

The Prague Agenda – Challenges and Prospects

The Global Zero and Beyond: Theory, Politics and Regional Perspectives

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Czernin Palace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague

Panel II: Nuclear Non-proliferation: Global & Regional Perspectives

Chair: Ivan Jančárek, Director of the United Nations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

Linton Brooks, *Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington*

Ian Anthony, *Research Coordinator at SIPRI and the Director of the SIPRI Programme on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Stockholm*

Jaakko Laajava, *Under Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and Facilitator for the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone*

Alyn Ware, *Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament*

LINTON BROOKS

Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington

In the beginning of his speech, Mr. Brooks mentioned that it is important to understand that he used to be government official – but is not anymore, therefore he represents here only his own views. Also, he warned that his speech is not going to be the most upbeat presentation that the audience will hear today.

It is important to consider challenges and failures as well as successes and despite the significant progress, the non-proliferation regime in a national community faces two major challenges – Iran and North Korea. In Washington it is said that every problem has the solution – it is not true. There are problems that cannot be solved but they can be managed. Mr. Brooks mentioned that in his view both Iran and North Korea are not solvable problems, but they are problems that can be managed.

North Korea - there is no near term for prospect of North Korea abandoning nuclear weapons, it is actually written in their constitution. Military actions and also the economic sanctions will usually not reverse the major decisions. It is also clear that China will not allow North Korean regime to collapse. The Kim's family has decades of demonstrating that international norms are not something that they care about very much. There was a strategy in international community – even though it has never been said publicly - to wait to Kim Chong Il to die and hope we would get a better deal afterwards. However, it failed and fortunately the North Korean actions have not lead to the risk of proliferation in the region.

The two states that feel the most fear of North Korean nuclear weapons are Japan and South Korea. However, there exists a strong security relation to US and they appear that they trust United States to

extend their nuclear missile defense and to protect them. It is important to mention that the danger for the international order is not regional, it is global. In 2007 North Korea provided a reactor to Syria, and it has been able to profit also from many internationally condemned activities. We actually do not know how many nuclear weapons they think they need and clearly in addition to prestige they want to make sure that they cannot be attacked and their regime will not be forcedly changed. There is a possibility that their nuclear weapons will be for sale – maybe to US but it also may be for sale to terrorists. So the first thing the international community needs to do with North Korea is not to treat it like anything other than the failed nuclear state it is – not even the prestige that it hopes to get. We have to prevent the transfers of nuclear weapons. The other thing we need to do is to recognize that the North Korea is not the first proliferator, is not probably the most serious proliferator but is the first one that developed nuclear weapons with enjoying the benefits of peaceful cooperation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The countries should abandon the notion that they have a right to withdraw from treaties. The personal preference of Mr. Brooks is the Security Council should automatically deal with this issue.

Iran - poses different and probably more complicated issues. First of all it is important to remind that probably nobody knows whether Iran is actually going to develop nuclear weapons – maybe even Iranians do not know that. What is certain is that they are continuing to develop the ability to feel nuclear weapons and to do so relatively rapidly. And what the international community has been able to do so far, has had little obvious effect on their decision making. President Rouhani, new president of Iran, has been making some very encouraging statements and has made some encouraging appointments. However, it is important to remember that the president of Iran is not like the president of the US – he is a secondary figure and the decisions in the nuclear area are made by the supreme leader who actually believes that the west is hostile and that negotiations are a bad idea. So what has the international community learnt from Iran about non-proliferation? First, the case of Iran reinforces the importance of all states working to make the additional protocol, the accepted standard, for any NPG member. If Iran does develop new weapons the chief task would be to prevent further erosion of the regime. The fears of a cascade of nuclear proliferation were wrong in regards to North Korea they may not be wrong in the Middle East. One long time US negotiator in the Middle East was told in 2009 by Saudi king: If they will get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons. Now we can see that it has tendency to happen. If Saudi Arabia moves to develop nuclear weapons that will force Egypt, Iraq and Turkey to at least consider the same.

Saudi Arabia is relatively small by population and the development would be time consuming but the kingdom has the long history of using his considerable wealth to buy technology. It has bought advanced aircrafts from USA, cruise missiles from China etc. They could acquire technology from two obvious sources – one is the North Korea and the second is Pakistan.

Now the greatest concern, unlikely but possible, would be that they actually get hold of nuclear weapons. President Obama has made it clear that USA will not permit the nuclear weapons development in Iran and he seems to be absolutely determined on this point. What is not clear is whether this is in the power of any non-Iranian including Obama. Even military action would only delay the acquisition of the nuclear weapons and would certainly solidify the Iranian regime desire to protect them.

So the government has trouble wrestling with this and non-governmental community has made several attempts to think through what they would do if Iran got nuclear weapons – we need to make sure it is not going to happen. We should create a series of security insurances in regime that will at least limit

the urgency of proliferation and those insurances should also cover the possibility of actual nuclear use.

The real risk is not that there is going to be exchange of nuclear weapons between Israel and Iran or USA and Iran. The real risk is that Iran is going to gain confidence that they can destabilize the region.

So the first thing that must be done is a series of insurances and to clear that the USA has the major role to play in that. Secondly, the international community has to make it very clear to Pakistan that assistance in any form to Saudi Arabia or any other nuclear weapon program is unacceptable.

Finally, and that is the most difficult step, the international community needs to deny Iran the prestige of being treated as a nuclear weapons state and this will be very hard. We have learnt as a community to live with nuclear threat in Pakistan, but they will never part a non-proliferation regime. North Korea is insignificant backwater state and we can sort of live with that but Iran is large sophisticated and important state and key player in the region.

IAN ANTHONY

Research Coordinator at SIPRI and the Director of the SIPRI Program on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Stockholm

The focus of the speech was on the general challenges that impact on the successful resolution of the individual cases. That is how to recover sense of common purpose around the need of nuclear risk reduction. There are some existing frameworks turned into ritualized arenas for not very productive confrontation. Integrated approach which is illustrated by the proposals that Obama put forward in Prague is still the most convincing framework for thinking about these issues. To some extent it is a pleasure that this process has been kept alive. There has been some progress in developing and implementing specific non-proliferation instruments. The initiatives perhaps have not gone as fast or as far as we would like but have been nevertheless successful in generating support for important decisions which are implemented at international levels. The key to success is to create a space for cooperation and build on things we can agree on rather than proposals which divide. What we can do is to maximize the positives of those initiatives.

In a globalized and networked world, traditional approaches to national security have now been eroded. Historically, the USA was security provider with instruments and resources that were under the ownership and control. In the environment where the citizens depend mostly on non-governmental supplies, we have new security providers - we buy energy in private sector as well as financial and technology services. We have to be aware of the importance of the access to key flows – whether they are financial, material, intellectual etc. But also in a networked world we need to discover, monitor, dismantle the autonomous networks of different kinds and engage anti-social behavior. Whether it is in a field of serious organized crime, counter terrorism or whether it is in a field of non-proliferation. We know that there are these autonomous networks because we have seen very clear evidence which are undermining non-proliferation norms and that is a very serious challenge that we need to deal with.

We can deal with it by using new mechanisms and new instruments and we have seen these being developed. We need to make sure that we stay within this framework building on what is common and cooperative and positive in creating international coalitions. In some specific areas we are now running faster than international consensus will tolerate and that puts in a risk some of these

mechanisms we actually need. An important role plays growing useful sanctions as an instrument of non-proliferation policy and also economic sanctions.

The issue is how to use them. Within the western community we are having a discussion which is driven by the post 9/11 developments. The post 9/11 legislation was passed for purposes of counter terrorism and has created new powers for surveillance, for removal of banking secrecy, requirements on private sector to collect important information, but it put in the hands of the authorities some quite powerful tools. But this is essentially an internal discussion between Euro - Atlantic communities. There is a possibility we are going to undermine the effectiveness of these tools, especially if we continue to develop them within our own community without taking this discussion into global perspective where we can find some kind of consensus what is acceptable and what is not.

We must admit that there are specific proliferation challenges which are urgent. We need to develop new mechanisms to deal with those challenges but we must keep in mind that in order for those mechanisms to be effective we have to build them on what is common and cooperative and we have to bring with us the widest possible scope of partners to deal with this crisis.

JAAKKO LAAJAVA

Under Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and Facilitator for the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

He has a special role of a facilitator since October 2011, his job is to promote Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. This is a challenge and the process is still going on and there are a lot of sensitive issues. In the further speech he would like to share rather his personal impressions and reflections than carefully drafted remarks.

Pretty soon when he took over his job he decided to remove a word “impossible” out of his vocabulary. We use it so often that we should remove it together and not understand it anymore – that is the way things run better. Also, we do accept the reality and the issues of the region but does it have to last for eternity? No. There are some big changes that are on their way. This is no longer the Cold War - this is the globalized networked world. This region is traditionally still running on “win-lose” perspective, but sooner or later we will have to think in terms of some “win-win”. But of course, that is some novelty in this region and there are still lots of things to do. Because of understandable historical and other reasons there is a deep lack of mutual trust in the region and to create cooperative endeavor is very difficult.

The background of endeavor goes back to 1970’s, originally proposed by Iran and Egypt. There was a lot of development and finally there was a resolution on the Middle East sponsored by the governments of Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States and that resolution passed at a NPT conference in 1995. The resolution spoke about Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and that was very much in the context of promotion of peace in the Middle East, especially between Israel and Arab countries. The representatives have decided that there will be a conference in 2012 on the establishment of the zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction the Middle East to be attended by all states of the region. And later on in 2011 Finland was chosen as the host country and Jaakko Laajava was appointed as a facilitator. Since 2011 they had a tremendous consultation activity, they had several meetings with the countries, think-tanks, academia,

presentations, etc. In 2012 the preparations for the conference faced postponements because not all of countries of the region attended that of course created some understandable disappointments, but both sides – conveners and countries of the region wanted to continue.

Arab states had some criteria (agenda, UN umbrella, firm date of the conference, etc.). Jaakko Laajava has recently sent a response to the League of Arab States fully supported by co-conveners. The government of Finland has declared it is ready to organize the conference taking place this year in Helsinki. Decisions will be reached through the consensus and once the agreement has been reached, the conveners are ready to convoke the Helsinki conference without delay in 2030. At this time are still running diplomatic talks. Even though, the situation in the region is not less complicated than it was years ago. Mr.Laajava hopes that the regional partners will act in their national interests, but will understand their wider responsibilities as well.

The office of facilitator has done a number of things in respect of the procedure, agenda, working papers, etc. The perspectives are quite unlimited. Mr. Laajava is pretty sure that despite the complicated circumstances the progress can be achieved in the Middle East. In such a sensitive issue we need more cooperation, creating better environment and conditions, but we cannot do the job of the states of the region on their behalf. Jaakko Laajava knows that it is not the matter of tomorrow and understands the hesitation – but the cooperation is the key not confrontation.

ALYN WARE

Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

He was invited to speak about experience from nuclear weapons free zones and what we could learn from those. And how to resolve some regional issues and how that might fit into wider Prague Agenda of moving towards nuclear weapons free world through reducing and eventually eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrine. Alyn Ware in his speech further mentioned the participation of New Zealand in bigger international issues and conflicts.

He also mentioned that there is a little resemblance of New Zealand and the Czech Republic. They got a little bit of recognition when about 25 years ago they abandoned nuclear weapons. And the Czech Republic is here now with the Prague Agenda and people are paying attention towards what is happening here as they did to New Zealand before.

He can report on it was a difficult process to step out of the nuclear framework because many people from New Zealand felt more secured while being a part of that framework, but the overall experience was very positive. Stepping out gave them a greater credibility in the international affairs, better status and recognition, although they had few problems with the US from the start. In various conflicts they had, they managed to use the international mechanisms such as International Court of Justice – as in the conflict with France about testing nuclear weapons in the region and also in many other cases.

So they actually merged in a new security framework in which they feel very comfortable. But there are other regions that still could not manage to do that. New Zealand is quite far away from other countries so it is of course very different situation for other countries. But if you look at the experience of other nuclear weapons free zones you can see there are some lessons that can be applied.

For example in Latin America nuclear weapons free zone, stimulated by the Cuban missile crisis. If you look at the first proposals that was put forward to establish a Latin American and Caribbean nuclear weapons free zone, the political realists would said it was impossible. And there is Cuba in the security framework and there is Brazil and Argentina under the military dictatorships with nuclear energy programs with maintaining the option to start developing nuclear weapons if they would desire. In creating the free zone they decided to move forward but also not to leave Brazil or Argentina “out”. They would be able to join any time in future under the national security conditions. It was highlighted that now all the countries are part of it.

Other example is about France testing nuclear weapons in the region. The other countries did not wait until France sign the international protocol, they just made it a part of the process and it actually helped to build the political environment that eventually lead to closing down the nuclear testing program and moving on to compensations. It was a part of a process of lowering and eventually removing the core roles of nuclear weapons in region. He noted that when creating a nuclear weapons free zone, those protocols do not actually need to be ratified and this might be very helpful.

In Pacific region, there is still Australia under the extended nuclear relationship with USA and that was able to be built in to the zone, so it did not require Australia to give that up, but reduce the role.

Mr.Ware concluded that those lessons learnt might be helpful in solving conflicts in Asia and also mentioned some other examples (i.e. Kazakhstan which took primary role in negotiations of Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, South and North Korea, Japan).

Very interesting proposal came from Japanese and South-Korean Parliament – 3 plus 3 Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone which means that 3 countries – Japan, South Korea and North Korea agree to not possessing nuclear weapons on their territory but in addition there are commitments by 3 key nuclear weapons states – China, Russia and USA not to use nuclear weapons against the territorial states in the region. That provision is not unusual in fact the other nuclear weapons free zones also have similar protocols, but in most cases they do not require that the protocol is signed, ratified, or entry into force but in this case it is necessary to have this security insurance.

In Europe there have been also many proposals on nuclear weapons free zones but because of the different security arrangements may not be the most appropriate.

Mr.Ware ends his speech with the letter by Alena Gajdusková co-signed by the number of parliamentarians of NATO countries calling for the implementation of the Prague Vision. The letter highlights NATO’s commitment to create the conditions for a nuclear weapons free world through the NATO Strategic Doctrine and affirms a commitment to work with our governments on paving the way by promoting mechanisms and approaches in NATO for achieving security without nuclear weapons: “Together, we can achieve this in our lifetimes.”