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Perspectives

Review of International Affairs

Contents

Three Incarnations of The Quiet American: Applying Campbell's 'foreign policy' to Sub-Elite Identifiers[1]

GEORGE HAYS II

Abstract: This article examines Campbell's concept of 'foreign policy' and its application to identifiers 'below' those utilized by Campbell. Campbell's discussion of 'foreign policy' at the level of the ruling elite, though perhaps necessary for the historical breadth of his analysis, provides a skewed and privileged understanding of both national identity and its creation. Through an analysis of 'foreign policy' at the sub-elite level, using the three versions of The Quiet American as illustrative examples, this article demonstrates that a separation of 'foreign policy' from Foreign Policy can yield multiple potentially conflicting national identities. While at times taking on the form of an argument *ad absurdum*, it is not the intent of this article to disprove Campbell's work. Rather, its intent is to use the concept of 'foreign policy' with a different level of identifier to demonstrate that the tenuousness and indefiniteness of national identity are actually greater than those proposed by Campbell.

Keywords: Campbell, foreign policy, deconstruction, American identity, film

Fiction is a long, rambling encounter with many things ... Fiction re-complicates what politicians wish to oversimplify.

Mohsin Hamid

INTRODUCTION

The topic of identity is one, if not *the*, area of great interest in poststructuralism. How a state sees itself, how it sees others, and how it sees the relationships formed therewith are all important questions greatly impacting International Relations in both theory and practice. One of the more valuable contributions to this area of concern is David Campbell's *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Released in a revised edition just three years before 9/11, Campbell's book attempts to provide an alternate understanding of American foreign policy, specifi-

cally American foreign policy during the Cold War, through the deconstruction of national identity in general and American identity in particular. At the center of his analysis is the role of conflict in defining the 'other,' which thereby allows and determines the identity of the self. This is what Campbell terms 'foreign policy' (Campbell, 1998b: 68–69). His vehicle for this identification through conflict is the Foreign Policy of the state (in the traditional understanding of the term foreign policy) (ibid.). As will be argued here, the equating of national identity with state identity, and specifically the reliance upon the identifiers which Campbell uses in his analysis, perpetuates an understanding of national identity which has, at its base, the rationalist-dominated discourse in International Relations. This running assumption greatly impacts the result of any question regarding national identity.

This article aims to provide an alternative analysis of American national identity using Campbell's premises, save one: 'foreign policy' will here be divested from Foreign Policy in its application to national identity. In order to do this, an analysis of the three incarnations of *The Quiet American* by Graham Greene will be provided. It is the goal of this analysis to demonstrate the greater complexity existing in identity formation, the multiplicity of identities subsumed under the single term 'America,' and the multiplicity of temporal contexts impacting the identification process.

There are several levels and components in this article that touch upon areas of investigation discussed elsewhere. The time periods and events at the core of this article are tied to the Cold War and the transitions between the Cold War and the post-Cold War 90's as well as the transition from the 90's to the decade beginning with the September 11 attacks. The Cold War and the War on Terror, perceived both separately and as linked through the 90's, have been a fertile ground for metaphorical analysis as evidenced by (in addition to Campbell's *Writing Security*) Ivie's three chapters on the Cold War metaphor in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, Cameron's *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War* and Colas's *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' after the Cold War*. While these works, and many others like them, concentrate on textual analyses of policy-maker pronouncements, others have ventured into the area of metaphors in the arts, including film.

Drulak's *Metaphors of the Cold War* (*Metafory studená války*) looks at both the American and the Soviet understandings of the Cold War in the areas of political pronouncements, theorists' pronouncements, and artistic pronouncements. These investigations, however, all concentrate on identifying the Cold War primarily, with identification of the participants being secondary and/or by virtue of the one participant being identified by way of the other participant (American identification vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and vice versa). Identification of the self and/or the participation in identification by the sub-elite and audience does not really figure in this project. A good example of this is in Drulak's chapter 'The Cold War in the Arts' ('Studená válka v umění'), where he discusses *The Third Man* (Drulak, 2009: 243–246), another

work of Graham Greene's. This work (also an example of a work that exists as both a book and its film adaptations) (Greene, 1950; Reed, 1949) is more famous and influential as a description of the Cold War than *The Quiet American*. In the same chapter, Drulak also examines Stanley Kubrick's film *Dr. Strangelove* (Drulak, 2009: 250–253). Again, the object of the analyses is to describe the Cold War and the relationship between the two actors in it, not to investigate the self-identification of either of them vis-à-vis the audience, which is the structure of the analysis in this article. As we shall see, changing the components of the identificational relationship from a static 'representation-of-America' vs. 'representation-of-Other' to a more dynamic inclusion of the audience yields a different resultant identity.

In the above analyses, in addition to being concerned mostly with metaphors of the event rather than the actors, discussion of the actors is limited to the state level, meaning the political elite. Instances where this is not the case are exemplified well by Kaldor's examination of sub-elite national identificational actors (Kaldor, 2005) and Muller's analysis of sub-elite understandings of the 'self/other' in both negative and positive contexts (Muller, 2008) (both are discussed in greater depth in subsequent sections below). While the two authors examine sub-elite identification in different degrees and towards different ends, neither uses film or directs their analysis towards the US. In the case of Kaldor, a New War theorist, this makes sense. The greatest interest for the impacts of sub-elite national identifiers is in failing states (Yugoslavia in Kaldor's case) or post-colonial spaces. The US is not a failing state, nor is it considered to be a post-colonial space, yet the existence of sub-elites, the communication tools at their disposal, and the potential for 'foreign policy' are all there.

In between the two editions of *Writing Security*, Campbell also published a work concentrating on the events in the Balkans in the 1990's – *National Deconstruction*. In this work, Campbell looks at the splintering of the Yugoslav state, at its deconstruction (Campbell, 1998a: 17–20). This deconstruction happens at the hands of several parties, but also at the hands of the sub-elites of Yugoslavia. Campbell concentrates on the transitions from 'state' to 'states,' but the legitimating identities for those states come from somewhere. Although Campbell challenges the traditional pairing of national identity with state territoriality, the emotional, historical, and theoretical mechanisms he employs all revolve around the state (ibid.: Chapter 1). The terrible specters of the Holocaust raised during the Yugoslav wars are, as he rightly states, due in part to this terrible pairing (ibid.: 8–13). As a question of legitimation of national identities, however, the resultant expulsion of the other need not happen. It did happen in Yugoslavia, but it is not necessary. Furthermore, it is a separate act rising from the contestation of a single legitimate identity by a multitude of legitimating identities. In the Yugoslav wars, a popular example of splintering nation/state relations, the legitimating identities had recourse to 'historical' territories as well. This would seem to make the terrible pairing more likely. The US, howev-

er, does not have such an alliance between legitimating identities and territories, at least not since the resolution of the Civil War.

Cederman provides an analysis of analyses (Cederman, 2002) that is helpful at shedding light on the question of sub-elites and identity (indeed, also by way of Yugoslavia) which has been building up in the above review. He demonstrates that through the various understandings of state and nation as both individual concepts and relational concepts, there are various forms of 'constructive identity' which are actually being discussed by theorists (ibid.: 410–413). Campbell's understanding of the state and the nation would appear to fall in line with Cederman's Type 4 constructivism, where both the nation and the state are problematized (ibid.: 413, 419–422). But the problem is that while he accepts the *problematizability* of the nation, Campbell almost exclusively looks at the problematizing of the state by virtue of the combination of Foreign Policy and 'foreign policy.' Without act or intent, this moves his analysis to Type 2, where the state is problematized while the nation is accepted without problematization (ibid.: 413). This is a very different form of analysis than what would seem to be intended by Campbell's arguments elsewhere, yet it is the de facto position he comes into from his analysis concentrating on that nexus of state-act and identity-differentiation.

At issue between the Type 2 and Type 4 versions (and the Type 3 version between them) is the performativity of identity (held in the question of whether or not to problematize the identity of the state and/or nation), but also the legitimacy of the identities involved. Campbell accepts the need and right to problematize both state and national identity, yet he only problematizes the state. This leaves open to question the issue of legitimacy regarding the Foreign Policy actions of the political elite, yet it also, and in the same action, questions the legitimacy of the 'foreign policy' performance-representation of the elite for those subsumed under the structures concerning Foreign Policy, i.e. the citizens of the state.

It is only proper to provide a summary of *Writing Security* before delving into a further analysis critiquing it. Following the summary will be a clarification of premises taken from Campbell as well as a few additional premises. Those premises will be discussed and justified. Then there will be a brief recounting of the basic story of *The Quiet American*, as well as a discussion concerning the value in using it. Points of the plot which are of specific importance to the analysis will be presented and analyzed through the three different versions of the story by using guiding questions. This will be followed by a brief connection back to Campbell and a conclusion.

WRITING SECURITY

Campbell's work aims to demonstrate that 'we can understand the state as having "no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality"' (Campbell, 1998b: 9). Specifically, he argues that, rather than being an independently and objec-

tively existential thing, the United States' identity is the perpetually created product of its foreign policy and thus that the United States' foreign policy and foreign policy creation are central to the existence of the nation's identity (ibid.: 8). Campbell supports himself by way of recounting the history of the identity/differentiation concept in the emergence of the state in Europe, the concept's export to the American colonies, its engraining into the fledgling American state, and its role in the Cold War. After tracing the identity/differentiation concept up through the Cold War, Campbell further looks into its manifestations in the post-Cold War world.

Campbell begins with a brief argument problematizing, and defending the need to problematize, the concept of the state and state identity. He argues that identity is perpetually created by a state through the temporally dependent '*stylized repetition of acts*' (italics in original) (ibid.: 10) which propagates the identity-cum-difference relationship (ibid.: 9–10). Campbell applies this base to the problematization of the Cold War, the pronouncement of its being finished, and the inherent meaning of understanding and identity which exists in that pronouncement (ibid.: 15–17). In the course of re-investigating the nature of the Cold War's emergence, he discovers in the internal documents foundational to the United States' position at the beginning of the Cold War the explicit and implicit recognition that the main 'fear' and 'enemy' was actually disorder and anarchy, with the Soviet Union being at most a medium of its deliverance (ibid.: 19–33). With the true enemy being anarchy and disorder, a non-temporally specific enemy, Campbell continues by researching its history and evolution in relation to the state.

In order to understand the fear of disorder and anarchy in relation to the state, Campbell first examines the emergence of the state. Disregarding the 'traditional narrative' of the emergence of the state being a change in social organization surrounding the event of the Peace of Westphalia, Campbell shows that the 'state' which emerged after Westphalia and the end of Christendom was a new means toward performing the old task of securing identity amid disorder. The internal religious conflicts that emerged in Christendom tore apart the identifying powers that had been in place since the fall of the Roman Empire. The new 'states,' formed along these denominational divides, allowed for a new manner of identification concerned with danger and difference without reliance on God, altering and adding another level of fear and difference onto the world (ibid.: 40–48). True to its religious roots, the new state maintained the evangelism of fear that became so prominent in the centuries of Christendom. Contrary to the term's religious usage, however, where fear of personal corruption led to intense self-reflection in order to stave off Hell after death, the new state propagated the evangelism of fear in terms of the corruption of individuals leading to the death of the state (ibid.: 48–51).

The evangelism of fear incited by the state was concerned with the reversion of humankind back to the anarchic, disordered, and (thereby) dangerous world of

'nature' which existed before the 'state' (ibid.: 61–62). With the fear propagated being one of disorder in absence of the state, the internal state necessarily became identified as order (ibid.: 62–63). Anything which challenged or threatened this identity was considered to be 'foreign' in the sense of being beyond the spatial/identificational boundary of internal state order. This identificational process, which Campbell calls 'foreign policy,' impacts the traditionally understood Foreign Policy between states, and vice versa (ibid.: 68–69).

Having introduced the conceptual split between 'foreign policy' and Foreign Policy,[2] the delineation between a spatial/identificational inside and an outside, Campbell provides an argument demonstrating the simultaneous creation of complementary moral spaces, where the inside, as well as being ordered, is morally superior to the outside (Campbell, 1998b: 73–74). The discursive 'main means' towards this moral-identification of space, where the inside is good and ordered, and the outside is bad, disordered and threatening, is the body (ibid.: 75). Campbell charts the development of identity/difference through the evolution of the *corpus mysticum* (referenced as the body of Christ) into the *corpus mysticum* (re-referenced as the body of the Church), and subsequently, after Westphalia, into the body politic (ibid.: 75–80).

The identification of the state by means of the body is very important. Campbell shows that this metaphorical understanding opens the way to an identification of 'otherness' as a deadly disease which can easily infiltrate the body and must, therefore, always be guarded against (ibid.: 82–86). This understanding of the inside/outside combines with the American identification traditions of Puritanism, revolution, and the perpetual frontier (that being the edge of civilization-order/nature-anarchy) to produce a super fear of being 'infected' by 'pathogens' leading to the 'death' of the state and a return to anarchy, all due to proximity to the 'infection' of nature-anarchy.

Campbell traces this fear of infection by anarchy through the Puritan times (where proximity to Native Americans and distance from Europe threatened the colonists' maintenance within civilization) (ibid.: 107–116) and through the revolutionary period (where, having abandoned their Europeaness yet still confronted with the anarchic frontier, the colonists' maintenance within civilization was even more threatened) to the post-revolutionary period (where the European combined with the frontier as a threat in terms of immigration, foreign power, and foreign power manipulating the frontier) (ibid.: 119–130). In each of these periods, the threat of infection by anarchy promised to demonstrate itself by a breakdown in internal order, which meant civil unrest, attacks on the Puritan-capitalist system, and disagreement with the government.

Having traced these pathogenic fears from the founding of the US, Campbell then retraces them in the context of Communism, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. By

being able to retrace through different periods of identificational threats the same context of fear of infection by anarchy, Campbell shows that the Cold War, which was already shown to have been founded on the fear of disorder and anarchy more than on military conflict, was not a unique event in the American experience, but rather a re-introduction of the same classic fears of the outside-anarchy infiltrating and destroying the inside-civilization, the act of delineation between the two being a necessary act of identification (ibid.: 139). This act of identification regarding pathogenic fears took on the dimension of 'national security' under the Eisenhower administration through an effort to promote and maintain the 'normal' (i.e. 'inside,' 'civilized,' 'non-infected,' 'American') by systematically investigating and removing the 'abnormal' (i.e. 'outside,' 'anarchic,' 'infected,' 'un-American') from proximity to the national government and other influential places (ibid.: 151–156). This 'national securitization' of identification as a means to maintain the 'normal' transcends the actions and existence of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, though it is in perpetual need of some form of 'other' that would counterpoint it (ibid.: 168–169).

'FOREIGN POLICY' DIVESTED FROM THE STATE

Campbell concentrates throughout his work on the use of 'foreign policy' by various elites to determine the identity of the 'state.' This concentration privileges the relationship between 'foreign policy' as a process of identification and Foreign Policy as a practice of states and thereby elites. While there are certainly good and understandable reasons for this, it is not necessary to allow the relationship between the two to stand unaltered, and indeed there may be every reason to separate the two. First, however, let us defend the route Campbell took.

Campbell's analysis begins pre-Westphalia and ends with the end of the Cold War. As a matter of identity creation through differentiation, not to mention the recording of such practice, the elites of the times investigated *must* be privileged simply because of the demands in communication (both then and across time) as well as because of their having a view of the world, provided by education and experience, that could contemplate something beyond the horizon.[3] In addition, the center of his investigation was the United States' Foreign Policy in the Cold War (ibid.: Introduction). As stated repeatedly above, Foreign Policy is the venue of states, inferring the interaction of the leaders of political communities (states), here regarded as the elite. For Campbell, the use and understanding of 'foreign policy' was a means for understanding US Foreign Policy. The utilization of this tool, however, does not wed the two things together.

In explaining and developing the concept of 'foreign policy,' Campbell explains also the etymology of *foreign*. Before the creation of the term *international*, *foreign* had been used as a term of demarcation between, essentially, the regularly experi-

enced world of the 'self' and everything else (ibid.: 37). This demarcation 'served to indicate the distance, unfamiliarity, and alien character of those people and matters outside of one's immediate household, family, or region, but still inside the political community that would later comprise a state' (ibid.). It is this personal understanding of *foreign* taken together with 'foreign policy' that allows, and perhaps even necessitates, the understanding of differentiation/identification on a level 'below' that of the elite and in a manner that goes towards the formulation and fixing of qualities *within* the identity of the state – in short, the formulation of the characteristics of the 'us' existing in the '"us" vs. "them"' construction.

Campbell allows for, and even explicitly enumerates, several sub-elite 'foreign policy' identification groups (ibid.: 69). The problem here, however, is that after he acknowledges them, he seems to forget their existence as actors, especially within the US. This may be due to the structural limitations of his research as discussed above, but whatever the reason, it is a mistake. To apply 'foreign policy' to US Foreign Policy without an explanation or acknowledgment that this identification is being committed by only one of many identification groups badly skews the concept of identification generally, as well as that of the US specifically.

This final point, perhaps read as a charge, is in need of further clarification. In two places, Campbell references the identificational role of sub-elites. For clarity, larger sections of the texts will be reproduced and cited here.

In the Preface, Campbell states:

Any exhaustive account of identity, particularly one indebted to Foucault, would require a thorough discussion of the resistance to the scripting of identity proffered by those with greater access to social resources. Crudely put, one would have to consider the full range of popular resistances to elite practices. Although I consider some of the theoretical issues relevant to this question in chapter 8, I have restricted the argument in the bulk of the book to the representational practices of those acting in official capacities. This narrower ambit has an obvious logistical dimension, but I think it is intellectually justified by the space for alternative interpretations made available by the open-ended and overly figurative character of the texts of foreign policy, which allow their scripting of identity to be contested from within (ibid.: x–xi).[4]

Later, in Chapter 3, Campbell discusses the interaction of Foreign Policy and 'foreign policy,' with a few key points being the following:

'[F]oreign policy' can be understood as referring to all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as 'foreign' in the process of dealing with them. In this

sense, 'foreign policy' is divorced from the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between a self and an other located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or geography. These are the forms of 'foreign policy' that have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty and constituted identity through time and across space. ... Foreign Policy as state-based and conventionally understood within the discipline ... is thus not as equally implicated in the *constitution* of identity as the first understanding ['foreign policy']. Rather, Foreign Policy serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by 'foreign policy' and to *contain* challenges to the identity that results. ... Foreign Policy is a discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in its legitimation (all italics in original) (ibid.: 68–70).

In these two sections, we can see what would appear to be a contradiction. Campbell appears to state that the identificational-cum-political role of the sub-elite is to provide resistance to the identificational practices of the elite, and that due to the 'logistical dimension' assumed to be tied to the historically-textually dependent nature of his analysis, this area is not investigated. Later, Campbell states that the sub-elite practice 'foreign policy' on a relatively lower level of interaction between ethnic or gender groups within the state. Yet, the differential-identity coming from these lower levels provides a larger national identity that gives legitimacy and purpose to Foreign Policy.

This is important for two reasons. First, there is a conflict about the sub-elite's function – whether it is resistance or legitimation as regards to the political elite. Second, there is a conflict about whether the sub-elite, in its essence, is sub-national or whether it is nation forming. This article sides with the view that the role of the sub-elite is one of legitimation and, thereby, nation forming. This view is in line with Cederman's Type 4 analysis (Cederman, 2002) as well as Kaldor's use of sub-elite national actors (Kaldor, 2005).

Let us now look at several of Campbell's premises:
1. 'foreign policy' is an act of identification/differentiation through conflict;
2. Foreign Policy, an act of interaction after 'foreign policy'-separation, is impacted by this identification process;
3. this in turn impacts 'foreign policy' identification;
4. 'foreign policy' is an act committed at all and any level of identification, elite and sub-elite alike, while Foreign Policy is an elite-specific act.
Now let us posit a few more premises:
1. Foreign Policy and 'foreign policy' have often been incorporated into one and the same thing since Westphalia;

2. the specific identification group at the nexus of this 'foreign policy'-cum-Foreign Policy was the political elite;[5]

3. their impact was due to the ability to communicate and organize, an ability which requires some amount of education (primarily literacy in the time period where Campbell begins) combined with various forms of communication-infrastructure (Cederman, 2002: 418–419);

4. their positioning (at the nexus) was due to their monopoly of these abilities;

5. the elite having a monopoly of these abilities, providing an unbalanced impact on Foreign Policy, does not discount the potential for identification by sub-elite groups; it only discounts their impact;[6]

6. sub-elite groups have been gaining in the abilities of communication and organization through the past several decades of increased education and communications technology, most importantly through free mass media dispersing sub-elite identification and the internet making open and direct social networking and communications possible.[7]

This allows for several conclusions to be reached:

1. with this increase in enabled numbers, the monopoly of the political elite is disintegrating;

2. with the disintegration of this monopoly, so disintegrates the elite's position as the nexus of national identity creation, altering the relationship of 'foreign policy'/Foreign Policy to the point of equivalence, though this time favoring the 'foreign policy' side of sub-elite/sub-national identification;

3. the collapse of the heretofore nexus implies the collapse of the heretofore national identity (singular), replacing it with pseudo-national identities (plural) which are no longer actually 'national,' as they are not privileged with a monopoly over group-identification abilities;

4. this means that a large number of groups (potentially ever increasing and devolving, potentially conflicting) are laying claim to a national identity assumed to be one-and-the-same when, de facto, no such nation may further exist. In effect, it is equality towards the lowest denominator; if all men are kings, there is no king. If all individuals are 'America,' then there is no America.

Various points discussed heretofore need to be unpacked and explained further. The first of these is more a point of clarification, however. The terms 'elite' and 'sub-elite' have been used repeatedly up to this point with only indirect explanations. 'Elite' is here understood as the 'foreign policy' actors responsible for Foreign Policy within a state, extended to include the actors responsible for directing the operation of the state. 'Sub-elite' is here understood as 'foreign policy' actors not connected to Foreign Policy. In short, the elite are the policy-makers/legitimacy-takers

situated at the nexus of 'foreign policy' (which is an act of all beings of identity) and Foreign Policy while the sub-elite are the policy-takers/legitimacy-makers removed from the Foreign Policy structures of the state.

Next, as the elite are policy-makers/legitimacy-takers and the sub-elite are policy-takers/legitimacy-makers, the two are not involved in an 'either/or' or 'zero-sum game' regarding influence. The elite can and do continue to make policy (i.e. Foreign Policy) regardless of the sub-elite. The issue is legitimacy, not competency. The elite can only make policy reflecting the identity interests of the nation and not just the state if they are in step with the identifications of the legitimacy-makers (i.e. the sub-elite). In contrast to Campbell's statement on the role of the sub-elite from the Preface discussed above, this is not a question of 'resistances to the elite practices' because the 'practices' are 'foreign policy' (i.e. the us/them differential identity). At issue is resistance to the elite as a legitimate practitioner at the nexus of 'foreign policy'/Foreign Policy (i.e. whether the elite belongs to the 'us' or to a 'them'). It is not a question of act, but of actor.

Thirdly, the notion of national identity, as a form of identity, logically requires the combination of a single sign with a single signified. To speak of 'John,' although there are many 'John's, only has meaning if the sign is attached to a single signified that can be determined. If we ask for 'John' and are presented with two Johns, we can determine which was asked for by the signified (significations possessed). If we do the reverse and we somehow list the innumerable significations, we should theoretically come to a single sign, our 'John.' It is not possible for there to be a single 'John' attaching to different signifieds and for the relationship to have identificational meaning. The same holds true for the nation.

Finally, as regards to 'America,' it is necessary for there to be a single signified attached to that sign. Campbell argues that the elite perform a function at the nexus of 'foreign policy' and Foreign Policy that is, in this context, a signification of that signified. If a signified applied to that sign contains the signification of a disconnect between 'foreign policy' and Foreign Policy, however, it necessitates the loss of meaning of the sign. The existence of such a conflict of multiple signifieds attached to a single sign is argued by this article; the conclusion of it is the loss of meaning of 'America.' This is not to say that the state has 'disappeared' or 'been replaced' by another political actor. Supplantation would actually lend itself to a unity of the sign-signified problem. Rather, it is to say that the national identity, by losing *logical* meaning, loses *logical* existence. Where this fits in regard to performativity needs to be left to another work.

A STORY OF CONFLICT

What is sought to be done in this article is not to prove the above conclusions, but to justify several of the additional premises from which the conclusions are drawn.

The method for this justification is through an examination of sub-elite expressions of national identity over the second half of the 20th Century in the form of the three incarnations of *The Quiet American*. This time period spans the most important increase in communications ability for the sub-elite, covering the 'first televised war' (the Vietnam War), the 'first emailed war' (the Gulf War), and the 'first YouTubed war' (the War on Terror).[8] By telling the same story in different times and points along this process, the differences noted demonstrate differences in identification, and thus represent differences of identity. It is important to be clear that *The Quiet American* and its use here should not be understood as a cause of some further effect, but as a demonstration of the effect itself – a change in identification at the level of the sub-elite that is in conflict with the identification by the elite. That each incarnation revolves around one and the same 'international conflict' goes to the heart of Campbell's work, in that an international conflict should reaffirm and reify national identity. By constantly returning to the same conflict-story from across a lengthening time-span, it is demonstrated that it is not the existence of the international conflict itself that creates national identity, but rather a combination of an identification catalyst (conflict) with an identification context (identifiers with identification abilities). The more level the contextual space is (the greater the equivalence of identification abilities among the identifiers), the more diverse, and even conflictual, the identifications are.

There are two points at the core of this argument that need to be fleshed out a bit more. The first revolves around the question of actors. The second revolves around the question of acts.

The contention surrounding actors in International Relations is not new.[9] The classification and assignment of actors and their pertinence in International Relations have played a part in every debate. New war theory makes arguments for sub-elite, sub-state actors and their importance. Kaldor's work in particular is a valuable exploration of how sub-state and non-state actors have utilized advances in communications technology to cultivate national identities in post-colonial spaces' at times initiating war and at times being initiated by war (Kaldor, 2005). These 'campaigns' for identity creation are waged with disregard to state boundaries and structures, often connecting with globalized diasporas.

While Campbell's analysis de facto privileges the identification group of the political elite, this article seeks to examine national identity creation from a sub-elite level, analyzing its impact and importance with an appreciation more along the lines of Kaldor. This means accepting the possibility that sub-elite groups can have an identificational impact on the concept of 'nation,' and not just on their sole group identity.[10] While Kaldor and other new war theorists concentrate on post-colonial spaces, the principle is applicable elsewhere, if not everywhere, and it is certainly applicable to an artificial nation/state like the US.

The second point, that of acts, is a bit more complicated. First, it needs to be clarified what is meant here by 'acts.' Identity may be understood in terms of the meaning signified by certain words. This is the 'act,' the expression of meaning/identity. How does this happen, though? There are two ways: inherent meaning and contextual meaning (Ricoeur, 2008: Study 3).[11] Inherent meaning is that the word itself contains its meaning; the word and the meaning are one and the same. In contrast, contextual meaning is just that – meaning gathered from the context of the discourse, situation, 'speaker,' 'listener,' culture, history, etc. Again, these concepts reflect the understanding of meaning for any and all words, not just identity; but they speak particularly to the creation, existence, and perpetuation of identity.

It would be helpful here to expand on these two concepts of meaning/identity. The first is best exemplified by magic words. It is the idea that there is both meaning and power within a word itself (e.g. 'open sesame' or 'abracadabra') (ibid.: 88–93). To consider identity in this sense may seem laughable at first, yet that is essentially the rationalist position. There is a thing called 'state' and a thing called 'nation,' and these things have set meanings and powers. They are givens that need not be looked into more deeply. But, as anyone of a reflectivist persuasion would point out, such givens are faulty assumptions. All of social reality is context; it is discourse.

The contextual concept of meaning/identity creation makes definitions and meanings impossible to be certain of and impossible to take for granted. Meaning is fluid and need never be the same twice. As Derrida says, the only word not dependent on imagination and metaphor, on context, is the verb 'to be' (Derrida, 2009: 7). This is easily enough understood, for contextual meaning is at the heart of humor, misunderstanding, manipulation, and several other acts. To look in a dictionary and see more than one definition below a word is to realize the contextuality of meaning. The same holds true for identity.

Muller argues along a similar line when it comes to Russian concepts of 'Europe' (Muller, 2008). His analysis of elite Russian IR students' understandings of 'Europe' showed that each student may provide separate character-identifications of Europe depending on context. These character-identifications may be conflictual and express positive qualities of 'Europe' at the cost of 'Russia' in one context, while doing the reverse in another context (while, to tie back to Campbell, each situation Muller investigates was one of relative conflict, though not necessarily referencing war).[12]

This article goes along similar lines as Muller's, but it differs in some significant ways. The first difference is that this article examines 'solely' self-identification, rather than identification of an 'other.'[13] The second is that, rather than looking for conflicting identifications of the 'other' within a single individual, this article is supposing the existence of conflicting identifications of the 'self' within the single

group Campbell is interested in, 'America.' Context is context and should function the same regardless.

This sense of context is missing in Campbell's analysis. Again, it cannot be stressed enough that while he acknowledges the contextual creation of identity, he effectively limits that creation to a single specific context, meaning that there are certain identifiers for certain identifications, linking and privileging the political elite above other sub-elite identifiers. In a sense, it is only context in part, not in whole.

Campbell's limited context has further consequences. One of the most important (and the most important concerning this article) is the temporal limits of Campbell's context. The linking of Foreign Policy with 'foreign policy' means that the political elites are forming identity in an essentially one-off conflict. They experience and utilize a particular conflict in real time, not returning to it after its resolution because of the necessary development of a new conflict for the purposes of reification.

This is not the case when it comes to sub-elite identifiers. While conflict may be necessary for the process of identification, the sub-elites do not face the same pressure to remain within the present. Past conflicts serve their purposes as well as present conflicts, if not better, and future or fictional conflicts are not outside of reason either. This is the realm of history, literature, and the arts, all of which are expressions of the sub-elite. These expressions are just as important for national identity as those of the political elite, and perhaps even more so.[14] *The Quiet American* is an artistic expression along this vein.

FILMS AND DOUBLE READING

Before entering into the analysis of *The Quiet American*, it is necessary to say a few words on both the particular importance and value of the use of film in an analysis of this sort[15] as well as on the means through which the analysis will be conducted. The most important point to bring up regarding the use of film is that mass released films are designed to make money. Making a film, especially a current mass released film, takes a lot of money, and on top of the costs, there is the desire for profit. Profit is realized with sales (obviously), but those sales depend on public reaction to and acceptance of the film. This is where the value of analysis incorporating films comes in. During the pre-production phases, when producers and companies are looking through scripts and projects, they are looking for what they believe will be accepted and well received by the public. This means having an understanding of the public's sense of identity and that identity's direction. A simple example of this is the (most likely perpetual) lack of 'good Nazis' in popular American film. The American mass audience identity of 'Nazi' does not allow for the concept of good, and probably no American film has allowed for (or will allow for) such a combination.[16] In contrast to an impossible form of 'hero,' there is also a preponderance of

examples of structurally unlikely villains: the President of the United States rather than a drug kingpin, the US Military rather than Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, honest US soldiers rather than corrupt US soldiers, the US Military rather than the North Vietnamese, the American People rather than the US soldiers in Vietnam, US Military and Intelligence Services seeking weapons of mass destruction in Iraq rather than burgeoning Iraqi Civil War fighters.[17] What this reasoning suggests is that actualized, mass released films have gone through a process whereby their content is believed to reflect identifications held by the mass audience, thereby encouraging acceptance and creating profit.[18]

The analysis of *The Quiet American* follows a structure of guiding questions. Those questions are:

1. What is the conflict?
2. Who are the participants?
3. What is the message? (Who and/or what is 'America'?)
4. What is the argument delivering the message? (What occurs to situate an identity of 'America'?)[19]

The application of these questions spawns some sub-questions:

1. a. What is the setting conflict? (What is the war/event happening which surrounds the story?)
1. b. What is the real conflict? (What is the engine of the story, what issue separates 'the good guy' from 'the bad guy'?)
1. c. Are the two conflicts the same?
2. a. Who is 'the good guy'? (Not to be confused with the protagonist.)
2. b. Who is 'the bad guy'? (Not to be confused with the antagonist.)
2. c. Who is a catalyst? (Who acts, but without significant impact on the real conflict?)

The purpose of these questions is, in essence, to provide a double reading of a deconstruction – to deconstruct Campbell's deconstruction.[20] Campbell's analysis makes a link between 'us vs. them,' 'inside vs. outside,' and 'good vs. bad.' The consequence of this is the creation of an identity structure that includes the speaker, relative space, and moral authority. It takes for granted, however, the relative spatial identity of the speaker. This is understandable, considering that Campbell's main area of analysis is the political elite, whose concepts of national identity and sovereign space overlap, but it is not a necessary connection.

The above guiding questions, unlike the other works here discussed, do not look at the order 'we (the speaker) are "us"; "us" is whatever is "inside"; whatever is "us"

and "inside" is "good."' Instead, they reverse the chain and begin with the concept 'good.' Now, the order is 'we (the speaker) accept that in this discourse there is some thing "good"; we accept that in this discourse there is some thing "us"; we accept that in this discourse, whatever is "good" correlates to whatever is "us"; we accept that whatever is "good" and "us" is we (the speaker).'

In this second ordering, there is no assumed connection between the speaker, 'us,' and 'inside.' In fact, there is no need for a sovereign-spatial relation at all. The de-metaphorized metaphor of 'inside' and the connection between Foreign Policy (state) and 'foreign policy' (nation) are removed. Instead, there is a less defined temporal/spatial reference of 'here.' 'Here' is inherent in the 'existence' of the speaker, but it has no identificational force on its own. It has no set limits, no borders, no permanence. It can expand to the body, to the state, to the world, to the present, to the presentized-past, to the presentized-future, and to everything in between; yet it has no fixedness outside of the context of the discourse. 'Here' is where the speaker, 'us/good,' and context overlap.

The difference is that between a depiction of conflict where the 'good' and the 'bad' are attacking each other and killing each other, and a depiction of conflict where the 'good' may be attacking and killing some actor while being attacked and killed in turn, but the 'bad' need not be the actor attacking and killing the 'good.' It is entirely possible for the 'bad' of the second reading to have been subsumed previously under the 'good' of the first reading (e.g. depictions of fellow American soldiers, American authority structures, the American anti-war population, etc.). The removal of the sovereign-spatial correlation makes Campbell's understanding of conflict (inter-state/inter-national) one possible identifying conflict among many. The canvas conflict, or setting conflict, is still essential to this form of identity creation at the sub-elite level (just as without a canvas there is no painting), but it is no longer necessarily defining.

THE QUIET AMERICAN

The Quiet American is a story set in Saigon during the interbellum of sorts with the ending of the French war and the entrance of the Americans into Vietnam. Within this setting, an old, cynical British newspaper reporter named Fowler and a young idealistic American aid worker/embassy attaché named Pyle compete for the affections of Fowler's young Vietnamese mistress Phuong. The two men's interaction-cum-relationship extends to the current events of the country, with the French failing and the Communists advancing ever closer to the city. Fowler seeks to gain information about the changes in the war, while rumors of American involvement supporting a 'third force' (a concept Pyle repeatedly champions in conversations with Fowler) become ever louder and ever more welcome to Fowler's ears, as his American competitor, Pyle, could be at the center of it all. In the end, it is shown that Fowler

has played an intricate and vital part in the murder of Pyle, who is found dead in the river at the beginning, the story being Fowler's flashback-cum-confession of events.

The most fascinating and important parts of the story are the ones that change with each incarnation. The points which change, how they change, and when they change all demonstrate the changing context of identity creation. These changes and incarnations take the original book, a piece of criticism concerned with the rising American influence in the de-colonializing world as experienced by a British writer in 1950s Saigon, and carry it through two American film adaptations which bookend the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. It is this quality, having a 'single' story portrayed in three different forms over such an expansive period of time, which makes *The Quiet American* such a valuable tool for analysis.

In the three incarnations, there are three points in the plot that stand out for their extreme differences with each other and the implications of these differences. All three occur in the second half of the story. The first is the large explosion in the square. The second is the last conversation Fowler and Pyle have. The third is the aftermath of the discovery of Pyle's body. These three points answer the guiding questions, as they answer and justify the answer to the question of the argument of the various incarnations.

THE QUIET AMERICAN,[21] *1955* (TQA1)

This incarnation, the original, differs from the latter two in several important ways. First, it is a book while the other two are films. Second, it was written by a British author and was not initially intended for an American audience.[22] This makes a slight difference in the reasoning behind its usefulness as outlined above. However, it being the origin of the story, as well as the changes in medium and content in the incarnations that came after it, lends both value and importance to its use.

1. WHAT IS THE CONFLICT?

The setting conflict is the ending French-Vietnam War, as is the case with all three incarnations. The real conflict is between Fowler and Pyle, also as in all three incarnations, though this conflict is not as uniform across all three as the setting conflict is. In TQA1, the real conflict is balanced between the competition for Phuong and the extension of that competition in each man's relationship to, understanding of, and intentions concerning Vietnam.

2. WHO ARE THE PARTICIPANTS?

In all three incarnations, there are five participants of importance. The first two are obviously Fowler and Pyle. The third, and equally obvious, is Phuong. The fourth is Fowler's Indian assistant Dominguez, and the fifth is the French detective Vigot, who is investigating Pyle's murder.

While Phuong, the assistant, and the detective are all catalysts to the plot, it is not easy to classify the remaining Fowler and Pyle into good and bad roles. While Fowler is the protagonist, both are, eventually, exposed to be unsympathetic characters. With this said, however, the lesser of the two 'evils' would seem to be Fowler.

3. WHAT IS THE MESSAGE?

There is a strong message of anti-colonialism from a former colonialist's perspective. Fowler's aged cynicism and intent moral laissez-faire approach to the conflict he is covering seem to be effects of, and answers to, the experience of losing empire. Pyle, on the other hand, does not see his/American actions in Vietnam as colonialism, and therefore he does not see any of the dangers or ill-effects associated with it. His understanding of both Vietnam and Phuong are paternalistic, treating both as children in need of saving. 'America,' represented by Pyle, is seen here as being naive, arrogant, ill-experienced, and on the verge of making a mistake. This mistake is presented as being highly dangerous and damaging.

'National self-determinism' (in the sense of not colonizing, de-colonizing, and allowing peoples to determine their own respective fates) is good, while 'Imperialism' (as expressed by American New Imperialism) is bad. This message differs from that of TQA3 in that this one is part pragmatism on behalf of the colonizer and part morality with respect to the native population.

4. WHAT IS THE ARGUMENT DELIVERING THE MESSAGE?

First, let us look at the characters themselves. Fowler is nothing but hard learned world experience, while Pyle is nothing but university educated, book-fed theory and ideals. In fact, they seem to be opposites in just about every way. They are the 'before' and 'after' of life, and being the 'after' helps Fowler see and understand the trajectory and the consequences of Pyle.

Now, let us look to the three central plot points of interest, the first being the large explosion in the square. The large explosion occurs during the height of the shopping day in a main square of Saigon. This explosion comes after a much earlier, smaller explosion involving bombs camouflaged as bicycle pumps, which the police just barely managed to keep from causing heavy casualties. Such is not the case with the large explosion. Fowler discovers that both explosions were the result of General The, the leader of an emerging third force, trying to create disfavor for the Communists. Fowler also discovers that the bomb material was a form of plastique explosive, the makings of which were imported by the Americans. Just before the blast on the square, he hears two American women discussing how they must leave because they were warned not to be around at a certain time. After the explosion, Pyle calms Fowler (who thinks Phuong was in the ex-

plosion) by confessing that he had warned her to avoid the square also. It becomes clear that Pyle is in fact an American spy who is forming, supplying, and advising the third force of General The. Pyle admits to being a part of the plot but insists that when the plan was designed, it was intended to take out soldiers in a parade. The parade was cancelled, but The's bombers decided to continue with the plan, unbeknownst to Pyle.

The last conversation between Fowler and Pyle happens in Fowler's apartment in all three incarnations. It is a set up. Fowler invited Pyle to dinner at a time and place that will leave him exposed for assassination. Fowler has been instructed to open a book at his window to signal the Communist agent that the meeting will take place, and that the assassination may proceed. In TQA1, the conversation confirms Fowler's fears about both Pyle's intentions and his naiveté. Pyle confides in Fowler that he has scolded The and threatened to stop helping him if he disobeyed his instructions again. Fowler is shocked and sickened by this, and as the conversation turns to Pyle's plans to marry Phuong, Fowler takes a book from the shelf and, at the window, reads aloud a passage from a poem describing how killing someone through recklessness is not so bad as long as one has enough money to compensate for the damages. Pyle is disturbed by the passage, and eventually Fowler tries to gently give him an exit from the dinner invitation that will end up killing him. Pyle, however, insists on meeting Fowler for dinner, and the Communist agent has already left with the confirmation that the assassination can take place.

The aftermath of the murder is subtle, yet important, in TQA1. In it, Fowler is not punished by the detective who has uncovered his role in the assassination. Phuong also returns to him, in spite of having been engaged to Pyle at the time of his death. Though changed, she is happy that she will be able to marry Fowler after his wife cables from England and agrees to a heretofore impossible divorce. What is of particular importance is Fowler's expression of regret. He wishes Pyle were around so that he could apologize to him. Fowler rationalizes the killing of one to save many in a manner along the lines of Pyle's reasoning, that manner of reasoning being partly why Fowler aided in killing him. He has gotten involved, which is something that, as a reporter, he had been vehemently against doing. It is this sense of regret and desire to apologize, a sense that was never expressed by Pyle, which tips the scales in Fowler's favor as being the lesser of the two evils.

THE QUIET AMERICAN,[23] 1958 (TQA2)

This incarnation is the first film adaptation, and it was made by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios in the United States. It differs greatly from the original incarnation, which was published in the US just two years prior. These differences help make the identification provided by the film stand out.

1. What is the conflict?

The setting conflict is the ending French-Vietnam War, as is the case with all three incarnations. The real conflict is again between Fowler and Pyle, but this time, it is solely over Phuong. The conflict in TQA1 involving Vietnam and colonialism does not actually exist between Fowler and Pyle in TQA2.

2. Who are the participants?

There are the same five participants of importance as in TQA1. There are, however, some slight, yet significant, differences. In this incarnation, Dominguez is a Communist spy who manipulates Fowler, rather than being merely a helpful assistant. Vigot acts as the revealer of truth to Fowler rather than Fowler figuring things out for himself. Finally, there is no confusion or vagueness in understanding Fowler as 'the bad guy' and Pyle as 'the good guy.'

3. What is the message?

The message in TQA2 is that America, as Pyle, is indeed young, idealistic, and naive just as in TQA1. Also as in TQA1, Pyle sees no danger in his/American actions in Vietnam. This last point, however, is there because in TQA2 there is nothing wrong with American actions. Pyle/America is innocent and helpful. It is the old empires, the former colonialists, the Europeans, represented by Fowler, that are manipulative and dangerous to all around them.

'America' (as a humanitarian force for national-democratic freedom) is good while 'Europe' (as manipulative colonialists and imperialists) is bad.

4. What is the argument delivering the message?

Again, both Fowler and Pyle are complete opposites, but this time the divergence extends to sympathy. Fowler is completely unsympathetic, while Pyle is completely sympathetic. Fowler is driven to insanity by jealousy and self-centeredness, while Pyle plays fair and honest and is cut down by treachery and deceit.

The scene of the large explosion is very different from that in TQA1. This time, there are no Americans talking of having been warned. When the explosion occurs, Fowler sneaks onto the ambulance that Pyle is directing in order to gain entrance to the site. Pyle does say that Phuong is nowhere in the carnage because he had warned her, but this time his warning was based on rumors about a possible attack combined with having the good common sense not to tempt fate by being where something bad is supposed to happen. Fowler thunders at him, using almost the exact language from the book. Pyle's constant confusion and rising anger at Fowler's allegations, which are taking up time needed to help save people, causes him to snap and respond in a way that makes Fowler appear insane and detached from the horror around him. This detachment had been Pyle's in TQA1. In this in-

carnation, TQA2, the plastique turns out to be mythical, and the information that the Americans are involved in the bombings is a Communist ruse.

The final conversation between Fowler and Pyle is similarly dramatically different. In TQA2, Pyle definitively quashes any suspicion of his being an American spy directing The. He is simply a well intentioned aid-worker who is trying to make a difference in a country that needs it. Pyle confesses to being ordered home because of his unofficial contact with The, even though that contact was only to discuss the general's feelings towards an American educated Vietnamese exile who would most likely become the leader of an independent Vietnam. Again, Fowler thunders away at him, but his charges again seem insane and conspiratorial. Without Pyle being a spy, without him being involved in terrorist attacks, there is no longer any justifiable reason to aid in assassinating him. However, Pyle announces his engagement to Phuong, which provides the final snap in Fowler's mind and sends him to the window to read a passage. This passage differs from its counterpart in TQA1, however, in that it is describing a man who sees threats everywhere, when actually, the threats are all made up in the man's head. Pyle recognizes it as being from *Othello* and begins discussing it. The display of education annoys Fowler all the more.

The aftermath of the murder is far from subtle. It is damning. Vigot reveals that Fowler's assistant was a Communist agent, that he helped the Communists utilize Fowler's jealousy to convince him of a made up plot involving Pyle and American intervention, and that Fowler helped kill an innocent boy who was only trying to make the world a better place. This deepens Fowler's mania, but he is finally pushed over the edge when he approaches Phuong and she vehemently turns him away forever. In the end, Fowler goes wandering off into the crowded streets bemoaning himself.

THE QUIET AMERICAN,[24] 2002 (TQA3)

This incarnation is particularly fascinating because of its time of production. Not only was it made a generation after the end of the Vietnam War, but it was made during the change from the pre-9/11 era to the post-9/11 era. This means (we should be able to assume) that the mass audience identity existing during the preproduction process was very different from that of the post-production process. Though the technicalities of the actual fruitions of the various incarnations are outside the area of concern of this article, it is a fascinating position for this film to be in.[25]

1. WHAT IS THE CONFLICT?

The setting conflict is the ending French-Vietnam War, as is the case with all three incarnations. The real conflict is between Fowler and Pyle, though unlike in the pre-

vious incarnations, their competition over Phuong recedes into the background. The center of the conflict quickly and fiercely becomes Pyle's actions in regards to America in Vietnam.

2. WHO ARE THE PARTICIPANTS?

There are, again, the same five participants. In TQA3, however, Fowler's assistant is Vietnamese, not Indian as in the previous two incarnations. Also, while his assistant does turn out to be a Communist, he is not manipulating Fowler. Another, and more significant, difference is that the positions of 'the good guy' and 'the bad guy' are completely reversed in this incarnation. More than in either of the previous two incarnations, there is a clear portrayal of good and evil with no moderation, no defense by reason of insanity. Fowler is by far the hero, and Pyle is by far the nemesis.

3. WHAT IS THE MESSAGE?

While Pyle remains naive, and perhaps he even has good intentions, he is filled with a violent psychopathic arrogance and is deceptive to the point of having a split personality. The message conveyed is that Pyle/America is not only wrong in his or its goal, but also in his or its methods. Pyle/America is criminal in his or its sacrificing of human life for some perceived greater good. Every individual is valuable and worthy of not being killed, and every individual has the right to self-determination.

'National self-determinism' (in the sense of not colonizing, de-colonizing, and allowing peoples to determine their own respective fates) is good, while 'Imperialism' (as expressed by American New Imperialism) is bad. This message differs from that of TQA1 in that it is a purely moral statement with the interests of the native population at the forefront, while the consequences for the colonizer are something of a moral punishment and exist only as an afterthought.

4. WHAT IS THE ARGUMENT DELIVERING THE MESSAGE?

Fowler and Pyle are again polar opposites. As mentioned above, however, this difference is of the widest separation in TQA3 as compared with the other incarnations. Fowler begins with same laissez-faire morality regarding the war as in TQA1. However, in TQA3, this dramatically changes into a deep and personal concern for the people around him through his witnessing the bombing in the square, the realization of Pyle's acts and intentions, and his now almost heroic act of aiding in Pyle's assassination. Pyle, however, though initially being a nice, innocent, and naive boy similar to the Pyle in TQA2, eventually reveals himself to be a cold-blooded killer willing to use terror and the murder of innocents to his advantage.

Similarly to the other dramatic changes, the large bombing in the square shows a very different Pyle from that of the previous incarnations. Pyle is not disoriented,

shocked, or left detached by the horror. He certainly is not aiding any of the injured. Fowler witnesses Pyle screaming in perfect Vietnamese, a language Pyle has claimed not to know. The screams are directed at a Vietnamese policeman, who Pyle forcibly prevents from helping the wounded. Simultaneously, Pyle gives orders to cameramen to photograph the wounded, dead, and dying. This scene combines with Fowler's investigations into the plastique explosives, which are again discovered to be real and imported through the Americans, to convince him to aid in Pyle's assassination.

The final conversation between Fowler and Pyle is also very different, and also very damning. This time, however, it is Pyle who gives himself away. Pyle's self-revelation as a calculating and deceitful mass killer is complete. Thoroughly gone is the Pyle introduced at the beginning. This Pyle drinks hard liquor, speaks with violent anger and frustration, and justifies the deaths of the innocents. This time, when Fowler reads at the window, it is the original passage from TQA1. Pyle finishes the poem this time, however, and pronounces the lines of cold detachment from another's suffering as if they were his own motto. Phuong is barely mentioned at all.

The aftermath of the murder has a unique presentation not included in either of the previous incarnations. After Fowler 'wins' Phuong (she is not happy to return to him, but she does return), there is a series of newspaper articles that flash upon the screen. They are Fowler's reports from the time of Pyle's death forward. They show that while Fowler was able to kill Pyle, it was too late to prevent Pyle's plan from forging on. Quickly and steadily, the headlines mark out the history of the United States sinking into the conflict in Vietnam.

WRITING SECURITY VS. THE QUIET AMERICAN

Now we must look at *Writing Security* along with the various incarnations of *The Quiet American*. It is important to keep two particular points from Campbell in mind, and these points must be stressed. First, the conflict creating identity ('foreign policy') is within the ditochomy of 'us/good'–'them/bad.' This construct is made through the spatial 'us=inside=inside-state' and 'them=outside=outside-state' being combined with the moral 'inside-state=order=good' and 'outside-state=disorder=bad' as applied to the US and Communist Vietnam respectively. Secondly, Foreign Policy and 'foreign policy' are linked. Looking at the conflict that is the Vietnam War, Campbell's work would seem to insist that the United States (us/good) reified its identity vis-à-vis the Vietnamese Communists (them/bad). This war, however, only serves as the setting conflict in all three incarnations of *The Quiet American*. The conflict creating identity, the 'foreign policy,' is on a sub-elite level, and, what is more, it changes in nature in each incarnation.

Campbell's connection between Foreign Policy and 'foreign policy' means that he cannot delve into any other layer of identity creation. Similarly, without another

war or the threat of another war, there is no way to revisit the conflict, meaning there are no alterations to the identity coming out of the conflict. This lack of temporal fixedness allows for an opposite and conflicting identity to occur between TQA2 and TQA3.

In TQA2, the 'us/good' is expressed by Pyle vis-à-vis Fowler and is roughly in line with Campbell's sense of Foreign Policy-'foreign policy' as well. In TQA3, however, identification through the 'us/good' is shifted to Fowler. Fowler is the expression of 'America' in this incarnation by virtue of being *the* 'good,' for again, 'foreign policy' is expressed through the 'us/good' – 'them/bad' constitutive relationship. Pyle, however, remains the expression of Foreign Policy-'foreign policy' from before. Here is the split in identifiers and their identifications. Pyle must always be Pyle because Foreign Policy becomes history and there is no second chance at it. Sub-elite identifiers, however, have every opportunity and ability to revisit and resituate their conflict identifications. In TQA3, while Pyle may be American, and Fowler may be British, Fowler is constitutively 'America,' while Pyle is 'non-America.' To be otherwise would destroy the 'us/good,' as Pyle would then become the 'us/bad.' Just as it is impossible to be both 'good' and 'Nazi,' it is impossible to be both 'bad' and 'America.' To be 'bad' is to have passed to 'other,' regardless of Foreign Policy statements. The 'here' shifts, while the 'inside' may remain the same.

The exercise of 'foreign policy,' the act of identification by the sub-elite in this case, is not attached to class or gender or ethnicity. The identification is the expression of 'America.' It has connections to Foreign Policy and to a historical conflict where Foreign Policy-'foreign policy' was exercised, yet it is divested from the state in ability, practice, and result. It is no more or less a valid and valuable identification of 'America' than those developed by the political elite. It is different, however, and it exists. There is 'America' as expressed by the sub-elite, and 'America' as expressed by the elite. They are both 'America,' yet in relationship to each other, neither is 'America.' In this relationship, there is no 'America.'

CONCLUSION

Campbell's *Writing Security* is a valuable analysis exercising the concept of 'foreign policy.' It must be kept in mind, however, that 'foreign policy,' even regarding national identity, need not be attached to Foreign Policy, and that it can be and is exercised by sub-elite actors. This identification by sub-elite actors is not limited in the ways that the elite identification is. Sub-elite identifications are more fluid and independent, are potentially ever more numerous and diverse, and may be exercised in ways other than film. Each identifier and identification, however, lays equal claim to 'America.' By way of this, they exclude each other from the signifier which can only have one signified. Campbell's work sought to better understand the mecha-

nism of the identification and actions of a major actor in world affairs. The mechanism, however, can remove the identity of the actor, and perhaps even the actor itself.

ENDNOTES

[1] This work originated within the project for specific university research at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University ♯ 263 507: Current Forms of Governance: National, Local, and International Levels.

[2] Foreign Policy is the traditional sense of 'bridge building' between states, while 'foreign policy' is the process of differentiation, or 'wall building,' and can be at the individual level, the state level, or any level in between. Both forms reinforce and impact each other.

[3] This is what is understood here by Campbell's comment on the 'logistical dimension' (ibid.: xi).

[4] While Campbell references a further investigation in Chapter 8, the investigation neither references nor resolves the issues being discussed here.

[5] Though not expressly stated, this is the operational theme in Campbell's analysis.

[6] This is the tension between vertical and horizontal organization of social groups. See Kaldor (2005); Ashley (1988).

[7] For more on these points, see Kaldor (2005) and Der Derian (2009).

[8] References to these titles and the general role of media can be found in Der Derian (2009) and Cederman (2002).

[9] For a classic analysis of actors, see Allison (1969).

[10] Again, while Campbell enumerates identifiers based on race or gender, he seems to limit their identificational impact to those areas, omitting any recognition of the possibility of a political sub-elite impacting or creating national identity.

[11] See also Benveniste (1971) and Richards (1971), both of which contribute to Ricoeur's investigation.

[12] Also valuable along this line is Mouffe (1992), especially pages 28 and 29.

[13] I understand and acknowledge that it is not really possible to examine the one without the other, but the concentration of concern, the point of departure and points of interest may be so diverged, and they are so diverged in this case.

[14] After all, when the identity of the people diverges enough from the identity of the political elite, it usually means revolution is in the air.

[15] For more studies on media and film, see Der Derian (2009) and Drulak (2009).

[16] Films such as *Schindler's List* and *Valkyrie*, though portraying nominally Nazi characters as heroes, show a process of the 'Nazi' becoming 'non-Nazi' through heroic acts. These acts are in conflict with the acts and goals of the larger 'Nazi' representation, thus entailing that through acting as a hero and becoming a hero, the character ceases to be 'Nazi' and becomes something else. That 'non-Nazi'-something-else is what is acceptable and receivable by the mass audience. Similarly, the initially affable Zoller from *Inglourious Basterds*, though not presented as a hero, is still presented as decent and relatively innocent until his more violent disposition is revealed towards the end.

[17] The referenced films are, in order, *Clear and Present Danger*, *The Siege*, *Three Kings*, *Apocalypse Now*, *Hamburger Hill*, and *Green Zone.*

[18] While this logic may be the intent, it does not always provide a successful product. There are many aspects that go into making a film successful that are completely outside the realm of pre-production planning, not to mention any kind of conscious decision-making process. This actually touches upon the release and reception of *The Quiet American* in 2002.

Similarly, this logic does not always mean that two similarly themed films from two companies coming out at roughly the same time will have the same message given in a similar manner (though the combination of *Fail-Safe* and *Doctor Strangelove* and that of *Deep Impact* and *Armageddon* are fascinating examples of this being the case). Around the same time as *The Quiet American* was being produced, another Vietnam War movie, *We Were Soldiers*, was underway. *We Were Soldiers* has a different message than *The Quiet American* and may at first appear to be in conflict with it as the former seems to be pro-America and the latter anti-America as regards Vietnam. This is only a superficial view, however, as *We Were Soldiers* concentrates on the soldiers doing the fighting they were asked to do (demonstrating the theme of 'go ahead and hate the war, but not the soldiers'), while *The Quiet American* looks at who and how those soldiers came to be there (also potentially demonstrating the same theme).

There is also the occasional case of sheer star-power justifying the production of a film even though its message is unpopular (e.g. John Wayne and *The Green Berets*), although this would appear to be an ever less common occurrence. The decreasing number of such films may be the result of the recognition of past mistakes (*The Green Berets* being among the greatest). It could also perhaps be related to the increased ease and horizontalization of communication, making the pre-production judgments easier.

[19] Questions 3 and 4 are inspired by and loosely based on the methodology developed in Drulak (2008): 107–108. Question 3 takes the place of 'conceptual metaphors' while Question 4 takes the place of 'metaphorical expressions.'

[20] The concept of double reading used here is that from Ashley (1988).

[21] All references to *The Quiet American* in this section, unless otherwise stated, are from Greene (2004).

[22] Its original publishing in Great Britain was in 1955. It was not published in the United States until the following year.

[23] All references to *The Quiet American* in this section, unless otherwise stated, are from Mankiewicz (1958).

[24] All references to *The Quiet American* in this section, unless otherwise stated, are from Noyce (2002).

[25] For a taste of this, see the following interviews: Applebaum (2003), Cawthorne (2003), Leydon (2002).

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After the Enlargement: Trends and Threats in the European Union Decision-Making[1]

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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to outline important developments in the European Union decision-making after the eastern enlargement and to draw attention to their likely implications, especially to the threats they may pose to the functioning and democratic quality of the European polity. Starting with an observation of the trend of the informalization of the European political process, I outline a theoretical argument about the likely emergence of structural divisions among the member states in the Council of Ministers. On the basis of a simple spatial model I show that the informalization of the political process can be expected to lead to important changes in the Commission-Council interaction and, by implication, to the emergence of a stable group of MSs within the Council with a privileged access to the Commission in the long term. I illustrate the validity of the argument with the use of a computer simulation. The article does not present new empirical data; instead it attempts to provide an explanation for certain empirical patterns identified in recent literature and shed light on the strategic incentives of actors in the European decision-making process.

Keywords: European Union, enlargement, Council of Ministers, decision-making

INTRODUCTION

Over recent years, scholars as well as the general public have grown accustomed to the fact that a lot is going on in European politics. On almost a daily basis, new developments occur in such key areas as transatlantic relations, engagement in the neighbouring countries, or, most prominently in recent times, the crisis of the Euro. Indeed the concerns with the fate of the common currency grew so strong at some points that the very viability of the EU has been put into question, should the Euro fail. As the German *Bundeskanzlerin* Merkel put it in a speech in the *Bundestag* on 7 September 2011, 'The Euro is much, much more than a currency. The Euro is the guarantee of a united Europe. If the Euro fails, then Europe fails' (Merkel, 2011). In the light of such dramatic statements one is tempted to conclude that what matters is that which happens right now, the solutions, or the actual policy output of the Eu-

ropean Union. The question of the day is whether the EU is able to quickly come up with viable arrangements for its most pressing immediate economic problems.

However important a challenge for the EU this may be, it is not the only one. What I try to do in this text is to take a broader perspective and consider the more long-term developments the EU has been witnessing in the period after the eastern enlargement. The key problem I focus on is the increasing *informalization* of the European political process – a shift from a rule-based towards a more informal bargaining-based and hence power/interest-based process – and its impact on the functioning of the key European decision-making body, the Council of Ministers.

I develop a spatial model on the basis of which I demonstrate that the shift towards less formal and more bargaining-based politics is likely to produce an important change in the way the Council of the EU functions. I show that under reasonable assumptions we can expect the emergence of a structural division of the member states (MSs) in the Council, and potentially other bodies, into two distinct groups: a larger group of states with a relatively privileged position in the legislative process, and a smaller group of states which will be systematically disadvantaged. Strong indications of the emergence of this pattern have been recently identified empirically by Plechanovová (2011) on the basis of the Council voting records for the years 2004–2006, and the present text thus to some extent builds on her results. I do not present new empirical evidence; instead I try to shed light on the strategic incentives and behaviour of the key actors in the European political process. The validity of the presented model is illustrated with the use of a computer simulation capturing the nature of the MSs and the Commission's interaction.

I start by reviewing some broad theoretical considerations and the most relevant existing literature (section 2), and also by outlining what I refer to as the 'benign' model, a standard spatial analysis of Council politics that assumes a relative dominance of formal procedural rules (section 3). Section 4 then presents an alternative view, one that takes into account the informal bargaining nature of Council negotiations; I show that the model that takes the intergovernmental bargaining in the Council seriously yields dramatically different and probably normatively less desirable political outcomes than the benign model. In section 5 I present the results of the computer simulations based on the models, further illuminating the dynamics they capture. Section 6 outlines the likely long-term implications of the theoretically identified trends and relates the discussion back to the existing empirical research. Finally, in section 7 I conclude by laying on the table some broader implications of my findings.

INFORMALIZATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICS AFTER THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements almost doubled the number of the EU member states (MSs) and dramatically increased the political, socio-economic, and cul-

tural heterogeneity of the EU membership (Zielonka, 2007). Not having undergone the significant institutional reform for which many had longed before the enlargement, the EU institutional structure was supposed to be hit strongly by the enlargement, especially when it comes to its decision-making capacity; the overall quality of the decision-making process was supposed to be affected adversely, even to the point of system paralysis (Hertz–Leuffen, 2020; König–Bräuninger, 2004). But it is now several years after the enlargement, and not much seems to have happened in this respect, and apparently the process continues to work relatively smoothly, even with 27 MSs (De Clerk-Sachsse–Hagemann, 2007).

One of the key reasons for this positive development lies in what has been identified as a gradual *informalization* of the political process, i.e. a relative decrease in the role played by the formal rules and an increase in the prominence of informal negotiations among the actors, in venues on the margin of or parallel to the formal decision-making procedures described in the treaties.[2] As discussed by Reh et al. (2011), informalization refers to a process in which decision-making is transferred from arenas with extensively codified rules of procedures and with clearly defined and inclusive memberships to fora in which rules are more implicit and amenable to the immediate needs of the influential actors and in which membership is secluded (more exclusive for the key actors). In these informal fora various trade-offs can be pre-arranged and deals can be negotiated in a more exclusive setting based on networks of relationships, diffuse reciprocity, and personal connections.

To be sure, informal politics is nothing new to the EU political process, the most obvious example being the traditional *de facto* consensual decision-making in the Council, which dominates the Council negotiations despite the formal prevalence of the qualified majority voting (QMV) rule (Heisenberg, 2005; Lewis, 2010; Häge, 2010). However, we have strong reasons to believe that with the increase in the number of MSs and the heterogeneity of their interests brought about by the eastern enlargement, informal politics are becoming even more ubiquitous in the practice of Council politics. With a significant and increasing interest divergence, decision-making based on a QMV threshold of 71–74% (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006: 180–181) or even unanimity is unlikely to work efficiently as the likelihood that a state or a group of states will oppose a particular proposal naturally increases (Tsebelis–Yataganas, 2002; König, 2007); in such situations, support for the proposals needs to be informally traded off among the decisive actors if the deadlock is to be overcome.

Recent empirical investigations into several areas of European politics confirm this trend. In their extensive empirical study of the European legislative process Reh et al. (2011) present quantitatively a dramatic increase in the use of early agreements within the 'fast track' procedure after 2004 (as compared to the pre-enlargement period) and demonstrate that this process is connected with a significant increase

in the role played by small exclusive groups of powerful actors, at the cost of the transparency and inclusiveness of the political process (see also Dumbrovský–Petkova, 2012; Häge–Kaeding, 2007). Although this development does not take place outside of the formal procedural rules, it draws the core of the political contestation into a less rules-based and more bargaining-based and exclusive arena.

Similarly, research shows that one of the reasons why the enlargement did not result in a deadlock of the Council decision-making lies in its high reliance on various issue-linkages and trade-offs among the actors, i.e. it effectively lies in the absorption of the additional interests brought about by the new members through bargaining (König–Junge, 2009). Another explanation for the Council's relatively smooth functioning points at the development of informal mechanisms within the Council through which an increased amount of its workload was transferred to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Parízek et al., 2010).

An interesting example of the informalization trend has been provided by Elsig (2010), who shows how after 2004, due to an increase in the EU membership, the EU trade policy has been increasingly formulated within small informal negotiation settings in which the policies are 'pre-cooked' (Elsig, 2010: 793) by some of the influential members and then 'served' as ready-made policies to the whole membership. Furthermore, he argues that according to his interviewees' statements, this move of core activities into more informal fora has been characteristic for post-enlargement EU decision-making more broadly, not only specifically for the area of trade. In this vein, the edited volume by Plechanovová and Hosli (2012) presents empirical evidence of the informalization trend after the enlargement in most of the bodies involved in the European political process, from the Council to the European Parliament and national parliaments, from the Commission to the European Court of Justice.

In several studies, the very logic of by-passing the formalized political procedures for the sake of avoiding deadlock in a situation of a divergence of interests among the MSs has been identified theoretically as well as empirically as one of the reasons why the entire European structure is at all able to propagate over time (Héritier, 1999; Farrell–Héritier, 2003). European politics are characterized by a constant interplay between the rigidity of the existing formal rule frameworks and the practical need to achieve results (Christiansen et al., 2003). In sum, whenever the existing formal procedural rules appear to be too constraining and effectively prevent cooperation, the actors involved will have incentives to disregard them and move towards more informal bargaining-based modes of operation (Kleine, 2010). The core of the argumentation presented in this text is driven by this observation, and my target is to demonstrate how our view of the key properties of the EU decision-making needs to change if we take the possibility of informal power/interest-based bargaining within the Council seriously.

At the same time, though, we should understand that the pure-bargaining approach does not take into account the major institutionalist insight of the last several decades, namely that political negotiations induce significant transaction costs, especially in terms of information transmission, and that the less formalized the rules defining the negotiation process are, the higher these transaction costs are. With 27 MSs, there are 351 pair relationships that need to be established and negotiated among the actors if the Council process is to be based purely on 'unstructured' bargaining; the transaction costs of such negotiations are obviously extreme and any political system of such an institution-free nature would be destined for a system overload and possibly a collapse (Deutsch, 1963: 162). Hence, even if we accept (as I indeed do) that the EU decision-making is increasingly characterized by informal negotiations and in general an avoidance of rigidity in the formal procedural rules, it is clear that a completely institution-free bargaining forum is not a plausible alternative. The viability of the EU-level governance scheme depends on its ability to secure that at least some of the negotiation links among actors actually do not have to be re-negotiated so often, or at all, i.e. it depends on the fact that many of the linkages connecting the MSs in the negotiations are, in principle, fixed. This, after all, is precisely the argument that was developed by transaction-costs economists (Coase, 1937; Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1971; Williamson, 1979) and later applied in international relations under the name of functional regime theory (Keohane, 1984): cooperation among rational actors is impeded by high transaction costs and it pays off to the actors to lower these transaction costs by enabling development of (perhaps informal) institutions.

In this vein, the existing studies of EU informal politics, while maintaining that the formal rules are side-stepped by the actors, immediately add that what results from this process is the emergence and institutionalization of new informal rules which may, in the longer turn, even supersede the existing formal rules and increasingly transform the decision-making practice (Farrell–Héritier, 2003: 580–583; cf. Héritier, 2007; Helmke–Levitsky, 2004; Bailer et al., 2009). In correspondence to this two-way logic, most of my argumentation is concerned directly with the problem of the informalization of Council politics, but towards the end of the article I take a step back and consider how this trend is likely to play out in the long term, especially when the bargaining transaction costs are taken into account.

FORMAL RULES AND THE COUNCIL POLITICS: THE 'BENIGN' MODEL

In this section I present what may be labelled as a benign model of the European political process – a model that is based on the assumptions of rational MSs and other actors egoistically pursuing their interests, but that expects them to do so within a relatively firmly specified formal institutional structure, i.e. a model driven

by the formal rules defining the European political process. I label this model as benign because it predicts that the legislative process will in general tend to produce moderate political outcomes.

Let us start with the description of the policy space within which the interaction of the MSs in the Council and the Commission takes place. I assume a two dimensional political space in which policy proposals are defined by the degree of their European supranationalism and their substantive policy-content.

Following a long tradition of literature on European politics we can define the European dimension (the horizontal *eu* axis in all the figures) as capturing the disagreement among actors about how much of the political authority in a given matter should be supranationalized and what share should stay in the hands of the national governments (cf. e.g. Haas, 1958; Hoffmann, 1966). We do not have to decide what the ultimate motivations for the MSs to adopt their particular positions on this dimension are; they may be of ideational as well as material substance, or they may stem from deeper ideological, economic, or geopolitical interests (Moravcsik–Vachudova, 2003; Růžička, 2010). For a lack of better terms I will refer to the MSs whose ideal points are high on this dimension as pro-supranationalists, and to those that prefer keeping the authority on the national level as anti-supranationalists. Throughout the paper I assume that the Commission occupies a position on this dimension that is as much pro-supranationalist as that of the most pro-supranational member state (or even more so).

The substantive content dimension (the vertical *sc* axis in figures 1, 3, 4, and 5) then captures the political struggle over allocation of values which usually forms the core of domestic political systems (Hix, 1999). In practice, this dimension involves conflicts over distribution of resources from the European budget, both across MSs and, in the traditional left-right sense, across societal groups. Beyond this, it captures the conflict over formulation of supranational regulatory policies with distributive consequences, again both across individual societal groups (Wilson, 1980) and across the states (cf. Axelrod, 2006; Hix, 2005; Drezner, 2007).

There exists a significant debate in European studies as to the actual relative salience of the two dimensions, and possibly of other dimensions as well (e.g. Plechanovová, 2011; Veen, 2011; Mattila, 2004; Thompson et al., 2004), but it seems that this two-dimensional specification is the most standard one, and certainly it is the most theoretically elaborated and hence potentially the most fruitful a priori specification of the nature of the European political space. To simplify the way the argument is developed and its graphical representation, throughout the analysis I assume that the European and the substantive policy content dimensions are of equal salience for the MSs and that on both dimensions the MSs' ideal points are distributed uniformly. While obviously consequential for the actual results of the models as depicted in the figures, these assumptions do not affect the validity

of the core theoretical argument I put forward; the model is, in this sense, robust under specification alterations. Without loss of generality we can normalize both dimensions to unit length.

Lastly, I also explicitly consider the question of the negotiation transaction costs, that is, the costs induced not by the substance of the agreement but rather by the contractual process as such, namely the costs of establishing the negotiation links, of building the winning coalitions in the Council, and of running the negotiations (I denote these costs with T).

Overall, then, we can define the utility function of the MS i from the resulting policy on the basis of the Euclidean norm as

$$U_i = -\sqrt{\left(eu_i^{bliss} - eu^{result}\right)^2 + \left(sc_i^{bliss} - sc^{result}\right)^2} - T, \qquad (1)$$

capturing linearly the distance of the resulting policy from the i's bliss (ideal) point and the constant transaction costs T of the negotiations. I assume that the default option where the Commission proposal is not adopted by the MSs in the Council is the point $(0; \bar{sc})$, i.e. the point at which the least supranationalist policy (the smallest common denominator) is adopted on the European dimension, and the mean position is adopted on the substantive content dimension. This reflects the notion that while on the European dimension there exists a natural default, i.e. the least progressively supranational policy, on the substantive content dimension no such default is available, as the MSs have their positions on it no matter whether the policy problem at hand is solved domestically or on the European level (see Achen, 2006: 101–103 for a discussion of this problem). In this setup, government i supports a proposal if

$$U_i\left(eu^{proposal}; sc^{proposal}\right) - T \geq U_i(0; \bar{sc}), \qquad (2)$$

which means that the government supports the proposal if it is closer in the space to its bliss point than to the status quo, after deduction of the transaction costs T.[3]

Having set up the playing field, we can now ask, 'Who are the actors and what targets do they seek in the decision-making process?' Beyond the MSs, the key actor determining the shape of any decision in European politics is the Commission, primarily due to its agenda-setting powers, which are granted to it by its legislative initiation monopoly in most areas (Schmidt, 2000; Pollack, 1997; cf. Bailer, 2006). To be sure, the European Parliament (EP) is also an important actor but its role is, for the purposes of our analysis, secondary because its long-term structural interests tend to converge with those of the Commission. In particular, the two bodies share a strong institutional interest in a steady transfer of decision-making

authority from the national to the supranational European level (e.g. König, 2007; Thomson et al., 2006); because the analysis presented in this text is to a large extent driven by considerations of this structural interest of the Commission, we may simplify it by considering only the position of the Commission and its interaction with the MSs in the Council, and disregarding the position of the EP, without actually biasing the results. It should be noted that the relative power of the Commission in the process is very strong also because of the fact that while it only takes a qualified majority of Council votes to adopt the Commission proposals, it takes a unanimous decision to amend them. Once a proposal is acceptable for a qualified majority of MSs, even when it is not optimal for them, it is more likely that it will be adopted as it is rather than amended. In fact, in the Nice Treaty, which prepared the EU for the enlargement, the Commission's strength has been further reinforced in that the increase in the effective QMV threshold in the Council shifted power from the Council to the Commission (Tsebelis–Yataganas, 2002; Tsebelis, 2008).

Given the position of the Commission in the legislative process, a strong incentive arises for the individual MSs to try to participate in the legislative process from very early on, i.e. to be present in the process to the fullest possible extent already in the drafting stage, during which the Commission actually translates broad political targets into a specific proposal (Hayes-Renshaw–Wallace, 2006: 194, 200–201). The MSs are much more likely to have their particular interests accommodated if they are able to have the Commission incorporate them into the proposal than if they only wait for the discussion in the Council, the working parties or Coreper. In other words, if MSs want their interests accommodated in the decision-making outcomes, they need to make sure that they are articulated already in the phase of legislation drafting by the Commission, in the same way private transnational actors lobby the Commission in Brussels (Christiansen–Follesdal–Piattoni, 2003). The Commission will then obviously be in the position to promote its long-term interests by strategically tailoring the proposals it makes in ways that maximize the value on the European dimension, effectively picking the interests of those MSs whose interests best suit its own for the drafting of the proposals.

On the basis of this reasoning we can formulate a simple prediction about what kind of proposals the Commission is, in general, likely to make. For any given value of the QMV quota Q in the Council, the Commission will maximize its payoff by making proposals that will make exactly indifferent the pivotal actor lying on the line $eu = 1 - Q$ (Thomson, 2001: 144). As captured in the spatial model presented in figure 1, the Commission's proposals will therefore tend to fall into the area along the line $eu = 2(1 - Q) - T$ and, depending on the particular positions of the potential pivotal actors, on the vertical dimension somewhere close to $sc = 0.5$ (re-

call that I assume on both dimensions a uniform distribution of the actors' ideal points, hence the mean value $\overline{sc} = 0.5$). The full circle in figure 1 indicates the in-difference curve of the pivotal actor (located at $eu_{pivot}^{bliss} = 1 - Q$) cutting through the status quo, and the dashed segment of the arc then indicates the relevant part of this indifference curve with the adjustment for some low amount of transaction costs. The rightmost point on this arc segment identifies the point which maximizes the Commission's payoff while still being acceptable to the pivotal actor, i.e. the point at which the Commission will make its proposal (see Hinich–Munger, 1997 for an excellent introduction to spatial analysis).

Figure 1: The benign model: prediction of political outcomes

This simple model, while certainly admitting that the pivotal actors have dispro-portionate power over the outcome because the Commission will maximize its payoff by making proposals that suit them on the substantive content dimension, in general paints a relatively relieving picture. First, the fact that the pivotal actors have a disproportionate amount of power is not specific to European politics; in-deed, in cooperative game theory the very notion of power in decision-making bodies is conceptualized through the notion of pivotality (Shapley–Shubik, 1954; cf. Krehbiel, 1998).

Second, and more important, the political mechanism as depicted in the be-nign model shows what may be seen as normatively desirable properties. For

the value of the QMV quota set at the actual Q=0.74 (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006), the interaction within the Council and between the Council and the Commission will tend to produce outcomes relatively very close to the median position, therefore approximating what is usually considered a standard legitimate outcome of a democratic political process in national political systems (following the median voter theorem formulated by Hotelling and Black, cf. Downs, 1957). This effect will be very robust on the European dimension; on the substantive content dimension it will, in individual cases, be diverted from the median position but on average, it will converge with it (as indicated in figure 1).[4]

In sum, considering this simple 'benign' model of Commission-Council interaction, we may expect that the European legislative process will systematically produce politically moderate outcomes, on average close to where we would expect compromises to naturally occur (see the compromise model in Achen, 2006).

THE INFORMAL COUNCIL BARGAINING MODEL AND THE CHANGED LOGIC OF THE COUNCIL-COMMISSION INTERACTION

As indicated above, the picture outlined in the previous section suffers from a major omission: it does not take into account the very nature of the Council as a bargaining forum in which, as has been empirically demonstrated by Thomson et al. (2006; see also Thomson, 2011), it is first and foremost the actors' power and interest constellation that determines the political outcomes. The formal institutional structures are important in many ways but in general their role will be less important than that of actors' preferences and possibly also that of informal practices that develop among them (Arregui et al., 2006: 125).

I maintain that it is correct to take full account of the fact that the Commission has an agenda-setting power and that it certainly makes full use of it for its own organizational purposes; in this sense the model presented here is still technically a procedural one. By using the term 'bargaining' I do not mean to imply that I construct a bargaining model in the sense in which it is used in co-operative game theory (as discussed in Thomson et al., 2006) but only to highlight that once a proposal is on the table in the Council, it becomes a part of the negotiated package in which results are usually achieved through package-deals, side-payments, and issue-linkages (König–Junge, 2009; König, 2007). In this section, then, I try to show how the situation changes when we explicitly include these factors into the model and thus stress the interest-driven nature of the political processes within the Council (while keeping the essential insight that agenda-setting powers matter). Incorporating the informal bargaining

based on issue-linkages and trade-offs among the states into the picture dramatically alters the very logic of the actors' behaviour in the Commission-Council interaction and appears to have implications also for the normative desirability of the expected outcomes; the benign picture disappears and a not-so-benign picture emerges.

To start with, let us assume that once the proposal is put on the table by the Commission, it becomes a matter of inter-governmental bargaining within the Council, i.e. that its adoption or refusal depends not only on its substantive desirability for the individual MSs as it is proposed, but also on the way it is linked with other issues and on the amount of side-payments actors are willing to provide to others for support of the proposal. In formal terms, whether a government does or does not support the proposal will not depend on the calculation in equation 2 above but on a calculation where several such equations for individual issues will be added together and only the total result of their set, the positive or negative total balance on the right side, will matter. How does the outcome of the political process change with this calculation?

First of all, it is worth considering one crucial feature of the formal rules-based model as outlined in the previous section: the adopted policy located around the median point on each of the dimensions generates an enormous amount of surplus on the side of the winning coalition. Figure 2 depicts the net utility position of the MSs after the policy is adopted for a simplified case in which their ideal points on the substantive dimension are identical ($sc_i^{bliss} = \overline{sc}$, for all i) and therefore here they differ only on the European dimension, on which they are again uniformly distributed; the policy outcome is fixed at the equilibrium identified in the previous section, i.e. at the point $(2 - 2Q - T; \overline{sc})$. The bottom-left triangle in figure 2 indicates the amount of loss incurred by the least supranationalist actors, and the larger top-right triangle captures the amount of surplus obtained by all of the more pro-supranationalist MSs (all MSs with $eu_i^{bliss} \geq 1 - Q + T$ prefer the proposal to the status quo). If we assume that once the proposal is in the Council, the political outcome is determined primarily by bargaining among the actors, creations of issue-linkages, and mutually beneficial trade-offs both within and across issues, we see that there is a significant space for moving the policy rightwards, in the more supranationalist direction, simply because the proposal as it is now generates so much surplus that a part of it can be transferred in the form of side-payments to the MSs which would, due to the proposed shift in the supranationalist direction, appear below the zero-line and whose support would therefore be lost. In other words, if we allow for informal linkages and trade-offs in the Council bargaining, and do not consider the process as composed of individual issues that are independently decided on by the actors, a significantly more supranationalist policy proposal will still be acceptable for the Council.

Figure 2: Member states' net payoff balance for a proposal at eu=2-2Q-T

While certainly important, this is not the most interesting implication of the model. As it turns out, if we admit the informal bargaining framework with the possibility of payoff transfer among MSs in the Council, the very logic according to which the Commission decides whose interests to incorporate into the legislative proposal, i.e. who gets their way at the legislation drafting stage, changes. First, the pivotal actors lose a lot of their power because it makes little sense for the Commission to try to tailor its proposals to their interests – there are actually, strictly speaking, no more pivotal actors for the individual proposals in this scenario, but only pivotal actors for the whole package of proposals. This package, however, does not exist when the legislation is drafted; it is created by the MSs during the informal Council negotiations as they link the individual issues together to overcome interest divergences.

Second, and implied by the previous point, instead of seeking the pivotal actors the Commission will have to primarily focus on the interests of those MSs that are always safely in the coalition of supporters, which means those MSs that are generally highly pro-supranationalist and for whom the proposals constitute a significant improvement over the *status quo*. What the Commission needs to do to maximize its own payoffs is to propose policies that on the substantive content dimension correspond to the interests of the pro-supranationalist MSs which are safely in the coalition of supporters because by this it will maximize their stakes in the pro-

posal and the pool of the payoff surplus they will have available in the bargaining process. On the European dimension, then, it will propose policies that, for any given value on the substantive dimension, will balance the amount of surplus gained by the supporters and the amount lost by the MSs whose support is necessary (up to the 1-Qth MS) but for whom the proposal is now too supranationalist. Put simply, the Commission will always follow the interests of the pro-supranationalist allies on the substantive content dimension and then shift the proposal rightwards on the European dimension up to the point at which the last necessary member of the coalition of supporters is indifferent (i.e. at which the sizes of the two triangles in figure 2 become equalized).

What matters most for the success of a proposal, then, is not whether enough states are willing to support it in the form in which it is put on the table by the Commission (as is the case when informal politics are not considered) but rather whether it generates a sufficient payoff surplus among its supporters to make them able and willing to secure its passing even when various side-payments and concessions have to be provided by them to those who are initially against it. By considering the informal nature of the Council politics we obtain a completely new picture; the analysis shows that what is most important for the Commission is not to identify the pivots but rather to maximize the surplus of all the supranationalist actors that support the proposal regardless and by that to give them reasons to fight for it in the subsequent Council bargaining. We observe a quantitative change in the more supranationalist direction, which is indicated in figure 2, but more importantly also a dramatic qualitative change in the very logic of the Commission's reasoning, from an orientation on the pivotal actors to an orientation on the group of its natural supranationalist MS allies.

THE INFORMAL COUNCIL BARGAINING MODEL: COMPUTER SIMULATION RESULTS

To demonstrate how the argumentation outlined above plays out I present in this section the results of a computer simulation designed to replicate the Commission-Council interaction as captured in the model of informal Council bargaining, i.e. the model I argue to be an increasingly accurate description of the European political process after the enlargement.

In the simulation, the ideal positions of the 27 MSs on the European dimension are distributed uniformly across the space (i.e. on the points at which $eu_i^{bliss} = = \{0; 1/26; 2/26; ...; 25/26; 1\}$), and on the substantive dimension they are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. The value of the QMV quota is set at the actual $Q = 0.74$, and the value of the transaction costs is arbitrarily (but probably more or less realistically) set at $T = 0.1$. Further, as indicated above, the factor of the MSs' willingness to provide side-payments and engage in issue-linkages is also consid-

ered in that the MSs are only willing to trade off 80% of the payoffs implied for them by the initial Commission proposal, i.e. they are not willing to rid themselves of all benefits during the bargaining stage for the sake of reaching an agreement. The simulation was run 200 times over a policy space defined by 1024 discrete points (32 points on each of the two dimensions). The programme was created and run in the Wolfram Mathematica 8.0 software package[5].

The results of the simulation support the argument in several ways. Figure 3 gives the overall aggregate pattern, showing the mean payoff the Commission would receive for a proposal at each of the points defining the policy space, which is averaged over all 200 iterations. Many of the points consistently yield a payoff of 0 because they would not be adopted by the MSs, given the distribution of their interests across the space and also given the constant transaction costs, which effectively make those proposals that only marginally improve the outcome for many actors not worthy of the effort. In general, and on average over all the iterations, the Commission does best (the hill 'peaks') when it promotes policies well above the MSs' median on the European dimension, in the logic of the shift towards more supranationalist outcomes elaborated above.

Figure 3: The Commission's payoffs from hypothetical proposals on each point in the space (mean value over all iterations)

The disaggregated results for the individual iterations are presented in figure 4, but this time only the actual payoff-maximizing proposals which the Commission would tend to select are depicted. Each of the dots in the right part of the graph (many of the 200 dots overlap because of the limitation of the space to 1024 dis-

crete points) identifies such a best proposal from the point of view of the Commission in the particular iteration of the simulation, i.e. for a given constellation of the MSs' interests. Again, on the European dimension all the proposals fall above the median position within the interval $eu^{proposal} \in [0.78; 0.90]$, with the mean value of $eu^{proposal} = 0.84$.

Figure 4: The Commission's choice of optimal points in individual iterations

The fact that the Commission will propose policies fitting the more pro-supranationalist MSs is best captured in figure 5, which also plots the results of the same simulation, but this time from the perspective of the MSs: it shows how the distance of the resulting policy on the *substantive content dimension* depends on the MS's initial position on the European dimension, i.e. it captures the extent to which it pays off for the MSs on the substantive dimension to be seen as more pro-supranationalist on the European dimension. Each of the points shows how well an actor with a particular fixed ideal point on the European dimension 'fares' in terms of outcomes on the substantive dimension, on average over all 200 iterations. The upper of the two graphs shows the results for the informal bargaining model simulation, i.e. the model assuming the presence and ubiquity of informal trade-offs with-

in the Council (as presented in section 4). The lower graph shows, for the sake of comparison, the results of the 'benign' model based on formal rules (not allowing for side-payments and issue-linkages; see section 3), with exactly the same parameter values and the same ideal points for MSs. As we would expect from the theoretical debate above, while in the benign model it pays off most to be the pivot, in the informal bargaining model it is the group of the supranationalist MSs for whom the result on the *substantive content dimension* (and obviously the result on the European dimension) will, on average, be best. For easier interpretation linear models (the OLS method) are fitted through the data.

Figure 5: The resulting distance from the ideal points on the substantive content dimension; the informal bargaining (upper) vs. the formal rules (lower) model

Although they are only computer simulation results and not true empirical data (see, e.g., Gilbert, 2007; Miller–Page, 2007), the figures allow us to develop thicker intuitions about the dynamics of the European political process; they are obviously able to capture the empirical reality only if and to the extent to which we believe the simple assumptions of the model outlined in the previous sections to be empirically valid. Also, the simulation results (the particular locations of the points) depend on how the parameters of the model are set, and although the results tend to be fairly robust over different parameter specifications, there is, necessarily, a certain degree of arbitrariness.

What is much more important than the particular obtained values, however, is that the simulation supports the prediction of a qualitative shift in the very logic of the actors' behaviour, i.e. a refocusing of the Commission from the Council pivotal actors located at the point $eu_{pivot}^{bliss} \approx 1 - Q = 0.26$ (as implied by the benign model, again for the real QMV quota value of 74%) to the broader group of stable members of the winning coalition, i.e. the generally pro-supranationalist MSs without whose support no proposal can succeed in the Council.

In the long term, then, the Commission will have incentives to always tailor the proposals to the interests of a stable group of pro-supranationalist MSs, and therefore these MSs will be the Commission's primary negotiation partners at the legislation drafting stage, in the logic outlined is section 3. This fact, however, has some rather unwelcome implications.

A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE: THE EMERGENCE OF CORE-PERIPHERY STRUCTURES

How does the logic of the informal Council bargaining model – according to which the Commission will have strong incentives to consider primarily the interests of its natural pro-supranationalist MS allies in the process of legislation drafting – play out in the longer perspective? And how does the picture change if we explicitly consider the institutionalist argument about transaction costs and the role of institutionalization in their reduction?

The whole process outlined in the previous sections rests on the tacit assumption that the pro-supranationalist MSs are able to arrange for the transmission of the information about their particular substantive content interests to the Commission so that it can put on the table a proposal that takes them into account. Moreover, they also need to be able to coordinate among themselves at least to a certain degree so that the Commission can devise suitable proposals at all; they need to build alliances of support for the proposals; they need to establish with whom to negotiate, under what (informal) rules, and what the scope of the negotiated (issue-linked) agenda will be; and they need to invest time and other resources into the negotiation process *per se*. All this induces potentially significant transaction

costs, and the models presented in the previous sections tried to capture this fact. What should be stressed, however, is that a great share of transaction costs in contractual relations is, in general, of a fixed rather than a per unit nature. Once a cooperative arrangement is set up among actors, the patterns of their interaction will tend to become regularized, the arrangement will be increasingly stable, and the transaction costs of maintaining it will steeply decrease (Coase, 1937).

Applied to our case, the transaction costs reasoning shows that the MSs will, on the one hand, have to pay significant costs due to the need to build winning coalitions and in general transmit large amounts of information about their positions and interests, both to other MSs, in the negotiations, and to the Commission, at the legislation drafting stage. On the other hand, though, we see that precisely because of these costs the MSs will have strong incentives to regularize and (informally) institutionalize their relations and linkages, for instance within the repeatedly emerging bargaining coalitions or in their informal relationship with the Commission, once they are in place.

In other words, by institutionalizing some of their relationships the actors can save part of their transaction costs and thus increase, in the long term, their utility. This is an abstract argument that possibly contradicts the everyday intuitions about institutions as somewhat formal 'animals', but in fact it is derived directly from the general institutionalist theory in which institutions are conceptualized as in principle nothing more than recognized patterns of behaviour (Young, 1982: 277) or, in the strictly rationalist tradition, equilibrium ways of doing things (Shepsle, 2006: 26). If, then, some actors appear to cooperate repeatedly, e.g. in a bargaining coalition, their interaction becomes almost automatically progressively institutionalized.

Furthermore, the process of institutionalization of cooperation is characterized by important self-reinforcing, positive-loop dynamics. As put by Smith (2003: 17), studying the processes of institutionalization of relationships among actors

> [...] means taking into account the reciprocal links between institutional development and the propensity of states to cooperate to achieve joint gains. This relationship is dynamic and circular: cooperation can encourage actors to build institutions, but institutions themselves should foster cooperative outcomes, which later influence the process of institutions building through feedback mechanisms.

Once the cooperative mechanism is created, actors can save costs by sticking to it, which in turn increases their payoffs in the next rounds of cooperation, and so on. The informal bargaining model in the previous sections demonstrates that we can plausibly expect the existence of a simple mechanism through which a group of the more supranationalist MSs may gain the advantage of a privileged access

to the Commission and that due to the informal nature of Council politics, the Commission will have incentives to consider their interests more heavily than those of the other MSs. What is essential is that once the mechanism is in place, and the group of generally more supranationalist MSs starts to emerge as a relatively coherent block defined by their shared interest, as implied by the informal Council bargaining model, the institutionalist logic of transaction-costs reduction will lead them to solidify the links among themselves and to increasingly consider all their regular partners as natural and indispensable allies. As a result, the MSs in the Council will gradually tend to be separated into two groups – the relatively more coherent group of the pro-supranationalist MSs, and the less coherent group of the anti-supranationalists, with the former having a significantly better access to the Commission and hence a stronger position in the legislative process.

Again, this argumentation may appear abstract but the results to which I come on the basis of the model and of the theoretical argument are, in fact, in close congruence with the empirical patterns identified recently by Plechanovová (2011), who points at the possibility of an emergence of what can be interpreted as a core-periphery structure within the Council. On the basis of the Council voting records for the years 2004–2006, she finds that a relatively homogeneous group of MSs can be discerned in the Council, and that it is characterized by a high level of voting coherence and a generally lower level of dissent than that of the other MSs. Building on the social networks theory, she interprets the observed pattern as indicating a core-periphery structure within the Council, i.e. a structure reflecting the fact that the given social network of MSs in the Council can be partitioned into two parts — the core, consisting of actors with a high relative density of mutual interaction, and the periphery, consisting of actors which interact more with the core than among themselves (Borgatti–Everett, 2000; Hojman–Szeidl, 2008).

Her interpretation directly corresponds with the logic of the argumentation outlined in this text and especially with its long-term implications based on the institutionalist reasoning. In fact, the immediate implication of the social-network theoretical framework adopted by Plechanovová is that those MSs that are located within the core will have a better access to the various resources flowing through the system, in this case especially information, and therefore their structural incentive to be part of the core as opposed to moving to the periphery will be increased. If we adopt the core-periphery interpretation, then, and combine it with the findings presented in this text, we would expect that once it emerges, the core-periphery structure will perpetuate itself and that it is likely to become progressively stabilized and institutionalized over time. In sum, then, both the rational-institutionalist argument presented here and the social network theory-based argument of Plechanovová come to essentially identical results.

Relating this discussion back to the problem of the eastern enlargement, we see that the forces driving the emergence of the core-periphery structure are likely to grow stronger after 2004. The increased membership and diversity of actors' interests induce the empirically observed trend of further informalization of the European political process; as I demonstrate by the informal Council bargaining model in section 3, this changes the strategic incentives of the Commission and induces it to refocus its attention from individual potential pivots to the whole group of the relatively more supranationalist MSs. As a result, due to both the long-term transaction costs considerations and the immediate incentives of the Commission and the MSs, a space is opened for the emergence of a stable group of supranationalist MSs with a privileged access to the Commission. In other words, the increased informalization of the EU and specifically of Council politics, which was induced by the enlargement, combined with the fact that the Commission shares with some of the MSs an interest in further supranationalization, can be expected to lead in the long term to the emergence of a structural division of the MSs into a core and a periphery, with the former having a significantly stronger position in the decision-making process than the latter.

The actual realization of this process depends on many factors, including the degree to which the supranationalist MSs and the Commission are indeed able to arrange for the kind of systematic cooperation proposed here (or a tendency towards such a cooperation) and, on the contrary, the ability of some of the less supranationalist MSs to counterweigh the trend by their increased activity and assertiveness. Furthermore, we should obviously not expect the mechanism to be in any way massive in scale – what I propose is the likely existence of a tendency, not of a deterministic relationship. Nevertheless, if the logic of the argumentation presented here is valid, there is a threat that the proposed processes indeed may start, or may have already started, to unfold.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article I put forward a simple argument: the trend of informalization of the European political processes observed after the enlargement can be expected to lead, in the long term, to important changes in the way the Council of Ministers functions. I argue that due to the informal nature of the Council as of a bargaining forum, and given the MSs' and the Commission's individual interests, we can expect the emergence of a structural division of the MSs into two groups – a group of the more pro-supranationalist MSs, and a group of the less supranationalist states; following the findings of Plechanovová (2011) I adopt the interpretation of the two groups as the core and the periphery respectively. I demonstrate that the core group will be able to secure for itself a better position in the political process and systematically higher payoffs.

If the argumentation outlined in this text is correct, some important implications regarding the threats the EU is likely to face in the future follow from it. First, the differentiation of the two groups of MSs according to one of the most salient political dimensions – the degree of their support for supranationalization – might lead to a polarization of European politics and to the emergence of a bimodal distribution of actors across the political space. This might have severe implications for the viability of the polity as such. Second, the emergence of the structural division, and the connected systematically uneven distribution of benefits across the states, would directly threaten the democratic nature of the EU polity. There are strong disagreements over whether the EU as it functions now does or does not suffer from a democratic deficit (Moravcsik, 2002; Follesdal–Hix, 2006). Clearly, though, the argument outlined here would point at a much more profound accountability gap between the supranational body and some of its very members, suggesting that even the elementary 'internal' accountability mechanisms might fail (Keohane, 2003) and that even the thinner concepts of democratic governance would only apply with difficulties.

I should stress that much more empirical evidence needs to be collected before we can conclude to what extent the argumentation presented in this text is empirically valid. First, the analysis by Plechanovová on which I draw covers only the years 2004–2006; an extension of the period would provide her results with more reliability and also give firmer empirical grounds to my argument in this text. Second, the quantitative evidence should also ideally be complemented with a qualitative and more process-oriented approach, although it is clear that the kind of structural features I discuss here are notoriously difficult to capture qualitatively. These empirical limitations notwithstanding, the fact that the argumentation of this text is built on assumptions commonly used in analyses of European politics probably lends it some *a priori* credibility.

I started the text by contrasting its long-term perspective with the very current policy debates about the survival of the Eurozone. I hope my analysis points at the fact that even after the EU successfully weathers the current storms, and some would say *if* it does so, further and perhaps equally deep structural problems of its functioning as of a polity, as of an *ever closer union,* will persist. These problems will need to be solved.

ENDNOTES

[2] An alternative explanation can be based on exactly the opposite reasoning – the decision-making process may in principle improve its efficiency by becoming more formalized, i.e. by shifting to a more rule-structured and regularized mode (cf. Bailer et al., 2009). Yet, there seems to be little evidence for such a shift. Most notably, the key observable implication of such a possible process, an increase in the amount of voting in the Council, is not present (e.g. Mattila, 2009).

[3] While the transaction costs do not constitute the core of my argumentation, in this and the following section, they become directly relevant for the theoretical argument of section 6. Their inclusion in the spatial models and in the computer simulation does have an effect on the results in a quantitative sense (the strength of the described processes), but it does not change the qualitative insights of my argumentation (the presence of the described processes). For the sake of simplicity, the model assumes the transaction costs to be constant – i.e. I do not formally model any variation in them across MSs or over time.

[4] Here the assumption of uniform distribution of ideal points across the European dimension is consequential for my results. However, while weaker in quantitative terms, qualitatively the results hold also under alternative specifications of the underlying preference distribution. Consider, as the most plausible alternative, a normal distribution of the MSs' ideal points across the European dimension; take the simplest situation in which the mean value of the normal distribution is 0.5, and the standard deviation is 0.25, so that we can, on average, expect approx. 95% of all the ideal points to fall within the [0;1] interval. Under this specification, the resulting policy will, on average, fall approx. on the point $(0.7 - T; 0.5)$. This indeed presents some departure from the median position, but the result is still much more 'moderate' than that in the alternative 'informal bargaining' model presented in section 4. Furthermore, the 'heavier' the tails of the normal distribution, the more the results will approximate those I present in this text, based on the uniform distribution.

[5] The source code for the simulation can be downloaded from the following website: kmv.fsv.cuni.cz/en/people-publikace.aspx?IDuser=32.

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Which IR Do You Speak? Languages as Perspectives in the Discipline of IR

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Abstract: The universal pretension of the discipline of International Relations (IR) is increasingly being questioned by scholars who feel that the theories and issues that IR deals with do not represent their views on history and current events. The paper argues that a critical reflection on viewpoints and perspective is warranted for moving beyond a critique of the biases of the discipline. It does so by conceptualizing perspectives as contextualized systems of meanings which are part of knowledge production. The paper analyses languages as perspectives by examining their structures and especially the meanings given to things, and also by suggesting that languages constitute systems of meanings that affect how one sees and thinks about the world. Exploring the treatments of globalization and mondialisation in the French and English languages, the paper argues that the English-speaking and the French-speaking world's conceptualizations of the phenomenon of globalization are different, in large part because of the two languages' distinct linguistic structures and historically grounded words. The article concludes with a plea for more critical thinking about perspectives and for conceiving the IR discipline as a fragmented, as opposed to a universal, body of knowledge.

Keywords: perspective, standpoint epistemology, language, IR discipline, self-reflexivity

INTRODUCTION

When Stanley Hoffman observed that the study of IR is an American discipline (Hoffman, 2001), he was revealing the close links that exist between a certain political context and the type of research that is being done in it. While Hoffman interpreted this situation as a mere reflection of the dominant position of the United States in the world in the 1950s, in the 1990s many scholars started challenging the ethnocentric or geographical bias of a discipline that only pretended to be about the world. Attesting to this growing interest in the influence the context had on the discipline, several works were published on this theme, notably *International Relations – Still an American Social Science: Toward Diversity in International Thought* (edited by R. M. A. Crawford and D. S. L. Jarvis, 2001); *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations* (edited by K. Jørgensen and T. B. Knudsen, 2006); *Decolonizing Interna-*

tional Relations (edited by B. Gruffydd Jones, 2006) and the edited volume *Global International Relations Scholarship: Worlding Beyond the West* (by A. Tickner and O. Wæver, 2008), as well as special issues of *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (2007), *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* (2003) and the *European Journal of International Relations* (2000), to name just a few.

This growing interest in different views about the world and the challenge to the pretension of universalism of the discipline are healthy developments. Yet, curiously enough, it did not change fundamentally the way the story of IR as a discipline is being framed. Perspectives, the sets of meanings that influence how scholars not only see but also interpret and validate their knowledge, are still marginal in the discipline. In Hoffman's days, concerns about the factors that influence theory making were seen as marginal in a discipline that was seeking to produce a scientific research program as objective and universal as possible. The issue is still marginal today partly because scholars do not think it is determinant for understanding the discipline. This is not to say that they reject any subjectivity; on the contrary, the self-reflexive turn has never been so important in the discipline. But perspectives are often considered simple individual biases entertained by the beholders that are not worth being examined in detail.

This paper argues that on the contrary, perspectivism has much to offer when it comes to understanding the production of IR scholarship. In rehabilitating perspectivism, the paper seeks to broaden the analysis beyond the U.S. or Anglo-American biases said to be present in IR. Taking languages as an illustration of perspectives, the argument pursued suggests that knowledge production is closely influenced by what a perspective conveys as meanings, which is itself a product of the given historical conditions. The perspective that a language contains is intrinsically tied to the historical conditions of the language and its words. The paper argues that exploring how languages contain different interpretations of specific phenomena can potentially broaden the discipline by problematizing the relatively untheorized phenomenon of the historical conditions that affect how collective knowledge is produced (Harding, 1991).

The article will proceed as follows. First, the current place of perspectives in the discipline will be presented. The article will then proceed to a rehabilitation of perspectives by defining their importance in structuring knowledge production. When defined as a system of beliefs and knowledge, a perspective reveals the importance of contexts and the inherently fragmented nature of knowledge production in IR. The paper will then proceed to illustrate these claims by analyzing how languages, in this case, French and English, affect one's analysis of globalization.

PERSPECTIVES AND THE DISCIPLINE OF IR

Perspectives have received only limited attention in the analyses of IR scholarship, despite the growing recognition of biases in the discipline and self-reflexive analy-

ses of the history of the discipline. Brown (2001), for example, denounced the Anglo-American bias of the discipline, which is itself the product of an overrepresentation of American and British scholars and publications, but also the result of a community's construction of an object of study that is defined by the same community. Many scholars acknowledge the domination of Western conceptualizations (Smith, 2002) or the colonial origins of the discipline (Gruffyd Jones, 2006). Ole Wæver (1996; 1999) also recognized the US hegemony in the discipline, seeing it as based on a particular approach, rational choice, and a predominance of problems and theories.

The growing self-reflexivity of the discipline has been particularly effective in problematizing its origins but so far, it did not generate theoretical implications. The discipline does not accommodate issues of relativism or contextualized viewpoints contained in the notion of perspective very well. Whether the discipline constitutes 'the state of theory about international [relations]' (Holsti, 1985: vii) or the sum of all theories and debates around issues that pertain to international, as opposed to domestic, politics (Wight, 1995; Battistella, 2006), its self-reflexivity focuses more on epistemological and ontological questions (Wæver, 1999) than on contexts of knowledge production. Perspectives are considered viewpoints that, at best, reify personal biases or, at worst, rely on a 'romantic' view of closed cultures, disconnected and incommensurable (Wæver, 1996: 172), that no longer exist in the discipline.

The marginalization of perspectives can be seen in both mainstream and critical scholarship. The former argues that perspectives are marginal because research is not affected by who produces it and where it occurs. IR scholarship focuses on important problems of the day and seeks a scientific and objective way of doing this (Holsti, 1985). Accordingly, the subjectivity of scholars should not and does not interfere with the search for scientific knowledge. But critical scholars have acknowledged the inherent subjectivity of knowledge production in groundbreaking arguments in the 1980s (Cox, 1981; Ashley, 1984). These critical analyses led the way to further and expanded accounts of the development of the discipline, in which some views and voices became dominant while others were silenced. But the emphasis of poststructuralist thinkers on epistemological concerns focused more on questions about individual scholars than on the collective context of knowledge production. The thinkers focused more on who is speaking than on the question of where they speak from. Moreover, for many critical scholars, the issue was not to bring to the mainstream issues of subjectivity. They rather wanted to question and challenge the existence of the discipline by criticizing it precisely *from* its margins. Concerned about the incompatibility between critical analysis and the existence of the discipline, they wanted to write from a 'dissident position' (Ashley–Walker, 1990).

Despite these limits, critical interventions and self-reflexive analyses offer opportunities for exploring the differences and specific contexts surrounding knowledge

production in IR. The Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project (TRIP) has been surveying since 2005 a large number of IR scholars on their personal theoretical preferences and views about the discipline. The attention this survey has received and the effort to include more countries in the investigation signal a concern about the so-called universalism of the discipline. And even though its findings suggest an absence of 'national' perspectives about IR, they highlight differences among scholars that invite further investigations (Porter, 2001; Smith, 2002).[1]

It is perhaps within the sociology of science that the importance of social context in IR production has offered the most precise findings. Wæver (1999) pioneered this kind of research in the discipline. As his research focused on the role of social networks and internal power relations within scientific communities, his findings pointed to differences in research agendas, theory making, dissemination and teaching practices (Wæver, 1999, 2007, 2010). From a different approach, scholars of postcolonial studies have also been debunking europeocentrism and challenging the universalist posture of American and/or European knowledge. By focusing on the power relations between the Western powers and the societies of the global South, they have revealed the Western-centric view of IR. Their research revealed how specific historical concepts such as state and nation were developed into core theoretical aspects in the discipline of IR thanks to the geopolitical context that served to legitimize Western domination (Smouts, 2007; Benessaieh, 2010). And thanks to the work of postcolonial studies, there is an increasing awareness of and receptivity to authors like Spivak, Appadurai or Glissant and issues of identities, citizenships or mobility that challenge the unilinear discourse of Modernity. Contrary to a sociological approach, postcolonial scholarship focuses on different identities and suggests, implicitly, the existence of distinct communities based on common experience and geography.

These efforts signal a willingness to dissect and analyze the construction of knowledge, and to question the structure of the discipline as a unified body of knowledge (Wæver, 2007). While many authors started questioning the role and status of the discipline (Rosow, 2003; Ashley–Walker, 1990), more needs to be done to address why fragmented knowledge is being produced, and how this affects the evolution of the discipline. The notion of perspective is one interesting option, as it can potentially speak about both the social context and the cognitive process of a group simultaneously. This requires, however, that one defines perspective in a more robust manner than was the case until now.

DEFINING PERSPECTIVES

The idea that the context of knowledge production is important to theory making has been recognized by both social networks theory, which emphasizes the role of

social relations among scholars (Merton, 1968), and the theory of socio-cognitive communities, which insists on the influence of social contexts on ideas (Kuhn, 1996). While research has generally tended to consider the two corresponding processes as distinct processes of knowledge production and dissemination, some thinkers and schools of thought have tried to bring them together. Gender studies and the work of Harding (1990) have been crucial here. Harding (1990) argues that social contexts set limits on human understanding. Her feminist standpoint approach sought to depart from the relativism of individual taste or values, as she conceptualized standpoint as a posture built into real material practices and social struggles. Harding preferred the term 'standpoint' to 'perspectivism', however, as she associated the latter with relativism (Harding, 1990: 142). For Harding, the social context does not depend on relativism, but on the objectivity of real experiences (Harding, 1990: 142).

Harding's argument reminds us of the social conditions of theory making. Her rejection of perspectivism, however, is ill-founded; the conception of perspectivism does not need to be individualist and impregnated with strong relativism. As Kuhn argued, perspectives constitute an analytical category that enables observers to explore the various influences that contexts, perceptions and values can have on knowledge production (Kuhn, 1996). For Kuhn, the perspectives of socio-cognitive communities affect ideas, but not the scientific validation process. In other words, perspectives are those unscientific aspects that can affect socio-cognitive communities. There is also another version of perspective, which insists on the scientific system of knowledge. It comes from the history of art, where the notion of perspective was theorized for the first time. Here one finds a different conceptualization, which bridges knowledge and subjective viewpoints. To begin with, we should remind ourselves that in visual art, perspective is a system of representation. It is an illusion, a deception, and therefore, it is a manipulation by people of what they see. As it transposes a three-dimensional world onto a two-dimensional surface, it necessarily involves a distortion of this world. We are all familiar with linear perspective, the system whereby all lines converge to the horizon in order to create an effect of depth. But there are also other perspectives in art, such as the much older religious or non-realistic perspective, the two-point perspective, and the atmospheric perspective. What they all share in common is a system of rules that serve to represent a perceived reality in a painting. This representation emphasizes relations and connections between objects and conveys a message about their relative importance. Perspectives ought to be understood by artists and the public so that they would be able to make sense of the artistic representations that utilize the perspectives. Each perspective has its own codes for presenting objects on a canvas and for indicating the space and hierarchy between them. For example, the religious perspective took God as a reference point, and in works with this perspec-

tive, all lines converge towards His figure for the purpose of creating a feeling of authority; the atmospheric perspective adopted different colours and tones for indicating space and distance; and the two-point perspective used two points and two systems of line convergence to enable a juxtaposition of different standpoints on the same canvas.

As these examples show, perspectives are not just biases or individual standpoints. In one perspective there can be more than one individual standpoint. But viewpoints are an inescapable element of perspectives. This is so because within a perspective, there is one common vision of certain things which then contributes to shaping the system of representation. This system of meanings is then shared by others and makes intelligible the interactions between objects. Unlike a viewpoint, which is based on feelings and innate, perspectives suppose a prior understanding. When linear perspective was developed, based as it was on the new scientific discoveries in mathematics, geometry, and architecture, it directly challenged the existing religious codes based on faith and authority. It required some time and many arguments before the linear perspective was accepted by a large community of artists and viewers. One of the painters of the Renaissance suggested that linear perspective was a fraud, but a useful one. Andrea Pozzo (1707), writing in 1693, argued that 'the art of perspective does, with wonderful pleasure, deceive the eye.' In order to provide a solid alternative to religious perspective, Pozzo went on to argue that this form of knowledge is connected to others and brings the artists closer to the Truth and to God than any other perspectives that existed before: 'Therefore, Reader, my Advice is, that you chearfully begin your work, with a resolution to draw all the lines thereof to that true point, the Glory of God [...]' (1707: np).

The fine art definition of perspectives as historical knowledge and systems of meanings brings us further away from an individual or relativist viewpoint also because the collective meaning inherent in the production of an art is also shared by the public, or other fellow artists, once the art is disseminated. This view of perspective enables the problematization of both the social dimension or situatedness of knowledge, and the mental process through which information acquires specific meaning, is validated by others, and becomes knowledge. Perspectives, accordingly, are historically situated and collective and they constitute systems of representation that transform viewpoints into propositions to organize and analyze the reality that is portrayed. Perspectives display a certain coherence that brings to the forefront specific conditions in the production of knowledge. They also affect the validation process of knowledge cumulation and dissemination by shaping patterns of acceptance, support or resistance. Perspectives thus concern both the social and the intellectual experiences of scholars. For Kuhn, the arbitrariness of perspective, its unscientific character, was to be acknowledged but not theorized. But where Kuhn saw a problem, we should see opportunities for and the necessity of

analyzing the implications of perspectives in the process of knowledge formation as a serious matter. It can expand our knowledge of already known views of the world and dominant systems of representation, and it can teach us something about the social place and acceptability of ideas in a society.

The theoretical argument in favour of perspectives needs some illustrations. In particular, the notion of perspective begs the question of what types of perspectives there are in the field of international relations. What make perspectives exist as distinct collective viewpoints whose meanings affect knowledge production? This might be an odd question to ask, especially in today's world, where cultures and ideas increasingly blur the distinct conditions of studying and analyzing International Relations, and this is corroborated by the results of the TRIP surveys. The surveys confirm the disappearance of distinct national contexts in IR scholarship. But the question makes sense when distinct conditions are dissociated from the image of a national standpoint. Looking for perspectives consists in looking for common lines of thoughts and common references among various scholars, which constitute systems of representation.

At least two of these systems seem to be relevant for IR scholarship: geo-historical experiences and languages. Geo-historical experiences have been the focus of postcolonial approaches, and especially of subaltern studies. Both approaches seek to theorize how a context influences viewpoints as well as knowledge. They have made specific efforts to decry the imposition of a false universalism by Western science and knowledge, and, in the case of subaltern studies, to problematize how local contexts shape thoughts and the imagination of other possibilities. As Mignolo argues, 'subaltern societies construct knowledge in which local history plays a strong part, but unlike knowledge of dominant societies, their knowledge is not universal, nor can they construct it with an apparatus that has the pretension of being exterior to history' (Mignolo, 2000: 73). He insists in particular on the consequences of this knowledge construction for universal knowledge, the privileged vantage point on which Western European history was built, and the contrasting situations prevailing in regions that were subordinated to the West:

> It is one thing to criticize the complicity between knowledge and the state while inhabiting a particular nation-state... and another to criticize the complicity between knowledge and the state from the historical exteriority of a universal idea of the state forged on the experience of a local history: the modern, European, experience of the state (Mignolo, 2000: 73).

Subaltern studies suggest that the conscious experience of being or coming from a specific region can condition in a powerful way the values, the social structures and the system of knowledge that is produced. The historical consciousness of be-

ing part of a subordinated region can be partially explained by a sociological analysis of knowledge production and hierarchies. In her survey of Latin American IR scholarship, Tickner showed the concrete material and financial dynamics at play, which engendered very unequal contributions to the universal standard of knowledge. The power of attraction of American-based conferences and American universities for Latin American graduate students and professors contrasts with the paucity of resources in other regions. In addition, the overrepresentation of American scholars in the discipline exerts pressures on scholars elsewhere, and this has the effect of carrying or transferring American views and meanings well beyond the United States (Tickner, 2003).

In addition, it appears that the effects of a given geo-historical experience extend beyond standpoints and ideological propensity. One can venture that the experience of historical subordination of one society by another – in other words, their colonial and postcolonial experiences – shapes differentiated senses of what is knowledge and what is valid knowledge. These experiences entail different meanings and shared rules about how to think about power, justice, and agency in world politics. Even Mohammed Ayoob (2002), a more mainstream scholar, argued that the experience of state building and security issues illustrate well the distinct historical context of Third World states in comparison to the Western part of the world. Ayoob's call for 'more perspectives and less theory' (2002: 48) was precisely a call to historicize knowledge and produce historically grounded analyses of world politics.

Other examples illustrate the growing importance of subaltern viewpoints *and* systems of meanings. The greater place granted to identities and to notions of imperial forms in subaltern and postcolonial research instigated a shift in modes of knowledge production and validation. Issues of perception, of identity and of the importance of historical discourse constitute new ontological material as well as elements for interpreting the world. The resurgence in the study of empire – for example, in studies by Abu-Lugod or Vitalis – represents an illustration of a regional-historical perspective on IR. In both Abu-Lugod and Vitalis, the study of empire focuses on a concrete historical case that challenges the received Eurocentric view and also on the importance of local dynamisms for understanding the construction of empires. A recent work by Benedict Anderson on the rise of nationalism in Cuba and the Philippines (Anderson, 2005) offers a different account of History. With a careful look at historical local situations, Anderson suggests that in this case, the idea of nationalism and its manifestations might have come from places that the West considers to be small and distant places rather than from Europe. In what he calls the political astronomy of transglobal coordination of revolutionary sentiments and nationalism in countries of the Global South, Cuba and the Philippines might have been at the center of an emerging modernity and cosmopolitanist forms of nationalism (Anderson, 2005).

These examples illustrate various views and analyses produced by a deliberate awareness of different historical and geographical experiences. Such examples contribute to recognizing the narrow historiography of international relations, but more needs to be done for understanding how these standpoints affect systems of representation and analysis. The notion of perspective, as a system of representation, should be applied to investigating the way the various experiences constitute distinct analytical mechanisms that produce, or can produce, distinct meanings and knowledge. But rather than addressing this, the rest of the paper explores another possible type of perspective – that offered by languages as tongues. Languages refer to a context that influences how some aspects of the world are seen and given meaning and produce knowledge about IR. Through the use of a language, specific views and some concepts meaningful for a group contribute to delineating a particular approach to meaning. In the next section, I explore the extent to which two languages, French and English, illustrate significant differences in understandings about the world.

LANGUAGES

Languages affect thoughts. This proposition has several meanings. One of them is the logical and almost mechanical affirmation that languages convey concepts that make sense of the world. Accordingly languages are a tool of communication which logically affects thoughts (Bloom–Keil, 2001). This proposition can also go further and incorporate a reference to the social world. In lingustics, languages are studied in terms of their structure and their evolution, with the notion that they are part of the social world. Along that view, feminist anthropologists, for example, have argued that languages transmit a culture and important social values and rules (Wanitzek, 2002). As Mignolo suggested, the history of a people and the history of their language are closely intertwined (2001a). He also suggested that languages are tied to the experience of a particular place in the world hierarchy. Being social structures of communication, languages contain rules and meanings that provide constraints and opportunities. This interpretation counters the cultural or linguistic turn that assumes that texts have a life on their own (Descarries, 2003). Rather, languages carry specific modes of thinking and of questioning that are based on historical and daily experiences (Descarries, 2003 : 634). Languages contain or represent the exteriorization of a subjectivity (Auroux, 1996) because a language contains expressions that prefigure the social. The profound cultural aspect of a language was aptly described by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1998) when they problematized the pretension to universality of (some) languages. They argued that the transposition of concepts and analyses from one linguistic context onto another erases the specific conditions for their emergence. Therefore, the process of translation, they said, often leads to a de-historicization of the ideas and messages in a given language. Moreover, and this is

indicative of the 'power' of a language, the work of translation might bring only false universalization (Bourdieu–Wacquant, 1998).

The social and historical conditions of the existence of languages were discussed in social sciences especially in terms of their relations with other languages. Hence the unequal articulation of languages at the world level brings to the fore issues of inequality in representation. With language hierarchy comes the dilemma between publishing for smaller audiences in one's own language and publishing in another language, mostly English, with the constraint of having to follow textual and publishing conventions that are a product of historical conditions and that sometimes do violence to the author's own way of communicating (Canagarajah, 2002).[2] Many observers have noted the predominance of English in the discipline and, more generally, in theory production (Brown, 2001). Some studies suggest that 80% of the world's scientific publications are written in English (Canagarajah, 2002). The solution to this domination, which has often been the translation of English texts into another language to familiarize students who speak the second language with the state of the art of a subject, tends to reinforce the problem of asymmetry in knowledge production between the regions and languages producing the knowledge and the regions which are only receiving and consuming it, as Wæver rightly argued (Wæver, 1998). However, the hierarchization of languages has deeper consequences than its effects on the career paths of individual scholars. This is so because the consciousness of using a subordinated language can affect what one says and how she says it. The hierarchization of languages translates into the silencing of the other's 'intellectual and social horizons' (Descarries, 2003: 628–629). One linguist observed that a 'tradition of exiguity' exists in some parts of the world, which is reflected in some languages. This tradition encourages people to criticize their own work and constantly compare their (literary) expression to great traditions, which are then considered as the ultimate point of reference (Paré, 1992, quoted in Ali-Khodja–Boudreau, 2009). In the social sciences, the effect of this tradition of exiguity, of smallness, means that one feels excluded from the *Logos* and deprived of legitimate filiation with other great narratives which are often situated outside of History (Ali-Khodja–Boudreau, 2009). Mignolo (2001b) referred to geopolitics of languages to expose power rivalries of languages as embodiments of historical and ideational structures. Accordingly, there are languages that are dominant in some periods and languages that are silenced because the societies where they are spoken are unable to express themselves in the world, or as world leaders. Whether one knowledge can be transmitted and spread globally, whether some perspectives can be known, depends to a large extent on the place a language holds in the hierarchy of power, which is often the story of imperialism and conquest (Mignolo, 2000).

Being social and historical, languages contain collective meanings. The latter may constitute standpoints from which locutors see the world. But to make languages a

category of perspective requires that one looks into languages not only as mediums transmitting values and meanings, but also as structured meanings based on rules which then constitute systems of representation. One way of doing this would be to borrow the idea that the structures of languages affect thoughts from the 19th century scholar von Humbolt (the idea was later developed in experiments by Whorf and Sapir) (Bloom–Keil, 2001). This deterministic vision has been widely rebutted by socio-linguists over the years. If a word does not exist in a language, the corresponding thought can still exist in the same language but be expressed through different words, and the existence of translations tends to confirm that similar thoughts can exist in different languages (Ortiz, 2009). This does not mean, however, that languages are only communication tools. Languages can represent a single phenomenon differently and they can shape to some extent one's interpretation of a phenomenon. As one linguist suggested, languages are in the worlds that they want to say, and therefore a language cannot say everything (Ivekovic, 2007). This is because languages are also systems of representation connecting things and experiences together into coherent, albeit implicit, schemes. These connections provide the bridge between the linguistic structure of a language and the concrete circumstances of its production. Descarries, for example, argues that francophone feminists' choice of the term *rapports sociaux de sexe* in their studies of gender relations emphasized 'relations of power and hierarchy constructed by patriarchy in its interdependence with neo-capitalism' (Descarries, 2003: 629). This choice shaped to some extent the analysis of gender issues in francophone literature. In contrast, in English, the term *gender* was associated more closely with an identity process and was less constructed in social struggles. Descarries continues by suggesting that francophone feminists have lost some of the radical thinking included in their approach when they replaced *rapports sociaux de sexe* with *gender*.

The idea that languages can be a category of perspectives in IR is relatively new, and aside from Pettman, who borrowed the Worf-Sapir hypothesis to briefly raise the issue of how languages affect thoughts (Pettman, 2000: 32–33), no analysis in IR explores languages as systems of representation. The next section will seek to partially fill this gap by exploring how two languages, French and English, address the concept of globalization. This example should help illustrate how languages are perspectives, and how perspectives affect one's way of seeing and, more importantly, one's way of explaining the world.

GLOBALIZATION AND MONDIALISATION: TWO WORDS, TWO TALES

It can be argued that the different treatments of globalization in different languages not only reflect the social and historical context of the scholarship, but are the products of different languages and their abilities and ways to say the world. This can be illustrated

by a discussion of the distinct ways in which globalization has been treated in English and French. In English, the concept of globalization refers to major transformations in world politics. It refers to a change of scale, a transformation in the spatial organization from the local to the global (Held et al., 1999: 15–16). While some scholars used the adjective *global* already in the mid to late 1980s in phrases like '*global* cities' (Sassen, 1996), '*global* economy' or '*global* capitalism' (Robinson, 2004), a series of books about globalization appeared in the 1990s, discussing the process of globalization and its widespread consequences (Robinson, 2004; Scholte, 2000; Held et al., 1999). In French IR the word *mondialisation* appeared at about the same time, even though some authors had earlier recognized the need to expand conceptual frameworks that were too closely associated with the experience of the nation-states and territorially defined spaces (Badie–Smouts, 1992). Later, the term was used specifically to address the issue of political organization in a space beyond or above the nation-state.

The differences in the two languages' treatment of the phenomenon are noteworthy. In English, the term 'globalization' is used by a broad range of authors crossing theoretical divides (Held *et al.*, 1999; Scholte, 2000; Kofman–Young, 2003). It means a change of scale, deterritorialization, and the impacts these transformations generate onto political and social organizations (Held et al., 1999: 15). In French, *mondialisation* and *globalisation* are actually two different words with two different meanings. The concept of *mondialisation* refers to a process of time-space contraction produced by a complex system of forces affecting the globe as a physical space. The term *globalisation*, on the other hand, refers to an economic process of financial expansion that is managed by conscious actions (Ghorra-Gobin, 2007). Most authors in French IR use the term 'mondialisation'[3] (de Senarclens, 2005; Michalet, 2007; Moreau-Desfarges, 2005) or the adjective 'mondial' (Badie–Smouts, 1992) to address the array of transformations that the world is witnessing.

In the English-speaking world, the phenomenon of globalization is widely studied and addressed in the IR literature. It even generates debates, not only about the pros and cons of globalization, but also about the extent of the transformations that the process conveys. Those saying that it represents a fundamental change insist on a shift in the place of authority, as its place is now beyond and above the nation-states (Held *et al.*, 1999), on the ability of civil society movements to cross and combine spaces (Scholte, 2000), or on the sustained economic change provoked by economic and especially financial globalization. On the other side, their opponents question the fundamental novelty of the phenomenon (Hirst–Thompson, 1999; Mittelman, 1996; Lacher, 2006). But whatever the position of the scholars, references to globalization seem to have penetrated the common language of IR scholarship since the late 1990s.

The treatment of globalization in the French-speaking world is different. It should first be noted that until recently, the terms *globalisation* and *mondialisation* were

hardly used in French studies of International Relations. The book *Le Retournement du Monde* by Badie and Smouts, which constituted a pioneering effort to acknowledge major global dynamics of transformation, did not use the terms. Another author, Zaki Laïdi, referred to the notion of *global time* (*Temps mondial*) in order to underline the time-space contraction and an emerging common identity (Laïdi, 1997). But these efforts remained isolated instances in IR scholarship. There seem to be no French-language books from the 1990s that would deal with the 'reality' of globalization as their main problematique. It is as if the phenomenon of globalization did not fundamentally change the way scholars did research in Social Sciences (Gradaloup, 2010). Hence, there is no French-language debate about the extent or the nature of globalization. At the most, globalization is treated as one phenomenon among others that impacts on some spheres of social and international relations like security, identity and economic relations (Éthier–Zahar, 2003). At the least, it is seen as a new characteristic of already existing phenomena – e.g. the global economy (Laroche, 2000) or the global firm (Michalet, 2007). When globalization is analyzed on its own terms, it is specifically in relation to the challenges it poses to governance (de Senarclens, 2005; Laroche, 2000).

This subtle but existing distinction in French- and English-speaking scholars' treatments of globalization should be explained. Two possible explanations can be proposed. The first one, inspired by a sociology of knowledge approach, would situate the distinction in the different professional environments of the scholars. Accordingly, scholarly networks constitute structures of knowledge that impact on the types of research and even the types of viewpoints that the scholars adopt. Wæver (2007) noted the unique position of the Anglo-American community of scholars, which is able to constitute itself as the gatekeeper of the discipline and to have its own internal mechanisms of validation. In most cases, they have peer-review processes in place for tenure, financing and publication. In the example that concerns us here, English speaking scholars have been able to explore the extent of the transformations brought about by globalization, and as such, they have refashioned the discipline of IR in terms of these new findings and theoretical debates. Being largely self-constituted by the research and debates of scholars who act as gate-keepers and judges of their own discipline (Wæver, 1996), IR evolves according to 'fashion modes' and the ability of scholars to create momentum around specific theories, topics and problematiques. The strong influence of the works of Anthony Giddens and David Harvey, for example, has found its way into many theoretical approaches. The existence of debates about globalization, the renaming of International Studies departments to Global Studies departments (Rosow, 2002), and the creation of journals about globalization all contributed to the centrality of globalization in IR scholarship. This contrasts with the situation in other places where access to financing determines to some extent the policy-oriented research that many scholars do

(Tickner, 2003; 2008). A sociology of knowledge approach would also suggest that the evolution of IR scholarship in the French-speaking world is more structured by institutions and traditions than by scholars themselves. The cautious approach to globalization there can be explained, in part, by the strong influence of international law programmes in shaping the study of IR in France (Giesen, 2006). Indeed, the study of international law and its heavy focus on sovereignty grant hardly any place to manifestations of globalization, if by that we mean transnational processes and structures that bypass the nation-state. The few legal scholars exploring structural changes tend to focus on very specific legal regimes such as trade (Boisson de Chazournes, 2002) or human rights (Chevallier, 2001). The close relationship between legal studies and the study of IR constitutes, in that view, a rampart preventing other disciplines like sociology or geography from influencing researchers.

The sociology of knowledge explanation offers some interesting propositions. It connects differences in the treatment of the notion of globalization to the institutional and social relations that condition the research of individual scholars. Yet, this approach tends to assume a certain homogeneity of English-language and of French-language scholarly works that obfuscates their differences. As Brown made explicit, differences exist within the English-speaking world in terms of both institutional specificities and scholarships (Brown, 2001; Porter, 2001). Important differences also exist in the French-speaking world. Quebecker, Belgian, Swiss, and French scholars do not face the same relations between knowledge and institutions. The places where there is a strong institutional pattern dominated by some programmes and theoretical approaches are mostly in France. Moreover, the sociological approach to knowledge does not address directly why similarities exist among scholars who share the same language despite their institutional and professional differences. This is where the issue of language as perspective can offer interesting explanations. As discussed above, a language is the exteriorization of a collective historical experience. It contains not only a certain view of the world, but also, more importantly, a system of representation that makes sense of the world. These propositions can offer some explanation of the different treatments of globalization in French- and English-speaking contexts.

The meanings associated with mondialisation and globalization are influenced by the historical and social conditions in which the words were created, and the relations that they imply. A Brazilian sociologist, Ortiz (2009), suggested that globalization is better discussed in English (Ortiz, 2009) because the use of such terms is a reflection of our contemporary world, wherein English is in a privileged position.[4] One could add that globalization is a dynamic that is carried out in large part by cultural industries that proceed transnationally to reach large parts of the world, and in which English-speaking industrial interests play a dominant role. Its complexity is only a reflection of the multiple agents and processes that constitute it.

This means that the historical conditions that globalization describes are exactly those that make English such a dominant language today. Describing globalization in English is similar to promoting diplomatic practices in French in the 19th century: the medium (the language) is inseparable from the order (in the latter case, the European diplomatic order established after the Napoleonic Wars). The universal status of French, which was accepted as a reality for most of the modern period of world history, was largely attributed to strong state interventions and a deliberate strategy of language hierarchization. In the current context, though, it appears that the French language does not have the same historical proximity with the experience of globalization. The historical conditions of the French language do not blend easily with the history of globalization and the dynamics of transnationalism and deterritorialization. This might explain in part the cautiousness or even the unease with which the concept of globalization is treated in French language studies.

In the English-speaking world, the concept of globalization originated in both the works of sociologists and those of geographers, and it was used to signal a fundamental change. It was to be a sort of *big bang* that was supposed to shake up scholars' certainty and analytical frameworks. In the French-speaking world, the words *mondialisation* and *globalisation* did not appear in the same conditions. The conceptualization of *mondialisation*, which originated in works by geographers (Durand et al., 1992), referred to long term physical changes with a variety of effects on political and social life. This conception resonates to a certain extent with the work of the historians of the Annales. With his work on the *économie-monde*, Fernand Braudel offered a prism through which a certain type of explanation of meaning in the *longue durée* could be offered. The conception of the *économie-monde* did not replace other layers of political and economic dynamics; it was juxtaposed to other realities and practices at different levels. Similarly, the notion of *mondialisation* implied juxtaposed worlds of connections at the society level and the interstate level. The concept of *globalisation*, on the other hand, was associated with a specific historical moment attached to neoliberalism and some actors' political and economic strategies to transform the world through deregulation and reregulations. This distinction encouraged scholars who thought and wrote in French to develop analyses that could dissociate the two processes. Hence, most French scholars have maintained a distinction between a scalar transformation and a narrower economic process associated with capitalism (for example, Laïdi, 1997; Dollfus, 2001; Adda, 2006). Moreover, the concept of *mondialisation* is considered and makes sense in its relations to other social dynamics, whether they are the dynamics of state authority, governance, or the global political economy. The use of one word in English suggests that the term can become in and of itself the central point of focus. This in turn suggests that whether they agree with the globalization thesis or not scholars have to engage with the concept directly.

This exploration of the meanings and origins of the concept of globalization in two languages offers some insights into the important role that language can play as a perspective in the study of IR. It suggests that words appear in specific historical and social situations that convey special meanings. A similar exercise could be done with the words *altermondialisme* and *antiglobalization* in French and English respectively. The meanings of these terms are associated with both globalization and the historical struggles that gave rise to the antiglobalization resistance movements. Hence, the anti-American and often very nationally-oriented struggles of *altermondialisme* contrast with the mostly anti-neoliberal posture of antiglobalization movements. These different historical conditions seem to have provided a distinct conceptual space to discuss the interactions between global economic and social issues.

This cursory exploration by no means brings a conclusive illustration of the potential of languages as perspectives. It does, however, invite us to look at language as a system of meanings and linguistic structures that constitute a specific perspective of the world. With distinct words, connections between objects, and distinct ways of expressing ideas, languages produce meanings.[5] But languages are not closed and immutable systems. They do change and evolve, especially with the growing mobility of people and ideas, and the hybridity of cultural products. Furthermore, as scholars move through various parts of the world and as scholarly work is being translated, new notions and concepts are being introduced in different scholarly milieux, giving the ideas resonance in places where they did not exist before. Therefore, suggesting that languages constitute shared understandings does not mean that all scholars working and producing knowledge in one language agree on the theory, epistemology or ontology. One should be reminded of the distinction between a viewpoint and a perspective that was discussed earlier. The former is a condition of an individual that constitutes her own way of seeing things. It can be affected by her values, her abilities, or her environment. A perspective, on the other hand, is a system for making sense of the world, or parts of it. These meanings constitute codes that shape one's prior understanding of events or objects, which then affect how one studies the events or objects. As a system of meanings, a perspective may even contain more than one point of view.[6]

The field of International Relations would benefit from taking languages seriously. In a period in which scholarship from around the world is welcome (Tickner–Wæver, 2010), the self-reflexivity applied to knowledge production should look into languages, and into perspectives more generally, for the sake of deepening the IR discipline's understanding of the world.

A FRAGMENTED DISCIPLINE

I have argued so far that perspectives are significant categories for understanding the world of IR. In the previous section, I sought to illustrate how languages con-

stitute contexts of knowledge production that are significant from the point of view of those who share the views associated with the context. The problematizing of languages by viewing them as perspectives helps us to ascertain the extent to which scholarship in a certain language contains not only distinct ontological claims and views of the world, but also distinct epistemological claims about meanings, as languages make connections between things and issues. In this section, I would like to pursue further the idea of the importance of perspectives for understanding the discipline of IR.

The recognition of languages as perspectives problematizes the important role that languages play in conditioning understandings and analyses of the world, independently of the social and professional positions of scholars. The problematization of languages as perspectives thus contains both ideal and material dimensions. Words and language structures are determined by thoughts, and they, in turn, affect thoughts. But this is not occurring simply in a linguistic world. Languages are social because they contain social relations and experiences, and they interact with each other through real people and power relations. Languages as perspectives suggest that some collective processes of understanding are at work underneath or beyond the individual and institutional structures of the field.

If a perspective is defined as any system of meanings that includes structures, social interactions, and specific historical conditions that shape one's understanding, this means that there could be other perspectives than the one of language. But looking for perspectives might represent a daunting task insofar as they are made up of broad notions of meanings that extend way beyond the limited world of IR professional theoretical production. One way of going about identifying perspectives would consist in being sensitive to the broad social phenomena that surround scholarly production beyond the situations of single individuals. A similar approach characterizes subaltern and some postcolonial thinking. When Mignolo (2001b) argues that epistemology is geographically situated and contains within itself very concrete historical experiences, he refers to the historical social and institutional circumstances in which forms of knowledge emerge. Mignolo argues that there could not be a College de France in any other place than in France, and that the Alliances françaises or British Cultural Centers could similarly only be in Argentina or Bolivia (Mignolo, 2001b). His argument could be pursued by adding that these different historical and geographical regions provide not only different institutional practices of knowledge transmission, but also different forms of knowledge validation. The close attention that postcolonial and subaltern approaches have paid to non-scholastic, creative forms of expression such as novels or popular culture (Glissant, 1990; Ghosh, 1986) as important expressions of power and identity in world politics confirms the close relations that can exist between knowledge production and broader social phenomena.

Analyzing IR scholarship in terms of perspectives can transform our portrayal of the discipline. First, taking perspectives seriously means recognizing that theories are not just about ontology and epistemology. They are also connected to deeper or broader mechanisms of understanding that humanity develops in specific circumstances, places and times. Secondly, taking perspectives seriously also suggests that there cannot be a universal knowledge about IR, no matter how commensurable its theories are. A juxtaposition of perspectives would not lead to a universal knowledge, but rather point to the fragmented nature of knowledge, the plurality of social worlds (Poche, 1996), and the historicity of various interpretations. Such a conclusion signifies also that what is at stake in perspectivism is not a vertical accumulation of knowledge that builds on previous discoveries and theories, but an effort to reach a broader, horizontal accumulation of knowledge. This in turn invites the participation of a larger number of perspectives in the production of knowledge in IR for the purpose of broadening the spectrum of issues and dimensions of world politics that one should include in the discipline.

CONCLUSION

In their groundbreaking book on perspectives, Crawford and Jarvis (2001) raised concerns that the IR discipline risks being narcissistic due to its ontological, epistemological, theoretical, and conceptual narrowness and the fact that it is turned exclusively inwards. Sindjoun illustrated this very well by showing how African problems have been generally considered as regional issues by a discipline focused on Western issues and processes that are presented as global ones (1999). Even postpositivist analyses often assume that their epistemological positions are universal despite acknowledging the situatedness and power involved in knowledge production. Arlene Tickner (2003) denounced the *autistic* tendency of the discipline, which is associated with its inability to account for problems and issues that do not concern the Western world. Broadening the discipline to include more viewpoints is a necessary step toward making it move beyond its narcissism. But viewpoints alone do not suffice to make the discipline more international or global.

In this paper, the argument was put forward that the concept of perspective should be (re)introduced as a heuristic category that can contribute to enlarging our analyses of the discipline of IR. As contextualized knowledge, perspectives include different viewpoints, but what makes them important to an understanding of knowledge production is their search for meanings, which are closely tied to specific contexts and institutions. Perspectives offer a promising way of incorporating historical contexts that is different from what other self-reflexive analyses of the discipline have offered. Both sociology of knowledge and historicized analyses have critically examined the discipline as a product of historical contexts. Perspectivism

adds to this the system of meanings that shape how knowledge is produced. With their structural features connected to certain historical contexts and their exteriorization of ways of seeing things, languages constitute one example of a perspective that can be relevant in IR. This is not to suggest a cultural or linguistic turn in the study of IR scholarship. But as Bleiker (1997) suggested, '[t]he point is, rather, to investigate why certain language games become dominant, how they have framed our political realities, and how alternative forms of thinking and speaking may reframe these realities' (Bleiker, 1997: 68).

Bringing in perspectives is an important strategy for critically assessing the nature of the discipline. It brings to the fore the necessarily fragmented nature of knowledge production. This is not just about revealing viewpoints. This paper offered an initial glimpse at what this concept could reveal and offer. In order to make perspective a solid category for analyzing scholarship production in IR, more work is required. First, there is the need to explore the variety of perspectives there can be, aside from those of languages and historical regions. There is also the need to develop heuristically the concept of perspective in order for us to better understand how these systems of meanings condition our perception of reality and theoretical knowledge, and how they are being challenged. A sort of *strategic* perspectivism (Pellerin, 2010) consisting of inviting other perspectives to come to the fore, in their own terms, is a sure way of moving forward.

ENDNOTES

[1] Quoting Porter (2001), who asked, 'What do [American IR scholars] Kenneth Waltz, Richard Ashley, Cynthia Enloe, and Craig Murphy have in common?', the 2009 TRIP Report suggests that national categories artificially impose homogeneity of scholarship within national contexts and exaggerate the differences between them (Jordan et al., 2009: 1).

[2] Canagarajah notes that publications in English have adopted the textual convention of a text being seen as autonomous from the context of its production and the writer who wrote it. This convention was developed by the Royal Society of London as 'an extension of the literate tradition of classical culture' (2002: 86), and it supposes that a text is neutral and has a meaning independently of the material and social contexts in which it was written.

[3] Siroën (2004) argues that the French prefer the word 'mondialisation' for esthetic reasons and find 'globalisation' to be a distasteful Americanism.

[4] This is a similar argument to that presented by Stanley Hoffman about the study of IR in English. But what interests Ortiz is the privileged position that scholars writing in English get from this principle.

[5] The demonstration of the relevance of languages as perspectives would be even more conclusive if one could compare two or more very different historical languages that have almost no common particularities or shared idioms and that evolved in very different historical contexts. More work needs to be done on this, but that is beyond the capacity of this author.

[6] But being open systems, languages can be transformed. Tzvetan Todorov's triadic view of the transformation of discourse can be useful for conceptualizing this (Todorov, 1977). Accordingly, a language is configurated around a structure, historical circumstances, and locutors who use the language. In that sense, the work of locutors could bring about changes in perspectives and meanings. But for this to occur, time and a collective movement towards change would also be necessary.

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Do They Actually Matter? The Impact of NGOs on the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

ANNA KÁRNÍKOVÁ

Abstract: This research article scrutinises the factors that determined the success of the civil society organisations (CSOs)[1] that lobbied for changes to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). It argues that apart from the structural factors that influence the success of lobbying groups, the lobbying groups' accordance with the institutional discourse that pertains to a given issue should be taken into consideration when trying to comprehend the assessment of their lobbying strategies. The article thus introduces a discursive and institutionalist perspective to the lobbying debate, which traditionally tends to be rather actor-centred. In order to illustrate the possible influence of a discourse, the article looks into three areas of the instrument: democracy promotion, conflict prevention and support to human rights defenders. The reform of the EIDHR took place between 2006 and 2007 within in the context of an overall reform of the EU's external action instruments.

Keywords: lobbying, NGOs, human rights, democracy promotion, conflict prevention, EU external relations, discourse, EU institutions

INTRODUCTION

Interest groups[2] have been an inherent part of the EU decision-making process since its very beginning. Their input appears alongside the whole EU policy process, from agenda-setting to implementation to ensuring compliance. The groups have a legitimate and important role in the policy-making of the European Union, especially given the underinformed nature of its main legislator[3], the European Commission. Therefore, in this case, trying to circumvent interest groups would be similar to 'driving with eyes shut' (Coen–Richardson, 2009: 339).

On the one hand, the scholarly debate tries to assess the impact of interest groups on policy outcomes (e.g. Michalowitz, 2007; Princen–Kerremans, 2008; Mahoney, 2004). On the other hand it attempts to draw normative conclusions as

to the modes of inclusion of interest groups that foster democratic governance (see Karr, 2007; Kohler-Koch, 2007; Coen, 2007). The latter topic has been increasingly gaining in importance in the last years given the evidence of an élite pluralism being the prevailing pattern of interest intermediation at the EU level (Coen, 2007). However, this paper will primarily focus on assessing the influence of non-profit groups on policy outcomes, and it will tackle the issues of legitimacy and democratic deficit only peripherally.

This study attempts to complement the current research with a discursive perspective. Based on assumptions embedded in the work on transnational actors and institutionalist approaches, we will argue that apart from structural and actor-centred determinants (such as entry points in the policy process or capacities of interest groups), the ability to exert influence over the EU policy making process is also determined by the hegemonic discourse of the targeted institution(s) (or its [or their] relevant part[s]). The discourse is created in a communicative process within a policy network existing around the given issue, which includes non-government actors (both EU and national level), EU institutions and member states as well as international organisations.

In order to scrutinise the importance of discursive framing, this case study attempts to shed light on the impact of CSOs in the EU decision-making process in the field of support to human rights and democracy, and specifically on the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR is delivered mainly through civil society organisations and is thus an important source of funding for civil society organisations. Additionally, due to the central position of NGOs in the instrument's delivery, their input is crucial for ensuring the strategic quality of the instrument.

Within a process-tracing analysis and a method of assessing the degree of preference attainment, we will reconstruct the lobbying strategies for the changes in the instrument[4] and assess them against the finally approved changes in the instrument. In order to scrutinise the dynamics of the discourse, the case studies will also look into the broader communicative context of the negotiations. The study does not have the ambition to explore conditions of discursive influence and remains within the constructivist model.

Two of the chosen case studies (those of democracy promotion and conflict prevention) represent two key objectives of the instrument[5], and the support to human rights defenders is one of the main strategies that aim at promoting human rights (apart from political dialogue or advocacy by CSOs).

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
DELIMITING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Due to the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 and the consequent increase of community competences, we can observe a mushrooming of case stud-

ies with the main aim to map the newly discovered landscape of lobbying at the EU level. As Woll summarises in her thorough overview of literature on lobbying, the theorising of EU interest representation took four main directions since the 1990s: contributions to the corporatism-pluralism debate, works on collective action, analyses of europeanisation of interest groups and, finally, studies on interest groups that are primarily interested in shedding light on the nature of the European governance (Woll, 2006). An eminent interest was always directed towards the strategies of interest groups, mainly those that constitute a key to influence over policy outcomes. Given the difficulties with measuring influence directly, most authors focus on access to policy hubs as a precondition for influence instead (Michalowitz, 2005; Michalowitz, 2007; Dür, 2008; Bouwen, 2002). Apart from the logic of access, multiple entries into the system and venue shopping, the lobbying literature brings up the concepts of identity and reputation building and points out the importance of the phases of the policy-making process and legislative procedures (Coen, 2007). These academic contributions were accompanied by numerous 'how to' guidelines for professional lobbyists and practitioners.

Most literature on the role of interest groups in the EU system remains within the boundaries of structural and actor-centred analysis, and in the recent works it practically misses out on discursive determinants such as ideational structures or shared norms and common beliefs. Some attempts to account for the constructivist nature of lobbying appeared in the concept of 'framing', which is a strategy of 'venue shopping' in the EU multi-level system of governance (Princen–Kerremans, 2008; Bouwen, 2002; Bouwen–McCown, 2007). These studies mainly revolve around the notion of *access goods*, analysing the types of information to which the targeted EU institutions are the most receptive and the framing strategies of lobbying organisations. In these studies, the discourse of the targeted institutions is implicitly present and relates solely to institutional demands for information which correspond to the position of the EU institutions in the decision-making procedure (the EC's interest in technical legitimacy or the EP's in political argumentation [Coen, 2007: 340]).

In the last two decades, the explanatory power of 'ideas' landed in the centre of the interest of scholars, who used it as a corrective to the constraints of the new institutionalist theory, which is rather weak at explaining change (Schmidt, 2008). At the same time, ideas became central to theory and empirical research focusing on ideas- or values-driven networks (Haas, 1992; Keck–Sikkink, 1998; Sabatier, 1998). For our analysis, we will define 'discourse' as 'institutionalized structures of meaning that channel political thought and action in certain directions' (Connolly, 1983, quoted in Schmidt, 2008: 309). Apart from the 'substantive content of ideas', a discourse also contains information on its interactive context 'by which ideas are conveyed' (Schmidt, 2008: 305). We will conceptualise the institutions as internal to

the actors, ascribing to them a dual role in both limiting the actions of the actors and being constructed and changed by the actors (Schmidt, 2008: 314). This will also lead us to involve the institutions and their preferences in the policy network around the EIDHR. It is exactly this dual relationship which enables actors to exert influence over institutional structures as they use them, which can explain their change and continuity (Schmidt, 2008: 314). Compared to the literature on lobbying, which usually captures the static nature of institutions, the discourse perspective enables us to see the interplay between different discourses without assuming hierarchical patterns of communication.

The legal basis of the instrument (EIDHR regulations) and its implementation guidelines (Strategy Papers and Annual Action Programmes) do not only carry technical and financial details concerning the implementation but also information on the current EU discourse related to democracy and human rights promotion. Schmidt distinguishes between three substantive levels of ideas – policies, programs and philosophies (Schmidt, 2008). The solutions suggested by the programmatic documents reflect the underlying philosophy which has guided the analysis and formulation of the policy response. As Wentzel puts it, these documents can thus 'act as a form of hub between policies and philosophies' (Wentzel, 2011: 28). While policies (as specific policy solutions) and programs (as a wider strategic framework underpinning policies) can be detected and analysed within the EIDHR framework, the deepest level of 'philosophies' needs to be observed in the wider context of the policy-making process. We will therefore capture the discourse not only by looking into specific documents and immediate negotiations but also by analysing the broader context – that is, factors such as the interinstitutional dynamics of the EU political system or its embeddedness in international conventions.

The three case studies will primarily concentrate on how civil society organisations and institutions engage in a coordinative discourse on 'policy construction' (Schmidt, 2008: 310). However, due to the instrument's role in EU external relations and international commitments, the communicative discourse ('presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public', Schmidt, 2008: 310) comes indirectly into play in the form of expectations towards the policy outcomes and especially their manifestation of underlying values.

The individual case studies provide primarily an illustration of the different ways discourse can matter in lobbying. While the first case study (on human right defenders) captures an already established discourse and framing methods referring to it, the other two case studies represent a communicative and learning process in which discourse is gradually determined. The latter two case studies show lobbying strategies in a broader sense, as the organisations in them were not only lobbying for partial changes to the instrument, but with their activities they eventually aimed at influencing the ideational framework of the policy issue. The two latter

case studies thus rather contribute to our understanding of the process which Sabatier calls 'policy-oriented learning' (Sabatier, 1998: 17) or the role of the 'transnational advocacy network' in shaping the discourse of local governments and institutions[6] (Keck–Sikkink, 1998).

The EU institutions and their subunits are themselves bearers of discourses derived from the 'path dependency' of their actions as well as their position within the EU system. The discourses, however, might be also shaped by structural divisions within the highly sectorised political system of the EU. The more a particular field is structured by international organisations, the better the environment it creates for the activity of interest groups with corresponding goals (Risse-Kappen, 1995). This sphere of institutionalisation is by no means limited to the boundaries of the European Union, even though the pivotal policy debates are taking place within an EU context (e.g. the role of the United Nations).

The 'policy goods' supplied to different institutions should thus not only respond to the informational needs of the institutions, but they should also be framed so that the institution would find its way into the acknowledged discourse of the venue ('venue shopping'). By framing the issues, interest groups can bring about new understandings of the issues and functionally link issues that have so far been understood as belonging to separate policy domains.

METHODOLOGY AND METHOD

The analysis will focus on three cases that cover three key objectives of the instrument, and in all of the cases, interest groups were trying to translate their interests into the final form of the reformed instrument. The case studies will look into organisations supporting individual human rights defenders, organisations promoting civilian peacebuilding and, finally, organisations with a major interest in lending support to political actors as agents of democratisation (political parties, parliaments). The EIDHR is especially suitable for research on the CSO involvement in EU policy-making due to the central role the CSOs play in the instrument's implementation and evaluation. This also allows us to consider these organisations as an inherent part of the policy network around the EIDHR.

The case studies offer an illustration of discourse influencing policy outcomes – in this case, the EIDHR programming documents. The first case study follows the process-tracing method and (in cases where causal mechanisms could not be tracked) the method of assessing the degree of preference attainment when reconstructing the lobbying strategies of organisations striving to strengthen the support to human rights defenders within the EIDHR. The latter two cases follow a broader analytical pattern and elaborate on a wider context of EIDHR negotiations in order to show how discourse is determined in a decentralised multi-layer communicative process.

Since the latter two case studies look into a broader context of the EIDHR negotiations, this has an impact on the scope of the organisations which are a part of the policy network in the given fields that are examined in this study. While in the first case study, on human rights defenders, we mainly follow the NGOs, the dynamic process of influencing the institutional discourse in the latter two was accompanied by a wider variety of organisations, including political or multi-party foundations, and also the EU member states and other national actors (which also played a strong role here). The involvement of the EU member states is furthermore given by the topics – as democracy promotion and peacebuilding rest within the fuzzy zone between community and intergovernmental decision-making mechanisms.

Since the available information on the interactions between EU institutions and the lobbying organisations as well as their preferences is only partly documented, the author led a series of semi-structured interviews with 15 representatives of both civil society organisations and European institutions who were involved in the consultation and negotiation process or other initiatives related to the EIDHR.

THE EMPIRICAL PART
EIDHR REFORM: PROCEDURE, ENTRY POINTS AND MAIN ACTORS
ENTRY POINTS IN THE EIDHR PROGRAMMING CYCLE

The EIDHR has undergone several evaluations and changes throughout the last twelve years of its formalised existence.[7] The most recent and substantial reform took place in 2006 within the negotiations of the 2007–2013 multi-annual financial framework. This reform led by the European Commission opened a window of opportunity for civil society organisations to lobby for new arrangements and emphases for the succeeding instrument (the EIDHR II).

The programming cycle of the EIDHR II consisted of the adoptions of three long-, mid- and short-term programming documents between 2006 and 2007, and each of them was under a different adoption regime at the time:

• The adoption of the **EIDHR II regulation**, which formed a long-term legal basis for the instrument and set out its general objectives as well as creating a financial envelope for it (in 2006 for the years 2007–2013) via ordinary legislative procedure (formerly co-decision).
• The adoption of the **Strategy Paper**, which specifies the implementing measures, including details (geographical focus, detailed allocations for 2 to 3 years) on the activities eligible for funding under the specific objectives of the programme. The Strategy Paper was adopted via the comitology procedure, including consultations with the CSOs run by the EC in the drafting stage. In

2006, for the first time, the Strategy Paper drafting followed the democratic scrutiny procedure involving the consultation of the European Parliament.

• The adoption of the **Annual Action Programme (AAP)** by a Commission decision. The AAP further specifies the implementation of the programme (especially its geographical focus and thematic extent). The AAP lists the specific actions which will be financed through the instrument in the given year as well as the specific amounts that will be allocated to each of the selected countries under each particular action.

The regulation is mainly subject to inter-institutional negotiations, and civil society organisations find this phase rather hard to take part in. As we will see later, the only suitable point of entry into the deliberations on the regulation is the possibility to lobby the European Parliament as an actor of the codecision procedure.

Compared to the deliberations on the regulation, the deliberations on the Strategy Paper, which started in early 2007, were much more open. They were also crucial for civil society organisations seeking funding from the EIDHR II (Interviews with CSO representatives). If their area of expertise was explicitly mentioned in the Strategy Paper, there was a high probability that it would appear in the particular calls for proposals based on the AAP and also give them a formal basis for complaints in case it was omitted.

The initial drafting of the Strategy Paper was quite open to the civil society organisations, which were involved in the process via consultations of the European Commission. The two main bodies responsible for the management of the EIDHR, the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG AIDCO), organised their own consultations, both Brussels-based and in-country consultations organised by the delegations. The access criteria imposed on interest groups are derived from the EC's need to obtain reliable and unbiased information. When preparing a consultation, the relevant DG department sends out invitations to certain identified networks and allocates a certain number of seats to each of them. The participation of the specific groups and their representativeness are left to the discretion of the networks. Even though the Commission's first reflex is to invite big NGOs with wide constituencies and good reputations, the existence of NGO networks ameliorates the impact of this reflex and creates a space favourable to the participation of smaller NGOs. The consultations process is quite open to new networks, which can simply ask the Commission to be involved on the procedure, and in case they fulfil basic criteria (such as the ability to supply relevant input) they are invited to participate.

The latter stage of adopting the Strategy Paper, falling under the category of *comitology*, remained merely impenetrable. Information on members of the comitology committees, their agenda, and minutes of their meetings are normally not

freely available.[8] The comitology committees are presided by Commission officials, who can serve as an important source of information for the NGOs. For those organisations that have a good access to their national governments, the representative of the member state can also serve as a source of information. Both of these information channels are, nevertheless, informal to a high extent and reserved for actors who have built a long-term and trust-based relationship with either the Commission or the member states' representatives. The comitology procedure, however, was in this case accompanied by the democratic scrutiny procedure, which gave more space to the European Parliament and thus opened one extra entry point for the CSOs at this stage.

The multi-level programming cycle with multiple entry points to the decision-making process poses high demands on the lobbying capacity of the civil society organisations. Fierce negotiations at each stage of the programming documents can cause slight changes in the prioritisation and wording, which has an immense impact on NGO funding. Networking is therefore a crucial success strategy for the civil society organisations. Becoming a member of a network provides them with the possibility to access informal information, enables them to pool their limited resources and facilitates their access to the European institutions, which prefer to deal with networks. We will therefore mainly deal with NGO networks as the main lobbying subjects when focusing on the three case studies.

CASE 1: ENHANCING SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
CAPTURING THE INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN THE FIELD

The importance of support to and protection of human rights defenders[9] has been increasingly recognised by the international community and addressed by several international conventions in the last decade. In December 1998, after over ten years of deliberations, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.[10] The Declaration ascribes the right to defend to every human 'individually and in association with others' and irrespective of national borders (United Nations, 1998); it also implicitly acknowledges the activities of human rights defenders regardless of the legal or formal status of the groups (Human Rights First, 2010). The current provision allows application of the 'juridical framework' only in case it complies with the Charter of the United Nations and other international obligations in the field of human rights (Human Rights First, 2010). Finally, and importantly, the Declaration confirms the rights of human rights defenders to receive funding from foreign donors (Article 13) (United Nations, 1998).

The principles of the Declaration were adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Council within the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders in June 2004 and revised in 2008 (European Commission, 2010a). They laid out the cru-

cial principles of protection of human rights defenders and formed a basis for EU action in this field. Moreover, the Guidelines elaborate some practical suggestions related to EU action in the field. The document recognises the key role of human rights defenders in consultations on EU legislation drafted in the respective policy area. The Guidelines further outline the intra-EU coordination as well as the coordination with other multilateral fora. The EU delegations are also obliged to proactively engage with human rights defenders, since they present the most important contact point with the local environment. Finally the Guidelines mention the practical support embodied in the instruments of external action, especially the EIDHR (Council of the European Union, 2008).

TRACKING THE INFLUENCE

The CSOs entered the negotiations on the EIDHR regulation via the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) of the European Parliament. This was a logical step, given the long-term efforts of the European Parliament to make its mark as a major proponent of human rights. Moreover, one of the *rapporteurs* assigned to accompany the codecision procedure on this regulation was the influential British MEP Edward MacMillan-Scott, who stood at the very beginning of the instrument in the early 1990s. On September 11th, 2006, a representative of the organisation Frontline Defenders presented a recommendation for the new regulation to the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2006b). The organisation later joined a coalition of NGOs working with HRD to lobby the European institutions in the matter of the EIDHR II, however, at that moment they were the only interlocutor for the EP. The organisation's ability to approach the AFET could be partly explained by the personal continuity given by the long term presence of the then Frontline head in Brussels, even though the Brussels office was first opened only in 2006. In their recommendations, the Frontline Defenders emphasised the EU's commitment to the enhanced support of human rights defenders that was agreed upon within the review of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders in June 2005 (Frontline Defenders, 2006). Building upon the wording of the EU Guidelines, which, apart from an increase in the funding to HRD, called for a greater flexibility and accessibility of this support, the Frontline Defenders suggested two main measures: direct delivery of funds to HRD through delegations (including emergency case funding) and the possibility of re-granting through local NGOs (Frontline Defenders, 2006). Both of these measures were and remain a crucial part of the long-term strategy of the organisation (Frontline Defenders, 2011). The Frontline recommendations were accepted, and the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) amended the regulation with references to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders in order to support its claims for a greater flexibility of the instrument (European Parliament, 2006a: 32).

The actual scope of the activities aimed at human rights defenders was to be decided in the course of the bargaining on the Strategy Paper, which started in early 2007. The crucial entry point for the NGOs to influence the provisions of the Strategy Paper was the consultations conducted by the European Commission in the second half of 2006 and early 2007. Even though the consultation procedure remains a 'black box' as to tracking the influence of the NGOs, the conclusions of the drafting phase were highly favourable for the network of organisations lobbying for human rights projects which emerged during this period. The drafted Strategy Paper gave high priority to support of human rights defenders, making it one of the six objectives of the 2007–2010 response strategy (Objective 3). Its Objective 3 and the widening of its scope (in terms of geographical scope and re-granting options) (European Commission, 2007d) constituted one of the major changes to the thematic priorities of the instrument compared to the previous programming period (European Commission, 2007vi).

The lobbying, however, was not over yet. During the final consultation of the Strategy Paper in February 2007, the two present NGOs working with human rights defenders (the International Federation for Human Rights-FIDH and the Frontline Defenders) established a close contact with a representative of the responsible unit within DG RELEX, offering a delivery of further expertise to the drafting of the AAP (European Commission, 2007vi). This gave the organisations a unique opportunity to contribute with their experience and shape the instrument, since at that moment they were the only interlocutors to support the EC officials in the development of the new HRD-related measures. An alliance of organisations working with human rights defenders was then formed and provided follow-up documents to specify the actions under Objective 3.

The document of the NGO alliance nevertheless found only limited resonance with the EC officials, even though the letter contained particular suggestions and presented the needs of NGOs which were most likely to receive the funding. We can assume that due to time constraints (the delay in the adoption of the EIDHR strategic document) as well as the need to ensure high quality projects under the new Objective 3,[11] the EC officials were looking for more than general recommendations. The Frontline Defenders recognised this opportunity and provided the European Commission with a document summarising the activities they envisaged to carry out with the support of the EIDHR. Comparing this document with the final version of the Action Fiche 4 dealing with human rights defenders (European Commission, 2007a), we find striking similarities.

POLICY OUTCOMES – A SUMMARY

The debate on the reform of programming documents for the period 2007–2013 brought about major changes to the approach to the support to human rights de-

fenders. The proposal for the EIDHR regulation presented by the European Commission in June 2006 did not account for any special measures aiming at specific support to human rights defenders. Originally, the human rights defenders were solely included among the programmes' beneficiaries within the large-scale projects known from the previous programming period between 2000 and 2006 (European Commission, 2006). With numerous references to the UN declaration and the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, the EIDHR II regulation explicitly mentioned the importance of the support to HRD, with which the support of the experienced NGO representatives in the EC inner circle translated effectively into measures in the Strategy Paper and the Annual Action programmes. Since the programming process was already delayed and the Commission proposed finalising it by mid-2007, we can assume it was seeking a 'ready-made' contribution from the NGOs possessing expertise in this field. The Action Fiches for the period 2007–2010 incorporated numerous suggestions by the Frontline Defenders – among others, a permanent emergency response service and support to monitoring, advocacy and networking activities (European Commission, 2007a). The majority of the activities eligible for funding under Objective 3 were tailored to the running projects of one organisation.

In the programming period 2000–2006 the projects of human rights defenders received a total amount of 2.1 million Euro, which was allocated to altogether six implemented projects (European Commission, 2007v). The total amount of funds allocated to Objective 3 in the period 2007–2010, though, was 16 million Euro (European Commission, 2007c: 16), and we have to accredit the major increase in the allocated funds to human rights defenders. The Strategy Paper adopted in April 2010 retained this focus and increased the overall amount under Objective 3 to 22.6 million Euro (European Commission, 2011).

In this case, the NGOs and especially the Frontline Defenders employed an exemplary lobbying strategy. In presenting their interests, the organisations repeatedly made reference to the EU's international commitments, which are closely linked to the underlying values of the European culture (i.e. respect for human rights). Moreover, these commitments were called upon in an environment with a 'soft spot' for this type of information due to the identity of the European Parliament. If we look into the actor-centred and structural determinants of influence, can tell that the organisations lobbied alongside the whole policy cycle, proved the central importance of reputation and long-term trust-based relations with EU officials in getting access to policy hubs, and finally also proved the significance of 'being in the right place at the right time'. By analysing the networking strategies of the organisations, we can conclude that even for smaller NGOs (such as the Frontline Defenders) networking is not a necessity, but merely a situational advantage when seeking access to the European Commission, which prefers to deal with net-

works representing wider constituencies. This is given by the need of the EC to obtain a pool of organisations as representative as possible and it is central to the legitimacy of its policy-making.

CASE 2: PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY THROUGH SUPPORT TO POLITICAL ACTORS
CAPTURING THE INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN THE FIELD

The original European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights of the early 1990s rested upon contacts between civic initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe (especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia) and several members of the European Parliament. As one of the founders, Edward McMillan-Scott, recalls, at that time the initiative provided mainly material support to grassroots organisations of the former Soviet bloc (Interview with Edward McMillan-Scott). The formalisation of the initiative in 1994 (as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) and, finally, its establishment as an in-house project of the European Commission in 1999[12] brought significant changes to democracy support measures within the EIDHR.

In the period after 1999, the instrument's profile in the field of democracy promotion became extremely fuzzy and to track the development of the democracy-related actions and priorities requires an excessive amount of detective work due to their constant regrouping, changing and renaming.[13] The fading away of democracy support within the instrument relates most probably to the change of ownership of the EIDHR. While the EP's ownership ensured a strong democracy profile and support to cooperation with political bodies, the European Commission was rather cautious with such measures. As Herrero noted, compared to the original measures, which focused clearly on both political and civil society actors, the EIDHR excluded political actors and focused on the 'participation' of civil society in democratic processes (Herrero, 2009: 23). This might have also been a result of the new implementation mechanisms of the instrument, especially the gradual devolution to the EC Delegations (Herrero, 2009). The share of EIDHR funding managed directly by the EC delegations through the local calls for proposals was gradually increasing, from 8% in the year 2002 to 25% in 2006 (Řiháčková, 2008: 161). The rising amounts of EIDHR funding channelled via EC delegations were perceived among many actors as unfortunate due to the tendency of the delegations' officials to perceive the instrument as a technical rather than political tool. As Řiháčková concludes after a series of interviews with EC officials, the delegation staff tends to focus on the management aspects of the instrument but loses sight of its potential for democracy promotion (Řiháčková, 2010).

Compared to the field of development or human rights, the democracy field is characterised by a lack of consensus as to the principles of democracy promotion

and adequate measures. It also lacks internationally recognised background documents. This is reflected in the settings of the EIDHR, which, similarly to other external EU instruments, neither officially recognises nor makes use of the synergies between democracy, human rights and development issues (International IDEA, 2009: 12). These fields tend to often be divided along institutional structures or different territories, and the programmes lack practical measures to ensure their coherence. The main lobbying efforts were thus made to adjust the delivery mechanisms and target groups of the instrument in order to enhance the democracy support provided by the EIDHR. Later on, though, in a favourable constellation of institutional and non-governmental actors, the policy network further strived to establish a consensus on democracy support on the EU level which would create a frame for future EU actions in this field.

TRACKING THE INFLUENCE

With the reform of the external instruments in 2006, a window of opportunity opened for the actors interested in raising the EU's profile in democracy promotion. The context of negotiations changed at that time. Firstly, the new member states and their NGOs, with their vast experience with democratisation processes, became natural advocates of democracy support. Secondly, the last decade came to a wider recognition of the pitfalls of unconditional development aid, and this recognition gave rise to a 'good governance' discourse in development cooperation, in which the capacities of political actors to govern play a central role. Thirdly, the last decade has also been perceived as a major 'democracy setback', with many states having developed democratic structures but without actually bringing them to life. The 'teleological optimism in democracy's propensity to inexorable expansion' which prevailed up to the late 1990s (Youngs, 2001: 1) was deeply challenged. Finally, in 2006, the debate on the EIDHR reform was accompanied by the presence of numerous actors with substantial records in work with political actors, be it multiparty projects (the Westminster Foundation for Democracy – WFD, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – SIDA), work with individual political parties (political foundations) or projects facilitating dialogue between civil and political society (such as the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy – NIDM – or the European Partnership for Democracy – EPD).

The lobbying for a clearer profile of the instrument in democracy promotion was marked by several cleavages on various issues among the lobbying organisations. Unlike in the other two cases, the organisations were not able to form a coalition which would represent them during the EC consultations, and each grouping of actors was pulling in a different direction.

The main rivalry was that between networks of CSOs and political foundations. In 2006, the political foundations formed the European Network of Political Founda-

tions (ENoP) and also entered the Commission consultations on the EIDHR for the first time. Due to its size, scope of activities and political leverage, consisting in close contacts with MEPs and national structures, the ENoP immediately gained a pre-eminent position in the policy network. The ENoP's interests in the EIDHR differ significantly from those of civil society organisations. CSOs in general refuse funding from political actors (apart from multi-party projects) and lobby for making the funding more accessible for local grass-root organisations, whereas political foundations are natural advocates of political bodies and seek funding for their local branches (European Network of Political Foundations, 2007). Many civil society organisations do not hesitate to express their animosity towards the political foundations, as the former disapprove of the latter's interest in EU funds[14] as well as their activities that are aimed explicitly at political actors (Interview with CSO representatives).

The European Parliament supported the efforts of the political foundations and eventually managed to include them among the beneficiaries of the instrument alongside the parliamentary bodies (European Parliament, 2006). However, the EP's initiative remains important mainly on a symbolic level since according to EC officials not many parliaments are in fact likely to apply for the EIDHR funding (European Commission, 2007vi).

In the draft regulation, the European Commission suggested an increase in the allocation of funds to the electoral observation missions within the EIDHR. The increase in funding on already running EOMs and its inclusion among the main headings provided for a painless way to give higher visibility to the democracy profile of the instrument without a need to introduce new measures or priorities to the instrument. Their involvement and increased financial allocation were highly controversial among NGOs, which demanded that the EOMs be moved to regional instruments (European Commission, 2007vi). The EOMs fulfil a rather symbolic role in relations with third countries, and their actual impact is weakened since they remain limited to the short electoral period and do not offer a long-term follow-up throughout the whole electoral process (European Parliament, 2006). The 25% share which was later inserted in the budget was seen as a major failure of the civil society organisations, but at the last moment it was compensated by making local NGOs involved in election observation eligible for this support (Řiháčková, 2008: 159).

The only wider initiative at that time was aimed at adjusting the delivery mechanisms of the instrument. The attempt to solve this problem by establishing an agency which would channel the EIDHR funds to beneficiaries independently of EC structures failed.[15] The inability to involve political foundations in this initiative is seen as one of the reasons for this failure (Řiháčková, 2008). However, the wide alliance of actors which supported the foundation of this agency formed the core of the emerging initiative that strived to shape the discourse and create a clearer profile of the EU in democracy promotion.

The goal was to arrive at an EU Consensus on Democracy as an equivalent to the EU Consensus on Development from 2005 (European Partnership for Democracy, 2009). The Council presidencies (starting with the French one in 2008) took a lead in this initiative. The Council Conclusions adopted in November 2009 were expected by the NGOs to give a major impetus to the EU's democracy promotion profile. The ambitious goal of the Swedish presidency that can be read about in the draft Council Conclusions was, however, watered down in the final version. Whereas the Conclusions originally foresaw a 'common EU policy framework for democracy building' (Council of the European Union, 2009a), the final version solely mentions the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy as a set of principles which shall help increase the 'coherence, coordination and complementarity' of the EU democracy assistance (European Partnership for Democracy, 2009; Council of the European Union, 2009b). Despite their pitfalls, the Council Conclusions are a crucial underlying document recognising the need for a distinct approach to democracy support and putting it on an equal footing with human rights and development. To illustrate how intangible the issue of democracy is among some EC officials, we can recall the EIDHR regulation deliberations which took place within the CODEV, in which a Commission official suggested removing the word 'democracy' from the title of the instrument, arguing that human rights and democracy are not clearly interlinked (Interview with a COHOM representative).

POLICY OUTCOMES

In the field of democracy support measures, the civil society organisations fought to maintain the status quo against newcomers to the policy network – political foundations as well as EU institutions that attempted to raise their democracy promotion profile through measures that would exclude NGO involvement (intergovernmental EOMs, cooperation with parliamentary bodies or focusing on political actors). On the one hand, it was a fierce battle to retain the already existing funding opportunities, and on the other hand, it was an attempt to renegotiate the 'traditional' shares of the EIDHR budget.

The policy outcomes reflect the lobbying process, with the organisations interested in democracy promotion having no common strategy between them. Without any underlying consensus as to basic principles and modes of support in democracy promotion, the organisations lobbied for a particular setting which would enable them to either gain new funding opportunities or retain the ones they already had. It is only after 2008 that we can first observe an initiative to establish some basic consensus on democracy support between the organisations, but such a consensus could have only limited impact on the new programming period of 2011–2013 due to the delay in the project cycle which limited the space for

renegotiation. The overall direction of the instrument currently follows a strong path dependency, which is unlikely to be broken until 2013.

The EIDHR II regulation adopted in late 2006 marked a certain amount of progress in terms of democracy support. For the first time, the regulation clearly stated that 'human rights and democracy are inextricably linked' and referred to the European Consensus on Development from December 2005, which highlights the interconnectedness of democratisation, good governance, human rights and development (The European Parliament and the Council, 2006). Even though the enlarged scope of democracy promotion measures foreseen by the regulation was seen as one of the major changes by the EC officials (European Commission, 2007: 2), this did not translate into the supported projects. Between 2007 and 2009, the most prevalent project theme was *Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms*, followed by *Torture* and *Human Rights Defenders* (EuropeAid, 2009: ii), as these themes accounted for over a third of the allocated budget.

The path dependency is to some extent determined by the well-organised interest groups, which are reluctant to allocate the funding to 'new' democracy objectives at their expense. Moreover, the policy network which evolved around the EIDHR mostly consists of organisations focusing on human and social rights which perceive democracy promotion as an overly politicised topic and are thus reluctant to support it. However, since 2006 the policy network around the EIDHR changed significantly. The arrival of experienced organisations with leverage and good access to EU institutions (such as the political foundations) could eventually change the persisting distribution of interests and lobbying capacities and challenge the status quo that currently exists in democracy promotion.

CASE 3: CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE EIDHR
CAPTURING THE EXISTING DISCOURSE IN THE FIELD

The community instruments represent one of the major components of the EU's conflict prevention profile. All the instruments of external action[16] somehow tackle the issues of peace and conflict. Prior to 2006, the EIDHR was the pivotal instrument for funding of peacebuilding activities implemented by NGOs. The 1999 regulation included Conflict Prevention as one of three main headings (alongside Democratisation and Human Rights), declaring the instrument's 'support for measures to promote respect for human rights and democratisation by preventing conflict and dealing with its consequences' (Council of the European Union, 1999). However, between 2000 and 2006 the projects on conflict prevention received an overall funding of 21,5 million Euro, which represents only a modest fraction of the total budget (European Commission, 2007v).

The discourse of non-governmental organisations giving priority to long-term peacebuilding[17] and linking it with development inevitably encounters resistance

from the EU structures due to its often blurry delineation between community policies and policy areas guarded by member states in the field. In June 2001 the Council in Göteborg agreed on a set of Conclusions, which, among other things, highlighted the need to ensure synergies between conflict prevention measures, the actions of the European Security and Defence Policy, trade and development. In doing so, the Council called for an enhancement of both military and civilian means of peacebuilding (Council of the European Union, 2001). This integrated consensus was, however, abandoned in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, and the states again focused prevalently on 'hard measures'. This period furthermore strengthened the perception of security as an exclusive domain of the states and left a shadow of suspicion on the role of non-state actors in security-related areas (Weitsch, 2008). This situation forced the NGOs working in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention to restart their advocacy work nearly from scratch.

The EU discourse on peacebuilding can also be found in the interaction between the Council presidencies and NGOs: in the view of the presidencies the role of NGOs shall consist mainly in service delivery (such as training, monitoring, and recruitment), but they are not expected to take an active role in policy planning or to get involved in missions in the field (Weitsch, 2008: 13). This discourse is mirrored in the share of the EC conflict prevention and peacebuilding funding going directly to civil society, which currently accounts for only 3% of all available EC funding (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2010). The NGOs, on the contrary, strive for making the peacebuilding measures mainly civilian and often implement their own operations in the field. This paper does not have the ambition to scrutinise the effects of civilian peacekeeping measures, but it does, however, acknowledge that non-coordination between CSOs and (inter)governmental activities can be especially harmful in this sphere.

TRACKING THE INFLUENCE

Discussions on the reform of the external action instruments were perceived as a crucial aspect of the long-term dialogue between the EU and peacebuilding NGOs in recent times (Weitsch, 2008). In order to establish relations with relevant EU institutions, the organisations working in this field came together in 2004 under the umbrella of the EPLO (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office). Since 2005, the EPLO was regularly present at the EIDHR consultations organised by the European Commission, providing feedback at all levels of the programming cycle (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2010). The EPLO representatives eventually managed to insert references to peacebuilding in the EIDHR II regulation and both Strategy Papers (2007–2010 and 2011–2013), which, however, had only limited impact on the actual funding of such projects up until today (EuropeAid, 2009).

Apart from the European Commission, the organisations working in the peace-building field tackled the Council presidencies (Weitsch, 2008), which are important agenda-setters in the EU and are likely to be receptive to issues of security and conflict prevention. Since 2004, the EPLO became the main non-state non-profit interlocutor for the CIVCOM (Council Committee for Civilian Crisis Management), where it regularly arranges briefings by NGO experts on the situations in selected countries.

The conflict prevention measures, which naturally oscillate between development and security issues, indirectly became a subject of inter-institutional turf wars in 2005, which heavily influenced the EIDHR negotiations. In 2005, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked to resolve a cross-pillar dispute between the Council and the European Commission in the case of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Van Vooren, 2009). Even though the judgement in this case was first handed down by the Court in May 2008, in the meantime the institutions were quite cautious about making any significant decisions in the field. This had an inhibiting impact on the conflict resolution objectives of the new instruments, especially the emerging Instrument for Stability (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2006).

Lobbying the European Parliament was a logical step in the situation when both the European Commission and the Council were hesitant to give clear support to the peacebuilding measures within the new instruments. However, the negotiations took place during a 'stirred up' period in which there was increased public sensitivity to conflict related issues (e.g. the debates on the war in Iraq). Thus, in this period, the EP was reluctant to give support to this initiative, which was interpreted by some as a 'militarisation of development' (Interview with CSO representatives).

POLICY OUTCOMES – SUMMARY

The NGOs working in the field employed multi-level lobbying strategies when they addressed the European Commission and the European Parliament as well as the Council presidencies. Especially the NGOs' interaction with the Council presidencies mirrored the diverging ideas as to the role of NGOs in peacebuilding measures. Furthermore, in the period after 2001, the consensus on civilian peacebuilding was to be renegotiated in a context which was highly unfavourable towards NGO involvement.

In 2006 and 2007 the peacebuilding activities ended up locked between two instruments of External Action – the EIDHR and the newly established Instrument for Stability (IfS) – without good prospects to gain through their complementarity. While in the light of the interinstitutional disputes the European Commission was hesitant to support peacebuilding activities, the Instrument for Stability did not allow peacebuilding NGOs to gain funding for long-term sustainable conflict pre-

vention measures, which were previously funded under the EIDHR I (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2005). Moreover the linkage between the two instruments is quite weak and fails to ensure the complementarity of the instruments (Bayne–Trolliet, 2009), and this problem was further exacerbated by including the IfS in the EEAS structures. The chances for funding for peacebuilding activities thus lost their anchor in the community programmes and suffered a major setback in the aftermath of the EIDHR reform. The Instrument for Stability is currently a bearer of the EU discourse in the field, and to the NGOS, it ascribes only a limited role – that is, the role of a provider of short-term 'service deliveries' that is in line with the discussed discourse.

LOBBYING OF NGOS IN BRUSSELS: FALLING PREY TO INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES?

The goal of this study was to illustrate the various ways a discourse can enter policy-making at the EU level and create supporting incentives or inhibiting factors in the lobbying process. We have analysed the interplay between the institutional discourses and the preferences of the lobbying organisations in three case studies representing the key thematic components of the European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy.

In the first case study, a well embedded (on both the EU and the international level) discourse giving priority to support of human rights defenders created a significant backing for the claims of organisations in this field. By calling upon previous commitments made on the EU level (EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders) in a field which is closely connected to the underlying philosophy of the EU's identity (respect for human rights), the organisations managed to push through some crucial changes.

The field of democracy promotion captured by the second case study is institutionalised neither by international organisations nor by the EU. The attempt to establish a Consensus on Democracy at the EU level in 2008 succeeded only partially. The vagueness surrounding the definition of democracy promotion and adequate policy responses created an opportunity for various different organisations to lobby for their particular ideas of democracy support and, in the end, maintain the status quo.

In the third case, we observed a fragile discourse acknowledging the legitimate role of civil society organisations in long-term peacekeeping which, nevertheless, fell prey to the stirred up atmosphere accompanying the interinstitutional dispute over conflict prevention and the period after 2001, during which priority was given to nationalisation of security.

The interplay between the coordinative and the communicative discourse was an important aspect of these deliberations. The EIDHR especially fulfils a symbolic

role, as it represents actions based on EU ideational commitments. The idea of presenting and legitimating its goals before a wider public (including EU citizens, and the citizens and governments of the target countries) therefore guided several provisions included in the instrument (such as the increased visibility of EOMs). The communicative discourse, moreover, kicks in as the notion of 'political sensitivity', which is constructed around divergent values, enters the picture. The decision on the factors that make an issue 'politically sensitive' also takes place within the discourse. Furthermore, the constructivist nature of 'politically sensitive issues' can be illustrated on the fact that direct support to human rights defenders is widely recognised within the instrument, even though it can have a similarly disturbing impact on the legitimacy of regimes as democracy support measures (e.g. support to political actors).

Though the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research offered useful insights into the lobbying process, at the same time they represent a methodological challenge. The information obtained through the interviews is often impossible to cross-check due to the lack of documentation on the mainly informal processes. Also, for various reasons, the interlocutors can have tendencies to under- or overestimate their influence, and this can cause a bias in the conclusions of the research. This is why a broader context needs to be considered as a corrective of the lobbying strategies. The differing levels of availability of sources and interlocutors are mirrored in the different natures of the case studies as well. While the first study can follow the process-tracing and the degree of preference attainment method rigidly and show causal mechanisms, the latter two case studies rather offer a broader picture of the policy network.

The semi-structured interviews were prevalently led with representatives of Brussels-based networks and therefore they partially miss out on the evaluation and policy formulation process which took place between EC delegations and local organisations and also between EC delegations and their respective DG units. The influence of local organisations and European delegations should also be taken into consideration if we are to receive a comprehensive picture of the situation. The Brussels-based networks of CSOs represent wide constituencies which ensure their legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the European Commission. To what extent this representation remains vital and appropriate is an important question that is linked directly to concerns about legitimacy and democracy.

This small exploratory study has shown the various ways discourses influence policy outcomes through supporting or inhibiting lobbying organisations with corresponding goals. In order for us to arrive at any accurate and meaningful generalisations, though, further research in other policy fields will be needed. The EIDHR represents a specific field due to its very close linkage to the EU's underlying values and its role in the manifestations thereof. However, the constructivist strategies

can be employed in any policy field, given that ideas lie at the very heart of politics and policy-making.

ENDNOTES

[1] The notion of a 'civil society organisation' will be employed here in order to highlight the non-governmental and non-market nature of the actors. Compared to the official EC documents (European Commission, 2010c), however, the understanding of the civil society organisations presented here will be narrower, as it will exclude organisations that participate in social dialogue. Such a delimitation comes very close to approximating the actual membership of the analysed policy network, which is prevalently constituted by non-governmental organisations. Therefore the terms 'civil society organisation' (which is in fact a generic term encompassing, among others, NGOs) and 'non-governmental organisation' will be used interchangeably in the article.

[2] In line with Karr, by using the term *interest group* we will embrace both internal and external functions of the group referred to by this term while distinguishing it from a *lobby group*, as lobby groups focus primarily on representation of interests to public bodies (Karr, 2007: 58).

[3] See, e.g., the statistics on the number of acts adopted in the year 2011 at the EU LEX portal. Online: eur-lex.europa.eu/Stats.do?context=legislative&ihmlang=en (retrieved 10. 12. 2011).

[4] In order to distinguish the phases of the instrument, we will use the term 'EIDHR II' to denote the post-2006 reformed instrument. 'EIDHR I' will refer to the instrument between 1999 and 2006, after the formalisation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.

[5] Online: ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm, retrieved June 27th 2011.

[6] Even though the concept of transnational advocacy networks focuses primarily on advocacy campaigns which are 'outsiders' to the target political system, the particular propositions are useful for analysing the policy networks operating within the EU, where the interaction is based on mutual recognition and dependency. Keck and Sikkink specified several variables that are decisive for the success of the transnational advocacy networks' initiatives. One of them, the vulnerability of target actors, is highly interesting in our context. According to the authors, the target might be vulnerable due to either material incentives and sanctions or its prior normative commitments (Keck–Sikkink, 1998: 208).

[7] Originally established as an objective of the TACIS and PHARE programmes in the early 1990s (Neligan, 1998), the programme was formalised in 1994 as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (Herrero, 2009; Řiháčková, 2008); the Initiative was managed at that time by an external agency (the European Human Rights Foundation, EHRF) (Neligan, 1998; Herrero, 2009). It first became an in-house project of the European Commission after 1999.

[8] The Comitology Register of the European Commission provides basic information on the committees and their meetings since 2008. Online: ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm (accessed 2. 8. 2011).

[9] Commonly defined as individuals who encourage and enforce adherence to provisions of international commitments by engaging in awareness raising, monitoring of human rights abuses or seeking remedies for victims of human rights violations. The human rights defenders are a crucial source of the

information that is needed for assessing the human rights situation in many states. For their engagement, the human rights defenders are often a target of harassment from local governments or other political and economic actors (Human Rights First, 2010).

[10] The full title of the declaration is 'Declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms'.

[11] As an EC representative noted during the consultations with the CSOs, the specific provisions concerning human rights defenders are 'quite a new element, and the EC does not know yet how this will be implemented' (European Commission, 2007b: 2).

[12] Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 and Council Regulation (EC) No 976/1999 of 29 April 1999.

[13] A respectable amount of detective work in this matter has been done by Sonia Herrero; her article provides details on the development of democracy support related priorities within the EIDHR in the last decade (Herrero, 2009).

[14] The disapproval is based on the fact that compared to the civil society organisations the EU funding constitutes only a negligible portion of the foundations' budgets while at the same time the budgets are much bigger than regular NGO budgets.

[15] Details on these negotiations and the reasons for the failure are comprehensively analysed in the work of Věra Řiháčková (Řiháčková, 2008).

[16] Apart from the Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument (NSCI).

[17] The peace and conflict field suffers from a considerable terminological obscurity. For the purpose of our research, we will stick to a definition of peacebuilding in which it is a generic term encompassing a long-term approach to peaceful reconciliation of interests. The term peacebuilding does not appear in any official EU documents (Quaker Council for European Affairs, 2007). In contrast, conflict prevention is a term widely used in the European Union and it is defined as '...both short and long-term actions to address the conflict dynamics by addressing structural root-causes of conflict as well as the expressions of violence' (Quaker Council for European Affairs, 2007). *Crisis management*, on the other hand, represents a response strategy to an immediate outbreak of conflict.

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• European Commission: EuropeAid/F2, EC Delegation in Kiev

• European Parliament: Edward McMillan-Scott, Jana Hybášková

• European Council: Czech representative in COHOM (2006)

• Civil society organisations and political foundations:

• APRODEV (Association of World Council of Churches Related Development Organisations in Europe)

• Club de Madrid

• Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung

• Frontline Defenders

• Human Rights and Democracy Network (HRDN)

• European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP)

• European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

• European Partnership for Democracy (EPD)

• Nonviolent Peaceforce

• Open Society Institute Brussels

• People in Need

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Annual Action Plan
AFET	Committee on Foreign Affairs (European Parliament)
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (European Council)
COHOM	Working Party on Human Rights (European Council)
CODEV	Working Party on Development Cooperation (European Council)
CSO	civil society organisation
DG AIDCO	Directorate-General (EuropeAid Co-operation Office)
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations
EC	European Commission
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EIDHR	European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy

ENoP	European Network of Political Foundations
EOM	Electoral Observation Mission
EP	European Parliament
EPD	European Partnership for Democracy
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EU	European Union
HRD	Human Rights Defenders
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NIDM	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NSCI	Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy

Existing Conflicts in the Arctic and the Risk of Escalation: Rhetoric and Reality

ZDENĚK KŘÍŽ, FILIP CHRÁŠŤANSKÝ

Abstract: In recent years, both the scholarly public and journalists have started to discuss the likelihood of an outburst of new conflicts in the Arctic and an escalation of the existing ones. Interstate disputes such as the dispute of Canada and the USA in the Beaufort Sea over the border delimitation have already lasted for several decades. But an escalation of these conflicts is not inevitable. Nowadays, in terms of the level of institutionalization of the relations and state interdependence, the Arctic is equal to other world regions, and the UN-CLOS provides a sufficient framework for non-violent conflict resolution. Also the nature of the existing conflicts, the accessible technology, and the Arctic environment imply a conciliatory solution and promote cooperation between the Arctic states. Even though the current dynamics somewhat increase the conflict potential of the region, its level is definitely not as high as indicated by some authors. Moreover, articles presenting alarmist visions of conflict escalation in the region often count on incomplete and oversimplified data and assumptions and can hardly survive a rigorous verification and a confrontation with the reality of the situation

Key words: Arctic, conflicts, escalation, anarchy, order, law of the sea

THE EXISTING CONFLICTS IN THE ARCTIC AND THE RISK OF ESCALATION
INTRODUCTION

There has been much discussion recently on the issues connected to the geographical areas surrounding the North Pole. Both the scholarly public and journalists very often discuss the likelihood of an outburst of new conflicts in the Arctic and an escalation of the existing ones. The well-respected journal *Nature*, in its January 2008 issue, featured an article titled 'The Next Land Rush', which underlined the possibility of an escalation of the conflict concerning the jurisdiction issues of the Arctic (Young, 2009: 73; Graff, 2007). Scott Borgerson's article 'Arctic Meltdown' in *Foreign Affairs*, which emphasized the absence of international legal agreements and outlined a scenario of armed conflict for the Arctic, belongs to the most quoted and influential essays dealing with this issue. Borgerson assumes that

climate change will enable people to get access to the enormous natural wealth of the Arctic. Moreover, the receding of the ice also opens up the Arctic Ocean to lucrative sea transportation. That is why states will attempt to control the largest possible area of the Arctic. Taking the anarchic nature of international relations as well as the absence of norms that would regulate the settings in the Arctic into consideration, we can assume that these states will most probably act unilaterally. With respect to the value of the stakes, 'Arctic fever' and armed confrontation are real threats. Briefly put, the author foresees not only the occurrence of a conflict, but also the risk of its escalation to the phase of open violent confrontation (see Borgerson, 2008).

These and other similar opinions of Borgerson were accepted by a number of authors and the media (e.g. Spears, 2009; Young, 2009: 73). One can easily find similar articles and reports by various scholars.[1] There is a growing trend on the part of certain authors, agencies, think-tanks and even official authorities to securitize the Arctic. This approach, which pictures the future of the region in a pessimistic or even violent fashion, has already found its audience. For instance the European Union has recently operated on an assumption of conflict escalation in the Arctic. A document endorsed by High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner discusses the impacts of global warming and also points out the risk of conflicts over energy resources in the polar region. The danger of outbreaks of territorial and border disputes in the area regarding mineral resources and newly accessible transport routes is equally accentuated. The submitters of the policy draft call for protection of EU interests in the region and fear a possible growth in international tensions in regard to this matter (for more details see European Commission, 2008).

The stakes are high. If the relevant actors accept this logic and start to act as if the conflict is unavoidable, a self-fulfilling prophecy may occur. The general goal of this article is to critically assess the relevance of the above described opinions which stress the alleged increased risk of outbreak and/or escalation of conflicts over the Arctic (in particular to oppose the views presented in Borgerson's article). To achieve this goal, it is indispensable to firstly geographically define the region of the Arctic, identify the Arctic states, and define the term 'conflict.' Afterwards, the article will provide an analysis of the pre-existing conflicts among the Arctic states and other potential actors in this region. Here, an emphasis will be placed on the subject of disputes and conflict dynamics. After that, we will concentrate on an analysis of the existing international regimes in the Arctic, which should provide us with the answer to the question of whether Borgerson's attitude based on the idea that the structure of the international system in the Arctic is purely anarchic is justified. This way, we make room for a critical evaluation of opinions which anticipate an outbreak of new conflicts in the Arctic and an escalation of the already existing

ones. The paper does not aim to falsify any IR theory. It wants to turn attention to the fact that the existing conflicts in the Arctic region can be solved by peaceful means and that the region itself is institutionalized to a significant degree.

DEFINITION OF THE TERMS 'THE ARCTIC' AND 'CONFLICT'
THE ARCTIC IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The development of human activities in the Circumpolar North has been histori-cally limited by three factors: (1) An essential obstruction lies in the climate and ge-ographical characteristics of the region. This has to do with not only the extremely low temperatures and permanent glaciations, but also the region's relative distance from all centers of human civilization. (2) The attempts to settle this region or to use it for either military or economic purposes have been tied to the degree of tech-nological advancement in the given era. Both the climate and current state-of-the-art technology as objectively given factors determine what the Arctic can offer and which activities can be developed there. (3) Finally, there has been one extra sub-jective restraint. The marginalization of the region was up to a certain extent sup-ported by traditional mental maps of the world in which the Arctic as a distinctive region *de facto* did not exist.

National states started to turn their sights towards the North from the end of the 19th century. Initially, their engagement was limited to supporting national discov-ery and research expeditions for the sake of their reputation and prestige, and demonstrating the given nation's advancement (see Riffenburgh, 1994). However, the first territorial conflicts logically followed. Eventually, not only prestige, but also economic and military-strategic interests were at stake. Most of the disputes con-cerning the mainland and the islands (especially the dispute regarding the control over Greenland and Svalbard) were solved between the two world wars. The resid-ual areas remained more or less uncontested because at that time they did not of-fer much due to the restraints mentioned above. Economic and other activities were therefore limited to peripheral areas of the region 'just beyond' the Arctic Cir-cle. The core of the region itself had not been fully valued until the advent of avia-tion and the Cold War, in which aircraft, submarines and, most importantly, missiles relativized permanent glaciations and other constraining factors.

It was the era of the nuclear arms race when the Arctic became a center of in-terest for military strategists as the shortest connecting line between the civilization centers of both blocs. The significant militarization of the region came as a result of this. This new dynamic was nevertheless once again concentrated in the most northern parts of the continents and an adjacent strip of islands. The area of the Arctic Ocean was again nothing more than an arena for patrols of submarines and strategic bombers.

Though there was a considerable increase in cooperation even during the Cold War, especially within the Western bloc, the true boom came with the breakdown of bipolarity (for further reading see Osherenko–Young, 1989). The continual enhancement of the cooperation started with the rather symbolic Murmansk speech by Mikhail Gorbachev from October 1987 and continued with the so-called Rovaniemi process, which included not only 8 Arctic nations (the USA, the Soviet Union, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) but also three northern indigenous peoples' organizations. The initial focus on environmental protection gradually expanded to related fields, notably that of sustainable development. In the late 90s the Arctic Council became the most important platform in this respect (see Koivurova, 2010, or Heininen, 2004). After the increase of political interactions, further development of economic activities followed. The region has therefore come to a phase in which a complete spectrum of actors of international relations is involved in it, starting with NGOs and MNCs and ending with national states and important IGOs.

In the last few years, the impact of the limitations described above has been significantly reduced, which has opened new possibilities and increased the number of possible activities in the Arctic, as many activities were previously impossible to conduct there. The new activities include the use of new sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and further development and exploitation of natural resources – namely oil and natural gas, as these are the most demanded commodities. Also both actors (states, IGOs and other actors) and observers (the media, the scholarly community or the world's publics) who had previously ignored the Arctic for a long time have recently started to care about the developments in the region (see Powell, 2010; Dodds, 2008, or Dodds, 2010). At the same time, we are experiencing a rise of the interests of the 'traditional' regional players, i.e. the group of five Arctic states (the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Russian Federation).

DEFINITION OF THE ARCTIC

There is no single definition of the areas around the North Pole, nor is there any unity in the terminology used in reference to the Arctic. The core of the majority of the phrases for it include 'the Arctic' or 'the North' in combination with various adjectives such as 'circumpolar', 'far' or 'high'. We can identify papers in which the terms 'Arctic' and 'High North' refer to various different areas that were defined in various different ways (e.g. Skagestad, 2009). However, there are also other articles in which the variations were used as synonyms.[2] This current state of inconsistent terminology can be accepted only to the extent to which the reader is able to cognitively comprehend the region the author of the respective article is referring to. Otherwise, there is a risk of excessive generalization.

An example of such a generalization is given by Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor (2009: 10). Suppose that there is an uninformed reader who is to read two articles. One of the articles discusses the significant reserves of oil and natural gas 'in the Arctic', and the second article draws attention to territorial disputes 'in the Arctic'. This may lead the reader to the logical conclusion that such a situation greatly increases the risk of outbreak of conflict in the 'Arctic' as states will attempt to control these contested areas since they will see a prospect of future drilling and exploitation. However, such a conclusion is established on the misleading assumption that the 'Arctic' from Article no. 1 overlaps with the territory from the second article. In reality, though, these two geographic areas, although they are both located in the Arctic, can be several thousand kilometers far away from each other. This fictional example may very often be similar to real life cases as the Circumpolar North covers the area of several tens of millions of square kilometers.

Picture 1

Map presents the definition of the Arctic that is used in the Arctic Human Development Report (see Picture 1 – source: Arctic Human Development Report 2004,

Stefansson Arctic Institute, Reykjavik). It corresponds to 4 million inhabitants living in the vast area of 30 million km² – an area 1.43 times larger than the USA and 3.25 times greater than the EU (Bogoyavlensky–Siggner, 2004: 27). We have to mind this fact every time we are analyzing the situation in the region.

Another important issue is the question of which states are to be considered 'Arctic'. There is unity over the five countries neighboring the Arctic Ocean – the Russian Federation, the USA, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and Norway. Nevertheless, Finland, Sweden and Iceland are also often considered as Arctic, with respect to their membership in the Arctic Council. But the problem is that due to the economic development in recent years, many other actors, the territories of which are not even remotely adjacent to the areas discussed above, have started to become interested in Arctic regional affairs. These actors include China, India, Japan and South Korea (Holtsmark–Smith-Windsor, 2009: 13).[3] Moreover, other actors also play an important role in the region. After two decades, not only NATO and the EU, but also other IGOs, MNCs and NGOs have turned their attention to the North.[4] The Arctic is therefore becoming a region of global importance and so the spectrum of actors involved is global as well.

In this article the Arctic will be primarily viewed as the area beyond the Arctic Circle (66°33′ north latitude). The area defined in these terms represents 6% of the Earth's surface. Dry land represents approximately one third of this area. The continental shelf to a 500m depth represents approximately one third of it as well. The rest consists of deep waters (Gautier et al., 2009: 1175). Concerning the actors taken into account, due to the the need to limit the research subject, special attention will be given to the conflicts among the five states of the Arctic: Russia, the USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway.[5]

CONFLICT

The key to the definition of the term 'conflict' is to draw a distinction between conflict as a particular social condition and its particular forms (unarmed conflict, armed conflict, war, etc.). A general definition of the term is offered by Paul Wehr and Otomar Bartos, who state that a conflict is a 'situation in which actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility' (Bartos–Wehr, 2002: 13). Another example of a wider definition of the term is the definition by the KOSIMO project, which says that 'conflicts are clashes of interest (differences of position) concerning national values (territory, secession, decolonization, autonomy, system/ideology, national power, regional predominance, international power, resources, other). These clashes are of a certain duration and scope, involving at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations of states) determined to pursue their interests and win their cases' (HIIK, 2009).

For the purposes of this work, a definition of 'conflict' can be specified as follows. It is a social fact which encompasses at least two actors, and in which it is possible to identify an incompatibility of the interests of the given actors, while this incompatibility should be articulated by at least one side. Together with Wallensteen, we can identify three basic elements of a conflict based on the definitions above: 1) the participants in the dispute, or rather the actors; 2) an incompatibility of interests; 3) action (Wallensteen, 2007: 14).

Regarding the intensity of the given conflict, according to KOSIMO, we can distinguish between violent and non-violent conflicts, and within that division, there is a total of five levels of intensity: latent conflict, manifest conflict (non-violent), crises, severe crises, and war (violent) (HIIK, 2009).

EXISTING CONFLICTS IN THE ARCTIC REGION AND PROSPECTS OF THEIR RESOLUTION

Based on the criterion of incompatibility of states' interests, we can identify three categories for the conflicts in the Arctic: 1) demarcation conflicts over borders, 2) conflicts over control of the straits and control of the SLOCs and 3) conflicts linked to demarcation of the continental shelves and the demands resulting from this.

DEMARCATION OF THE BORDERS BETWEEN TWO STATES

Irrespective of the significant progress achieved by the Arctic states in the matter of their mutual borders and demarcation of EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) over the last twenty years, we can still find several controversial or until now unassigned areas of the Arctic that the states have striven to obtain.[6]

The first group – made up of conflicts over demarcation of the borders between two states – today encompasses five disputes:
1) the USA versus the Russian Federation in the Bering Sea;
2) the USA versus Canada in the Beaufort Sea;
3) Canada versus Denmark/Greenland in the Davis Strait;
4) Norway versus Russia in the Barents Sea;
5) Norway versus Russia and others on the question of the status of Svalbard.

Ad 1) The demarcation of the Russian-American border in the Bering Sea has been made within the framework of the mutual agreement from 1990, which was ratified by the USA the following year. Nevertheless, the Russian Duma has not approved the agreement yet, even though its wording developed as a compromise between the sector approach supported by Russia since 1926 and the US approach (Hoel, 2009: 88). Therefore the given agreement did not come into force, and this dispute remained unresolved.[7] Nonetheless, in practice, no larger con-

troversies have occurred in this respect. In addition, both sides have also contractually anchored questions of overlapping EEZs and fishery regulation in the open sea beyond EEZ borders (for more details see IBRU, 2010, or Hoel, 2009). The question therefore remains whether we can talk about a conflict in this case. If so, the conflict has not been escalating over the past few years and it can at most be labeled as a conflict of a latent character according to the KOSIMO categorization.

Ad 2) In contrast, the next case is that of a persisting dispute between the USA and Canada. Here, an area of 22,600 km^2 in the Beaufort Sea is at stake. The USA holds the opinion that the border has not yet been defined and thus it prefers the median approach. On the other hand, Canada cites an 1825 agreement between Great Britain and Russia which set the border between Yukon and Alaska in accordance with the 141st meridian (IBRU, 2010). The problem in this approach is not only the age of the agreement and its signatories, but also the fact that it demarcates the border using the vague term 'as far as frozen ocean.' The disputed area is rich in seafood and probably also oil and natural gas. At the same time, here extraction is not entirely unrealistic, taking into account the location of the entire area, and both states are therefore repeatedly trying to grant extraction concessions for parts of the area. Nevertheless, the production has not yet started, partly because of the persisting conflict.

This territorial conflict is nothing new in the mutual relations, though. When it comes to its intensity, the sides have so far limited themselves to official protests via diplomatic means. The discrepancy has been articulated by Canada in the context of an American moratorium on fishing. Canadians view the moratorium as a serious matter, as they traditionally treat questions of sovereignty on their northern border as matters of great importance (Boswell, 2009). Neither of the sides has stepped back from their demands; however, they are at the same time open to mutual discussion and prefer cooperative solutions. In the summer of 2010, USCGC Healy and its Canadian counterpart CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent participated on a joint mission aimed at generating seabed data across a wide swath of the Beaufort Sea. This was the first time a conducted survey included the disputed zone in the southern part of the Beaufort Sea (Boswell, 2010). However, this is a conflict with a dynamic that does not indicate further escalation so far. Taking its duration into account, it is rather a dispute that has come to a deadlock, yet some level of activity toward cooperation in this matter has been noticeable over the last few years. From an intensity point of view, it is at most a Manifest Conflict according to KOSIMO (HIIK, 2009). Nevertheless, an increase in tension could be brought about by an intervention of one of the sides against fishing vessels. But on the contrary, one recent development in the region – namely the Russo-Norwegian agreement (see below) – actually appears more likely to contribute to de-escalation.

Ad 3) Even though Canada and Denmark have nearly solved the problem of border demarcation between the Northern American coast and Greenland by an agreement from 1973, the conflict over Hans Island, located between Greenland and Ellesmere Island, still remains open.[8] The question is what makes this piece of bare rock of 2 km² so valuable and why an agreement on it has not been reached in the following four decades. At first sight, the reason could lie in the control of the fisheries and the oil and natural gas drilling in nearby waters, but both sides have agreed in previous talks that the gaining of Hans Island by either of them would not change the approved border, which negates such an explanation (Harper, 2005). It therefore seems that it is rather prestige which is at stake, and both sides' unwillingness to step back results from this. In particular, on the Canadian side there is a great fear that giving up the island would mean an undesirable precedent for their other claims in the region.

As for the conflict intensity and dynamics, this dispute has existed since the 1970s, when Canada raised a claim upon the island during the ongoing demarcation talks, which was in contradiction with the interests of Denmark. In the following decades, both sides have been alternately placing their flags over the island, or conducting 'research' activities. The dispute came to a head in 2005 when the island was visited by the Canadian Minister of Defense, which was followed by an official protest from the Danes. During the summer months, though, both sides nevertheless agreed to come to negotiations which took place on the ministerial level in September 2005, but no official agreement has been reached. One certain positive shift, though, is signalized by the Canadian government taking the step of drawing the border through the center of the island and not eastwards of it in updated maps. The island, therefore, is not entirely Canadian according to Ottawa, but only 'half Canadian' (Canadian Press, 2007). When it comes to the instruments employed in the dispute, the states have avoided direct confrontation or the use of violence so far. Nor has a crisis occurred according to the KOSIMO categorization.

Ad 4) When it comes to the area of the disputed territory, the conflict in the European part of the Arctic has been the most serious one. Norway and Russia have conducted talks over the demarcation of the borders in the Barents Sea since 1974. Moscow has traditionally advocated the sector approach in this matter. Norway, on the other hand, has defended an area of almost 176,000 km² on the basis of the median principle with slight adjustments (mainly the deflection around Svalbard). In the given area not only fishery management, but also the control of the oil and natural gas reserves is at stake. Moreover, the entire area is situated in a relatively accessible location, and oil extraction is therefore not a completely unrealistic option for it. That is also why the USSR and Norway had already come to the signing of the Gray Zone Agreement in 1978 to regulate the rules of fishing in the so-called 'Gray Zone,' which constitutes a part of a disputed area, a part of a Norwegian EEZ

and a part of a Soviet/Russian EEZ (IBRU, 2008). The agreement forbids mutual control of ships and regulates states' actions towards third states' ships. Quotas were then annually set by a joint commission. This agreement was repeatedly renewed, and the last time it was renewed, its expiration date was 1ˢᵗ July 2010.

On 15 September 2010, the Russo-Norwegian Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean was signed and it replaced the Gray Zone Agreement. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a law in April 2011 to ratify the September 2010 treaty and the new treaty entered into effect on 7 July 2011. This deal effectively ended one of the most serious and long-lasting disputes in the region. In spite of the termination of the 'Gray Zone' fishing arrangement of 1978, the agreement reaffirms the cooperative management of fisheries. Both states also unequivocally welcomed the deal in the belief that it would pave the way for hydrocarbon exploitation. Annex II carefully details the rights and obligations that would apply if any hydrocarbon structure was found to straddle the maritime boundary, as well as provisions for dispute settlement (IBRU, 2010).

Even before the Agreement, it would have been inappropriate to talk about an acute dispute in which one of the states would have interrupted communication and relied on a unilateral approach and coercive measures. The issue was regularly a part of the program of mutual talks of the leading policy-makers of the involved states. They believe in further progress in the negotiations (see Moskwa, 2008).

Ad 5) The last conflict concerns the status of Svalbard. On the basis of a multilateral agreement from February 1920 (the USSR ratified this convention in 1935) Spitsbergen, Bear Island and all islands located between 74° and 81° north latitude and 10° and 35° east longitude were assigned to Norway (Article 1 mentions full sovereignty) (Dobronravin, 2009). The agreement has nevertheless established a freedom of entry and stay for all nationals of the signatory states. The signatory parties therefore did have the right to equal use of the natural resources of the area (specifically, the right to hunt and extract and the right to development of all naval, industrial, extractive, and commercial opportunities on the basis of absolute equality; see Articles 2 and 3 of the Svalbard Treaty). Rules for the development of these activities would be set by Norway while the principle of non-discrimination would be kept. The convention has also forbidden the establishment of naval bases or military fortresses and the use of the islands for military purposes (Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty).

Even though 39 states have joined the treaty by now, Svalbard is, in reality, mainly Norwegian and Russian. The Russian-Norwegian coexistence represented a global rarity especially during the Cold War, as on the island, *de facto* straightforward contact between the citizens of the Western bloc and those of the Eastern bloc remained possible without any visa obligation or similar restrictions (Ruščák, 2008: 10). Plus, even nowadays, Svalbard remains an integral part of the Norwegian kingdom.

The essence of the dispute in which Norway is on one side and Russia (and to a lesser extent the remaining signatories as well) on the other lies in the two sides' different interpretations of the agreement mentioned above. There are three domains of problems: the interpretation of the term 'military purposes,' the question of the status of the continental shelf, and the status of the EEZs.

Norway limits the effect of the treaty to the mainland and the territorial waters of the islands (Dobronravin, 2009).[9] The area of the EEZs – or more precisely the so-called Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ), which was created in 1977 – is included in each state's unlimited jurisdiction. That is why Oslo has started to regulate fishing in the FPZ area and has repeatedly taken action against Russian fishermen. A similar dispute has been ongoing in the case of the continental shelf, where Norway refuses to concede that Svalbard has its own continental shelf (i.e. Oslo excludes the shelf from the agreement's authority). Disagreements are also present regarding the interpretation of the articles dealing with the demilitarization of the area. While Russia interprets the applicable regulations as excluding all military activities from the area, Norway does not consider the article as an absolute ban, and therefore a Norwegian military ship or airplane lands on the island from time to time. Russia, however, interprets the regulations as entailing complete demilitarization, which would also prohibit an installation of a double-use facility (for more details see Zyśk, 2009: 115).

There are thus many disputes related to the Arctic, including the regulation of the fishery and other economic activities in the EEZ, and the security concerns of Russia linked to the advantageous geostrategic position of the archipelago (the position of Svalbard as an important control point with respect to the Russian military base positions on the peninsula of Kola). What sorts of dynamics and intensities does this conflict show?

The disputes over the proper interpretation of the particular passages of contention, which arise from the differences in the Russian and Norwegian versions of the passages, were present from the very beginning of the regime (Zyśk, 2009: 113). Nevertheless, the conflict fully manifested itself no sooner than during the Cold War, when Moscow officially protested against the establishment of a landing strip and a telemetry station on the island and simultaneously called for a revision of the agreement (Åtland, Pedersen, 2009). There have also been increasingly more installations of Norwegian facilities, which were often related to space research, on the island since the 1990s. The Russians therefore feared the possibility of the usage of these facilities within a US anti-missile shield. Moreover, the eastward enlargement of NATO, Norway's adaptation of its self-imposed restrictions to the allied military activity in the country's northernmost and easternmost land-, sea-, and airspace, and the United States' announcement of their intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty were interpreted as new threats in Russia (Åtland–Pedersen, 2009: 7–8). Moreover, the Norwegian attempts to regulate activi-

ties on the archipelago by new environmental protection legislation are perceived negatively by Russia. Moscow often views stricter regulation in the area as an attempt to make extractive activities impossible and as a measure directed against any Russian presence in the area. One possible example of such controversial regulations would be the Norwegian 'Svalbard Environmental Protection Act' from 2001, which provoked a groundswell of protests in Russia led by the proclamations against the act by President Putin. These developments resulted in a 2003 compromise according to which the area of Russian coal mining was excluded from the operation of the document (Åtland–Pedersen, 2009: 9).

The last area of friction between Norway and Russia is the control of the fisheries in the FPZ area around Svalbard. The Norwegian Coast Guard repeatedly intervenes against illegal fishing by Russian ships in this area. A specific escalation in this matter occurred in 2002, when Moscow sent the destroyer Severomorsk into the region, and the Chair of the Russian State Fisheries Commission Evgeny Nazdratenko threatened to sink Norwegian ships if they infringed on the rights of Russian fishermen (Åtland–Pedersen, 2009: 13). Nonetheless, in the end, the warship did not enter the zone, and its journey has been described by Moscow as a routine maneuver conducted to inspect Russian fishing vessels.

This is one of the most intense conflicts discussed in this paper. However, even in this conflict, the states have restricted themselves to diplomatic protests and demonstrative acts. Yet at the same time, steps against illegal activities by fishermen are often taken. Furthermore, even if these are actions against private entities, the armed services of the state are often employed in them. Above all, a quite considerable sense of unease is obvious on the Russian side, which has also to do with the complexity of the participating interests. The conflict is not only about resources, but also about strategic and security issues. Even in the case of this most intensive conflict, we can at most talk about a crisis in KOSIMO classification. Also, concerning the recent Russo-Norwegian maritime boundary deal, one can rather expect a de-escalation in the conflict in the future.

The conflicts mentioned above represent bilateral disputes, and their subject is the demarcation of disputed borders. Such clashes are no exception to the pattern of conflicts in the world at large. As for their dynamics and intensity, the states have only used diplomatic means, legal argumentation, and symbolic steps (such as raising their respective flags) in the conflicts. In addition, none of the conflicts mentioned above are new. Plus, we can consider the checking and detaining of ships under the opposing country's flag as the most significant manifestation of antagonism in the conflicts. But over the last few years, there were some activities of the involved states that were conducted towards finding the solution of these disputes. In most cases, negotiations are to come, which implies a mutually constructive approach and the existence of at least an elementary mutual trust between the two

sides. This process has already caused the de-escalation and termination of one of the most serious disputes – although this statement is made with reservations because the corresponding treaty has still not been ratified. Furthermore, economic interests have helped to facilitate provisional agreements in a few cases (e.g. the case of Russia's dispute with the USA), which in turn have enabled the countries to use the Arctic's natural resources in an effective way. One interesting fact is that in the case of Russia and Norway, such a consensus had *de facto* already been achieved during the Cold War period.

While these cases have some common features, several differences and particularities are to be found in them as well. Primarily, each of the disputes deals with a different area (and correspondingly with different actors), and the areas all have different sizes. In most of the disputes, it is primarily natural resources that are at stake. However, in the case of Hans Island, it is mostly a desire for prestige and fears of creating a precedent that prevail. In the case of Svalbard, an important role is played by the military, security and strategic concerns on the Russian side, which cause this dispute to have more tension and complexity among the participating interests than the other disputes. This conflict could also be viewed as a dispute over values, as Norway attempts to protect the environment, while Russia tries to fully exploit the island's economic potential without such a regard for the environment.

Drawing up a mutual agreement as a means of reconciliation has so far been a rule in these types of disputes in the region. On the other hand, despite the fact that the talks on the conflicts mentioned above have been conducted for several years, significant progress was not achieved in most of them. With respect to the length of the dispute, the existing dynamics in the region, and the question of national prestige, these talks could easily end up trapped in a deadlock. Even though the possibility of an escalation in one or more of the conflicts cannot be wholly excluded, the events of 2010 in the Barents Sea – namely the Russo-Norwegian Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean – may have set a new course toward peaceful resolutions to the conflicts.

THE QUESTION OF STRAITS AND THE CONTROL OF THE SLOCS

The second group of conflicts is related to the unresolved status of several straits within the NEP (North East Passage) and the NWP (North West Passage), and it encompasses two conflicts – Canada versus the USA and other countries in relation to the problem of the status of the NWP straits, and Russia versus other countries in relation to the problem of the status of several straits within the NEP. At first sight, it may seem that the two disputes are classical disputes over jurisdiction over a particular area. Nevertheless, this view is only partially true. Although nobody questions that the NWP and the disputed parts of the NEP lie in waters that are under the direct con-

trol of Canada and Russia, the question is to what extent these states can regulate naval transport through the straits in the given SLOCs. It is a dispute over the legal interpretation of the relevant parts of UNCLOS. The conflict concerning the NWP is of bigger importance. The NWP runs for the most part through waters whose status is contested: there is a lack of agreement about whether these waters are internal waters (waters between an island and a mainland over which the state has complete jurisdiction) or waters classified as territorial (12 NM), as contiguous (24 NM) or as a part of the EEZ, where the extent of the state's jurisdiction gradually decreases (Arnold–Roussel, 2009: 63). Unlike the NWP, the NEP only passes through areas with the status of inner waters, and in most cases it runs through the Russian EEZ rather than through territorial waters (Lassere, 2009: 182). Even in this case, though, ships sailing through the NEP have to respect Russian instructions and rules.

According to Arnold and Roussel, Canada's goal is to achieve maximum control over the NWP straits. However, contrary to Canada's wishes, the USA and other states long for freedom of navigation. Since the 1960s, non-authorized voyages of both private and state ships from the USA have repeatedly resulted in controversies and setbacks in mutual relations. Besides the activities of ships, there are also the activities of nuclear submarines, which are even more difficult to control.[10] In this case, not only Canada's regulation of sea navigation, but also its feeling that its state sovereignty and national security might be threatened is at stake. These Canadian worries are naturally becoming stronger in the context of climate change, which may bring an unprecedented increase in shipping, since Canada is unable to control all unauthorized naval activities, even with the current minimal frequency of cruises. As for the United States, there concerns about establishing a precedent for similar disputes worldwide prevail (Arnold–Roussel, 2009: 63).

When it comes to the dynamics and intensity of the conflict, we can observe a relative stability. According to the KOSIMO classification, it definitely falls under the column of non-violent disputes. But every time Canadian authorities register unauthorized transits, the developments naturally lead to a slight escalation in the conflict. However, thanks to an agreement from 1988 in which the parties agreed that the US would not send a ship through the passage without Canada's consent, and that Canada would always give that consent, a certain stabilization of the situation has been achieved. Though this conflict takes on new dimensions in connection to climate change, even in this case it is neither a conflict based on a newly occurred discrepancy between interests nor a dispute where there is an ongoing significant escalation of the tensions involved.

THE CONTINENTAL SHELVES PROBLEM

The last and historically the newest group of disputes is related to the problem of the EEZs and continental shelves in the Arctic region. It is this very group of con-

flics which has attracted the worldwide attention of the media, politicians and the scholarly public to the Arctic. Unlike the disputes mentioned above, these are not purely bilateral conflicts as an incompatibility among the interests of many of the actors involved occur in them.

Until recently, there have been several areas beyond the territorial waters and the EEZs of the Arctic states that did not fall under direct state control. Namely, these included (1) the so-called 'Loophole' in the Barents Sea, (2) the 'Banana Hole' in the Norwegian Sea, and especially (3) the vast area around the North Pole that is north of the EEZs of individual states. These areas were still considered as waters where the *mare liberum* principle applied, and the natural resources in these areas were therefore seen as the common heritage of all mankind (thus the areas fell under the international legal regime and were not a *terra nullius*).[11]

The ongoing climate change and technological progress make economic activities in such remote regions as the Arctic ever more feasible. These new changes lead to new efforts aimed at achieving direct control of the (so far) undivided areas on the part of the states. Legitimate changes of the long-lasting status quo are provided by relevant UNCLOS regulations (such as the regulation on the extent of an EEZ on the continental shelf beyond the 200 NM border). The problem, however, is that the states' claims – raised on the basis of UNCLOS regulations – could probably overlap again. This represents a potential source of conflict.[12]

These fears were found to be justified in practice with respect to Russia's actions, as Russia first provided the CLCS with a request for certain materials and later issued a claim upon vast areas in the Arctic stretching up to the North Pole.[13] The question is whether the birth of the dispute should be dated 2001, when Russia submitted its request, or summer 2007, when the symbolic staking of Russian flags on the seabed near the North Pole took place. The first event took place without much attention. The opposite is true for the second step, which provoked negative reactions from probably all the potentially involved parties.

If Russia proves that the Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of the Siberian continental shelf, its territorial claims will be legitimized. There is, nonetheless, no unilateral law of any state that would legitimize its claims within the given regime. Russia had to provide the other states with relevant geological data proving that the borders of the continental shelf are just as Russia describes them. The legitimacy of the claim was thereafter reviewed by the CLCS itself, which nevertheless postponed a definitive decision in the case of the Russian claim due to the insufficient conclusiveness of the presented geological data and suggested that Russia complete its submission. Thus, Russia should presumably present missing the data in the near future (Petersen, 2009: 45). Nevertheless, the above described conflict *de facto* includes mainly undivided areas around the pole.

On the basis of a submission from 2006, the CLCS has decided upon the legitimacy of a Norwegian claim for two other undivided areas – the 'Loophole' and the 'Banana Hole'. The truth, however, is that even these already accepted Norwegian claims, which altogether encompass 235,000 km², may be in conflict with the claims of other states. In the case of the 'Banana Hole,' Iceland and Denmark/Greenland may submit contesting claims. In the case of the 'Loophole' and the western part of the Nansen Basin, Russia is the opponent. Even though none of the states directly questioned the Norwegian gains, any definitive demarcation of the boundaries should take place only on the basis of bilateral agreements. Despite all these challenges the successful completion of this resolution is supported by preliminary agreements negotiated by Norway before the submission of its proposal (for more details see Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2006).

The vast area around the North Pole therefore lies at the fundamental core of the ongoing disputes. Claims have already been presented by Russia, and similar steps can be expected from Denmark, Canada and the USA. Norway is, according to official declarations by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, out of play (BarentsObserver, 2009), since its continental shelf has enabled it to claim solely territories in the western Nansen Basin area.

States nowadays try to gather relevant geological data to prove their claims. It is already obvious that there will be significant overlaps of their submissions. The claims have to be brought up by the signatory no later than ten years after the UNCLOS ratification. Denmark must therefore present its claims by 2014, and Canada by 2013. The only, but indeed very significant, complication regarding the current international UNCLOS regime is the position of the USA. The Senate has not ratified the agreement irrespective of the repeated recommendations of all the recent administrations. This has led to the USA staying outside the given regime. However, contemporary developments and the fact that the document has been accepted as binding by not only all other states of the region, but also other world powers, including China, India, Brazil, Japan and others, support the American efforts to ratify UNCLOS.

Even though the disputed areas mentioned above promise at least some chance to extract oil and natural gas and to develop fishing in the near future, the economic potential of the area around the Pole is still very limited. It is so due to the total remoteness of the given area and the fact that it will be covered with ice during most of the year, even if the warmest climate change scenarios come true.[14] Therefore, it is not the states' economic motives, but the question of prestige that is the most important. In this situation, the logic of action-reaction also plays its role – for example, there is the case of Russian inducements for when states do not want to be tricked or 'ashamed' (Muse, 2008b).

Nevertheless, even in this case the intensity of the dispute remains in the boundaries of non-violent conflict according to the KOSIMO classifications, and

until now, the developments did not get into a situation which would indicate a dynamic shift to the crisis phase. At the same time, the discrepancy between verbally strong declarations (mainly by Russia) and similarly vigorous action is obvious.

Nowadays, it is very difficult to assess the nature of this conflict. Although in the sections above we stress the distinction between the individual disputes and their conflict potentials, it has been in particular the dispute over continental shelves that has attracted politicians' attention. Although this overall generalization of the situation in the region is rather undesirable (in respect to the diversity of the aforementioned conflicts), the illusion of the interdependency of the existing regional disputes must be taken into the account. This interdependency refers more to the dynamics and intensity of the conflicts than to their mere existence. If we try to estimate future developments in the region, we firstly have to take into account the current situation and do so irrespective of whether any existing dispute occurred 30 years ago.

ANARCHY AND ORDER IN THE ARCTIC REGION

Kenneth Waltz presents the anarchic structure of the international system as the opposite of the hierarchical structure of domestic politics. In the international system there is no sovereign to whom the units of the system, the states, would be subordinate. The logic of power dilemma is therefore functioning within the system, and it leads to the security dilemma (Waltz, 1979). This general conclusion is applicable also to the Arctic; nevertheless, in thinking about IR, this classical neorealist assumption should be revised through the lens of liberal institutionalism and its international regimes that argue with realism and neorealism. Taking into account the knowledge and assumptions of liberal institutionalism and international regimes theory, one should pay attention to the fact that the international regimes in the region are an important factor that directly influences the relevance of the opinions on the (high) risk of conflict outbreaks in the Arctic and escalation of the already existing conflicts. Even if the question of a precise definition of the term 'international regime' is still subject to scholarly discussion (Hasenclever–Mayer–Rittberger, 1997: 11–14), international regimes are indeed important. According to liberal institutionalists, international regimes soften the impacts of the anarchic nature of the system of international relations, limit the uncertainty of the participating actors and therefore encourage cooperation, reduce transaction costs, and help to establish the members' reputation and strengthen cooperation (Keohane–Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984). As a result, international regimes lower the risk of escalation of existing conflicts and help to keep newly erupted conflicts in non-violent phases. Therefore it is important that we analyze the state of institutionalization of the region and the existing regimes

in the upcoming section. We also attempt to outline historical patterns of be-
havior in the disputes that occurred in the Arctic. The argument is thus evident:
the higher the level of institutionalization of the international relations, the more
we can assume cooperation and collective resolution of disputes.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, a boom of cooperation and institutionalization
followed. This contained a large scale of projects – ranging from interparliamentary
conferences of the Arctic states and a cooperation of the organizations of indige-
nous people to the Arctic Council and initiatives in the field of military cooperation
(Heininen, 2004). Nevertheless, some countries engaged in close cooperation dur-
ing the Cold War period as well. This is particularly true for the USA and Canada
and some Scandinavian initiatives.

All the Arctic states taken into consideration are OSCE members and they regu-
larly meet in other IGOs, such as the Council of Europe (with Canada and the USA
participating as observers). We cannot omit the membership of Canada, the USA,
Denmark and Norway (and other actors potentially important for the region, such
as Iceland or the United Kingdom) in NATO either. This institutionalized coopera-
tion is nevertheless not limited only to building trust and mutual communication
within the organizations, which care about the Arctic only up to a certain (rather
marginal) extent. An important role is also played by local IGOs such as the Nordic
Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and, most importantly, the Arctic Coun-
cil,[15] which are concerned solely with regional issues. Specialized institutions and
agencies, including the International Marine Organization (IMO), are playing an
ever more important role in this respect too.

The skeptics would of course argue that these are mostly strictly intergovern-
mental bodies without real competences; therefore, according to them, one can-
not assume that they would by any means contribute to the reduction of the risk of
conflict escalation. Although it is undoubtedly true that states have limited the re-
gional multilateral cooperation only to domains such as environmental issues, it is
impossible to deny the apparent benefits of the cooperation for the development
of mutual relations and trust among the states. This contradicts the existence or
possible threat of the situation labeled by Morton Deutsch as '*autistic hostility*' (see
Deutsch, 2000: 28–29).[16]

In this respect, the Arctic Council seems to be the most important body, uniting
not only the five Arctic states, but also Iceland, Finland and Sweden. Other impor-
tant powers take part in the meetings as observers or possible observers (e. g. Chi-
na, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and others). The working
groups of the Council also deal with issues such as natural gas and oil drilling reg-
ulation, or the future of Arctic shipping.[17]

The Arctic therefore currently offers a multifunctional, multidimensional, and
multi-institutional network of international relations which is comparable to the net-

works of other world regions in this respect (Bailes, 2009). To some degree, there is an order in the Arctic region. It is thus impossible to suggest that an escalation of conflict would be caused by an absence of mutual communication. Even in the area of 'hard security', some first projects which support the building of mutual trust already exist. Along with the cooperation of the NATO countries, there are some collective exercises of Russian and Scandinavian forces (e.g. an annual rescue action drill by Barents Rescue).

Nowadays, the risk of conflict escalation in the region has to do mainly with territorial disputes. However, non-violent resolutions of these disputes are supported by the existing international legal regime – namely by the UNCLOS, which covers all the problematic questions and offers a mechanism of dispute resolution.

However, there are several problems which relativize the importance of the UNCLOS, among which the most important seems to be the problem of the US non-ratification of it. Moreover, the stances of the Commission have only an advisory character, and a mechanism of their enforceability has not been established. The asserted claims upon the enlargement of the EEZs in the North Pole area will most probably mutually overlap, which necessarily implies that one side will be the winner, and the other will be defeated. Nevertheless all the states have until now proceeded in compliance with the UNCLOS as the only body capable of legitimizing their requirements.

Then there is the opinion that the contemporary international legal regime of the given agreement has not kept up with technological progress or the specifics of the Arctic region (Borgerson, 2008, or European Commission, 2008). Nevertheless, many historical multilateral disputes in the domain of the law of the sea have been solved by an agreement. Furthermore, the UNCLOS itself has been repeatedly modified so that it could reflect technological progress and the current needs of the participants (for more see Shackelford, 2008).

The well-established practice of arbitration is confirmed by the historical development in the region as well. The conflicts over the area were limited only to legal argumentation, and the resolutions of these conflicts arose from agreements or decisions of an international tribunal. These statements are based not only on examples that are several decades old (such as Greenland or Svalbard), but also on the practice from the 1990s. Denmark and Iceland have solved their disputes over the demarcation of the border on the continental shelf and the fishery zones by an agreement from 1997. Agreements also ended (1) a long-lasting dispute between Denmark and Norway over the border between Greenland and Jan Mayen Island (the ICJ decision from 1993 followed by the agreement from 1995), (2) their dispute over the border between Greenland and Svalbard (in 2006) and, lastly, (3) the dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. The involved states acted

in a similar manner in the case of the dispute between Norway and Iceland over overlapping EEZs (leading to two agreements from 1980 and 1981, respectively). The latter compromise then established the rules for the common development of future natural gas and oil drilling and for sharing the revenues earned from this drilling (Hoel, 2009: 89).

Various agreements concerning common control of the fisheries, mineral resources use, free access to the area, or seafaring regulation enabled the resolution of a number of disputes (e.g. Svalbard or the agreement between Russia and Norway over common regulation of fisheries) or significantly contributed to tension mitigation in existing disputes (e.g. the agreement between Canada and the USA regarding the NWP). These officially 'temporary' and often unwritten agreements, which in reality effectively function for several decades, underscore the fact that in disputes related to the Arctic, the states often rather make a compromise (if this enables them to fulfill their essential interest in using the resources) than rely on unilateral action with a hope for attaining an uncertain full control over the disputed area. These unwritten agreements to disagree when the dispute is formally still ongoing and none of the sides officially give in enable the countries to avoid any loss of prestige or any doubt about their sovereignty .

Scott Borgerson describes the current situation in the Arctic region as a state of pure anarchy, which necessarily implies behavior in the manner of 'everyone against everyone.' According to Borgerson, we can find a diplomatic and legal vacuum in the region as well as an absence of mechanisms that would facilitate a well-ordered regional development and conciliatory resolutions to existing disputes (Borgerson, 2008). Based on the findings presented in this work, though, we must strictly refuse this vision (even though it is impossible to completely rule out the statement that a sovereign state can theoretically act without taking any existing rules or established practices into account, and that there is no Leviathan within the system of international relations who would penalize violations of the rules).

Regional international relations are often marked by additional and deeper cooperation, which has also been recently proven by the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008. This significant confirmation of the Arctic states' non-violent and cooperative attitude was adopted on 28 May at a ministerial meeting of the five Arctic states. This signature meeting was a culmination of the Danish and Norwegian initiative to discuss regional issues with a focus on territorial disputes. In the declaration the USA, Canada, Russia, Denmark and Norway have agreed to submit to the existing legal regime and confirmed their will to deal with any overlapping claims by legal means. The declaration also stated that the current maritime law provides a sufficient framework to address all the existing challenges and that it is therefore not necessary to create a specific legal regime purely for the Arctic. The states also stressed the importance of the existing international institutions and their achievements in

solving specific problem areas (for further reading on the Ilulissat Declaration see Petersen, 2009).

CONCLUSION

The fact that nowadays we can speak about an incompatibility of the interests in the Arctic does not *a priori* imply a risk of an escalation of the conflicts, let alone a risk of an outbreak of a warlike conflict. However, an undesirable selection of possible scenarios for the developments in the Arctic and superficial judgments of the current state of affairs could, on the contrary, lead to a misinterpretation of the reality and also to self-fulfilling prophecies that would be conducive to a real escalation of the situation. Thus, the future developments will to a certain extent depend on how the situation will be perceived by all the participants. At the same time, when thinking about a possible escalation of the conflicts and the motivations of the concerned states for the ways they deal with the existing conflicts, we cannot forget that the Arctic, as a region stretching north from the Arctic Circle, represents an area of extraordinary size. The area defined this way covers 6% of the Earth's surface. Conducting war on such a huge territory would be a very tricky adventure.

In this way, we get to the problem of *generalization*. Scholars' neglect of the Arctic, which is caused by the predominant mental maps, has led to ignorance and insufficient knowledge of the region. The excessive generalizations which often lead to completely misleading conclusions easily imply presumptions of pessimistic scenarios for future developments in the Arctic.

The second fundamental problem leading to the distorted perception of the Arctic is that of *uncertainty*. Climate change models and reports addressing estimated oil and gas reserves are established more on theoretical modeling than on empirical data. This leads to a sense of uncertainty which provokes speculative and reactive actions on the part of the states when they fear that they might be tricked by a counterparty. However, this issue should hopefully shrink over time due to the increasing importance of the region. Giving greater publicity and more attention to the Arctic leads to ever deeper and more precise analyses and new pieces of information which work against simplification and uncertainty in this matter.

This paper is also trying to say that the conflict potential in the Arctic is actually much lower than indicated by Borgerson, as overlaps of interests with still unresolved questions of control of the area occur in only a few areas of the Arctic. In most cases, these are disputes that have lasted for several decades. They include four bilateral disputes over border demarcation, one over the administration of Svalbard and two over discrepancies regarding the status of the straits and marine transportation control. None of the conflicts mentioned above have ever reached the stage of crisis. Moreover, the Russo-Norwegian dispute in the Barents Sea, which had been previously considered as one of the most serious disputes, has

been recently solved. Historically, the incompatibility of different states' interests in the Arctic was demonstrated by nothing more than sharp rhetoric, symbolic maneuvers by armed forces, and detention of foreign fishing vessels. Even though the long term conflicts have been trapped in stalemate for long periods of time, the states have frequently tried to accept measures facilitating fishing, commercial marine transportation and research projects in the disputed area. However, these conflicts are still frozen.

A more detailed analysis shows that the existing disputes are certainly not only about economic interests. Another important role in them is played by strategic-security questions (e.g. Svalbard). Plus, on a more abstract level, national sovereignty and prestige are also traditionally at stake in the Arctic (the case of Hans Island and/or the domestic policy dimension in the case of Canada and Russia). Concerning the risk of an escalation of the tension in the region, these interests are pivotal factors, as when they appear in a conflict, they mostly support the conflict's classification as a zero-sum game. Moreover, their occurrence in conflicts counters the presumption that the given conflicts are purely conflicts over resources.

The perception of the situation by the participating actors is particularly important for both the outbreak and the possible escalation of a conflict. In the case of the Arctic, the main actors who shape the future of the region are the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia. They still represent the most active and significant countries of the region in the long term and also take part in the existing disputes. Both Norway and Denmark unequivocally prefer cooperation and non-violent resolutions to the existing disputes. At the same time, both countries prefer interests which favor a non-zero-sum game approach (natural resources exploitation, environmental protection). The USA has approached the attempts at cooperation in a rather reserved way. This, however, by no means implies that they would prefer a confrontational style and actively contribute to an increase of animosity in the region. The countries mentioned above would actively employ armed forces only in extreme cases of necessary defense. A rather different approach can be seen on the part of Russia and Canada, as these are the countries which control the vastest areas within the region. This heightens their attention to any developments in the region and results in the fact that questions of security play a much more important role in their dealings with it. Regarding their conflict potential, the most risky factors are their rather pessimistic perception of the remaining actors in the region and the fact that some vast polar areas are traditionally regarded as their national heritage. The questions of prestige and national security are therefore significantly represented when it comes to both of these states. In the case of Canada, these facts are demonstrated on a rather rhetorical level and overall they cannot prevail over the long-lasting arc of Canadian foreign policy, which supports cooperation and conciliatory approaches to disputes.

Russia represents the most important regional actor, as it has the biggest economic, military and demographic capacity in the region at its disposal. Moreover, the current trends in the way it acts are, unlike those of the other actors, not free of a provocative and confrontational style. The reasons are to be found in the current Russian foreign policy (Russia's return to the status of a great power, Russia's renewal of its influence in its near abroad, etc.) and in the negative perception of the situation in the region by Russian elites, which includes a feeling of vulnerability, distrust, and grievance. In the case of Russia, it is possible to identify the rudiments of the risky patterns of behavior presented by Deutsch (autistic hostility, unwitting commitments, and self-fulfilling prophecy) (see Deutsch, 2000: 28–29).[18] This is why the conduct of Russia and the ability of the remaining actors to balance the aims of achieving their own interests on the one hand, and the need for cautious advances towards Russia on the other will be crucial for further developments.

Even though these risks are present, we have to underscore that none of the states mentioned above have deviated from their long-occupied peaceful position. Their current steps, which include increases in regional military capacity, are therefore not to be seen as something unconventional, surprising, or *a priori* hostile. The states only want to have such capacities as would enable them to fully implement their state authority and fully utilize their available economic potential in the extreme conditions of the Arctic. The interests of most of the states are still concentrated into relatively peripheral areas of the Arctic, such as the mainland and the adjacent seas surrounding the Arctic Circle. These areas have been controlled by the states for decades, and the states' sovereignty over these territories is not questioned.

Last but not least, if one assesses the level of anarchy in the Arctic, he or she can conclude that there are formal institutions which not only strengthen the states' mutual trust and communication, but also offer particular means of resolving regional disputes. The thesis mentioned above which stresses the diplomatic and legal vacuum in the regional international relations is therefore considerably diminished. Contrary to what some authors indicate, the Arctic does not represent any extreme case of anarchy that would cause an escalation of the conflicts up to the phase of armed confrontation. Nowadays the Arctic is equal to other world regions in terms of the level of the institutionalization of the Arctic states' relations and their interdependence, and the UNCLOS provides a sufficient framework for non-violent conflict resolution. A number of similar disputes have already been solved in a conciliatory way in the Arctic. This general trend cannot be interrupted by the existence of a few conflicts. Moreover, the increase in the importance of the Arctic attracts the attention of previously inactive regional players, which in turn facilitates a further rapprochement of the interests of the five states mentioned above. The

situation in the Arctic region is therefore in no respect different from the world standards in terms of the intensity of the risk of violent interstate confrontation. Even though the current dynamics rather increase the conflict potential of the region, its level is definitely not as high as indicated by some articles (namely those by Borgerson, Spears and Young). A conflict escalation in the Arctic is a possible but definitely not inevitable scenario. But on the other hand, a war in the region is highly unlikely in the near future.

ENDNOTES

[1] See, for example, Gupta, Arvind (2009) 'Geopolitical Implications of Arctic Meltdown', *Strategic Analysis* 33 (2): 174–177; CNA Report on 'National Security and the Threat of Climate Change'. Online: securityandclimate.cna.org/report/.

[2] A reader may go through the titles of the referred literature and mind the different names used to cover the region or its parts.

[3] For more details on the activities of the 'exotic' states in the Arctic see Muse, 2008b.

[4] MNCs – multi-national corporations. NGOs – non-governmental organizations.

[5] This article concentrates mainly on interstate relations. However, this fact – stemming from what is necessary when dealing with the subject of the research – should in no way lead a reader to think that indigenous peoples and their organizations are not important actors in the Arctic regional politics. For further reading on this subject see Nicol, H. N. (2010) 'Reframing Sovereignty: Indigenous Peoples and Arctic States', *Political Geography* 29 (2): 78–80; Nuttall, M. (2000) 'Indigenous Peoples, Self-Determination and the Arctic Environment', in M. Nuttall–T. V. Callaghan (eds) *The Arctic: Environment, People, Policy*, pp. 377–410. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers; or Inuit Petition (2005) 'Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Right Seeking Relief From Violations Resulting From Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States'. Online: www.inuitcircumpolar .com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf.

[6] For example, there was the dispute between Denmark and Iceland in the Fram Strait area, and there were also two disputes between Norway and Denmark over the borders between Greenland and Jan Mayen Island and the borders between Greenland and Svalbard, respectively, and the already-solved conflict between Norway and Iceland over Jan Mayen Island. The subjects of the disputes were the demarcations of the borders and EEZs and regulation of fisheries and oil and natural gas drilling. With one exception (a conflict which was decided by the International Court of Justice in the Hague), all the conflicts have been solved by mutual agreement, while in some cases the result is a common management of the fishery and drilling in the given area or a part of it (for more details see Hoel, 2009).

[7] The Russian Federation has therefore repeatedly advocated the sector claims it presented since 1926. In fact, the Soviet claims were limited to the zone of 12 NM and the EEZ during the Cold War; however, a number of Russian authors refer to historical rights or to the unique nature of permanent glaciation which enables people to consider ocean areas as dry land (Canada used

similar arguments) and consider the entire sector as Russian sovereign waters (BΝrresen, 2008: 15).

[8] Along with the disputes over Hans Island, some authors mention the conflict over a relatively small area (approximately 168 km²) of overlapping EEZs in the Lincoln Sea as another existing conflict between Canada and Denmark. The states, however, do not accentuate this conflict in any way; therefore it is rather a latent conflict. Huebert also mentions a conflict between the two countries concerning illegal fishing by Danish ships in the waters between Greenland and Baffin Island. This, however, is no more than a suspicion so far, as Canada does not currently have any facilities able to monitor ship movement in the area (Huebert, 2009).

[9] There is also the argument that Svalbard is not a state and therefore cannot raise a claim upon the shelf area, which belongs to the Norwegian massif.

[10] Canada registered an unauthorized voyage of a submarine for the last time in 2005. The situation concerning the voyage of the SS Manhattan in the 1960s can also be seen as a typical example of the rift. The ship did not have an applicable permission, which resulted in a negative reaction on the part of Canada. However, Ottawa subsequently granted the permission without being called upon to do so and the voyage was therefore formally all right (even though the US side has never actually demanded the permission). The ship had been accompanied by a Canadian icebreaker, which was necessary due to the climate conditions (for more details see Huebert, 2009).

[11] Claims built on the logic of historical rights (e.g. the Russian or Canadian approach of dividing the entire Arctic into sectors) were accepted by none of the states.

[12] The conflict between Russia on one side and Canada, Denmark, and the USA on the other is evident nowadays. The claims raised by the trio of states, however, overlap as well, which complicates the situation significantly.

[13] The Russian claim overlaps with the formerly declared Soviet interests in many respects. Nevertheless, it is overall 'smaller.' The sector claimed by the Soviets, which can be defined by the Bering Strait, the North Pole and the Kola Peninsula, represented almost one third of the Arctic Ocean and was generally accepted as USSR territorial waters (Baev, 2007: 4).

[14] Furthermore, the extension of the EEZs concerns only the continental shelf, and correspondingly the sea bottom.

[15] For more information concerning the existing institutionalized cooperation in the region, see Bailes, 2009 or Heininen, 2004.

[16] Autistic hostility involves one side breaking off contact and communication with the other in a situation where at least one side feels hostility towards the other; it can result in the hostility being perpetuated because when there is a misunderstanding or misjudgment on the part of one side, or when a side changes for the better, the other side has no opportunity to learn about it (Deutsch, 2000: 28).

[17] This is especially true within the AMAP. See www.amap.no.

[18] In the case of unwitting commitments, during the course of the escalating conflict the parties not only overcommit to rigid positions but they also may unwittingly commit to negative attitudes against and negative perceptions of the counterparty. Thus, a nation may commit to the view that the other is an evil enemy, or the conviction that one must be constantly vigilant and ready to defend the na-

tion against the danger the other poses to the nation's vital interests. After a protracted conflict, it is hard to give up the negative perceptions and attitudes, and they may live on independently of the conflict (Deutsch, 2000: 29).

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Reviews

DANIEL C. THOMAS (ED): MAKING EU FOREIGN POLICY. NATIONAL PREFERENCES, EUROPEAN NORMS AND COMMON POLICIES

Foreign policy as a functional area of the European Union (EU) has been a hot topic among IR scholars, especially when it comes to the 'actorness' and the external impact of the EU. This volume comes as a result of a transnational research project which ties together fourteen case studies conducted by several scholars led by Daniel C. Thomas. The case studies are all connected by a single aim: to challenge prevailing approaches towards the EU's development of foreign policy and external relations. The project pays attention to the dynamics of the EU foreign policy making in the European Commission's Directorate General for External Relations and to any policy outputs under the CFSP/CSDP. The book is organized around a Normative Institutionalist theory of the EU policy-making and confronts it with existing intergovernmentalist and discursive approaches by focusing on the EU's substantive and procedural norms, as well as its pre-existing commitments. Regarding negotiations of agreements between Member States with divergent policy preferences, there are two processes that the authors identify in order to find out how the EU overcomes those differences between its Member States: entrapment and cooperative bargaining.

This volume can be seen as an excellent demonstration of the environment evolution on the EU level. Thomas et al. reflect these changes by applying a new approach to the position and decision making in the EU institutions. Although the author admits that other theories are necessary here as Normative Institutionalism is not universally applicable, the explanatory power of Normative Institutionalism is proven as strong in more than two thirds of the presented case studies, since it meets the conditions which are clearly stated in the first chapter. It has to be mentioned that Normative Institutionalism should not be confused with a statement about the EU's ability to promote certain values and interests in world affairs. Thus, this project serves three purposes: to provide an overview of case study findings in order to demonstrate the explanatory power of Normative Institutionalism, to explore the conditions under which the Normative Institutionalist mechanisms of policy agreement are more likely to be effective, and to present the implications of those findings for existing scholarship and future research on EU foreign policy. Though the approach of Normative Institutionalism is still in its beginnings, this volume could force IR scholars dealing with EU affairs to critically reevaluate the study of policy and decision making practices of Member States within the European institutions, as this project has unveiled that it is a current fashion that Member States

often reach agreement by pursuing their national interests in a way which takes into account the values and commitments which they have already articulated together.

However, the basic question still remains: are these claims sufficient to build a new theory? There are some aspects which should be considered regarding the case selection: Is the CSDP a policy field representative enough to test a new theoretical approach? What if more cases in which consensus was not reached were included? The other tricky question which a person reading this volume should bear in mind is 'How do we define norms? More precisely, when does the congruence begin, and when can we talk about entrapment?' In addition, the approach described in this book needs to be considered in the context of several already existing branches of institutionalism. To sum up, this book is a valuable contribution to EU integration and policy studies. It reflects the current dynamics of affairs on the European level and presents a mirror for existing theories regarding their up-to-dateness.

Dominika Kunertová

DANIEL FLEMES (ED): REGIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM. IDEAS, INTERESTS AND STRATEGIES OF REGIONAL POWERS

Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2010, 394 pages, ISBN 978-0-7546-7912-7 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-7546-9804-3 (ebook).

Regional Leadership in the Global System is an edited collection of essays and analyses written by policy experts and scholars interested in foreign policies of regional powers, which is a very actual and often discussed topic in current studies of International Relations. Even the introduction promises that the publication will be very interesting. According to the first lines, this volume 'presents innovative approaches to the analysis of the foreign policies of regional powers and establishes a conceptual framework for further research' (p. 1). Apart from a few of the chapters, this is definitely true. The book is divided into five thematic sections, each of them consisting of three chapters.

The contributions in the opening section, 'Theories and Analytical Concepts', deal with theoretical questions about power, hegemony and leadership. Douglas Lemke, in the chapter 'Dimensions of Hard Power: Regional Leadership and Material Capabilities', investigates if the power of dominant actors influences the peacefulness/conflictuality of relations within the subsystems and whether the existence of regional organizations and their density relate to the distribution of power within regions.[1] This is significant particularly in understanding why some regions are more conflictual than others and also why there is no single regional power and why there are only a few regional organizations in the Middle East.

The contribution 'Power, Leadership and Hegemony in International Politics', written by Dirk Nabers, focuses on the conditions necessary for effective leadership of states and the role of hegemony in this context. Then Philip Nel and Matthew Stephen, in the chapter 'The Foreign Economic Policies of Regional Powers in the Developing World', show how foreign economic policy can also be used by regional powers as an effective strategic instrument in dealing with other states.

The second ('Foreign Policy Strategies of Regional Powers'), third ('Idea-Driven Foreign Policies of Regional Powers') and fourth ('Domestic Factors' Impact on Foreign Policies') sections consist of case studies providing an overview of the foreign policy activities and strategies of several (potential) regional powers, the role of norms and ideas in strengthening leadership and the impact of domestic factors on the foreign policies. Some of the contributions present a very original approach to the analysis of regional policies. It is worth mentioning, above all, the following contributions.

Martin Beck, in his contribution 'Israel: Regional Politics in a Highly Fragmented Region', examines the regional policy of Israel as a potential Middle Eastern re-

gional power in different periods of time in the light of (structural) realism, institutionalism, and social constructivism and shows why Israel cannot be a regional hegemon, listing both its power limitations (especially its lack of political and ideological power capabilities) and the great power capabilities of other actors in the region as reasons.

In the chapter 'South Africa: The Idea-Driven Foreign Policy of a Regional Power', Deon Geldenhuys is analyzing one aspect – the ideational element – of the foreign policy of South Africa from the perspective of typology of leadership (p. 153). He describes which activities fulfill its intellectual, entrepreneurial and implementation leadership (pp. 153–154) but at the same time he points to its normative inconsistency and shows which activities contradict its three-dimensional leadership (p. 165). Nevertheless, it is a very interesting analysis which clarifies one part of South Africa's foreign policy strategy and at the same time it provides a convenient guidance for an analysis of regional policies of other states.

The chapter titled 'Iran and Venezuela: Ideology-Driven Foreign Policies in Comparison', which is written by Henner Fürtig and Susanne Gratius, describes the role of ideology – namely, 'Iranian Islamism' and 'Chavism' (pp. 173, 174) – in the regional policies of Iran and Venezuela, respectively. The authors also declare that because of 'the gap between regional ambition and real power' (p. 186), Venezuela is not a regional power[2] (and cannot become one in the near future), and they instead class it as a 'small regional "smart" power'[3] (p. 186). Iran is a similar case – there are several reasons why Iran cannot be a region-wide power in the Middle East (pp. 187–188, 326). But on the other hand, Iran can become a superior state in the Persian Gulf sub-region. This chapter is one of the best in the book, as it accurately describes and analyses the particular foreign policy steps of Venezuela and Iran in the last decade or two as they were on their way to becoming power hegemons in certain sub-regions.

Mingjiang Li's chapter 'China: Domestic Sources of its Soft Power Strategy in East Asia' explains the transformation of China´s foreign policy in the last three decades for the purpose of economic growth and strengthening its position in both the world and the regional systems from the perspective of its grand multi-dimensional transition[4]. Li deals with what he calls 'soft use of power' (p. 214) when he aptly shows the shortages of the traditional understanding of the distinction between *hard power* and *soft power* (see Nye, 2004). On the case of contemporary Chinese foreign policy in East Asia, he shows and explains in detail what this 'soft use of power' looks like in practice. It would be interesting to validate his hypothesis by applying it to other Asian regions, specifically South Asia and the immediate surroundings of another regional power, India. Would a competition between India and China in this region have some consequences for China's 'soft use of power'?

The contributions in the final section titled 'Implications for Europe and the US' provide a very fresh view on regional power issues, namely on the foreign policy responses of great powers (the USA, the EU, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) to the rise of the power capabilities and policies of emerging regional powers.

Despite the definite quality of some particular chapters (especially the innovative approaches to the analysis of regional policies and of the foreign policies of regional powers), the book lacks a cohesive theoretical framework. All three of the theoretical chapters are very helpful in the specific field they deal with, but nevertheless, some of the case studies are not based on their conclusions. Each case study assigns importance to a different element of foreign policy strategies, and each author chooses a different analytical tool for their analysis. But this does not have to be necessarily wrong – the book does not aim to provide a complex foreign policy analysis. As the introduction announces, 'The theoretical reflections as well as the parallels and differences of the presented case studies are intended to stimulate comparative thinking and the discussion of the future research agenda on regional leadership in the global system' (p. 14). It is necessary to say that both the individual contributions and the volume in general completely accomplished this objective.

The book's aim to establish a conceptual framework for further research (p. 1) is another successfully achieved goal. The authors managed to cope with a very difficult task – to 'suggest a concept of regional power in International Relations which will be distinguished from (...) middle and great power' (p. 2). Although there are some attempts to lay a conceptual ground for the research of regional powers (see Jordaan, 2003), Flemes and Nolte are right when they say that 'there is a general lack of analytical instruments to identify and to compare regional powers, and to differentiate regional powers from great powers and middle powers' (p. 1). Their work has contributed in large part to the existing conceptualizations.

In addition, the selection of particular case studies is meaningful and comprehensive. That is why I feel free to say that this book, especially the above mentioned chapters, provides a very fresh and valuable perspective that complements and extends previous research of regional powers.

Martina Ponížilová

ENDNOTES

[1] He employs power transition theory and hegemonic stability theory for regional arrangements.

[2] Although its political representatives try to reach this privileged position – for example, they use the so-called 'smart power' (p. 185).

[3] That means that its power capabilities are not enough for it to reach a hegemonic status in the region but it is powerful enough to be the leader among a group of small developing states.

[4] That is, the transition 'from a revolutionary state to a developmental state, from a planned economy to a trading state, and from an extremely opaque Leninist party-state to an authoritarian regime more or less willing to be accountable and responsive to public demands' (p. 208).

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HARSH V. PANT: CHINA'S RISING GLOBAL PROFILE: THE GREAT POWER TRADITION

Brighton, Portland, Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2011/2012, X + 122 pages, ISBN: 978-1-84519-517-5.

What is the most important and challenging process that influences everyone today? Undoubtedly it is globalization. And what is one of the most striking consequences of globalization for world politics? The rising economic and political power of some developing countries in the system. And one cannot deny that China is the best example of this. Harsh V. Pant, who works in the Department of Defence Studies of King's College London and specializes in security issues in Asia, is the author of the reviewed book *China's Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition*. In this book he tries to describe the increasing political involvement of China in the world's political affairs in connection with its economic rise.

The seven chapters of his book tell us about China's policy towards other significant players of international politics in various different regions of the world. Every chapter begins with a piece of historical background from the last 10–20 years or even from earlier times which allows us to get acquainted with the problematique and see the Chinese involvement in the given region and China's ties with other regional actors in retrospection. The historical perspective is followed by a description of the present Chinese policy towards a particular actor in the region that explains China's motivation for acting/not acting in a certain way in the given case. One should note here that the author also explains the reaction of the opposite actor, so the situation is not seen one-sidedly from the Chinese point of view. In some chapters Pant also offers some 'tips' or 'pieces of advice' to one or both of the actors. Each of the chapters ends with a conclusion, where the author briefly summarizes the current situation of the given topic and tries to foresee some further developments of the situation.

In the first chapter of the book Pant sets the goal of the work: '[t]o look at the presence of China in various parts of the world and gauge how that presence and corresponding influence impact individual countries and regions as well as China itself'. In my opinion, the author managed to achieve this goal quite well. In an introductive part he briefly describes China's economic rise and the new geopolitical situation which is connected with it – the impossibility of not accepting the new Chinese role in the world. He also points out that China is 'following the old great powers' steps' and will be trying to increase its military power and become a regional hegemon in Asia. There is no doubt that the book is written from the neorealist perspective and in the traditions of geopolitics/geoeconomics.

The second chapter tells us about Chinese policy in the Asia-Pacific. Pant briefly describes the shifting balance of power in the region – the rise of China and India

and the weakening of the American predominance. He notes the growing tension in the relations between China and India, especially in the issues of border conflicts and the Chinese support to Pakistan. Both China and India are seen as potential predominant regional powers which do not want to give up their ambitions to dominate the South Asian region and the Indian Ocean. What is very important in this respect is that the author is showing how other great powers (US and Japan) are trying to check the rise of China, which has a much greater potential to become the major player in Asia than India, by strengthening their relations with India. Pant supports his observations with political speeches and official documents of the states. In the end of the chapter he acknowledges that the US, India and Japan have the same interests in controlling China's rise and that this will shape 'the security architecture' of the region in the following years.

The next chapter continues with describing the Chinese policy towards India and its neighbors. It is a well known fact that China is looking at India's attempts to become a leader in the South Asian region with suspicion and trying to contain it. Pant thus offers the reader an excursus of the relations between China on one side and Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal on the other. He concludes that China is brilliantly using its diplomatic, political and economic potential to lower India's ambitions in the region. China is containing India inside the ring of states that are afraid of India's expansionist tendencies, and India is balancing this by maintaining good relations and cooperating with China economically and even militarily. China is more developed economically, and hence it can offer the other South Asian states much more than India. In the end the author concludes that 'India finds itself politically isolated in its region' and has no clear working strategy to change the situation in its favour.

The fourth chapter closes the 'Indian' theme and tries to answer the following difficult question: Who does the Indian Ocean belong to? India has always seen it as a vital 'mare nostrum', but nowadays it has neither the material nor the financial means to fully control it. Pant fully acknowledges the geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean to China – it is the key route of oil transportation for China. The author is again convinced that China is much more assertive in terms of performing in accordance with its vital interests in the region. It has economic power and strategies – it builds and develops its fleet, naval bases and infrastructure. India's response to this appears to be quite limited – it takes diplomatic measures (it maintains a broader military cooperation with the US), changes its naval doctrine and tries to strengthen its fleet. The author concludes that the Indian authorities sitting in New Delhi (far away from the ocean) are lacking a national security strategy in the seas like that of the Chinese. He assumes that the competition between these two emerging powers will shape the security structure in the Indian Ocean in the 21st century.

The next chapter is especially interesting because it tells us about the Chinese policy in the Middle East. The author defines three major priorities of China in the region: oil, export of arms and acquiring of new military technologies, and politics. He shows the reader how China manages to balance its relations with such different countries as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Pant is also convinced that China is trying not to be involved in the regional conflicts in the Middle East, and that it is using its geo-economic rather than its military strengths in this respect. And it is not surprising – it is the Middle East that allows the Chinese economy to grow so rapidly, and it supplies 51% of China's oil. The author remarks that China is very little engaged in the politics of the region, and this is not surprising either – being engaged in the politics of the Middle East means inevitably becoming an ally of one state and an enemy of the other. So in the end of the chapter Pant acknowledges that the current Chinese position will not change in the near future according to its vital unchangeable interests.

The 6ᵗʰ chapter of the book tells us about the Chinese policy towards the African countries. The author fairly remarks that China has a very different policy in Africa in comparison with its policy toward the Middle East. It tries to politically support African countries throughout the world regardless of the countries' political regimes. China is trying to benefit from the weakness of the region and ensure the countries' oil supplies are kept in order to help its own companies to conquer the markets in Africa. China is trying to help develop these states, but only if it does not turn against China's interests. What is noteworthy is that Pant points out how China makes a profit from these kinds of relations. Meanwhile, the number of African countries that have official relations with Taiwan is falling. Along with this, he warns that this policy often helps some undemocratic regimes not only to survive but even to make a profit on the expenses and suffering of the population. In the end, the author points out that the result of the Chinese 'expansionism' in Africa is a quite negative reaction from some African countries – they are beginning to associate China's African policies with a new colonialism.

The last chapter is devoted to China-EU relations and it is quite surprisingly short. Pant explains that regardless of the 'flourishing' economic relations between them, China does not recognize the united Europe as an equal partner on the political scene. He sees the cause in the political disunity of the EU, but any effort to establish more close and trusting relations between them has other limits as well. The author states that these limits are caused by the EU's alleged status as 'a postmodern-entity shaped by liberal political beliefs', and specifically by the European emphasis on human rights, issues related to Taiwan and Tibet, environmental policy, and China's fulfillment of WTO norms. Pant would embrace a much more close and intensive partnership between the EU and India because he sees such a partnership as an instrument to check the Chinese economic and geopolitical rise.

Pant's point of view is very similar to that of Robert Kagan in his book *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* – both are adherents of the neorealist theory in IR. Nevertheless the EU – China relations would deserve a more detailed and deep debate.

From this point, I would like to make some critical remarks about this book. First of all, it cannot be seen as an extensive guide to Chinese policy. Its overall view could have been broadened if the author made use of other perspectives, such as historical and economic perspectives, among others. Unfortunately the author does not even mention China's relations with Russia, and its relations with the countries of South-East Asia are only marginally mentioned. The book also lacks a good chapter on China–US relations, which is the core topic for understanding the Chinese rise to power, and such a chapter would be very interesting for many readers. What also limits the book is its strong emphasis on neorealist and geopolitical/geoeconomical concepts. It seems to be rather one-sided from this point of view. Thus, undoubtedly, the book could have been more interesting and more objective.

Nevertheless, *China's Rising Global Profile* is very well written – on the one hand, it is not too 'scientific', and it would probably not be boring for the non-professional public at large, but on the other hand, it could still be interesting for many students of IR and IR scientists. One can also take a lot of case studies for neorealist theory and geopolitics/geoeconomics from it. Plus, it can be a perfect introduction to current Chinese foreign politics in the sense that it is briefly written and apposite.

Andrey Rozhnov

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INSTITUTE
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Announcement of the Start of the Selection Procedure
for the Position of Director
of the Institute of International Relations
in Prague, Czech Republic.

In accordance with § 18, Paragraph 2, section h) of Law No. 341/2005 Sb. on public research institutions, the Board of the Institute of International Relations, a public research institution, is announcing the start of the selection procedure for the position of director of the IIR.

The candidate should demonstrate the following:

experience with directing, research, communications and fundraising as well as a communicative knowledge of the Czech language.

The candidate will produce the following:

structured biography which demonstrates that the candidate meets the preconditions listed above;

a proposal of a conception of the future directions and development of the IIR (with a maximum length of 5 standard pages);

documentary proof of the highest level of education attained;

a printout of the candidate's criminal record;

declarations on word of honour produced according to § 17, Paragraph 4 of Law No. 341/2005 Sb. on public research institutions. The candidate must also prove that he or she meets the conditions specified in Law No. 451/1991 Sb.

Expected monthly salary: CZK 50,000

Expected time of entry into the position: May 2013

All applications for the selection procedure should be sent to the IIR in both printed and electronic form. The printed version should include all the required documents. The electronic version should include only the structured biography and the proposal of a conception of the IIR's future direction. Both versions should be sent **by October 31st, 2012** at the latest to the following postal and email address:

Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, v. v. i., Nerudova 3, 118 50 Praha 1, Czech Republic
kanka@iir.cz

All applications should be marked with the words "Ředitel ÚMV, v. v. i. – výběrové řízení" (on the envelope or in the subject line of the email).

All judgments about whether the application met the deadline will be based upon the date the application arrived at the postal and/or email address above. The candidates selected by the Board of the IIR will be invited to the oral interviews for the position, which will take place **on November 26th, 2012 in the IIR building**.

ARTICLES, CHAPTERS FROM BOOKS AND INTERNET SOURCES:

Author's name, title of article or chapter within single inverted commas with principal words capitalised, name(s) of editor(s) if in a book, title of journal or book in italics, volume number, issue number in parentheses, page reference, place of publication and publisher if in a book, url if an internet source: **!**

Lisowski, Michael (2002) 'Playing the Two-Level Game: US President Bush's Decision to Repudiate the Kyoto Protocol', *Environmental Politics* 11 (4): 101–119.

Aguilar Fernández, Susana (1997) 'Abandoning a Laggard Role? New Strategies in Spanish Environmental Policy', in D. Liefferink and M. S. Andersen (eds) *The Innovation of EU Environmental Policy*, pp. 156–172. Copenhagen: Scandinavian University Press.

Yahuda, Michael (2004) 'Europe and America in Asia: Different Beds, Same Dreams'. The Sigur Center Asia Papers No. 18. Online: http://cow2.la.psud.edu.

QUOTATION MARKS:

Single in text throughout; double within single; single within indented quotations.

HEADINGS:

Only main headings and subheadings (both non-numbered) should be used in the main body of the text.

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