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The Prague Agenda - the Way Forward

Venue: Czernin Palace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague

Opening Remarks

Karel Schwarzenberg

Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished Colleagues, Allow me to welcome all of you, top experts in the nuclear portfolio, at this conference. It is indeed a great pleasure to host this gathering here, in the legendary Czernin Palace. It is quite fitting to begin with a question: why do we meet in Prague? Well, looking back over the past two years, I believe Prague is more than appropriate a place for such a meeting. In April 2009, President Obama announced in Prague his new bold nuclear agenda with its goals in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and having all nuclear material secured. April 2010, also in Prague, saw the US-Russia summit which concluded the New Start Treaty. We had the special honour of hosting the ceremony of signing of this ground-breaking document, which took place further down the hill, at the Prague Castle. Many more steps and developments have occurred since. And the phenomenon of Prague Agenda has taken on its own existence at the top of global political priorities.

As it tends to be useful in all areas of human pursuit, this conference may be a good opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved since President Obama's speech. You are here to examine where we are at on the trajectory he then described. He was setting the goalposts of what is now referred to as Prague Agenda - a term we are proud of. A lot of goals have been accomplished since, yet, many urgent tasks still remain ahead of us. So far, nuclear disarmament exists only in the form of bilateral nuclear arms control measures. As much as we are interested in further steps in this area, we are also curious about a potential shift towards a real multilateral process involving all nuclear powers. At the same time, we are extremely worried about the continuing non-compliance of some countries, notably North Korea and Iran, with international obligations. Are the restrictive measures applied against these violators sufficient? Can a full implementation of sanctions be ensured? Are there additional measures at our disposal that would help us to stop further spread of nuclear weapons?

We also keep assessing the chances of terrorists to get their hands on nuclear material and to use it. We have to continue our search for new ways of how to maintain our nuclear material secure and nuclear facilities under control. Will the conclusions of last year's Nuclear Security Summit help strengthen the various measures in place? Is there sufficient political will generated to bring about new ones? And how does the scope of the Summit relate to the poignant questions of nuclear safety - a topical issue these days when we look at the plight of the regions near Fukushima power plant.

Dear colleagues, I am sure the following discussions among government officials and experts in all three panels, during the coffee and lunch breaks and beyond will address much more questions than I have in my brief speech, and possibly will provide some answers. I also hope that with today's meeting a new tradition of conferences on Prague Agenda begins. After all, what would April in Prague be without debating nuclear issues? Let me wish you productive and fruitful discussions today and an enjoyable stay in Prague. Thank you.

Panel I: Taking Stock of the Prague Agenda

Jiří Schneider

The idea behind this conference, the Prague Agenda, is debated, that's why we have started to embrace the idea, so I'm grateful for the IIR for their assistance and the US embassy and ambassador for being very active in supporting this conference, and bringing one of the architects of the Prague Agenda: Gary Samore. We are also very happy that we have a representative of Russia, because what would be the Prague Agenda without Russia. I think it provides a new perception of Russia, and also because we have started with the EU we have important representatives from two countries of the EU who are not always on the same side.

You have all their resumes in their files, let me just say that I wish that Mr. Levy is here not as ambassador but as one of the top experts in the field. In Paris he served really close to the issue and I'm really happy we have him here. So now the floor will be open for the speakers, for the opening remarks, and then I hope we'll have time for a debate, this first panel is called taking stock. So I expect that there will be some stock taking in their presentations but also a perspective, what is ahead of us, what are the next challenges in implementing the Prague Agenda. So the first speaker is Gary Samore specialist to President Obama, he's sometimes called the proliferation czar in Washington, but now the czars are a Russian notion, so I don't know if you like it.

Gary Samore

Good morning, I'm pleased to be back in Prague for the third April in a row, I was here when Obama made his famous speech in Hradcanske square in which Obama laid out his plan and proposed a plan of action. Then last April I was back when Obama and Medvedev signed the

START treaty. Now I'm pleased to be back again and I want to thank Minister Schneider, the IIR for putting on the conference, and to take stock of the Prague Agenda.

Obama's Prague Agenda has 3 important parts, first, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons with countries that already have weapons like the US and Russia. Second: to prevent countries from acquiring more nuclear weapons, like Iran and North Korea who have violated their treaties and combat nuclear terrorism. And lastly, to develop new mechanisms that will spark the growth of new technologies that could be used as alternative sources of power.

In the two years since Obama's speech we have made progress in all 4 areas. The US nuclear doctrine has progressed in such a way that we have reduced the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense strategy while maintaining an arsenal to defend us and our allies. Last year's summit strengthened our support for cooperation and security. In just one year since the summit, we've already eliminated hundreds of nuclear weapons. In addition we've held a summit with our allies, and discussed the idea of setting up a fuel bank; we've also worked with countries like France and Russia in an effort to go against Iran and North Korea who have violated treaties.

The USA is moving forward with bio nuclear energy. We must learn from Japan, but we must continue to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Going forward President Obama is determined to prevent proliferation. Ensuring the IAEA has the resources to conduct effective monitoring and inspections. We continue to put pressure on Iran for developing weapons and North Korea to complete denuclearization, and to enhance security we'll continue to work with our partners. The Czech Republic and the nuclear research institute will continue to be a partner and important we look forward to the summit next year in Seoul.

I'd like to focus in more detail on the reduction of arms with Russia. As the two biggest powers we have a responsibility to take the lead in further reductions. To demonstrate our commitment, to nuclear arms control and strategic operation, the treaty has helped to strengthen the rest of the world and made it possible to deal with emerging threats. And finally, the cooperation between Washington and Moscow is important to maintaining European security. Even as the US and Russia implemented the treaty, we making preparations for further reductions.

Once our review is complete, this will help shape our approach. One idea we have is a single overall ceiling that will cover all warheads, non-strategic or otherwise. Although it will probably we wise to allow each side to have some room. We'll also look to decrease the role of tactical weapons and Russia looks to move away from NATO. NATO will identify the alliances requirements based on Russia's non-strategic forces.

Even before a new treaty had been completed, we'd like to tell our allies that steps could be taken towards greater transparency, in terms of the numbers and types of weapons that might serve as a starting point. Of course we recognize that the next round will be a hard task and take time to complete, this will require much more demanding techniques, which we will need to discuss with Russia to provide the basis for future arms reductions.

In parallel with our talks to Russia, President Obama is committed to developing a defense to emerging nuclear threats as Iran and North Korea. The European approach approved provides a timely effect to deal with threats that we will likely face in the next years. As President Obama has said our programs does not threaten Russia. Presidents Obama and Medvedev have agreed to cooperate to provide assurances to Russia, enhancing both countries' ability to defend against emerging threats: in Europe and worldwide.

The Czech ambassador to the US stressed that the Prague Agenda, epitomizes the importance of working together, President Obama agrees with that. The US is the largest supplier of commercial nuclear power, more than any other country. The Czech Republic is also a leader in nuclear energy, with a cutting edge facility, and expert scientists. The US does so without pollution or greenhouse gases, Fukushima underlies the concerns about safety, both the US and Czech Republic has reaffirmed their commitment to safe renewable energy.

In the summer both counties signed an agreement to expand our cooperation and to meet for the second time in 4 months to increase bilateral cooperation.

In conclusion Obama's Prague Agenda is alive and well, we all recognize that a world free of nuclear weapons will take a lot to achieve, none the less the Prague Agenda's key points outline a realistic vision: reducing the role of nuclear weapons with countries that already have preventing countries from acquiring more nuclear weapons and developing new mechanisms that will spark the growth of new technologies that could be used as alternative sources of power. Some argue that the spread cannot be stopped or checked and that we are destined to live in a world with nuclear weapons. Two years on, we are meeting this challenge and we are confident that we can live in a world where fewer nations have the tools of ultimate destruction. We are also confident that the way passes through Prague, and we look forward to future meetings in Prague.

Vladimir Leontiev

Thank you chairman, I'd like to thank our Czech hosts for putting on the conference. This Agenda is of important significance, and it's important to understand the President of the United States, and the Prague Agenda that was signed here by President Obama. The START treaty is important, for it brings the two countries some fifty years left, thus reimbursing half a century, but what makes it really special is the for the political strength that was negotiated not by adversaries but partners working together towards non-proliferation. This new generation of world leaders made this relationship possible by realizing their relationship to the globe. We should rely on joint decision making and comprehension is steadily growing. What makes this treaty really special is the set of principles. Second of all, the Russia president Medvedev called the result a win-win situation. That it was and that is what it should remain in the future, as we make further progress in the field its increasingly important to adapt to changes.

First of all, all changes should be relevant and functional with the existing agreements. From this point of view it was a building block for global security. It has more ways to disassociate all

countries from making more nuclear weapons and taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we cannot ignore the current provisions of the treaty. To make things clear let's mention there is one provision calling for reductions by the end of 2017. Russia's strategic arsenal will consist of 700 vehicles carrying up to 1500 missiles. The new restrictions on the treaty will have been introduced. They represent only a fraction and that makes up more than 300 pages of the treaty itself and all these rules and regulations that had been agreed bilaterally by Russia and the US.

The new experience shows that numbers and confidence building alone is not sufficient for building. There are factors that may negatively affect strategic defense and defenses in arms. This issue was relevant at this time, because it was at this time that the treaty was worked out. The treaty will continue to need to accommodate new developments such as the eventual deployment of weapons in outer space, and it could not ignore the future conflicts existing in regions. An increase or escalation by one side forces the other side to build up arms to compensate.

If Russia does succeed to cooperate, we will have a whole reason to stay, as fully fledged as President Medvedev emphasized. Our country is ready for European commitment. We're convinced that the European defense should build on the faces of the each other. It's a mutual respect of each other. The importance for us is to ensure the prevention of proliferation. That's why we think that the simple issue that we produce our defense. Unfortunately, in the process, what we need is clear, unambiguous, transparent guarantees that such a system will never be used. Our use of nuclear weapons will create a dividing line in the world. As we see it, we will be the judge and jury, where NATO and Europe protect themselves. It's important to us that the use of defense created by the US and NATO, does have any things that might undermine our capabilities. Agreements will be viable only if they take into account the solutions taken in steps

That's why we arrived at the situation today: that neither side crosses the line. So these are some of the lessons that should be drawn. From our point of view, they would be useful. We must assess the efficiency, the first session on bilateral consulting, was a good meeting with a constructive atmosphere, still it was just the first step in a journey that was scheduled to last 10 years. As Minister Ladrov said, in a recent address, this means that the weight of nuclear missiles that a number of issues be addressed including the rolling of all states without exception. For instance the issue of non strategic nuclear weapons is another issue that must be discussed. We take it as a starting point, another point is for deeper reductions, however, as protecting nuclear weapons, that's the first step in addressing this issue is to withdraw the state to which they belong, no discussion is possible without cooperation. As we can see there is still much left to do, but we believe that there is a positive dialogue with both the USA and Europe.

Pierre Lévy

Ladies and gentlemen let me tell you first of all that I am very grateful for being invited to contribute to this very important event. Patrick Masionnave regrets not being able to come to this meeting but he is busy at this time. I am very happy to bring the French view to this major debate and it has a special significance for me. As you recall, as I have worked on all this during my years as a policy planning staff and we have had many discussions with our American friends before the coming of the new administration and of course we all have in mind the extremely powerful speech by Obama in the long history of disarmament and non-proliferation, France welcomed it and shared its commitment to strengthen the nuclear proliferation regime in all its aspects and to work to its historical objective. I should also mention the summit in December 2009 and the START Treaty, we are conscious, it is a long process to create a safer world and to create the condition of the world without nuclear weapons. Remember that Obama said the goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in my lifetime and as we know how young President Obama is, and so it is a long process and it is all the more interesting to debate and assess the key trajectory.

The key question is for a statesman is to translate the vision into policy, it becomes a reality check, and in this manner, when it comes to a question of the security of our countries, and the constraints are obvious. It will happen with political and security conditions enable it to happen. That is the key element. So let's start from reality. I remember that President Sarkozy had a summit in September 2009 and spoke about how we live in a nuclear world, the huge proliferation crisis we had in Iran and North Korea. I won't elaborate on that cause that cause all this is well known but we see now in the current situation where countries are on the path to democracy, how Iran had the strategy of aggressive policy planning to reach its nuclear ambition. We remind us also that each time proponents their case for building nuclear weapons, we had the difficulties in front of us. We remember the long missile range just before 2009, just before the speech of President Obama, and they did the second nuclear test in May just after the signatory had exploded the US vision. And just before the summit of the US in the Security Council in 2009, Iran presented a letter that made reference to a new secret nuclear facility. So these are elements we need to have in mind and we are facing an extremely serious element with a country that consistently refused to consider all the offers made by us. This is a key element to keep in mind.

Second point, I want, by the way, to challenge the view among some governments and experts that insufficient process in design explains why proliferation continues. The relation is the other way around. When you see what happened in the past, you see that proliferation is explained by international regional dynamics rather than insufficient nuclear disarmament. When you look back at the history, the conclusion is that there is a lot at stake with the Iranian case, and it is clear that if we cannot stop proliferation, also with the North Korean case, it puts an end to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. There is a risk of hedging strategy and it is clear what has to be done in the framework, it is a question of the initial protocol and the role of the UN Security Council. Second remark, these gloomy pictures should not lead us to be depressed, passive or give up, but is a reason for us it is a reason to do more. We welcome very much the reduction of the action plan, we welcome the START Treaty, the significant reduction that you mentioned very well, and these two countries possess over 90 percent of weapon stockpiles. It came at the right time before the

security conference and I want to stress that is very important from the European perspective that these developments are extremely significant and help enhance our relations with Russia first of all by the level of trust with these key partners. We encourage further efforts and I was very happy to listen to both of you presenting what can be done and your views about that. About the START agreements, Obama spoke about this all this is of course extremely important. I want to stress that France has taken a lot of unprecedented, unilateral measures regarding nuclear disarmament and we believe that these elements are in concrete progress and to enhance international security and ours.

The first logical action, and I refer to Sarkozy in 2008 in Cherbourg, is that the first is to stop arming and to prevent buildup. These elements are very important. This means dismantling facilities dedicated to fissile production and nuclear testing sites. We also need to get states to ratify. Second question is the further reduction of two other larger arsenals and for the other nuclear powers to keep commitments; we question very much the value of such commitment. We need more transparency and confidence building, and this was mentioned by my US and Russian colleagues. That is very important. Let me underline the fact that from our side we took a lot of steps, and by the way, I want to challenge some ideas and to rectify some perception about these issues that I see from time to time. French nuclear deterrence has been protecting our country for over fifty years. It is a strategic function based on the principle of sufficiency. We work a lot and we are very much on the same line as the Brits. There was a treaty signed last November between London and Paris in order to increase the reliance and reliability of our arsenal. And France is fully committed to fulfill the objectives of the NPT, and you know for instance that France has already implemented 10 out of 13 steps, which were defined by the NPT conference in 2000. We have reduced our arsenal by half in ten years, we are again in the posture of strict self-sufficiency. Minimization is very important. We have stopped producing fissile material and now we have less than 300 warheads. It is very important to keep in mind, we have a shared responsibility and we need to accompany nuclear disarmament with credible disarmament in other fields to not have an arms race.

Last point, the way ahead. I won't present a comprehensive view, but just a few points. With NATO we saw the return again of a new debate with the preparation of the Lisbon Treaty, and the outcome is definitely stronger NATO and the heads of state have reaffirmed that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, which is an extremely important point to reassess. The fact also that missile defense is not a substitute for nuclear deterrence. The second task will take place at a meeting tomorrow and the day after tomorrow when we meet in Berlin. It is a question of security and collective defense of the alliance. We favor a pragmatic approach, starting from an analysis of our security and our threats. We start with a debate on tactical weapons, which has a lot of dimensions. The political one not the simplest one. The debate is starting and at the end, the point is to not weaken the nuclear alliance but to adapt it to the challenges and threats of the current security environment. Last point, nuclear security cooperation. It is of course impossible to not mention the events in Japan. It is too early to assess the consequences and lessons but we know that Fukushima will have an impact on the use of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It enforces the French emphasis on the responsible development of use of nuclear use worldwide and

the maximal safety with total transparency at both the national and international level, especially with the IAEA.

President Sarkozy in March 2010, stated that we need to make progress in this respect. We are very much on the same line with the Czech Republic, not only because we have to work together at the bilateral level, at the European level, to make safer and reassure the future of nuclear energy in Europe and in the world. We also have to work to the adoption of strong safety norms worldwide. Nuclear safety and nuclear security will be discussed later, they are not the same. The nuclear security summit in Washington was a great event and we look forward to the Seoul conference in 2012. Looking ahead, so my conclusion has three remarks. We have a common goal to work towards a safer world create the condition that will nuclear weapons less and make ultimately unnecessary. We have to act, obsessed with one question, will this initiative make our world safer? There can be no disarmament without collective security and vice versa. We are committed with other responsible members of the international community to work on this. Behind all of these is to broaden the world order of international world governance in this matter and the matter of efficiency in the whole system. Last remark, you mention the tradition of debate in Prague. I think it is a great idea, especially with this issue, I think we have to the much substance to feed a long tradition of debate in France on this very element for our future. Thanks a lot.

Peter Gottwald

Thank you very much, I think it's very appropriate, there's a lot to see, there's a lot that needs to said a and delivered. It's always a pleasure for me to come to Prague, a city with such history. Prague is very famous for its Charles University. It is an example of knowledge and reason, knowledge and reason that would teach us that nuclear programs must come to an end. History reminds us in '68 of the Prague Spring when tanks rolled through the square amid the belief in the Cold War. A new perspective is here in Prague, the important role that Prague plays in the vision of Obama in a world free of nuclear weapons. I was pleased that the treaty was signed here, this was very important and especially this year. Of course were very pleased with the overall treaty, but it's not complete in any event. We feel there is an opportunity at the moment for more progress. And also last year the document was a consequence of Obama's Agenda and positive spirit. Obviously, now we need to move forward, and one important area for that is the United States as Gary pointed out, one that is especially relevant, is the US safe guarding and security is possible.

At the same time there's no doubt that this will be a very complicated and long way, but we have to find those that feel that it is attainable and that we can make it happen. The view from the mountaintop isn't the same as the view from base camp, but we need to put our energy to get to the top. Kissinger said that nuclear weapons are less and less a necessity and more a liability. We need to submit a new rationale for the need of nuclear weapons. Let me use President Obama's Prague Agenda to identify some roadblocks and at the same time give my assessment. Let me start with the issue of nuclear power, I think it's very relevant to today. First clearly with the accident at Fukushima, it changed our perception of what's secure, and it is a reminder of what nuclear power

can bring, our thoughts are with the people of Japan, that are trying to cope with the disaster, but we must ask what can be learned. First we have to concede that nuclear power will never be 100 percent safe. At the same time I feel that it has to be said, that the IAEA organization needs to be strengthened. But there's a second aspect, and that is the degree of consent, on a nuclear accident can arise, imagine what the detonation of a single nuclear warhead, be it a terrorist plot or any other, would make 9/11 pale in comparison which is a lot for someone who was in New York when it happened to say.

With this in mind we need to look at how we can move the Prague Agenda forward. We feel that a very good start has been made, and what we've heard today, further reductions are necessary and possible. First the expectation of the international community is certainty and it includes the expectation that the arms reduction commitments are increasingly implemented with Russia and the US are willing to do that. And further ahead, of course, many complications are in the way that we haven't heard, but the missile defenses are significant and relevant. We should voice concerns and see these concerns reflected. It will be an issue at the NATO conference in Berlin later this week. And I do hope that the constructive spirit will carry over.

But now we of course have to see how we move forward inside the lines, the defense is very relevant exercise from the German point of view. It is very close to what the US has already done and should see that leaving an alliance is not too far behind, for Germany is technology of nuclear weapons. I think what has been said about the relevance of transparency is important, that we know better the aspirations of the state, and then we will be in a position to discuss what needs to happen. We need to engage each other, for why plants are as they are, I think at the same time while the flow on the negotiations we are feeling that the natural steps are that the 2 precedents can be pursued in parallel. This is something that will occupy quite a bit in the next years of an area where we need to move forward, an additional reason why, is we need to look at nuclear weapons and attacks. It's an object for discussion and the attempts of terrorist to get access of passports; to reduce and eliminate them is also a very important aspect.

I would also mention the non nuclear power agenda; we are conforming to NATO and member states and moving that process forward. At the moment it's still a very important process to move us ahead, not only to build confidence, but to shed the light of transparency on existing assets. What we all need to do to improve European security, is to enact these provisions in the 21st century. I'm very hopeful in that aspect, and that at the Berlin conference we can discuss in a friendly and cooperative way with all partners whose willingness will be required going forward. We all know that the success of last year's conference was very necessary and heartening, but there's still a very strong degree of difficulty and opinion between nuclear and non nuclear, west and south, the nuclear technology and those interested in using it for their own peaceful purposes. We are still very much engaged in this debate within the EU. At the moment the Middle East is a region undergoing a very significant change, so we do of course understand that that is one element unlike any others. I think there's an optimistic mood around these changes in the Middle East, that some of the states that can work this issue out for good. We can see if it's possible, but less important is the intention to move these states of the region into a dialogue to where they can overcome difficulties. Obviously with the existing states, this is very important in the context of

long term cooperation. The German point of view between global 0 and non proliferation is that, if we declare a practice of less and less nuclears, we set an example which will make it less and less effective, and we can demonstrate. If our security does not compel us to depend on them, then we can explain to other countries that it doesn't depend on them, like explaining this to Iran for example. Their security is very much challenged, and this issue can be of dependence for them. Of course Germany with its partners is doing its best to bring Iran to the negotiating table.

Nuclear terrorism is a very serious issue; we are grateful that Obama's Agenda does include that issue, and that Korea will organize the summit next year. Of course nuclear terrorism was not an issue during the cold war; it is now more and more a concern, so we are grateful that it is an issue now. Germany is very committed to cooperation, notably with Australia and Japan. At the conference in Berlin at the end of this month where we will try to work together and try to move forward, the presidents say that taking action and one of the next logical steps on the global Agenda. And like the USA, we feel that patience is a good thing but at some point it is necessary to overcome, and discuss with the partners, and make the start real serious and meaningful. Maybe that's a role for the United Nations. But this is one of the ways to be explored. We will be trying to cooperate with all our partners and handle all these threats. I'm very thankful to be sitting here, with all these partners. With the shared ultimate objective, and there is no doubt that we will cooperate with Russia with NATO to achieve it. I feel this conference is an excellent forum for that. Thank you very much.

Jiří Schneider

Thank you, you touched on the very reason we organized this conf, it's easy to agree on a law or objective, but not easy to agree on a tactic, and there are definitely some roadblocks or hurdles on the road to 0. This should serve as a platform where we should ultimately speak of these roadblocks, and the certain goal. It seems to me that some tools are outdated, military, legal, were still very much dependent on the path that we took on the cold war, its biological initiations, and there we have some multilateral which are not perfect and need to be upgraded and refurbished, there's an interesting element in this discussion, what's the proper balance in confidence building measures, and legally binding matters, it appears this is a real dilemma, the solutions are not only legally binding, or confidence building, but what is the proper mix because it's always a mix. And finally the Prague Agenda, from Prague perspective, its because of the current situation or more recent experience, will never be nuclear only, we can't separate decreasing the science of nuclear weapons, it necessarily increases the role on our weapons, the current weapons are much more deadly than in the past, so of course I thank you for mention, it's in the back of our minds for those who speak about the nuclear field as well.

Now I open the floor, thank you for your interesting presentations.

Panel II: Strategic Thinking: Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Ian Anthony

Thank you very much Petr and thanks to the organizers for making this possible. And thank you also for the title of this session “Strategic Thinking: Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. I think if we take these two words strategic thinking, there are three phases of arms control, usually developing a mandate and deciding what subject of the negotiations will be, then the negotiation of the agreement, and then the implementation of whatever has been agreed. And when we look at where we are at the very moment, in the current phase, the development of a phase of bilateral discussions between the US and Russia, well beginning the very important phase of the implementation of what has already been agreed and I think this is a good time for wider reflection. And I think the word strategic is very helpful because it seems to me what was said in the first session that arms control possibilities grow out of strategic realities, that arms control is not a value per se, but is a contributory factor to security building. So if we think about what is the strategic framework that we are currently placed in and I think it was Pierre Levy that made reference to what was on Obama’s mind when he was here and making his speech. We can look at the US National Security Strategy from 2010, which begins by what is called, “The World As It Is” and what did Obama have in mind when he was talking about the world as it is?

Well it is looking at the circle of peaceful democracies has been expanded, the specter of nuclear war as lifted and the major powers are at peace. And this is a conducive environment if we follow the logic of the documents laying out US nuclear policy for significant changes in the role of nuclear weapons in security. If we look at the strategy of the UK, laid out more or less at the same time, it was described that no state has the capability to pose a threat, which would require the use of nuclear weapons but in the longer term we can’t rule out a major shift where the international security situation changes in negative ways that would cause such a strategic threat to reemerge. Again, if we look at the two countries most directly connected with NATO and collective security environment, you can see that both of them describe a strategic concept that is rather permissive from the view of arms control. Now in terms of the NATO strategic concepts, it lays out the continued need for deterrence and I think that is a common and not contested feature across the NATO community but it doesn’t elaborate really on what deterrence is or should be in the present security context. At a very general level, deterrence meaning a response to a particular action is enduring and not challenged. The idea of deterrence at the very basic level is based on human behavior. But we can also see the version of deterrence that was applicable in the Cold War and which nuclear forces were deeply inclined, it doesn’t seem to be particularly useful as an instrument with the current threat perceptions in the strategic environment. That was again a common theme in the first panel.

So, if a new version of deterrence is required and we can’t run on with the business as usual, then what will it consist of and what is the role of nuclear weapons in this newly configured perception

of deterrence actually be? Well I don't have an answer to that question but what I will try to do in the next five or six minutes is to lay out the basic parameters in the way this question has been posed in recent times. If we look at the way the nuclear for structures have changed in the recent years, and particularly if we look at the European nuclear forces, we can see the growing acceptance of "deterrence to whom it may concern." That you have extremely powerful capabilities but they are not the target towards any specific country or specific actor. And that has many advantages in the approach to deterrence. Such huge and unwelcome Cold War and nuclear arsenals and that approach would take permit further reductions, in line with the Prague objectives. And it can also accommodate the approaches of the UK and France in particular when thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in European security. But it also has some significant disadvantages it seems to me, it may not provide the type of reassurance of the NATO community that the discussion of security illustrated that they still want. Many members of NATO made it clear that what they wanted was further reassurance and Article 5 guarantees although this may not be possible within the "deterrence to whom it may concern" concept. It also raises the question of whether those people who could be concerned can actually understand the message.

Here the point was made before that you have people like Kissinger who was writing that not only is deterrence not a solution to security problems but that it can actually exacerbate those problems. Because we are not in the Cold War where we had a risk-averse opponent who understood the rules of the game and helped to develop the rules of the game. But if you have a much more fluid situation where the potential targets of deterrence who either don't understand, or can't receive, the signal you are trying to send, or receive it and understand it but simply don't care, then deterrence because it is a conditional response and not a bluff can lead you into taking actions that you might not actually want to take cause the alternative to acting is undermining your credibility. So this is really what people like Kissinger means that deterrence in the present conditions can actually be dangerous. And of course this "deterrence to whom it may concern" leaves many unidentified risk spectrum completely unaddressed, like security issues that I have described that countries really do seem to be worried about. A second framework for thinking about deterrence, which has at least been written about in the past years, is so-called "tailored deterrence," where you will try to identify threats in a very specific way and then you will look at what are the most appropriate tools for dealing with these threats on an individual basis. The advantage of that is that it can take into account a very broad spectrum of current, present and future security concerns and this approach opens the door because it mixes a variety of instruments to tackle and identify threats. It opens the floor for comprehensive participation. But again this tailored deterrence concept itself has some disadvantages. First of all it makes it more difficult to explain how nuclear weapons is being de-emphasized. It is theoretically possible to do that but it requires a pretty extensive dialogue with the public. What was actually intended to be the reduced use of nuclear weapons to the public, actually seemed like the reinforcement of these.

Secondly, it requires a detailed catalog of threats to be agreed, which would be a difficult thing to do. If you look, for example, at the extensive debate about how Iran should be characterized, or not characterized as a threat to NATO. It shows how difficult it has been in fact to come up with a collective threat analysis within the alliance. If we move forward, the conclusion that you draw is

that deterrence is necessary but by itself it is not going to be sufficient, in any of its versions, to take into account the current strategic environment and what we need is a spectrum of responses. It would be extremely helpful if NATO embarks on deterrence, but that review shouldn't be disconnected from a variety of factors and carried out in a kind of vacuum. What are the other factors that need to be part of this spectrum? Well, defense is clearly one of them because it can address some of the issues of reassurance and burden sharing. It can help to manage some of the current and emerging threats, although there is a great deal of skepticism of whether the original version of missile defense acts as a comprehensive shield, is still not really accepted. Nevertheless there has been significant technological progress, which would allow you to implement this approach, which is now the collective view of the alliance. The second set of issues which I think need to be a part of this spectrum of responses is thinking about the role of the use of force. Here it seems to be spent a large part of the need of the strategic concept, and the focusing and refocusing on Article 5 and collective defense, within two months we find ourselves in a situation where in North Africa where NATO is acting outside of its traditional area of operations. It seems to me that this is a factor that continues to have to be a part of the discussion because NATO doesn't want to be in a situation where it is perceived by any of the countries around its periphery as a threat. It needs to be reinforced that NATO is not itself a threat to any of its neighbors and that is the only way that we are going to be able to build confidence and have an environment which allows further steps in arms control. And you wonder whether in fact the current effort in North Africa would give some indications on the way to think about the use of force by NATO as a NATO sense of principles that would be reassuring to countries around the periphery, since the current activities in North Africa have been rather carefully crafted.

Finally I have two more points, on the role of engagement in key states. And here it seems to me that this is a part of NATO's agenda that shouldn't be forgotten and I think it needs to have equal weight with some of the others. The idea of positive engagement with key states to manage problems together has to be a critical part of the policy going forward. And finally the issue of mutual arms constraint or arms control as you traditionally call it. Here I would say that the first panel made the point that we need to take the discussion beyond the role of nuclear weapons, and to look at conventional weapons, but I would say that there are a number of other issues which also need to be part of the discussion even if at the moment we haven't reached agreement on them. The CFE Treaty doesn't capture all of the things that people worry about. So the development of new types of weapons that are outside the scope of CFE also has to be a part of the discussion, a broader definition of CFE equipment and perhaps taking into account new types of precision strike weapons and also the role of space in the conduct of military operations are three sets of issues which are perfectly legitimate and necessary in the NATO agenda as it thinks about its current and anticipated threats. So with that, I would like to hand the floor back. Thank you very much.

Mark Fitzpatrick

Gary is so modest; he said he's been in Prague for 3 years in succession. What he didn't say is that he's the architect of the speech, he wrote the speech. I'd like to say that I replaced Gary Samore, I say this to try to inflate my own status, but that was 6 years ago, and being invited to this conference, helps me do that. If the Prague vision of nuclears is to become a reality, there are obviously a number of conditions that have to be created: security and enforcement. To me the security issues are the most important, the goal is not just the revival, but the architecture of such a world would have to make it at least as secure in the last 65 years since the atomic bomb was used, and far more secure than before the atomic bomb was used. Those 31 years before the atom bomb was used, was the most destructive time in modern history between 45-19

There's no guarantee that the 65 year record will continue. Especially as more states acquire more capabilities, and as non state actors express an interest, there's a chance that they might be used and as long as there's a chance that they might be used, there's every effort needed to keep in mind the security imperative to stop the use of nuclears. If states today are to be convinced to give them up, then they need to be convinced that rival states can't develop ones of their own. This will require more political will that exists today. If you look at the measure that exists, the NVT hasn't been enforced, and the violations aren't being enforced. What we have today on the books needs to make it clear that states won't get off without a severe penalty.

Obama has argued that USA stance towards disarmament is vital to the global disarmament. In addressing it head on, he sought to remove the double standard from the global debate. Nobody expected that reductions from Russia and the USA would give North Korea and Iran reason to abandon their ambition. But there was hope that this would at least help strengthen the global non proliferation regime. Even if they do accept and follow through, will the non nuclear states accept the demands? The answer so far is not clear, and the answer so far is not promising. Non proliferation obligations are made in exchange for non proliferation without recognizing that it's a benefit for all states. It's a benefit for everyone in the general sense. The unintended consequences of the Prague speech were the expectations for how far the USA could move. Obama hasn't had help domestically to make it a reality; he hasn't been helped by his foreman. For all his efforts, two years in have brought little results. And problems are getting worse. North Korea has abandoned its previous intentions in 2005 and now wants to be recognized.

Iran doesn't even want to talk about new confidence building measures. In Southeast Asia, there are rumors of Myanmar and their efforts with North Korea. And there at a dead end, with any efforts in south Asia seemingly locked. Syria was also at the heart of dispute and can't find what they were trying to build. And in the Middle East as a whole prospect of nuclear free zone hasn't improved and I think they have gotten worse. Four countries have purposely violated the treaty, Iraq, Libya, did so with its explicit request, more recently Iran and Syria have sought nuclear weapons and refused to allow the IAEA to get to the bottom of it. Meanwhile as long as Israel accepts, Egypt says they will not increase at all. The US and Russia have to agree to decrease their arsenals, and take other steps. A couple of weeks ago in Washington, I heard a former foreign minister, of the developing world, he said his state will not accept the protocol until the developed world accepts all

this protocol and then his country will only consider accepting. There has been some progress, the world is united in condemning North Korea, yet few states are willing to carry out indictment called for in North Korea, China in particular. Although North Korea is the most difficult case, Iran seems to attract the most attention. Unlike North Korea, Iran has not yet failed. If the Iranian case fails, the repercussions would be greater, and Iran is more likely to spark an all out war, and more likely to provoke a cascade. Saudi leaders talk about following suit if Iran does develop. But some of Iran's neighbors will at least want to have the option; they will be less inclined to accept limitations. Iran's professes that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes, but they are conflicted by its systematic hiding its program, breaking off communication, refusing questions, or refusing access of facilities, et cetera.

In conclusion, there is much to be done to enforce existing rules that will make the Prague Agenda possible, the NVT conference in New York last year produced an outcome that modestly improved the situation, but unfortunately it did little to significantly strengthen measures. It's regrettable it didn't do more to strengthen the IAEA, to tighten the terms, to prevent states doing what North Korea did. Too many states were happy to pocket Obama's steps towards disarmament, without giving anything back. So how the world responds to rule breakers is important today for how states deal with things in the future. Thank you.

Dmitry Trenin

First of all, thank you and for allowing me to be here. The Prague Treaty was extremely important as a symbol of the productivity of US-Russian relationships. It was also relevant to the reenergizing of the arms control process and non-proliferation agenda. But now, a year after the treaty was signed, the question is what are the next steps? People are talking about going deeper with reductions on strategic forces, maybe as low as 1000. People are talking about doing non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. People are taking about conventional forces in Europe, confidence building measures and a number of other things. I believe that it is all very valid and all these avenues should be pursued. Yet I would posit, ladies and gentlemen, that no amount of arms control can actually change the nature of the strategic relationship between the US and Russia, or more broadly, between NATO and Russia. With all due respect to arms control, it is essentially a means for regulating an adversarial or a post-adversarial relationship, a relationship which is largely devoid of trust.

As I look ahead, the issue that I think is of primary importance is not how to make strategic adversity safe but how to change the nature of the relationship, in order words how to make it less adversarial. The basis of that adversity is, in my view, the institutional and institutionalized memory of the Cold War with which will, for some, continue to live in the back of their minds. To change that we need to map a passage from arms control to something that is fundamentally different from arms control, a strategic collaboration. The passage I am talking about is the passage of post Cold War Europe to something, which I would call with my colleagues, and with the commission established by the Carnegie Endowment on Euro-Atlantic community. Something that members

would call a strategic community in the normative sense, meaning a state of relations which you simply do not expect, and reliably do not expect, and should not expect, and must not expect that conflicts will be used with the deployment of force. They are talking about essentially a demilitarized relationship in this part of the world and of all the projects that have been talked about recently a lot of people have zeroed in on ballistic missile defense in Europe as the project to focus upon that would be able to transform the strategic relationship. Ballistic missile defense is a strategic issue for the US. And I would say that it is the top foreign policy and security policy issue for Russia.

For Russia, it stands above its position in the US but it is important for the Europeans: West, Center and East. It has the advantage of combining the bottom-up approach of incremental collaboration because that is the way that you can build trust but it also has the top-down element because it is so central to core strategic planning in the countries involved. Missile defense cooperation was identified at the Lisbon Summit as the centerpiece of NATO-Russian collaboration, yet the difficulties in that area are obvious and are enormous. A mere juxtaposition of the initial NATO offer and Russian offer basically tell the same story. There is a lot of mistrust on both sides. Keeping a partner at an arm's length. Trying to embrace it so tight that it can't get out, basically it is the same thing. You do not trust your partner enough and you want to have either as loose a relationship or as tight a relationship with him. And frankly I am very skeptical that missile defense collaboration could be addressed by placing legal commitments at the top of the agenda. IR history is littered with non-aggression pacts dually concluded and then left by the wayside. This is not, in my view, the way, but the way is not to have only a very light relationship, but to have as much integration as possible where it is possible and what makes sense and work it from there.

Basically there are many asymmetries when talking about missile defense collaboration. The basic problem for the US of course is Iran and frankly, for Russia it's the US. That is simply the reality. But in my view, this collaboration is perfectly doable. There are principles that need to be put at the very top of the agenda as you address missile defense collaboration. There must be a clear understanding of the threat that exists and I think frankly that there are differences in how you gauge the threat. But in principle you see the threat from Moscow even as we see from Washington. The Threat in the region can be broadly defined as the Middle East. If you want to mention Iran by name does not really change much. People know what they are talking about.

The second claim that is important, is that people need to agree that they will be better off by collaborating than by not collaborating, in meeting and assessing the threat in that they basically agree. I talk about integrating some elements of missile defense cooperation arrangements and again there is a consensus among experts that at the level of information gathering, surveillance, and acquisition, you can and should have as much collaboration as possible. In this day and age you can do that virtually, but politically it would make sense to have Russian and NATO officers sitting in the same room, and working as an integrated unit, feeding information into their respective command structures. It is also clear that each side should be responsible for its own security. It is clear that sovereignty is sacred and shouldn't be comprised. It is also clear that sometimes you can be helped by another man's missile that would be able to hit something that is headed towards you, there needs to be protocols to discuss conditions under which interceptors could be deployed to

engage missiles over your partner's territory. It is also clear that partnership between Russia and the US can and should be full but cannot be equal in today's moment.

If you look at assets and resources between the US and Russia then you see a disparity, at least at this very moment. Full cooperation means that you cooperate from the very start; that everything must be transparent and cooperation is encouraged on all levels. That what we are talking about is intercepting missiles, missiles that neither the US or Russia possesses under terms of the INF Treaty. Let's talk about the missiles up to the range of 45 kilometers. It is also clear that you need to have a modern architecture from not only Russia and the US but also from European countries. This is not an abstract discussion. In June this year defense ministers from NATO and Russia council will meet to discuss whether missile defense will proceed with Russia or without Russia, in Europe. In November this year, the Russian government is scheduled to take a decision on the architecture of Russia's own missile defense system. And the question there is whether Russia will build its missile defense structures with NATO, or frankly, against NATO. So in my view, missile defense is a game changer or a game breaker and the time to act is now. Thank you very much.

Tibor Tóth

Thanks to the institute, Peter you mentioned your promotional chances, this looks to be an educated public an educated media. I was polishing my statement, I was planning to deliver a statement on two countries, but being inspired by the issues raised by my colleagues and I just turned around my notes from my colleagues, but with your permission, hopefully I will make this discussion more interesting. Let me start with this notion of the educated public and the media, probably international security is an issue too important to be left for experts. It is probably too important to be just left for experts and politicians. I want to talk about systems and system failures. There was a reference I think it was Mark you made reference to historical origins to where historical problems were emerging. You went to 1914, we could go back to 1890, if you want to see the roots of the two world wars, when the highest level of globalization was in Europe, there was unprecedented progress in living standards, and this is where things went wrong. We saw the labor arms race between Germany and the UK the mistrust and them istunderstanding.

This is a reminder where things went wrong and where we have to think carefully. In this respect, let me record some recent system failures, the references to Madoff, in context to the financial system failure, Warren Buffett called this the hydrogen bomb of the financial world. We have to be very careful in the international system which is much more complex than the financial system. If you go to Fukushima and you see the level is 7 right now. The question is for all international security systems. Are we level one or level two, could we be at level 3? How far can we take the safe secure use of nuclear energy? Will it keep us on the right path, which was characteristic for Europe in the pre-First World War period? Will arrangements like the NDT play a role? And can better arrangements can play a role?

I agree with the notion that Mark put forward, these aren't feel-good things, these are things that have to have a role, things that big countries have to make the best of. If you take South Asia, I don't think that the onus is on the treaty to make India or Pakistan come under a big tent. Weapons are more a liability than an asset, India and Pakistan aren't immune to this stance by Kissinger, whether there are terrorists, anywhere or in the region, whether it is in their interest, not to move up in the level of industrialization, it might be regional, or otherwise. But if they recognize that if these arrangements are there for them, it might be naive, but yes. Under this big tent they might make this new truth from the point of view of concessions, its new treaties.

It's up to the countries that are trying to address a specific security concern; they are trying to see it as a real tool to solve real problems. But I can see the TBT as a real tool for real problems, it's not just a feel good arrangement. You have to link it to a concrete problem, it's important that we see it to a real link to real problems. Although the TBT is signed by North Korea, there is no sustainable deauthorization. With Iran, the treaty should be used as a benchmark, but Iran will have to define itself, but whether on the non military use of nuclear energy, Iran will have to ratify the treaty. There were reports in India a couple of years ago, that the number of nukes in Pakistan increase by 1/3rd there is an arms race going on. This isn't only a program for a small part, we are all sitting in the same boat as it is clear from Fukushima. How one nuclear weapon would affect the whole of us. In the middle east, I myself can name more than 100 reasons why countries should not join the CTBT, but I see a reason again to manage a situation where new developments are the stakes are being raised from a safe secure safeguarding nuclear energy, Israel is not part of the MPB, but Israel is a signator if the CTBT, they are working with the middle east.

Compared to where we are on other issues, even the shape of other issues, we will have something tangible to build upon. From the point of view on the state of health of the nonproliferation regime, the TBT is half and half, yes it was important that was not a failure, and there is a lot to take care of. There are concrete issues we have to deal with, we have to go forward, it is symbolic for the CBT, it is the glue that is keeping together a lot of elements, whether it is the us making further reductions w the test door wide open the TBT is very important. It will be difficult to see the Prague Agenda moving forwards with the CTBT together with FMCT, they need each other. I know the youngest member elected to the parliament, the Irish man, they know something about bars, before you close the bar, you stop serving the drinks. I have to stop here, but the message is yes, we can expand on the realities, we have to do something, this is a big system, this is a complex system and we have to take care of it.

Panel III: Strengthening the Nuclear Security

Dana Drábová

First of all I have to apologize because I will only be able to spend with you half of this afternoon session. We must not forget the valuable work that has been done after the terrorists' attacks. In the same context, in the speech held by president Obama, he called the threat of nuclear weapons the most extreme threat to security. We all can agree that the threat of weapons on the black market is a serious threat.

As for the strengthening of security; the essential steps in this area, are how to detect and disrupt nuclear terrorism. The Czech Republic has had the premier position, to witness the Prague Agenda first hand. The actions derived from Obama's Prague speech spoke for themselves. A year after Obama returned to a new start treaty, regarding nuclear security. Obama set a closed door in his Prague speech. He invited 47 nations to a security summit. A global is being developed to strengthen the global cooperation. And the next that will take place in Seoul Korea, will cover a number of subjects, information security, transportation security, trafficking of uranium sources. The Czech Republic welcomes the launch of the security summit, in connection to this, I will welcome Mr. Kim Bong-Hyun , Lisa Hilliard, Khammar Mrabit, and Stamatios Tsalas,

Of course, also other institutions deal with international security of public institutions. First and foremost we are with the necessary infrastructure that protects nuclear facilities from theft, sabotage, and to combat illicitly trafficking in nuclears and other materials, other services include the protection of the state system, in the control of international materials, furthermore, the idea is, the use of such procedures, nuclear and radiological threats are discriminated between international conferences, the Czech Republic welcomes the contribution and strengthening of cooperation of the IAEA, including the exchange of information between states. We are strongly convinced about the importance of nuclear materials, my country has established the state system of the IAEA, between the communication abilities, and the other states as well. As I have already mentioned, the secretary of human resources and material, and the EU as well have been focusing on combating nuclear terrorism, Dr. Tsalas is our guest on behalf of the EU commission, and he will be commenting on the EU perspective of security. We are also of the view that nuclear security depends on organization and the operation of teamwork. In this regard, I'm pleased to welcome Ms. Hilliard director of international affairs at the World Institute for Nuclear Security. Ladies and gentlemen as a representative of the Czech Republic I feel it is my duty to acquaint you with my country's history. Since 2005 we have participated in the uranium enrichment and international project in the framework of this project, with the international community and the United States. However, within this generation the Czech Republic itself has also provided the material like transport materials to mention one. Being aware of the importance of these activities, the Czech Republic made the financial contribution of one hundred million which was given during 2008-09, finally let me say that strengthening the international safety, is essential for peace. I hope that here in Prague we will initiate proper discussion that sets us forward toward an enduring security, and to quote president Obama, toward a better future. Thank You.

Kim Bong-Hyun

I thank you for organizing this conference. I hope I can offer provocative points to you and then I can get a response from you. Today is the topic of “Moving Toward a Successful Nuclear Security.” Nuclear security is important as nuclear terrorism. It is the most immediate and extreme form of threat, is a global threat, and we have to promote nuclear energy for nuclear safety. The nuclear security summit premises are: political commitment on a voluntary basis, consistent with respective national laws and international obligations, in all aspects, from the storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials, preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use nuclear material for malicious purposes and the responsibility of each state to take security measures. In 2010, we raised the political profile of nuclear security to a summit level and provided an opportunity for global leaders to review on-going nuclear security efforts and to commit to new ones. The outcomes were many national statements which are the individual steps taken in support of commitments in the Communique and the Work Plan. The Communique is a high-level political commitment, and the Work Plan was a detailed guidance for national and international actions to implement the Communique. And the final documents of the Communique included national responsibilities, international cooperation, and cooperation with the private sector. The Work Plan was to ratify and implement treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism, to review national regulatory and legal requirements relating to nuclear security, working with the IAEA, converting civilian facilities that use HEU to non-weapons-usable materials, developing corporate cultures that prioritize nuclear security, and developing detection methods and forensics techniques. In 2012 in Korea, we are taking stock and going forward in nuclear security. Now we have a few key issues identified to further and expand the discussion based on the 2010 Work Plan:

1. HEU Management Guidelines (France)
 - a. Management and minimalization of HEU should be accompanied by technological support and international
2. Transportation Security (Japan)
 - a. It is important to maintain a balance between confidentiality and transparency and how can we protect sensitive information while sharing information for better international cooperation?
3. Illicit trafficking (Jordan)
 - a. The IAEA should play a central role in international information sharing for counter-terrorism efforts
 - b. INTERPOL could be invited to the 2012 Summit as a full participant
 - c. Setting up a CNS (Counter-terrorism Support Unit) Point of Contact (POC) should take into account different national needs
4. Nuclear forensics (Netherlands)
 - a. It proposed to create an international platform for nuclear forensics cooperation and information sharing, and to develop a nuclear
5. Nuclear security culture (Russia)
 - a. Developing a nuclear security culture is import to reduce insider threat, which could off-set measures to protect against outside threats
 - b. Important both for the industry and the academia
6. Treaty ratification (Indonesia)

- a. In emphasizing the need to ratify the CPPNM and the NTC, the working paper suggesting creating a ‘model national legislation’ (i.e. IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law) that includes all major nuclear security documents.
- b. Countries should share best practices
- 7. Coordination (Pakistan)
 - a. Coordination among existing initiatives, such as the GICNT and the G8-GP
 - b. IAEA should play a central coordinating role
- 8. Information security (UK)
 - a. Protecting intangible information (sensitive technology, knowledge) is as important as physically protecting nuclear materials/facilities
 - b. But should not deter academic research
 - c. Need to define the scope of the information that needs to be protected
- 9. Radioactive sources (Germany)
 - a. The possibility of a terrorist attack using a dirty bomb is high than nuclear terrorism
 - b. Public concern for large scale radiological accidents is also higher

There is the issue of nuclear safety, in which the Fukushima accident exposed vulnerabilities that can be exploited by persona of malicious threat. The same effect can be replicated by non-natural causes and security lesions need to be learned from the successes and failures of the current nuclear security system. The outcomes were the 2012 Communique and Work Plan and the works and progress since 2010. The ambitions are to ensure the highest political profile, an integrated legal framework, an implementation coordination framework (ICF), a policy coordination framework (PCF), agreement on beyond the 2012 NSS and greater public confidence in the use of nuclear energy. We need to raise public awareness, with videos of nuclear security activities of participating countries, and an official website. We are preparing two parallel events: the nuclear industry event, which is to be organized by KNP (Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd) and KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) and the Academia and NGO Event.

Stamatios Tsalas

Good afternoon, before I comment, I'd like to pass the good wishes of the director of the European Energy Commission who was not able to be present himself. To add a little bit, maybe to justify my presence, I was part of the team at the nuclear summit, and I'm still there, maybe there is some connection to nuclear security. So today I want to provide an overview the commission's role within the EU, and how the EU supports the strengthening of the EU's security both as a major donor and as a provider of practical assistance. In order to say more on nuclear security, I would like to introduce a definition of what nuclear security means, because the primary and secondary legislation of the EU does not define it. I would like to begin with Vienna to find a definition. The current draft of the IAEA contains three components of a states nuclear security regime. First the legislative and regulatory framework, secondly, the state institution which implement this framework, and third operational institutions for protection and response.

This regime applies to nuclear materials, and to demonstrated in my view, the previous regime covers more than just physical reduction. Now that we have a definition, we can try to see, to pass

on to the EU's own situation. The legal basis for the nuclear security regime is provided by the treaty on the EU. These treaties are complimented by the Lisbon treaty, these treaties regulate nuclear energy in a general way, in these treaties you may only act on confidences from the member states. In the light of these division on confidences, there is a spate of confidence for errors. And there is another important split, that is the action within the EU and outside the EU.

I don't particularly analyze who does what in the EU. But I will make some general observations concerning international efforts and efforts within the EU. The EU is very present in international efforts to improve security in the first instance. We provide technical and financial support for the organization and it goes back to the founding member states of the EU. This is done either directly or indirectly through the IAEA. The task of foreign ministers, the instrument of stability, and the instrument of pre accession. For the 2007-2013 budgetary cycle, the EU has set a mark of it goes back o the pre budgetary cycle. Including for support in establishing regional centers throughout the world. These financial instruments, are complimented by what was until recently known as joint action. In total the EU has become the largest donor to the IAEA's nuclear security fund.

It should be forgotten that EU member states are also major donors providers in their own right, EU member states are the leading forces in efforts to strengthen nuclear security. Not only does the EU promote the high level of nuclear security internationally, it also plays its part in ensuring that each of its member states enjoy a high level of nuclear security. No treaty mentions nuclear security per say, never the less the EU possesses some internal competences that make nuclear security inseparable from it. Moreover the less the EU has a common position that no member state will be without security. The general standard is agreed upon which is nonproliferation. A basic part of the declarations refers to the amount, type and location of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Nuclear material accountancy and control is our mission. It is no surprise that we saw a couple years ago the agency agreed to devise a manual to be used at institutional level for the purpose of nuclear security; the proposal will be finalized by the end of this month. Similar issues applied in other non security areas where the EU has competencies. For example, the safety of highly active sources, or transport of dangerous goods. This includes ensuring the safety securing radioactive sources or nuclear materials. We can consider these a manifestation for the overlapping of the three Ss: safety, security, and safeguards. The respective efforts are issues that are elemental for implementing other security measures. Before making changes to one of the s regimes, the possible consequences of the other s's must be carefully weighed.

Another area which the EU has competencies is derived from the treaty, having to do with freedom, justice, and security. This is the alter ego of the EU's internal market. This includes measures encouraging cooperation between member states. We can consider this distinction as the over mapping of safety and safeguards, before making changes the possible consequences. A second type of internal EU bonuses is the area of foreign policy of the EU's internal department. It includes cooperation between member states, which includes member states projects involved in developing new agendas for the security measures. The coordination of the 124 action and reaction file. They used to be set up a year ago and is making good progress over the next five years, the system guidelines. The CBRN advising group will make the maximum use of existing guidelines and will ensure adherence to existing guidelines. We can identify another competence that builds upon the

commissions long history of compliance with IAEA standards where it has become the leading international player, and provided a solid foundation for leadership for the assessment program. These will also if we use the word competence, in the sense of technical competence, in terms of technical competence, we can use the word. Similarly, years of experience, provided a solid foundation for expanding the radiation monitoring program as evidenced in the progress we've made. The experience gained through many years will be put to good use in the new European training center. It is difficult today to not have any reactions on the Fukushima accident. We have certainly a profound influence on future approaches to safety. But in a context of the decision or proposal that all the nuclear components will be subject to review in the coming months. The criteria for inspection will be in place by July 2011. One of these criteria is to not be blind with our judgment, were not prejudging outcomes of the safety. We should be open minded towards the possibilities that security measures need to be reappraised, but stressed that it shouldn't take the sacrificing of safety to achieve it.

In conclusion, I hope I was able to give you an overview of some of the EU's activities and a summary of the EU security goals. Within the EU we must maintain the means to strengthen our security, and outside the EU, through the nuclear security fund, we must maintain the funding for this in order to ensure security on both fronts. Ladies and gentlemen thank you for your attention.

Lisa Hilliard

Thank you very much, and like my colleagues before I would like to thank my Czech hosts and conference organizers for the event day, you can't beat this venue. Let me explain to you how WINS fits into the international nuclear security framework. The mission of WINS, which was created to fill a gap between the international and national initiatives, was to implement or strengthen nuclear security and the people with the responsibility on the ground for managing nuclear and other radioactive materials. The WINS concept was intended to be new, innovative and put WINS in a unique position to disseminate best practices, bring together experts, professionals, operators, guards to talk about their experiences and to develop a set of best practices. The original founders of WINS included the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the NGI part of the US Dept of Energy as well as the government of Canada. They were the original funders and the government of Norway also gave some funding to WINS to help pay for participation of professionals from developing countries. Since then the UK Commonwealth Office has contributed funds to WINS, as has the US Department of State. So for now WINS is still relying on government money, but for the next foreseeable future, we are going to be looking at other funding sources.

Today WINS has over 500 members in over fifty countries and let me get to the point as to why we are here. As Gary pointed out this morning and we have been hearing all day, from the Prague Speech of President Obama two years ago, there were four general pillars that he stressed: securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world, setting new standards and pursue new partnerships and also developing new mechanisms to support the growth of safe nuclear power and applications. WINS fits quite nicely into this by bridging the gap between government commitments and what

happens on the ground. The exchange of best practices has also been highlighted in some of the series summit outcomes. So how does WINS do what it does? We bring together operators and the industry to take leadership in nuclear security to supplement what governments and people are doing with responsibility on a day-to-day basis. We look at all the different aspects that you have to take into consideration in doing the job on the ground and develop international best practices. So we bring together the experts, we identify the problems, where the gaps exist, share experiences, document the best practices, and translate them into relevant languages, we use seven languages including Japanese and then disseminate the best information to practitioners worldwide. What you have here are the workshops conducted in 2010, aiming to be timely and responsive issues of today, mainly focusing on raising security awareness, we don't get into technical recommendations of what is the best way to do something. WINS uses innovative techniques, what you see here is electronic voting that you can see in the left hand side, we tried to bring people into the discussion by employing professional actors with a scenario of a nuclear security incident, and then how the CEO and other officials would respond to what they originally thought was a safety incident, but instead a malicious act. This show you the WINS style, again engaging people in the workshop, bringing people into groups and tables, rather than just listening to presentations so that they get the most out of their experience. And then also practical exercises, this was a training workshop that took place in Canada last year. Again, the dialogue and exchange with industry to know what governments are doing, but it is important to know that WINS is not promoting nuclear power but for those who choose to take nuclear power, to make sure that it is handled responsibly. This is a list of the best practice guides that WINS published in 2010, a full range from security culture to even security of well logging and radioactive sources. This is to point out that the WINS website is also available in the languages you can see at the bottom there, if you join, you get all the best practice guides.

This is our list of guides that we intend to publish in 2011, it is a pretty ambitious, and all of this will lead up to a compendium that will lead up to the summit in Korea next year. Inside of our guides, we ask questions to raise awareness of the things that someone would need to take into account in the subject matter of the guide and then there is a self-assessment at the end where you can determine if you have a lot of work to do and qualify into category one or two or on the higher end and doing well although there is always room for improvement. The plan for 2011 and 2012 will bring WINS into education and training and in particular, something that we have been working on recently, engaging scientists and engineers in the importance of security, including designing insecurity, taking it into account while building rather than adding security measures later on. Basically getting it right from the beginning. In summary, WINS is promoting best practices, supporting the efforts of states, bringing practitioners together through workshops, producing best practice guides, being proactive, and trying to make a difference. Thank you very much.

Khamar Mrabit

Distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen good afternoon to all of you. It gives me great pleasure to be here with you today and participate in the third panel, “Strengthening the nuclear security” under the Prague Agenda- The Way Forward. I welcome this opportunity to make my first speech, less than a week after taking over as the new Director of the Office of Nuclear Security at the IAEA. I do so a little over nine years since the IAEA board of governors approved the first three year nuclear security plan; as one of major steps by the international community to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. I do so too exactly a year after the nuclear security summit in Washington which recognized the essential role of the IAEA in the global nuclear security framework. The IAEA of course welcomed that recognition of its role and the value of the program that it has implemented since 2002. Under this program the agency has significantly contributed to the establishment of a global nuclear security framework and has assisted states to improve their national nuclear security regimes. I do not wish to give chapter and verse on past activities. These are covered by the various reports to our policy making organs and in other documents.

But just to outline some achievements since 2002, the agency has produced 15 documents in the nuclear security series to assist and guide states in meeting their obligation under the global nuclear security framework; we have carried out, upon request from states, almost 100 peer review and advisory missions; we have developed, with the states concerned, some 52 integrated nuclear security support plans to identify proactively where work needs to be done in states and to act as a coordination tool for the implementation of that work, we have trained some 10000 people from around 120 states on all aspects of nuclear security we have improved physical protection measures at more than 100 facilities; and we have cleaned up some 4700 vulnerable radioactive sources. These are impressive achievements which would not have been possible without the dynamic efforts and full commitment of my predecessor Anita Nilsson.

Today we would like to look more to the future in particular what I see as opportunities and challenges associated with the strengthening the global nuclear security framework and ensuring that the entire framework is truly universal and enjoys effective support by all states. I would also like to outline the role that IAEA has and can play in overcoming the difficulties in achieving this goal. The global nuclear security framework I am referring to has three pillars: the first is the legally binding and non binding international instruments adopted under both IAEA and other auspices these are instruments such as the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, and its 2005 amendment, the international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism (the Nuclear Terrorism Convention) the united nations security council resolution 1540 and the code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources. The second pillar is composed of the IAEA nuclear security guidance established under its nuclear security series. This guidance is used by the IAEA to provide, upon request, support to help states establish and sustain their capacity building through modular peer reviews and advisory services, human resources development and education and training, and knowledge network to share experience and lessons

learned. The third pillar is a national nuclear security infrastructure that each state should have and maintain including legal regulatory and enforcement infrastructure.

It may sound strange for me to say that we have to establish a truly universal framework, when I have just said that such a global framework already exists. I start from the premise that although we have a global framework, it does not yet enjoy full universal effective support. For instance, the ctpnm has 145 parties but only 46 states have so far adopted the 2005 amendment; there are only 77 parties to the nuclear terrorism convention. To my mind, in order to achieve the goal of full universal effective support for the global nuclear security framework, including the international instruments we have to address a number of concerns expressed or perceived by some states, some counterparts may argue that these concerns are political rather than real or have already been addressed but the fact that they continue to be expressed or perceived means that we have to continue arguing against them.

The first argument is that new security requirements are importantly perceived by some states as another barrier to slow down or stop the use or expansion of nuclear energy and nuclear application by those who wish to go down that path. It requires constant efforts to reverse this argument. But put importantly, in the current climate it is inconceivable that new build will go ahead without addressing the three key areas of global nuclear governance: security, safeguards as building blocks for promoting safe, secure and peaceful nuclear energy. So we have to see security along with safety and safeguards as enabling factors to new build, not hindrance or barriers to entry or expansion of such technology. They are a means of providing assurances to both other states and civil society that new build will take place with the highest possible standards and guidance's. Without such assurances, you will not be able to effectively move forward.

The second restraint that we have to overcome is that security is an issue for some people and not others. In addition recent political upheavals have demonstrated the fallacy of that argument. The illicit trafficking database information's shows weaknesses in material security and detection capabilities and practices in many different locations. The international community cannot take the risk of allowing terrorists to exploit weaknesses and/or unrest in a state to acquire material for use in a dirty bomb or worse. Security is a global issue; it is for all and not for some.

The third restraint is the confidentiality surrounding nuclear security and its sensitive character that could be seen by some counterparts as a limited factor for global governance and international cooperation. While it is right that the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with individual states and that sensitive information shall be protected. It is also widely recognized that nuclear security is a global issue that requires global approach. This global approach and global governance can only be facilitated through effective international cooperation so that less developed nuclear security counterparts can benefit from more advanced nuclear security performers.

The fourth restraint is the lack of predictable and assured regular budgeted resources to allow the iaea to fully plan and implement an adequate and effective nuclear security program that meets the needs of states. In addition, conditions attached by donor states to have their limitations on the use of their voluntary contributions have created difficulties in implementing the iaea nuclear

security program. Currently, the nuclear security program relies on more than 80% of extra budgetary resources. The question we have to address is how to move forward and continuously improve the global nuclear security framework. I understand that there is always the temptation to try to work with those who share your vision. I would argue that attractive through this path is, it is ultimately self defeating because it creates the risk that you may end up with differing standards applying to differing groups or other groups establishing their own mechanisms and guidance. This in turn will weaken the global nuclear security framework and will lead to gaps which terrorists will exploit.

The only sustainable way forward, therefore is to effectively establish truly universal and implementable nuclear security standards and I use that word to be provocative. That means bringing in all stakeholders, even those to whom you do not find it easy to walk to, so that the people who will have to implement these standards and guidance have a stake in drafting them and therefore a sense of ownership. This is where the IAEA is ideally placed to play a leading role in security. We have 151 member states. We have already supported the framework through CPPNM and the code of conduct for the safety and security of radioactive sources. We have in addition; produced 15 documents in the nuclear security series and many others are in the pipeline. By this I mean the nuclear security fundamentals' recommendation and guidance. These documents assist states to meet their obligations under the international instruments and also establish and maintain effective nuclear security infrastructure. We also provide upon request, tailored peer reviews and advisory services, and education and training, based on international guidance.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of international cooperation through the IAEA for a strong and effective global nuclear security framework that includes international instruments security guidelines, peer reviews, advisory services, education and training and knowledge networks that work synergistically to help strengthen and sustain national nuclear infrastructures and capacity building. I reiterate that nuclear security is an indispensable enabler and not hindrance, of reliable and credible use of nuclear technologies. Thank you.