutions for old traditions in Ghana.

Next Mr. Skalník moves on to his own research, which he conducted in a north Ghanaian chieftain of Nanum in 1978. There he found an alternative method to succession of central chieftaincy that is different from the traditional African concept, in which central chieftaincy is alternating between two houses of chiefs and monitored by a ritual specialist. In theory it is an impressive concept but in practice it may also create problems. They might arise for example if

the electors are not able to agree on the next successor, as was the case in 2003, after the death of the last chieftain. Therefore, the main question lies in our perspectives whether we see role of the chieftaincy as a watchdog of democracy within a state, or if we are thinking that we face again a new form of indirect rule, where a modern state is controlled by elites.

Zora Hesová's presentation concerns Islamist movements emerging in the aftermath of the Arab spring. During the last year these movements have established political parties, won power in elections and are in a position to formulate conditions for democratic transitions in two out of the three countries that have underwent drastic political transformations. It is therefore possible for us to study not only their political characteristics, but also to determine, whether there is such a thing as Islamic specificity.

Western observers are mostly suspicious of Islamic movements, mainly because of the role of religion in their political agendas and strong transcendental reference to religious law. These suspicions lead westerners to expect political practices to correspond with theocratic perspectives. Concurrently, there is also another factor that raises suspicion, which has more to do with the actual political practices that is to say the movements are embedded in traditional, very conservative, societies. In her presentation Ms. Hesová tries to summarize debates that are taking place in Tunisia and Egypt concerning their new constitutions.

Since the fall of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, Islamic movements in Tunisia and Egypt have engaged in lively debates regarding the creation of new constitutions for their countries. In this sense we can talk about several phases. During the first phase, after the fall of the old regime and before the founding of constitutional assemblies, various actors in both countries were seeking a broad consensus over the so-called constitutional principles. This process was inclusive and led to decisions that were mainly accepted well in the west. As the actual constitutional process started with the first elections of assemblies, the process rapidly changed significantly and lost its transparency. Islamic parties gained the parliamentary majority in constitutional assemblies and became politically hegemonic powers. Even though the final drafts of the new constitutions are not completed yet, it will be very likely, that religion will play an important part in both of them. Within the Islamist parties themselves there is a huge diversity of actors and the policies they actualize – mainstream Islamists do not only have to fight liberals, but even more so right-wing radical Salafist parties both in Tunisia and in Egypt.

Ms. Hesová concludes that the ongoing debates have been so far held in the context of everyday politics and there is nothing extraordinary about Islamists being in power and drafting constitutions, apart from a number of problematic points being discussed with the liberals (e.g. women rights). Islamic practices seem to be amenable to the political logic and reason of state governance and Islamist vocabulary can be seen expressing rather an affirmation of identity than promoting a theocratic vision of the world. However, unclear provisions and the lack of definition of rights may open a door to an islamization of state policies but not from the top, from the constitution itself, but from the practices of various institutions.

Michal Kolmaš focuses in his presentation on the different perceptions of multilateralism in Japan and in the United States and he studies the current perspectives on multilateralism through discourse analysis of the War on Terror.

Multilateralism itself is originated in the western tradition quite recently and it could be defined as cooperation of three or more states guided by general principles. However, that is only one of the possible definitions that isn't taking into account the diverse perceptions of the concept in

different countries. Mr. Kolmaš therefore decides to talk about the “institution of multilateralism” – the guiding principles standing for multilateral cooperation, as described by an American political scientist James A. Caporaso.

The United States has been considered a pioneer of multilateral cooperation, because of their continuous support of global order based on multilateral principles throughout the 20. Century. However, the United States has never been willing to be constrained by the limitations of multilateralism in order to sustain their superpower status. This standpoint is thus illustrated also in the discourses of the War on Terror.

Despite this specific historical perception of multilateralism, there are considerable differences in understanding and utilizing the concept in the US administration that has been dependent on the position taken by the sitting president. Consequently, the Bush administration happens to be very similar to the Obama administration. However, whereas the later administration understands multilateralism in positive terms, the earlier one saw it in negative nonetheless a necessary concept. Moreover, Bush identified the concept with constraints that it could create for his policies but Obama sees it as an enabling notion. Nevertheless, both of them approach multilateralism in terms of sovereignty, effectiveness and action.

When looking for a definition of multilateralism in Kotoba, a renewed Japanese dictionary, Mr. Kolmaš encounters a different description of multilateralism, where it stands for two states willingness to utilize international framework in order to settle disputes. Thus, it is obvious that the Japanese viewpoint is different from the western understanding of the concept. However, the second world affected Japan's post-war foreign policy and the country's new constitution was written by the Americans due to its defeat in the war. In addition, Japan's foreign policy was being conducted mainly in economic terms and in alliance with the United States. Japan was not though reluctant to accept multilateral framework but they didn't consider it as a suitable option when dealing with security issues. However, Japan promoted IMF, APEC and ARF as well as joined GATT and UN but rather understood multilateralism merely as an extension to its bilateral relations with the United States. Therefore, in this view it is comprehensible that if there emerged security threats or potential disruptions to its bilateral alliance with the USA, Japan was trying to withdraw from multilateral cooperation. Thereby, we could understand Japanese multilateralism as a confidence building measure and an attempt to obviate regional rivalries in Asia that had been troubling the countries' relations for at least 100 years. These efforts were, however, rather difficult to realize due to Japan's foreign policy stances and especially its close relationship with the United States.

Open debate

After every individual presentation, audience had an opportunity to pose questions.

Petr Drulák asked Petr Skalník whether we could use the metaphysical religious order to understand politics, like Mr. Skalník argues, it is being done in Africa. If not, what makes Africa so special?

Petr Skalník answers, that in Africa we can hardly find a single individual that would not believe in God or other spiritual beings. In Europe on the other hand it'll be soon difficult to find any such people. Therein Mr. Skalník sees the main difference.

Mr. Drulák's other question was aimed for Michal Kolmaš: Is there any notable evolution in Japan's foreign policy towards the United States?

Michal Kolman argues that even though there have been several significant shifts in the Japanese politics during the last 20 years, for example the change in government in 2008, they have not reflected on the country's foreign policy. Though, the policies might be evolving slowly by time, the main characteristics of the system remain the same.

Baghat Korany asked Miloš Mendel how does the theory of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb* make us to understand the contemporary practices of religious societies?

Miloš Mendel presents many examples of how the two concepts are still relevant even today and concludes that even though the distinction between the two is not as clear-cut as it was in the time of the early Islamic jurists, the concepts themselves are still being used in many Muslim debates and arguments.

Mr. Korany had one more question and asked Zora Hesová, why the position of liberals in the countries of the Arab spring is so weak?

According to **Zora Hesová** the main asset of the Islamists in the Arab Spring is that they have a plan, a project. The liberals are less organized and fail to come up with an actual alternative to the Islamists agenda. In Tunisia for example they do not even have a reformative project or any idea how the new state institutions should look like.

Panel III: Political Theory and Thinking in Latin America

Moderator: Petr Kratochvíl, Institute of International Relations, Prague

Kateřina Březinová, Head of the Ibero-American Centre, Metropolitan University Prague: Politics of Cultural Hybridity in Latin America: Post-Colonial Analysis of Néstor García Canclini

Šárka Moravcová, Institute of International Relations, Prague: Critical reflections on identity and rights of indigenous people in Mexico

Matyáš Pelant, Faculty of Arts, Charles University: Developmentalism and Dependence theory – case-study of Brazil

Miroslav Jurásek, University of Economics, Prague: Dependence theory in a comparative perspective

Kateřina Březinová prepared a presentation about her paper, dealing with the concept of hybrid cultures, which has been used as a political tool in Latin American countries. She detains herself particularly on the notion of hybrid cultures as conceptualized by the philosopher and sociologist Nestor García Canclini in his most influential work called *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*.

Ms. Březinová notes that hybridity is by no means a new concept in Latin America. The most frequent use of the term in the region refers us to “mestizaje” – a phenomenon particularly significant at the time of inception of new states in Latin America in the first half of the 19th century. At the time, when these states sought to consolidate themselves, the ideal of racial and

cultural mixing, represented by the mestizo, was crucial in the search for the authentic Latin American vis-à-vis European or United States culture. Simultaneously, in the 19th century, the issue of racial purity presented a central concern for the Latin American societies, so these celebrations of diversity were mostly racial narratives of national identity attached to particular political agendas. They were central to the politicized rhetoric of assimilation, emerging in Latin America, whose authors succeeded, at least nominally, in incorporating pre-colonial cultures into the dominant societies in the early 20th century.

Kateřina Březinová then moves on to the notion of hybridity as conceptualized by Canclini. Canclini doesn't see Latin America's hybridity as an ethnic, cultural, racial or religious hybridity, but as a hybridity of different accesses to modernity. We can see this multi-temporal heterogeneity as far back as in Argentina in the 19th century. Argentina's sixth president Domingo Sarmiento noted, that both the 19th and 12th centuries live alongside each other – one in the cities, the other in the countryside. Ms. Březinová presents Canclini's opinion that this hybridity in terms of access to modernity can also help to explain the oblique powers involved in the mixing of liberal institutions and authoritarian habits, social democratic regimes with paternalistic regimes, in Latin America. Canclini studies contemporary processes of cultural hybridization demonstrating the extent to which they are linked to social inequalities and contradictions. In his perspective it is not a synonym for the reconciliation of things different or unequal. In this sense it is not enough to look at what has been fused, but also at what has been left out.

In the last part of her presentation Kateřina Březinová talks about the US – Mexican border. During the years 1994 – 2000 she was working with Canclini himself in the Mexican province of Tijuana. In the early 90's Tijuana was a place of great change, mainly due to the accelerated modernization of the region following the signing of NAFTA. Towards the end of the decade it fell into a state of calculatedly uncontrollable situation due to a takeover of Mexican drug cartels. The US – Mexican border, with its multidirectional migration, thus became a perfect example of a region that has lost all its natural relations between culture, geographical and social territories. In this way Tijuana could be seen as a metaphor for the hybridity of different accesses to modernity in Latin America.

Šárka Moravcová has chosen to talk about the theory of liberation that she argues to be particularly significant in Latin American thinking, because of the historical consciousness of conquest and the long term domination of external powers in the region. In her presentation she focuses especially on one of the most important Mexican proponents – Leopoldo Zea. He particularly reflects the concepts of liberation and identity and links them to the problematic phenomenon of indigenism and similarly presenting an alternative to the western Hegelian understanding of the topic. In the second part of her presentation Ms. Moravcová comments the relevance of Zea's ideas regarding the recent Zapatista movement in Mexico's southernmost province Chiapas.

To illustrate Zea's contribution Ms. Moravcová draws a comparison between Zea's and Hegelian versions of philosophy of history. To this end she poses three questions:

1. What is the aim of history? (And thus what methods should we use to study history? Should we try to objectively interpret the facts in history?)
2. How is the human consciousness related to individual freedom?
3. What determines the human mind? (And how is it reflected in historical processes?)

Hegel argues that all human activity is driven by reason and history in his opinion is a reflection of this transcendental rationality of the human spirit. The aim of history is therefore to be translated in a way that reflects the human spirit. The other part of Hegel's argument is that consciousness is a prerequisite for freedom – in order to be free, one has to be aware of it. According to Hegel the Greeks were the first to possess the level of consciousness necessary to be aware of their freedom. In contrast, he specifically argues that Asia is at the beginning of this process of realization and for that reason his theory is sometimes regarded to be Eurocentric.

Zea on the other hand is inspired by Hegelian ideas and he follows up on them saying, that there is a conscious desire for reciprocal recognition of its own freedom by another consciousness. In the context of Latin American philosophy he stresses the importance of self-awareness of the local thinkers coupled with external recognition by other cultures – especially the dominating western culture. Zea opposes Eurocentricism in Hegelian philosophy and claims that it is held falsely universal. At the same time he provides a possible solution to this problem – recognizing one's marginality and being recognized as such by those, who caused the marginality. He agrees, that freedom depends on self-consciousness, but he doesn't see it as a transcendental virtue, rather as a historical construct. In Latin America it is derived from history of suppression – first by European conquerors and presently, Zea argues, by the cultural and economic dominance of the United States for example in Mexico. It is therefore necessary to recognize, that there are more than one interpretation of the concept of historical consciousness. The historical conquest of Latin America for example has been seen in positive terms by Europeans, but for the natives it has been a very traumatic and humiliating experience.

Another important part of Zea's philosophy is his commentary on the Latin American identity. Ms. Moravcová quotes one of Zea's comments that characterizes the way he perceives the mestizo culture: "The mestizo, the son of an Indian woman and an Iberian father, will aspire, although unsuccessfully, to become part of the paternal world, feeling ashamed of his maternal origin." Zea is indeed very critical about the mixed identity that is suppressing its native origin in favor of the dominant western culture. Zea emphasizes the transcendental virtue of equality, which is not compatible with this view of superiority/inferiority.

Regarding the Zapatista rebellion Ms. Moravcová acknowledges, that there is some relevance between Zea's ideas and the movement itself. This can be seen as an example of the revival of the indigenous culture in south Mexico. However, she sees the limits of this comparison, because Zapatistas are asking for positive affirmation and special treatment rather than simply equal recognition within the society.

In his contribution to the discussion **Matyáš Pelant** talks about the issues of development and dependency in Brazilian politics. In the 20th century these issues have been at the center of attention in several theoretical concepts, which strive to find solutions for further political and economic progress. The two best known notions are developmentalism and dependence theory. In his case study Mr. Pelant attempts to determine, whether these models accurately reflect present Brazilian reality and if they can be used in analyzing contemporary Brazilian politics and policy-making, and its both internal and external dimensions.

First of all Mr. Pelant briefly defines and compares the two approaches. Developmentalism also known as development model was common in the 50's and the 60's and its aim was basically to catch up with the west. It was based on three primary policy components:

1. "Import Substitution Industrialization" – the focus on building industry

2. Accumulation of capital (to make industrialization possible)
3. Strong presence of state in economic development

However, there were some people that did not agree with this viewpoint. Proponents of the dependence theory opposed and challenged developmentalists, arguing that it is not enough simply to follow the western model, and therefore the dependistas argue that underdevelopment is not only a preliminary stage on the way to modernization. In order to move on to modernization, it is first necessary to identify the reasons behind underdevelopment and get rid of dependence on developed countries.

Getting back to Brazil, Mr. Pelant states that the country's politics are genetically equipped with the heritage of the Iberian tradition. Some authors claim that in Brazil that fact is responsible for technocracy, hypertrophy of state institutions, confusion between power and authority and the use of violence as a political means. Mr. Pelant agrees that the rules of the political system are predominantly western and is not only the Brazilian federalism that is largely inspired by the United States, but the country's republican tradition is also based on Comtian positivism. Comte's followers in Brazil somehow invert his positivist equation and want to precipitate the installation of the so-called "positive stage" – the final stage of development by state and even military intervention. We can therefore see that in the end of the 19th century the characteristically developmentalist idea, that national development lies in the inevitable development of the nation state through direct organization of society, is already in place. These developmentalist tendencies are present throughout the entire so-called Brazilian development cycle, in beginning of the 19th century when Getúlio Vargas was finishing the military authoritarian regime of 1964 – 85. Throughout the entire cycle there were tendencies to restrict the foreign import and to support domestic production sectors. The state was playing a role of an important investor and founder of major state enterprises. It was also acting increasingly confidently in the international arena in requesting new market areas and attempting to increase its multilateral engagements.

Even though the Brazilian intellectual background was decisive in the formulation of what became to be known as dependence theory, it did not have such huge impact on Brazilian politics. The simple reason is the 1964 military coup after which all the Brazilian thinkers responsible for its emergence were forced to leave the country for political reasons.

Mr. Pelant continues by commenting on the relations between the two theories and contemporary Brazilian politics. Surveys show that Brazil spends, especially in the social area, far more than other countries with comparable levels of income. The large number of ongoing governmental programs may indicate that the pattern of the developmental politics is still valid in Brazil. Brazilian foreign policy, Mr. Pelant argues, has an instrumental nature, because it has always resulted the nature of the Brazilian development cycle and its close relations to the country's economic and developmental objectives. Brazilian foreign policy tends to blame rich countries for imposing barriers and refers often to the need to redesign international order as its main objective – perhaps a trace of the dependista heritage.

Matyáš Pelant concludes that both theories can be useful tools in analyzing Brazilian politics. On the other hand, both theories have proven not to be entirely valid in their predictions – modernization did not automatically lead to democratization, while dependency on what we now call the global economy will not either be easy overcome. According to Pelant, both theories are also Eurocentric to a certain degree – they do not reflect Latin American social hierarchies. In Mr. Pelant's mind the underestimation of Latin American colonial and racial hierarchies lead

inevitably to an analytical impoverishment and to an inability to understand the complexities of the political and economic processes.

Miroslav Jurásek talks about the different variants of the theory of dependence and he seeks to extend the western concept of theoretical universalism in his presentation. He has chosen the theory of dependence, because it is undoubtedly the product of non-western political thinking, even though its connections to the western theory of modernization are obvious. However, the concept is a reaction to the failure of the import substitution and the countries' industrialization strategies. It is also based on macro-sociological model with specific economic principles as well as strong political implications and recommendations. Those are the main reasons that directed Mr. Jurásek's attention to dependence theory.

In his paper Jurásek concentrates on pointing out the factors that constitute a good theory, because all of them do not succeed to meet the required criteria. In his opinion a good theory is an abstract, simplified image reflecting reality and therefore a theory should not be determined only by subjective features, such as personal traits or author's education, but also by objective factors. Jurásek attempts to identify the relevant geographical factors.

Mr. Jurásek decided to compare dependence theory in two different regions – Latin America and Africa. He compares two authors: African Amir Samin and Latin American is Andre Gunder Frank. In his opinion it is suitable to compare these two authors, because both of them are dealing with underdevelopment of their respective region roughly at the same time.

Open debate

After the presentations the floor was opened for discussion.

Mr. Kratochvíl utilized his position as a moderator and posed a question to each speaker. Kateřina Březinová was asked to explain in greater detail Canclini's concept of modernity and to voice her opinion on whether there is a political agency hidden in the subtitle of the Canclini's book – is actually possible to enter or leave modernity? Šárka Moravcová was given a task to explain, why she has specifically chosen to compare Hegel with Zea. Matyáš Pelant was to answer what are the alternatives to developmentalism and dependence theory and why he claims that both of them are essentially Eurocentric. Miroslav Jurásek was asked about the expected results of his paper, if he is applying his paper for a specific empirical situation and also if he thinks some modifications are necessary when applying dependence theory for the African region.

Kateřina Březinová argues that it is not in fact possible to enter or leave modernity but it does indeed have a political agency, because his book is a kind of a recipe for an alternative approach to modernity and opposition to the tendency posed by some national elites in Latin America claiming to be the only ones introducing modernity to their countries.

Šárka Moravcová explains that she did not choose to compare Hegel with Zea, but rather wanted to illustrate to what extent Zea used Hegelian concepts. Zea often referred to Hegel and it was Ms. Moravcová's critical argument, that even when trying to be original, he was still starting from the same western ideas and concepts such as identity, freedom, justice etc.

Matyáš Pelant states that he doesn't see any relevant alternative to the dependence theory or developmentalism considering Latin American politics. Concerning the Eurocentric nature of these theories, he claims that the reason that led him to label them as such, was the fact that every author using these theories opposed the model of modernization that was essentially western.

Miroslav Jurásek answered, that he believes that dependence theory is quite easily transferable from one region to another, so there is no need for any substantial modification.

The first round of question being answered, **Mr. Kratochvíl** gave the floor to the audience.

Baghat Korany had several questions for the two panelists that were dealing with dependence theory. 1) What is a non-dependence situation in a globalised world? How is it measured? 2) Has the theory gone to the other extreme of modernization? Does it unintentionally blame external factors of all domestic problems? 3) What has happened to the theory since the 60's and 70's? Has it stagnated?

Wang Fan then asked Matyáš Pelant whether the contemporary Brazilian government clearly prefers developmentalism against dependence theory and should we rather talk about inter-dependence instead of dependence in today's Brazil.

Matyáš Pelant first answers Baghat Korany's questions, saying that non-dependency is indeed problematic to measure and that he in fact states in his paper, that it might be a misleading idea to try to get rid of all dependence on external factors. He also notes that the contrast to dependency would logically be isolation, which considering for example North Korea, is hardly the ideal situation for the Latin American countries. Regarding the second question, Mr. Pelant argues, that in Brazil it was not the case, because all the dependistas had to leave the country and possessed essentially the status of a dissident. Regarding the stagnating the dependence theory, Mr. Pelant believes, that at the time of its inception, it was a reaction to a specific situation and as such, it is less relevant today. **Miroslav Jurásek** adds that dependence could perhaps be measured by the volume of import of secondary technology into a given country.

Mr. Pelant then reacts to Wang Fan's question, agreeing, that it is unthinkable that as large country as Brazil would not be interdependent within the global economy. There is also a historically important phenomenon present in the Brazilian foreign policy – its special relationship with the south. Brazil is currently working on expanding its relationship with Africa, India and China, while maintaining its special relationship with the United States.