The social construction of Slovakia as a donor and its power effects

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Abstract
This article shows the power effects of the Slovak development cooperation discourses. It identifies the actors whom these power effects serve and the mostly non-subjective yet intentional nature of the workings of power in the Slovak development apparatus. The article focuses on how the Slovak population is constructed as willing to help and the effects of this construction. Further, the legitimation of the current regime through the construction of the Slovak identity as that of a developed nation is analyzed. Finally, the article shows the unequal relation between “old” and “new” donors and what particular interest groups the discourse of donors’ effectiveness in Slovakia serves.

Key words
Slovak development cooperation, discourse, Michel Foucault, transition experience, identity, power

1. Introduction
“Development” cooperation is, in general, perceived as an effort to help one’s partners in their “development”.\(^1\) It is not just a practice that is enacted in particular projects, but also a set of discourses constructed around and through this practice with many intended and unintended effects.

Development discourses and identities have been analyzed within development studies especially in relation to the postdevelopment and postcolonial critique. These studies were, however, mostly of a general nature (see, e.g., Escobar 1995; McEwan 2009) or related to a particular project (Ferguson 1994) or an international organization (Mitchell 2002; Li 2007) in a recipient country. Very few studies engaged with the national discourses of Western donors (for a focus on the British discourse see Noxolo 2006; for a focus on Danish expats’ identities see Eriksson Baaz 2005; for a focus on Canadian female

\(^1\) The term “development” is in inverted commas in this sentence, as it may seem to imply a progress from worse to better, but the actual practice of development does not necessarily correspond to such a progress (for a more detailed version of this argument see Ziai 2007). But in order not to annoy the reader, in the rest of the text the inverted commas that would otherwise be placed around this word are dropped.
development workers’ identities see Heron 2007).

Within the Slovak development cooperation, there are several discourses that constitute this cooperation. They reflect the Slovak identity and, at the same time, they participate in the formation of this identity. The discussion about Slovak development discourses is rather limited (see, e.g., Fecenková 2013; Gažovič 2014; Profant 2015a). CEE area studies also rarely consider development cooperation policy as part of the regional culture (see, e.g., Horký-Hlucháň & Lightfoot 2013, 2015; Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot 2015). This article is thus intended to be a contribution to this discussion in general and to the more theoretical part of this field in particular. Horký-Hlucháň offers a good overview of the “diverging theoretical approaches” (Horký-Hlucháň 2015, p. 1) within the “new” donors sub-field of development studies. The approaches range from a “descriptive and policy oriented” approach (Horký-Hlucháň 2015, p. 1) through a focus on Europeanization and the governmental politics approach that Horký-Hlucháň labels “positivist and rationalist (or, at most soft constructivist)” to an alternative type of approach labeled “(radically) constructivist and post-positivist” (Horký-Hlucháň 2015, p. 9). Whereas the first approach tries to explain the donors’ poor performance, the second one looks at “how and why the benchmarks were established and how they are related to the issue of power and donor identity” (Horký-Hlucháň 2015, p. 9). This article falls into the second category, though in the last section it discusses one of the contributions from the first category. The tradition of country case studies is followed in this text, but unlike in the case of Gažovič and Profant (2015) and many others this is done with a clear theoretical framework here. Thus, the article fits in the constructivist part of the research field and it also employs a critical perspective (Horkheimer 2002).

The first goal of the article is to show the power effects of various Slovak development discourses and also the power effects of the identities they create. The second goal is to show whom these power effects serve and how power operates in terms of the intentionality of particular subjects. The article also points to the resistance against the discursive power as an inherent part of the functioning of this power.

Before outlining the structure of the text, it is necessary to introduce Slovakia as a donor. Slovakia became a donor when it was part of Czechoslovakia, as it made a commitment to providing international aid during the communist period. The Slovak development cooperation never actually ceased to exist. Due to the Slovak support for foreign students studying at Slovak schools and humanitarian aid after 1989, Slovakia was a donor even during the turbulent period of the 1990s. At this time only a few Slovak Christian organizations had the capacity to go abroad and engage in development aid activities, but Slovakia joined the OECD in 2000, and then the Slovak government started to pay attention to the topic of development aid. The aid Slovakia provided at this time was spread between various ministries and their departments and was, in general, “non-systemic and ineffective” (Brzica 2002, p. 117). Correspondingly, the phase of Slovak development aid that began in 2002 was characterized by Brzica in 2002 as “the growing period” (Brzica 2002, p. 118). However, today’s figures would not allow for such an overly
optimistic term. This period was also characterized by the adoption of the first Medium-Term ODA Strategy for 2003-2008 (MFA 2003a), which defined the basic goals, the main recipient countries, and the reasonings and principles of the Slovak development aid. Currently the Slovak development cooperation is consolidated with the new and recently adopted Act on Development Cooperation (NCSR 2015), the Medium-Term Strategy (MFEA 2013) and the Slovak ODA, which is at 0.103 % of the GNI (MZVaEZ 2016).

This article is mainly based on existing research and, together with my own observations, offers a comprehensive perspective on the discursive construction of the Slovak development cooperation. The text focuses on the present period and the recent past, but it also uses information from the socialist era before 1989. Occasionally the article uses empirical evidence based on research from the Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania and/or Poland in order to better illustrate the proposed arguments or provide relevant data when there is no existing Slovak research on the given issue. These countries thus serve as proxies for Slovakia here.

With regard to the levels of discourse, the article deals with the Slovak official discourse, the public opinion survey discourse, the academic and non-governmental discourse and the official international discourse from various IOs. As the number of the various discourses indicates, the text does not engage in a thorough analysis of these discourses, but merely uses them in order to illustrate the main arguments. The public is included in the text as well, but rather in relation to the discourse created by the public opinion surveys than as some kind of a transparent actor.

The analysis will be theoretically anchored in the poststructuralist approach, as it focuses in particular on the importance of a Foucauldian analysis of power relations. The analysis itself will be divided into two parts, focusing on how development and transition discourses are related to the Slovak past and the current Slovak identity, first, in relation to the aid receiving Other and, second, in relation to the West. In both these parts the aim will be to respond to the following questions: How is power exercised in or through the Slovak development apparatus? Whom does it serve? And to what extent can one speak of an intentional agency or a non-subjective strategy without a particular agency?

The first analytical part (part 3) will first (in 3.1) deal with the construction of Slovakia as a developed country and focus on the construction of the Slovak people as

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2 The observations consisted of an academic looking in as the author attended various work-related events of the Slovak and Czech development apparatuses, such as those of the Slovak non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) and the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore the author conducted research of the non-governmental organization (NGOs) sector in development (see Profant 2015a, 2015b), and there is also an unpublished research by the author based on interviews with Czech development workers and focused on the effectiveness of the Czech development cooperation and the findings of this research are occasionally used here to illustrate the arguments of the present text.
willing to help. Here the analysis of the public opinion surveys will serve as a follow-up to the existing literature on the construction of Slovakia's identity as a member of the developed world. After that (in 3.2) the text will focus on the link between the transition discourse and the discursive liberal-democratic hegemony in Slovakia. The aim will be to show how development cooperation contributes to power relations in Slovakia. Thus, first the article will show how the Slovaks are constructed as developed, and then it will show the power effect of this construction in Slovakia.

The fourth part will focus on the relationship to the West in the development and transition experience discourses. Here the aim will be to show the power relation between the East and the West while using Slovakia as a proxy for the East. First (in 4.1) it will not be considered self-evident that Slovakia belongs among the “new” donors and the section will point toward the fact that here the academic discourse contradicts the governmental as well as the non-governmental discourse. The aim will be to show how the “new” donors discourse inferiorizes Slovakia by representing it as a donor at a lower level of development with a specific experience. The text will thereby problematize the power relations between old and new EU member states. The second section of this part (4.2) will focus on different constructions of Slovakia as an altruistic, egoistic and effective donor and show how the unequal relation to the West has power effects in the Slovak development constituency.

All the parts show the power effects of development discourses and of the identities that emanate from these discourses. Another result of the research is the identification of the actors whom these power effects serve and the mostly non-subjective nature of the workings of power.

2. The theoretical perspective

The aim of this article is to discuss the discourses that constitute the Slovak development cooperation and are the basis for the construction of Slovakia's identity as a donor. The analysis of these discourses is important because discourses “not only shape but even enable (social) reality” (Jäger & Maier 2009, p. 36). Development cooperation is not an objective reality, but is perceived through the development discourse. From the opposite perspective, the development discourse is also enacted by this cooperation. Other discourses such as that of the “new donors” or a “successful transition” are part of the development discourse. They all form the social reality. In this sense Foucault (2002a, p. 54) defines discourses “as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”

A discourse consists of so-called “points of diffraction” (Foucault 2002a, p. 73) that one could describe as more particular sets of arguments or concepts that cohere at a lower level inside a more general discourse. The points of diffraction are characterized by incompatibility and equivalence. On the one hand, they contradict each other (i.e. they are incompatible); on the other they are formed according to the same rules of formation (i.e. they are equivalent). This means that the points of diffraction have commonalities related
to the whole discourse, but differ on less general issues. As an example of this, Foucault (2002b) uses various concepts of money in the discourse of wealth (e.g. those of physiocrats and mercantilists), while Escobar uses the contradictory economic approaches in development economics – the structuralist and the monetarist school – as two different points of diffraction inside the development discourse (Escobar 1995, p. 42). The structuralists and monetarists believe in development on a general level (equivalence), but the two groups have different approaches to it (incompatibility). Section 4.2 will focus on the following points of diffraction: altruism, egoism, effectiveness, complementarity and coordination of donors. It is possible to ascribe to Slovakia the identity of an altruistic, egoistic and effective actor on their basis.

The question of the primacy of structure or agency is one of the crucial questions in the post-structuralist debate. If it is correct to state that “discourses exert power” (Jäger & Maier 2009, p. 39), what possibilities do subjects have to fight this power? “When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of others [...] one includes an important element: freedom” (Foucault 1982, p. 221). The aim is to analyze the effects of some of the discourses that exert power, but this does not mean that subjects would be denied the possibility to change the discourses or to fight them. The text will deal with this issue in the fourth part in relation to the “new” donors discourse and resistance against the “old” donors.

It should be noted that even though Foucault considers power relations to be “nonsubjective” (Foucault 1978, p. 94), which means that power does not “result from the choice or decision of an individual” (Foucault 1978, p. 95), he recognizes that power can serve particular interests or actors. Focusing on the example of delinquency, he asks “what is served by the failure of prison?” (Foucault 1995, p. 272), and “why […] is the prison called upon to participate in the fabrication of delinquency?” (Foucault 1995, p. 278). The answer is that “the establishment of delinquency [...] has in fact a number of advantages” (ibid.). These include the supervision of illegality, the supervision of vagabonds and the restriction of politically and economically serious criminality so that it is thus a localized and much less harmful criminality. Therefore “[d]elinquency [...] is an agent for the illegality of the dominant groups” (Foucault 1995, p. 279).

A similar example is the apparatus for fixing workers in the first heavy industries at their workplaces that emerged between 1825 and 1830. It includes “a coherent, rational strategy, but […] it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it” (Foucault 1980, p. 203). Despite this, the apparatus serves the particular interest of the heavy industry in “master[ing] a vagabond, floating labour force” (Foucault 1980, p. 204). Simply put, even without clearly identifiable agents, discourses and apparatuses serve particular actors and their interests. They are “nonsubjective”, yet “intentional” (Foucault 1978, p. 94). The aim will be to show whom exactly the analyzed discourses serve and how.

When it comes to the development discourse, the question of whose interests are being served by the discourse has been answered by examining it in the context of its emergence during the first half of the 20th century. The change from colonialism to
development that led to a reconfiguration of North-South relations served, among others the ruling elites in the North, who wanted to preserve their privileged position. With the transition to the development era, they were able to control the trade and keep their economic advantage. At the same time the non-elite parts of the population in the North together with the elites were discursively constructed as modern, enlightened and developed and therefore superior to their traditional, backward and underdeveloped Southern counterparts. On the other hand, the elites in the formerly colonized countries could profit from development projects and secure their powerful positions in their home countries. At the same time, they could use the promise of development to mobilize populations and demand sacrifices from the people in the name of development. This allowed them to rule in an authoritarian manner and impose harsh economic measures if necessary. Finally, the people in the South were attracted to the development discourse, as it put them on an equal footing with the formerly allegedly superior white race. There was also the material promise that at times provided some benefits. These, however, went mostly to the elite parts of the Southern nations. But still, people in the South had the possibility to demand the fulfillment of the promise of a better life (Ziai 2007a, pp. 54-56).

Overall, even though it is hard to imagine one creator of the development discourse, this discourse served particular groups in various ways. The same applies to the more particular Slovak development discourse analyzed in this text.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly discuss why identities are crucial elements of discourses. They are not stable points that would fix the subjects in the discourse. On the contrary, they are always in flux and dependent on other discourses and other identities. Power aims at a temporary closure of a discourse, and its goal is to fix identities at particular places to enable governance. Yet, even in such a case, a superior identity depends on an inferior one, and they define each other (see, e.g., Eriksson Baaz 2005). The next part deals with the question of the Slovak identity.

3. The construction of Slovaks as willing to help and of Slovakia as a country after a successful transition process

In this part it will first be shown (in 3.1) how the representation of the Slovak people as willing to help strengthens the identity of Slovakia as a developed country. After showing that Slovakia is represented as developed, it will be possible to point to the power effects of this representation and of the transition discourse in Slovakia. The next section (3.2) will show how the transition experience discourse forms the basis of the general hegemonic discourse, which legitimates the current political regime. The aim in these sections is thus to show how development and transition discourses powerfully intervene into the Slovak society.

3.1. Building the identity of Slovakia as a donor and the identity of the Slovak people as people who are willing to help
As Bátor (2004) and Gažovič (2012) show, the Slovak development cooperation does not only serve the national interest, but at the same time it constitutes this interest by defining the Slovak identity (see Bátor 2013 – for a similar issue in relation to NATO). “It is only once we know who we are that we can know what we want” (Ringmar 1996, p. 64). Only once we realize what our identity is can we formulate our national interest. Development cooperation serves the Slovaks as one of the tools they use for defining themselves. Slovaks become who they want to be – members of the developed world – through this foreign policy tool.

This identity building is not just some kind of an unintentional (and nonsubjective) result of Slovak actors’ activities, but as Gažovič writes, “the ODA provision is represented in the official discourse as one of the tools that constitute the identity of a country in terms of promoting a particular foreign perspective on Slovakia” (Gažovič 2012, p. 40). Development cooperation is thus used in multiple ways: not only does it serve particular Slovak interests in the sphere of international politics, but at the same time it co-produces a particular identity for Slovakia and an improved image for it in the international realm as a result of this identity (and thereby serves the national interest at a higher level).

The effort to create the identity of a developed country for Slovakia through its participation in development cooperation as a donor comes from the governing elites who accept and enact the expectation coming from outside of the Slovak society. In fact, the Slovak development apparatus perceives the Slovak development cooperation as a policy that is de facto imposed upon it from the outside (Gažovič 2012; for the same argument about the Czech case see Horký 2010; for the Austrian case see Hödl 2013). The Slovaks give because they have to. For example, for a respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “the main reason [for providing ODA] is our entry into the EU” (ibid., p. 33; for the same argument in the Polish case see Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, p. 66). There has never been a discussion in the Slovak society about this question. Development cooperation never became a topic of political parties’ campaigns. One can thus speak of a top-down constitution of a country’s identity as a developed society.

However, it is not only the government that directly builds the identity in relation to other countries and in relation to the Slovak population. Another strategy within the Slovak development apparatus is the use of surveys that represent the Slovak society as willing to help. The surveys show that Slovakia wants to be a donor, and that this is not imposed upon the Slovak society from the outside. The society desires to give, and the government only reacts to this demand.

Gažovič and Bátor have already sufficiently analyzed the creation of the Slovak identity by the governing elite. This part of the Slovak development apparatus is thus well mapped. The goal will be to complement this knowledge with an analysis of a different part of the development cooperation apparatus. This section will thus try to analyze the surveys and how they contribute to the construction of the Slovak identity in which Slovaks are perceived as willing to help.
It is crucial to note that these surveys are being used by the Slovak development actors. For example, one can find the question “Why does the Slovak Republic provide development aid?” on the NGDO (non-governmental development organizations) Platform photography competition website “Human Rights in Development Cooperation”. The answer on the website states that Slovakia has international commitments, that it is not a poor country, that providing development aid is in the Slovak interest because of climate change and migration, that even a small country can bring a positive change and, finally, that “the Slovaks support humanitarian and development aid for moral reasons as well” (PMVRO n.a.). A quote from the Pontis Foundation (here quoted as FOCUS 2009) follows these answers: “7 out of 10 respondents think that Slovakia should provide aid to people in poor countries (Pontis Foundation survey 2009)” (PMVRO n.a.).

Slovak development actors can quote the surveys whenever anyone tries to question the identity of the Slovaks as people who are willing to help and as people who support development cooperation.3 There are two such Slovak public opinion surveys (FOCUS 2009; IVO 2005) as well as a study (Pontis 2010) and a survey (PMVRO 2010) that focus on the relation of the Slovak political parties to development cooperation. Furthermore, Eurobarometer did its own surveys among the new member states (Eurobarometer 2007) as well as among EU citizens (Eurobarometer 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015) that were focused on the issue of development cooperation. So, what is problematic about these surveys?

First of all, it is necessary to note that while Slovaks support the principle of development aid,4 this support seems to be “a mile wide and an inch deep” (Smillie 1999, p. 72), just like in the UK (Darnton 2009; Hudson & van Heerde-Hudson 2012; HoC IDC 2009; Henson et al. 2010). Should one follow the response of the British Department for International Development (DFID) to the British House of Commons International Development Committee’s “Aid Under Pressure” report (Darnton 2009, p. 12) and include only those Slovak respondents who believe that it is very important to help people in developing countries among supporters of development aid, one would get only 24% as the percentage of supporters of aid among the respondents instead of 79%.

The main element of the “strategy without a strategist” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p.

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3 This argument is not specific for the Slovak development constituency. The analysis here includes an analysis of Slovak surveys that contain similar questions to those used in Eurobarometer. Further research would be necessary to differentiate between donors not only in terms of the actual willingness to help, but for example also in terms of the choice of recipient countries.

4 According to the last Eurobarometer survey Slovaks think that it is very important (24%) or fairly important (55%) to help people in developing countries (Eurobarometer 2015: 19). Despite the fact that many Slovaks do not believe that development aid is “used purposefully” in these countries and “improves lives” there (49%; FOCUS 2009: 34), they would still use international organizations such as UNESCO or the Red Cross (ibid.: 26) for development aid.
187) of representing the Slovaks as willing to help is visible in the question about the amount of money that people are actually willing to give. Both the question and the possible answers offered by Eurobarometer (2015, p. 34) indicate a fear that people could refuse the aid. The fact that “we” promised to donate the money is mentioned, and 52% of the respondents choose the least painful but still ethical answer - that “we should keep our promise to increase aid to developing countries” (Eurobarometer 2015). Seven percent are for even more aid. 14% are for not increasing the aid “even though it has been promised” (Eurobarometer 2015), and 33% are for a decrease. The way this question and its possible answers are formulated is more important than the actual results. The formulations “insure” the result by invoking the possibility of breaking a promise. The way this promise came about and whether the promise is a result of a legitimate democratic procedure is not mentioned. A more neutral question would drop the promise, and a serious democratic engagement would lead to a public debate on development cooperation before the constructing of such a survey.

It is worth noting that the former Slovak NGDO Platform director Nora Beňáková (2013) actually claimed in an interview that Slovaks do not want to help, and the director of People in Peril – one of the largest Slovak NGDOs – Braňo Tichý, in an article on the refugee crisis, qualified the results from Eurobarometer with a mention of the low amount of money that Slovaks actually give from their own pocket (Tichý 2015). Such statements from the leading figures in the NGDO sector suggest that the “common sense” views on the Slovak willingness to help might differ from Eurobarometer’s results.

The public opinion agency FOCUS uses a similar strategy in its survey. It first asks whether Slovakia gives enough or not “with regard to its economic capacity” (FOCUS 2009, p. 38). In the results of its 2009 survey, fourteen percent of the respondents think that it does not, 39% think that the amount Slovakia gives is just about right and 29% think that it gives too much (ibid.). Given the fact that only 9% know (or guessed correctly) how much the EU spent on ODA (Eurobarometer 2007, p. 7), this question seems to measure the respondents’ attitude to Slovakia’s current “economic capacity” rather than their attitude to its development cooperation. The mentioning of the Slovak “economic capacity” suggests that Slovakia has the capacity to give. But this is by no means obvious. The survey constructs Slovakia as an aggregate unit and thereby avoids the differences within the country. A question that would include, for example, the phrase “with regard to the economic capacity of Eastern Slovakia” would certainly bring a different result (not to mention one with a phrase such as “with regard to the current economic slowdown”). The aim is not to argue for asking these kinds of suggestive questions, but merely to point at the suggestiveness of the question that actually has been asked.

An Austrian example shows that different questions on the same topic bring different answers. The general support for helping people in developing countries is roughly at the

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5 It should be noted, however, that Slovakia has one the lowest inequality rates in the world.

6 Due to a lack of research on the “new” donors, I rely here on data from “old” donors – Austria, the UK and the
same level in both countries (Austria and Slovakia). However, as soon as the question of financing the aid was connected with a compensation in the form of lower social welfare expenditures, only 33% of the Austrian respondents were for more money being spent on development cooperation (Maral-Hanak 2008, p. 110). Furthermore, 84% of the respondents in the US agreed with the statement that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001, p. 9), and when DFID asked respondents to rank government expenditures for healthcare, schooling, defense, social services, police and support to poor countries, support to poor countries was the least supported policy (Darnton 2009, p. 13). Clearly, such relative questions, as opposed to the generic ones used in the surveys analyzed here, show much lower levels of support for development aid among the public in the “new” donor countries. This is the reason why the House of Commons recommended that “DFID [examine] how it assesses the level of public support for development and [redesign] its surveys” (HoC IDC 2009, p. 45).7 One can only speculate as to how the Slovak respondents, who are in general poorer than their Austrian, British and American counterparts, would respond to such relative questions.

The use of the monetary unit “per month per citizen” (FOCUS 2009, p. 39), which clearly aims at bringing the numbers closer to the people and turning millions of EUR into cents in the people’s view, enables FOCUS to ask whether people would agree with an increase of the ODA “by 10 cents, i.e. to €1.10 per month per citizen” (FOCUS 2009). Who would refuse to give 10 cents more to a fight against poverty? Even such a positively formulated question, though, brings a negative answer from 39% of the respondents, who disagree with any increase. Ten percent agree with an increase of less than 10 cents, 21% are for the 10 cent increase and only 13% would maybe agree with the fulfillment of Slovakia’s promise (at the time) to donate 0.33% of its GNI, a figure that by far surpasses the 10 cent increase. Again the formulation of the question could be different. Even though the 10 cent figure has the advantage of making it easier for a respondent to imagine the increase, the current practice is to use much greater figures related to the gross national income. A research with a control group would be necessary to show that the figures in cents do indeed increase positive answers in comparison to those in millions of EUR.

There is thus a discourse of public opinion surveys that clearly constructs Slovaks as a nation that is willing to help. However, the questions bring contradictory answers as well - for example, when they deal with real gifts that the respondents are supposed to pay for from their own pocket. Only 33% are “prepared to pay more for groceries or other products from developing countries to support people living in these countries (for instance for fair

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7 There are further problems with the surveys that the analysts from the UK point to. The aim here, however, is only to show how the surveys contribute to the representation of Slovaks as willing to help and not to thoroughly analyze them.

USA. However, the findings in this case are supported by the “common sense” claims made by important actors from the Slovak development apparatus.
trade products)” (Eurobarometer 2015, p. 44). The already mentioned claims by Nora Beňáková and Braňo Tichý also point to a different discourse. Fair Trade statistics complement this discourse with an even less encouraging number. There is no data for Slovakia among them, but research in the Czech Republic showed that only 5% of its population buys Fair Trade products (Kouřil 2010), and there is no reason to think that this share would be higher in Slovakia (quite to the contrary).

What kind of identities are then constructed by the surveys and the Fair Trade statistics? On the one hand the respondents are represented as willing to help (and as preferring for international organizations to do the helping), but on the other hand, at the same time the questions about payment, Beňáková and Tichý’s (common-sense) opinion and the Fair Trade statistics create a contradictory discourse and represent people as unwilling to actually contribute. It is, of course, up to the reader to decide which discourse is truthful. This article becomes a political intervention as it confronts the official discourse with an alternative one.

Yet, it should be stressed that it is not the aim of the text to imply that there was a conscious manipulation in one direction by suggestive questions. One would need a different kind of research to make this kind of a claim. It is possible to perceive the surveys as a non-subjective working of a discourse (see, e.g., Foucault 1999). Still the results from these surveys can serve instrumental goals as they provoke positive answers. Those who quote the surveys can then say that Slovaks (or EU citizens) are a nation of people who want to help, and as has been shown, the actors from the development cooperation apparatus do that.

It is thus possible to question the legitimacy of the Slovak development apparatus financed by the state. More importantly for the aims of this text, though, one may point to the way public opinion surveys contribute to the construction of the Slovaks’ identity as people who are willing to help and thus legitimate governmental laws and strategies.

On the other hand a study by Pontis (2010) and a survey by PMVRO (2012) point to the fact that the topic of development cooperation hardly figures at all in the Slovak public opinion. This question itself is also problematic. Eurobarometer is not asking whether the respondents are ready to pay more or less, but offers four possible answers (apart from “Don’t know”). The two extreme positions are “No, you are not ready to pay more” and “Yes, you would be ready to pay more than 10% more”, and the two middle answers are “Yes, you would be ready to pay 6 to 10% more” and “… up to 5% more” (Eurobarometer 2015, p. 42). It could be argued that people most often choose the middle (“normal”) positions, and having only two middle positions among the possible answers probably brings different results than having more middle positions and different extreme positions would. Still, much more problematic is the assumption that the lives of the poor can be seriously improved by increasing a price by 5% (which was assumed by 26% of the respondents). It is also interesting to note that only 2% of the respondents are willing to pay more than 10% more.
political parties’ programs, and Slovak politicians only rarely speak about this issue in public. One can see here the lack of interest in the issue among the voters and their representatives.

An important question is, whom does this construction serve? Just like in the case of the “old” donors (see the theoretical section), development cooperation helps Slovaks to define themselves as members of the developed world despite the lack of interest in this issue in both the public and the political spheres. Being represented as developed has further effects in terms of power. The Slovaks can feel a sense of superiority over the “underdeveloped” Other. At the same time Slovaks participate in an unequal economic system that exploits them, but it equally enables the Slovaks to exploit others. This economic system is discursively constructed through the development discourse – among other discourses. For example, a decision of any country to produce cash crops based on the arguments in the development discourse lowers the price of such a crop for the global economy including Slovak consumers and companies. The cultural benefit is thus complemented with an economic benefit.

In sum, there is an attempt to represent Slovakia as a donor at the governmental level towards the outside as well as an effort to represent the Slovak population as generous and willing to help. The governing over the population is realized through the creation of a particular identity – that of a developed society that has the right to be and at the same time wants to be part of the community of donors.

The next section focuses on the inside of the Slovak society and shows the power effects of the successful transition discourse. The representation of Slovakia as a developed country and as a country that has gone through a successful transition is by no means innocent, and it gives a discursive advantage to particular forces in the Slovak society.

3.2. The successful transition discourse and its effect in terms of power and resistance

An important element of the Slovak development cooperation is the Slovak transition experience. One can read about the Slovak “comparative advantages” (MFA 2009, pp. 4, 12), particularly in official documents. For example, the Medium-Term ODA Strategy for 2009-2013 states that “Slovakia remains prepared and willing to share its transformational experiences and knowledge of the reform process in key sectors such as democratization, the building of the rule of law, civic society development, promotion of good governance, and/or security sector reform” (MFA 2009, p. 15). Further, “Slovakia can also share its experience with health sector transformation and social reforms” (ibid., p. 14). Similarly, the Slovaks want to share their knowledge of economic reforms and also of “[i]nfrasstructure development with a positive impact on sustainable development and environmental protection” (ibid.). Simply put, the Slovaks want to concentrate on selected sectors in which “Slovakia has more potential and advantages compared to other donors” (ibid.). The authors of the Strategy for 2014-2018 write in a similar but less detailed way
about the Slovak transition experience. The same can be said about the National Slovak ODA Programme 2016, and Slovak official representatives from the MFA make very similar statements about the need to export the Slovak transition experience (see below).

The successful transition discourse is not just an important part of the development cooperation discourse, but also a hegemonic discourse for the whole society, and its power effect is the legitimation of the current regime. The traditional narrative about the regime before 1989 represents this regime as totalitarian and the current one as an embodiment of freedom (for similar narratives see, e.g., the journal Memory and History from the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes). Such a binary approach assumes a total oppression and an amoral regime based on a lie in the pre-1989 period. In this approach this regime was in direct opposition to a society that could not stand up to it and, at most, included only islands of freedom – those of the dissent. The totalitarian model of the society before 1989 enables a binary twist and a romanticizing approach to the current model, which is by definition the reverse of the previous one and therefore is free and right (see Pullmann 2011 or Burzová 2014 for a similar argument). The development constituency builds its main discourse on this romanticization, which also enables it to claim a specific transition knowledge. One can then transfer this knowledge to other countries within the framework of development cooperation.

It is necessary to emphasize the linkage between one of the main Slovak development discourses – that of the transition experience – and the hegemonic discourse of a successful transition. This is crucial for the legitimacy of the current regime, the unequal power relations in it and their effects, such as the oppression of the marginalized. The discourse of the Slovak development cooperation participates in this oppression by normalizing the idea of a successful transition and putting this idea further into practice. If the Slovaks are exporting their experience, it is perceived as undoubtedly positive (i.e. worth exporting).

However, this does not mean that an admission of mistakes is not a part of the discourse. Indeed, the most recent “end of postcommunism” discussion (Barša 2012; Buden 2013) shows that a discourse disrupting the current hegemony might be rising. Thus the following anecdotal evidence to a certain extent contradicts the previous claims.

For example, employees of the NGDO PDCS are aware of the mistakes of the post-1989 Slovak regime and internally discuss the fact that they export knowledge not only about the patterns worth following, but also about how things are not to be done (Interview No. 1, 2013). Furthermore, one respondent from the Pontis Foundation said the following in relation to Tunisia: “We are trying to confront Tunisians with some good and bad practices from the transition” (Interview No. 5, 2013). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, and the Slovak ambassador in Moldova also mentioned problems related to transition in their speeches. The Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico made similar comments at a meeting with the Serbian prime minister (TASR 2014).9 It could also be

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9 According to Robert Fico, “there were mistakes before 2004 that cost us a lot. It is therefore even more necessary to
mentioned that the author’s own unpublished research in the field of the transition experience in the Czech Republic shows that people at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as those who carry out Czech development projects do not romanticize the transition experience and that these actors admit to mistakes as well (for example, in the realm of economic transformation). It should be noted that such a balanced perspective could actually be of use to societies interested in the recent Slovak or Czech experience in dealing with the transition from communism to capitalism.

However, it is to be questioned to what extent the (self-)critique of the transition weakens the hegemonic discourse. An admission of transition-related problems at the level of general political declarations (such admissions are completely absent in the official documents) does not necessarily mean their thorough analysis or a search for deeper causes of these problems. It may actually strengthen the image of a successful transition that, however, was not reached without a few stumbles. The overall success of the transition is not being questioned.

What might at first sight seem like a resistance to the dominant discourse of a successful transition on the side of those who are engaged in development cooperation can thus actually be part of a moderate critique expressed within the unquestioned limits of liberal democracy and capitalism. It might also be useful to think about the fora at which this critique is expressed and the extent of the recognition of the Slovak transition problems. A deeper critique that could cast doubt on the whole narrative of a successful transition has so far no place in the development discourse.

I would add one more observation in this regard. It seems that the recognition of some of the mistakes is quite recent, and it is doubtful whether one could find an expression of such a recognition from ten years ago. There is thus a certain change in the discourse, but it remains to be seen whether this change actually means the beginning of the dissolution of the social consensus or its normalization through a self-critique. A contributing factor in this regard could be the temporal distance from the revolution. There is now a new generation of politicians and ministry officials who are not responsible for the transition problems and can therefore “admit” to them.

Finally, the question of whom the successful transition discourse serves in terms of power needs to be addressed. On a very general level it serves the winners of the regime change. The transition discourse legitimizes their gains, as these are seen as part of a larger societal success. All those who were on the loosing side and now engage in a counterdiscourse have yet another argument to take part in – that of how the transition can be problematic if it is worth exporting. But on a more particular level, the political parties connected with the previous regime such as the communists are delegitimized, as the new regime seems viable and better than the previous one, with which their ideology is connected.

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use the experience of countries such as Slovakia not only to avoid some decisions, but also to be prepared for them” (TASR 2014).
In terms of subjective intentionality, it is doubtful whether there are any particular subjects who invest into this discourse with the aim of keeping the liberal-democratic hegemony. It seems much more likely that the transition discourse within the Slovak development cooperation is a small part of the “strategy without a strategist” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p. 187) that reproduces the ideological basis of the Slovak society.

The transition experience discourse and the representation of Slovakia as a “new” donor at the international level have further power effects. They enable unequal relations between “old” and “new” donors. The next part focuses on these relations.

4. The construction of Slovakia as a “new” donor with a specific transition experience

This part will first (in 4.1) point at the discourse of “old” and “new” donors that creates for Slovakia and other postcommunist countries a specific identity inferior to that of the old EU members. A significant part of this discourse is the perception of Slovakia as a country that went through a successful transition. In the second section (4.2), the power effects of the transition experience discourse and also of the EU and the OECD norm of effectiveness in Slovakia will be shown. Both sections thus focus on the connection between the transition discourse and the relationship with the West and complement the focus on the inside of the Slovak society in the previous part.

4.1. Development cooperation and the transition experience as discursive tools to differentiate old and new EU member states

The acquisition of the “new” donor identity enabled the new EU members to be differentiated from the old member states. In relation to the label (or discourse) of “new donors”, it is first necessary to mention the existence of an academic discourse which is governed by a consensus about the international aid provision by the current “new” donors before 1989. This consensus within the academic discourse is missing in the discourse of the governmental and non-governmental actors. Their discourse is dominated by the representation of Slovakia and other postcommunist countries as “new” donors. Subsequently, the power effect of the label “new donors” is revealed. As the research on the Romanian development cooperation argues, the effect of this is an unequal relationship between the “old” and “new” donors, as the “new” donors become novices and apprentices who are supposed to be taught by more experienced teachers. However – and this is the third argument of this section – this label has an opposite power effect – it enables the “new” donors’ governments not to honor their commitments.

Czechoslovakia was “an important donor” (Benč 2005, p. 75) during the socialist period of 1948-1989, and “in financial terms [its aid reached a] much greater financial and personal volume than today” (Mesík 2012, p. 182). In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia sent aid to 124 countries - for example, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Libya, etc. (Benč 2005, p. 75; Brzica 2002, p. 107) and the provided sum ranged from “0.7-0.9% [of the] GDP” (Szép
“[The f]ormer Czechoslovakia thus belonged among the biggest donors” (Szép 2004). For example, it built elementary schools in the recipient countries, provided help with irrigation, provided technical gear and engineers, etc. (Benč 2005, p. 75; Brzica 2002, p. 107). It is thus clear that there is no discussion among academics about whether Czechoslovakia was a donor in the past, nor do they censor themselves to hold on to the narrative of new donors. However, their approach does not move on to the wider development community that talks about Slovakia as a new donor.

For example, the Medium-Term Strategy for 2014-2018 contains the following paragraph: “At the time of [the] formulation of [the] Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) before 2000, the Slovak Republic was still a recipient of aid. Now, at the time of [the] preparation of new development goals beyond 2015, Slovakia is already acting as a donor country. The strategy for development cooperation of the SR, therefore, bears in mind the new position, new tasks and new responsibilities” (MFEA 2013, p. 4). The 2009-2013 Strategy was more explicit and spoke about “Slovakia’s comparative advantages as a new donor” (MFA 2009: 12). Beňáková (2010: 4) also wrote about Slovakia as a new donor.10

Thus, Slovakia has a past of development cooperation that the Slovak development constituency disremembers, and this disremembering enables Slovakia to fit under the label “new donor”. There is a similar process going on among other “new” donors. In one of the more extreme examples, when the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contracted an external expert for a report, they demanded that she would not deal with the Polish development activities within COMECON in it (Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, p. 66).

The second argument of this section points to the power effects of this disremembering. According to Mirela Oprea (2012, p. 73), “the discursive construction of the EU-12 as ‘new’, ‘novice’, ‘beginner’ and ‘inexperienced’ can be susceptible to having some ideological effects.” Oprea studied the Progress Reports, Monitoring Reports, Strategic Papers, Composite Papers and other documents issued by the European Commission that monitored the Romanian progress towards accession. They created “a type of strategic discourse” (ibid., p. 76) that not only noted the “progress’ towards accession in a neutral and disinterested manner, but they also play a crucial part in shaping institutional behavior by showing what the desired standards are for the candidate country to be acknowledged as achieving such ‘progress’” (ibid., p. 76, italics in the orig.). One could probably conduct a similar research for the Slovak case. According to the documents analyzed by Oprea, Romania is not an international donor. An international donor is something that a candidate country is expected to become. Romania needs to define its development policy; however, this policy is not related in any way to Romania itself, but is something that Romania simply “is obliged [to do] according to EU standards” (ibid., p. 78). To fully embrace European norms, Romania and other postcommunist countries need to be

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10 It might be added that one should not doubt that Beňáková is well aware of the international aid before 1989. But for a discourse analysis, the important point is that she does not talk or write about it publicly.

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represented as “new donors”. They “are not encouraged to become members of the donor community – they are encouraged to join the community of Western donors and abide by the dominant development discourse represented by the OECD-DAC norms filtered through EU soft development law” (ibid., p. 79). In this way they are “encouraged to marginalise and forget about older experiences, particularly those that could draw [them] close to non-OECD-DAC development practices” (ibid., p. 79).

The question remains why Slovakia and other “new” donors accept their lot. One may only speculate about this, but an overall acceptance of the Orientalist discourse and the practice of self-orientalization that is so common in the Slovak society could be two of the stronger factors. Furthermore, trading one’s original position outside of the club of developed (ie superior) nations for an inferior position within this club might be considered a good deal in the global hierarchy. Third, as one respondent stated in relation to the term “development”, “[this term] is part of the usual terminology that one uses here without attaching to it a distinctive connotation... it is rather a technical and partly a commonplace term” (Interview No. 4, 2013). In the same way, the term “new donors” can be accepted as a commonplace term without much thinking about the hierarchy it creates.

Whereas the Slovak academic sphere concerned with development accepts without problems the international aid of the previous regime, the rest of the Slovak development constituency erases this (Czecho-)Slovak experience from the collective memory. Slovakia is most often represented as a new donor. This representation serves the inequality in the relation between the old and the new member states. The assumption of an asymmetry between the two groups in terms of knowledge enables the demand that inexperienced donors accept the norms of experienced donors, who supposedly know how development cooperation is supposed to be done. Slovakia thus takes up norms in a field to which it could contribute with its own experience. The power of the discourse results in its subordination to more powerful actors.

The temporal (old-new) distinction between the two groups of donors is further supported by a distinction in terms of their particular focuses. As soon as Slovakia acquired the label “new donor” it needed something special that would distinguish it from the traditional donors. Here the socialist past became useful, as the experience with the transition to democracy became useful, as the experience with the transition to democracy became the knowledge to be transferred.

It allowed the relations between the “new” donors (ie the so called developed countries) and recipients (ie the so called developing countries) to emerge with a very specific constitutive basis. Here it is not industrialization or mass consumption that defines development, as is usually claimed. This time it is the experience with transition, i.e. an experience with a particular type of development, an experience of a change from worse to better, in this case a change from an authoritarian regime to (a Western type) democracy.

In this way the Self is constituted as knowledgeable and as having experience, and the Other is constituted as lacking knowledge about how to achieve change, about the way a successful transition is supposed to occur. The development discourse thus remains intact,
and Slovakia, together with other formerly socialist members of the EU, can occupy a specific niche on the development market. They are particular donors with a particular knowledge. They are thus distinct from traditional donors, yet still developed, as their identity and membership in the EU and the OECD require this quality.

Slovakia thereby escapes its fate of being a powerless receiver, but it accepts its ranking as an inferior donor with respect to the experienced Western donors. The transition experience enables Slovakia to play this role as it becomes a specific kind of a donor which gives less than traditional donors and whose expertise is also different.

What emerges here is a more complex “global circle of obligation” (Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, p. 70). Poland and Slovakia negate the hegemony by becoming donors. The logic of international giving and receiving is more complex and happens not only on the vertical axis of the donor and the receiver, but also on the horizontal axis of the donors themselves. The categories developed and developing are no longer sufficient for the workings of power (Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, p. 72). The asymmetrical power relations in development are more complex, as they follow a more complex form of competition within the logic of the gift. Discursive strategies thus result not only in the distinguishing of donors from recipients, but also in the distinguishing of various categories of donors. Their power effect is a hierarchic differentiation of donors, and Slovakia (willingly) assumes an inferior position in it.

The question remains whether there actually is something worth preserving from the socialist (Czecho)Slovak international aid that would enrich the current DAC OECD approach. Research shows strong similarities between the two approaches based on the modernization theory that strongly influenced the Western development aid as well as the socialist international aid (Unfried & Himmelstoss 2012). The difference one might expect to emerge from a more thorough analysis could be in the articulation of, e.g., unequal trade relations. Whereas the dominant parts of the development discourse (especially since the 1980s) were conspicuously silent on the issue of the market inequality in trade relations, the Marxist perspective focused precisely on these unequal relations. There has been a return to some of these ideas at least since the most recent economic crisis. However, one might also find some similarities in the socialist and the capitalist camp in this regard in the period of the 1960s and 1970s, when inequality was the debate of the day.

Finally, power can also work the other way around. The acceptance of the label “new donor” not only inferiorizes Slovakia and other “new” donors, but at the same time it also opens space for resistance against the dominant actors and thereby shows the ambivalence of the discourse. The emergence of the particular group of “new donors” enables this group to behave according to its own specific norms and differ from the “traditional donors” in terms of what a “good donor” should be doing. Ghica (2013) compares it to the logical fallacy called a red herring. ¹¹ According to her, “it is more likely that such policy makers use the regional labeling rhetorically for either not committing themselves to substantive ODA or [sic] for creating identity markers and thus justify

¹¹ The term red herring refers to a diversion of someone's attention from the matter at hand to something different.
internally their position not as an international donor but as the more ‘handsome’ country in the neighborhood” (Ghica 2013). One of the main arguments in this regard is related to the amounts of development aid. Whereas the richer donors have set their targets for development aid at 0.7% of their GNI, the former socialist countries used to have the target at 0.33%. Yet, they are currently not capable of reaching even this target and thus compete at the level of 0.05-0.15% over who is “the more handsome” country in the region. At the same time the creation of the group of “new” donors “neglects the significant variation among the members of such groups and the significant resemblance with other donors, be they old or new” (Ghica 2013; see also Gažovič & Profant 2015).

One can thus see here the ambivalent workings of a discourse in terms of whom it serves. On the one hand the discourse represents “new” donors as novices and thereby creates an unequal power relation serving the more powerful “old” donors. The power effect is the acceptance of foreign norms by the new member states. On the other hand this discourse creates a group and thereby serves the members of this group by strengthening them in their resistance against the EU norms.

Again, it is hard to trace a single originator of the new donors discourse. Rather, it seems like yet another instance of the Western Orientalism towards Eastern Europe. Development cooperation is just another field in which the West sets the norm, and the East is supposed to follow.

The last section will follow up on the critique of the instrumental use of the transition discourse and focus on the points of diffraction in the development discourse and their power effects. It will be shown how this unequal relation with the West can serve different interest groups at home as the consensus about what constitutes the right approach to development cooperation varies.

4.2. The transition experience and the construction of Slovakia as an egoistic, altruistic and effective donor

As has been mentioned in the theoretical section, discourses contain so-called points of diffraction or discursive sub-groups. It is possible to find them in the Slovak development discourse as well. This section will focus on four such points of diffraction – altruism, egoism, effectiveness (of development cooperation) and complementarity and coordination (of donors). Whereas altruism and egoism clearly stand against each other, complementarity and coordination are a crucial part of effectiveness. These discursive sub-groups enable Slovakia to accept the identity of an altruistic, egoistic and effective donor.

At first sight it seems that altruism is the dominant discursive sub-group, but it is actually much easier to find an egoistic line of reasoning in the official documents. Gažovič (2012) in his research shows that the main argument for giving aid is based on an obligation that fits the logic of consequences, i.e. egoism. One can see it also in the Slovak Medium-Term Strategy for 2014-2018, as it emphasizes global problems such as the depletion of natural resources, illegal migration, climate change, etc. These constitute
“challenges” (MFEA 2013, p. 5) for development cooperation, and there is a need to find effective solutions to them.

On the other hand the ODA Act from 2007 “brings a clearly altruistic interpretation of the Slovak ODA – its task is to help the recipients as much as possible, and this goal is valued positively regardless of whether it promotes other Slovak interests” (Gažovič 2012, p. 33). And as for effectiveness, the Act on Development Cooperation from 2015 includes effectiveness as its first principle.

It is possible to see the altruism/egoism dichotomy more clearly in the criteria that the Slovak government uses to define its territorial and sectoral priorities. There are the “needs of partner countries” (MFEA 2013, p. 9) on the side of altruism and “the global challenges of the international community, [and] priorities of the foreign policy and economy of the SR” (ibid.) on the side of egoism. However, especially in relation to the economy it might be better to call the egoistic discourse the win-win situation discourse, as the economic priorities of the donors are in general represented as congruent with the priorities of the recipients. On the other hand, though, the empirical evidence could show that the donors’ economic policies are detrimental to the recipients’ economic interests (on policy coherence for development in this regard see, e.g., Elgström & Pilegaard 2008; CONCORD 2015).

It is important to note that poverty as a criterion of aid has been losing its primacy in the Slovak development discourse.12 Whereas in the 2009-2013 Strategy, a country’s “level of social, economic and political development” (MFA 2009, p. 13), understood as its HDI, was one of the criteria, one cannot find it in the new 2014-2018 Strategy. Only in the case of Afghanistan can one read that it is an LDC (“least developed country”) and in the case of South Sudan that it is a low income country, but in the first case this information is preceded by the statement that Afghanistan “has been a territorial priority of SlovakAid since 2003” and in the case of South Sudan, it is stated that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) “have built a positive reputation” there (MFEA 2013, p. 10). Other countries are also included in the Strategy on the basis of arguments unrelated to poverty. For example, it is argued that Kenya “is a traditional partner” of Slovakia (MFEA 2013, p. 9). Altruism is thus much less present in the discourse through the “level of development” criterion today than in the previous years, but it is present (at the rhetorical level) through discussions of partner countries’ needs.

The international discourse is primarily concerned with the eradication of poverty in a way that is often unrelated to national interests. The first MDG is clear: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Similarly the Treaty on the Functioning of the European

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12 The change of discourse has been followed by a change in the allocation of the ODA in 2014 and 2015, though this information is not included in Graph 1 as the graph that is reproduced here is from the NGDO Platform’s report on the year 2013, and the Platform has stopped publishing this graph since then. In 2014 LDCs and LICs received 31% of the ODA and middle income countries received 69% and in 2015 the figures were 22% and 78% respectively.
Union states that the “[European] Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty” (EU 2012b, p. 141, Article 208)

At the same time the discursive subgroups of effectiveness and coordination and complementarity make up a part of the development discourse as well. Article 210 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU speaks clearly in regard to this: “In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation” (EU 2012b, p. 142). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness commits the donors to “[m]ake full use of their respective comparative advantage” (OECD 2008, p. 6) and the Accra Agenda for Action speaks about reducing fragmentation of aid “by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors” (OECD 2008, p. 17).

Thus on the one hand the discourse is dominated by poverty reduction, and the donors’ altruism is an important part of it. On the other hand the egoistic emphasis on national interest is part of the discourse as well. Then there is also the discourse of effectiveness that is based on the discourse of coordination and complementarity of donors.

The already mentioned experience with the transformation is an element that enables the differentiation of Slovakia and other postcommunist countries from the Western donors. The choice of a particular discursive subgroup can serve as a guideline for the choice of recipient countries. According to the OECD the transition experience should influence the choice of the program and project countries. The DAC OECD Special Peer Review Report on the Slovak Development Cooperation Program recommends that “Slovakia should (...) ensure that its comparative advantage as a donor more consistently informs its policy and selection of priorities and countries” (OECD 2011). The DAC understands under the term “Slovak comparative advantage” the capacity of Slovakia to pass its own transition experience to other countries and its detailed knowledge of and closeness to Eastern Europe (OECD 2011).

Nevertheless, the discursive subgroups of effectiveness and complementarity and coordination enable a different interpretation of Slovakia’s choice of the same countries than the altruism and egoism subgroups. As such, these subgroups serve different interests. Whereas the Slovak foreign national priorities are perceived negatively in the altruism

13 The Conclusions of the Council of the EU on this matter are also clear: “The Council calls upon the EU to make more efficient use of knowledge sharing and capacity development methods, promoting expert exchanges and twinning, where appropriate, and furthering the use of the transition experience of Member States, where applicable. […] In this context, the Council welcomes the offers of EU Member States to make their experience and expertise widely available” (Council of the EU 2013: 3).
discursive subgroup, since they are seen as negating the (seemingly) dominant logic of development cooperation, these priorities are perceived positively in the discursive subgroups of effectiveness and complementarity and coordination because here they are seen as examples of an effective functioning of development cooperation.

The power effect is clear here. The interest groups which prefer countries within the realm of the Slovak national interest suddenly gain a much more persuasive argument than the one they had until now. They do not have to argue that by helping in their country’s neighborhood Slovaks are also helping themselves, as they can now say that this is the region where Slovakia should be helping because this is where the Slovak comparative advantage lies and where the donor community expects Slovaks to be helping.

Here two examples from the existing literature will be reinterpreted according to the different discursive sub­groups in order to illustrate the argument. The first example is a research article from Balázs Szént-Iványi (2012), which analyzes where the development money of the Visegrád countries goes. The author himself criticizes the “simplistic cleavage between ‘altruistic’ and ‘egoistic’ OECD DAC donors” (Szént-Iványi 2012, p. 70) and uses several variables in his research. However, his research results return to the altruism/egoism dichotomy: according to him “the level of poverty (…) and the previous performance of the recipients (…) are not significant factors in explaining the aid allocation decisions of the four donor countries” (ibid., p. 84). The V4 countries “mainly support recipients in which they have political, security and economic interests, as countries in the Western Balkans and the CIS region are the most important recipients [for them]” (ibid., p. 85).

Nevertheless, a different interpretation of this finding based on the discourse of effectiveness could change the last sentence to the following one: The V4 countries support the recipient countries where their aid is most effective, i.e. they support the countries they know best and the ones in which their transition experience can be used most effectively. These are the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Szént-Iványi comes to a different conclusion regarding Slovakia, though: “Slovakia, however, seems to be the [Visegrad] country which differs most from the other three. The per capita income levels of the recipients are significant — although only marginally — which means that the country may actually have a poverty focus, in contrast with the other three” (ibid., p. 81).

A different interpretation, however, could go like this: Slovakia differs from other

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14 Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.
15 The variables include: the size of the country, GDP per capita (measuring the recipients’ need for aid), GDP growth and the quality of economic and political institutions (measuring their merit) and, finally, groups of recipients (measuring national interest) – such groups include the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States; Iraq and Afghanistan; and the partner countries “inherited” from the communist period such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Angola.
Visegrad countries, as it does not use its development money effectively and spends it in countries to which other donors send their aid and where it cannot use the comparative advantage of its transition experience and does not have a detailed knowledge of the local society.

The second example is a graph from the Slovak Development Cooperation 2013 report (namely the dark line in the graph) (PMVRO 2014). It categorizes Slovakia's aid recipient countries into the categories of poor and middle income countries according to their income. By focusing on incomes, this graph (or line) implies the normative importance of this category and suggests that one should be helping the poor countries, which seem to need help more than the middle-income countries. It also raises the question of why any money is destined to go to the latter category of countries. The discourse of the dark line in the graph thus belongs to the altruism/egoism dichotomy. The altruistic aid goes where it is most needed, i.e. to the poor, but there are probably other interests behind the egoistic aid that goes to the richer countries.

Graph to be inserted here

Source: PMVRO (2014, 2012)

A different approach could focus on the discursive subgroups of effectiveness and complementarity and coordination as the light line in the graph shows. If such an approach is taken, suddenly, very different groups of countries become important, and the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries (i.e. the countries where Slovakia can use its comparative advantage) gain a positive connotation. Together with them the importance of the new discursive subgroups rises as well. The question of egoism and altruism disappears, and effectiveness becomes crucial. The Slovak motivations are not important anymore, but what counts is the effectiveness of the Slovak work.

The claim that there is a trend to give to the poorest countries regardless of the Slovak national interests (the dark line in the graph) can be replaced with the claim that there is a trend of decreasing the use of the Slovak comparative advantage abroad (the light line in the graph). Neverthless, today’s actual trend is the opposite of the one in the graph (see footnote 12).

This discursive shift has its power effects. Slovakia does not lose its foreign political priorities with the change in the development discourse; however, there is no place for national interests in the discourse of effectiveness and complementarity and coordination of donors. The power effect of these discursive subgroups connected to the transition experience discourse is to conceal “the promotion of political, security and commercial interests in the middle income countries of East and South Eastern Europe” (Horký 2012, p. 28).
A different research would be necessary to show how commercial interests are served in these countries. An indication of how they are served in them could be the number of companies interested in investing in, e.g., Kenya or Moldova. A much simpler task, though, would be to prove that, for example, Moldova is a more important partner according to what the Slovak political and security elites consider to be the Slovak national interest. However, a much more demanding research would be necessary to show how the Slovak ODA in Moldova actually contributes to the Slovak security.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this text was to discuss the Slovak development discourses and point to their power effects and the power effects of the identities that these discourses create. The article tried to show whom the power effects of these discourses serve and how particular actors (un)intentionally act through these discourses. It also tried to show that discourses enable resistance against the discursive power.

The text reiterated extant research findings about the Slovak development policies, showed how it helps Slovaks to define themselves and complemented these findings with an analysis of how Slovaks are represented through opinion surveys as people who are willing to give. The result is a Slovak identity in which Slovakia is a developed country with one crucial element of this feature – development cooperation – that is supported by the Slovak population.

The discursive construction of Slovakia as a developed country has power effects in the Slovak society as well as in its relation to the outside world. First of all, Slovaks are distinguished from the “underdeveloped,” and this serves their self-esteem, but at the same time the development discourse is part of the discursive terrain for global economic relations and contributes to the current inequality in the world. As for the related opinion surveys that contribute to the construction of the Slovak people as willing to help, despite having instrumental effects for various actors the construction of the opinion surveys seems to be a strategy without a clearly identifiable agent. A different research would be necessary to thoroughly answer the question of whether this is the case, though.

The construction of Slovakia as a developed country and as having successfully gone through a transition from communism to democracy has power effects in relation to the Slovak Self in the past as well as in relation to the West. The export of the Slovak transition experience suggests that this experience is worth exporting and that the current regime is somehow substantially better than the previous one. The transition experience discourse thereby legitimizes the gains of the winners of the regime change and delegitimizes the suffering of the losers, the marginalized and also those connected with the previous regime. But again there does not seem to be one intentional actor behind this discourse. More importantly, in recent years more and more doubts are being cast on the Slovak transition, and the Slovak aid may well be sharing Slovakia’s negative experience to help others avoid it. However, the question remains whether this more balanced approach weakens the pro-
capitalist liberal-democratic discursive hegemony or strengthens it by admitting to the
democratic regime’s partial failures while still generally supporting it.

The transition experience has a power effect in relation to the so-called old donors as well. Slovakia, when it is seen as a developed country becomes somewhat equal with other developed countries; however, by being called a “new donor” it gains the position of an apprentice who is not as experienced as the “old” donors despite its previous engagement in international aid as part of Czechoslovakia. The power effect here serves the dominant donors as their norms are not being questioned and the Slovak development constituency (willingly) adopts them. Another effect of the “new donor” label is a contribution to an overall Orientalism between Western and Eastern Europe, of which the field of development cooperation is just a small part. The Slovaks are again in a hierarchically lower position than their Western counterparts. Yet, it is important to note that the label “new donors” enables a resistance against the “old” donors as the “new” donors do not fulfill their commitments. This ambivalence also demonstrates again that there is not a single originator of this discourse.

Finally, the adoption of the European (and OECD) norm of donors’ effectiveness has power effects in Slovakia. Whereas the acceptance of the altruism/egoism dichotomy enables criticism of the Slovak ODA flowing to the recipients chosen on the basis of the Slovak national interest, the acceptance of the norm of donors’ effectiveness reverses the perspective, and the same recipients become the embodiment of Slovakia following the right European norm. This new approach may serve not only those political or security elites who define the Slovak national interest, but also very particular financial interests. A research of a different type is necessary to pursue this line of reasoning, however. Further research is also necessary in order to find out about the origins of the abovementioned discursive subgroups. There clearly are actors who promote altruism, egoism or effectiveness, but the relation between the gains from the adoption of this discourse and the support of this discourse might be complex.

Overall, the article tried to show that the Slovak development discourses have power effects in relation to the Slovak communist past, the “underdeveloped” Other and the “developed” Western Other. These effects are intangible in terms of identity - as they enable cultural superiority - and in terms of a spread of particular norms within the field of development cooperation. Yet, there can also be tangible economic effects serving the interest of the Slovak consumers or the Slovak investors abroad. In general it is difficult to trace the origins of these discourses despite their effects serving particular actors, and therefore it might be better to speak about a “strategy without a strategist” (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, p. 187) within the Slovak development cooperation apparatus.

The contribution of this analysis is both academic and political. First, it intervenes into the academic field by questioning its powerful concepts that contribute to how the world is shaped politically. The new-old donor distinction is not just an empirically problematic conceptualization of donors, but also an enactment of a politically questionable Orientalist division of the world. What is well known from the postcolonial research about
the developed-developing distinction can be applied to the East-West slope (Melegh 2006) that is less known in the field of development studies. Second, development policy is not just one of many governmental policies, but it also contributes to the legitimation of the current regime. The article highlights this non-trivial finding and it can be considered as a spark for a debate about the nature of the regime in Slovakia. Finally, another political contribution of the article lies in the potential connection between the seemingly innocuous discourse of effectiveness and the financial interests working within the Slovak development cooperation.

These are all rather political contributions that fit well with the critical tradition of research, but the article also provides a useful contribution to a theoretical debate. Power and discourse are not deterministic, and resistance against them is possible. Not only could all the examined discourses be changed, but the discourse that subordinates “new” donors at the same time enables their resistance as part of this subordination. This article thereby contributes to the perception of the world as complex and ambivalent, thus negating simplistic notions of an absolute dominance or hegemony.

Bibliography


Documents


**Interviews**

Interview No. 1 (2013) Interview with a respondent from PDCS, personally in Bratislava, 17 June 2013.

Interview No. 4 (2013) Interview with a respondent from the Pontis Foundation, personally in Bratislava, 26 June 2013.

Interview No. 5 (2013) Interview with a respondent from the Pontis Foundation, personally in Bratislava, 3 July 2013.

Interview No. 9 (2013) Interview with a respondent from People in Peril, personally in Bratislava, 13 August 2013.