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• Europe as a Global Player: A View from China

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EUROPE AS A GLOBAL POWER: VIEWS FROM THE OUTSIDE

For more than two decades since the end of the Cold War, debates on the future of Europe have largely been intra-European discussions on European institutions, identity, treaty revisions, Eastern enlargement, competitiveness, demography, democratic legitimacy and, finally, the recent financial and political turmoil that shook Europe’s foundations. The mainstream European discussions have been deep but somewhat narrow. Whilst Europeans indulged in navel-gazing, the non-European world changed with an unprecedented speed and intensity. As a result, today’s world is ever less European and Europe finds itself in a deep political and economic crisis. This does not mean that Europe is no longer a key global actor, though. The sheer size of its market, its historical legacy, its role in major international institutions and the scope of its development aid guarantee its global influence. However, the next decade will define whether, to what extent and in what way Europe can remain an influential force reaching beyond its geographical limits. The most recent EU response to the financial problems of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain seems to have created an image of Europe in which it is stingy, rigid and possibly oppressive, which is hardly a model to emulate. This obviously undermines Europe’s soft power and increases the transaction costs of Europe’s international bargaining. Therefore, the way other major players look at Europe becomes of paramount importance. Europe constantly needs to interact with them to meet its basic international objectives.

A new definition of the role of the European Union in world affairs that would reflect such perceptions and respond to them is an obvious political demand. The authors of this special edition thus contribute to the overdue debate on this topic. The starting assumption of this special edition is the recognition that Europe, when defining its global role, depends as much on the views and strategic visions of outside powers as on its own self-image and global aspirations. This special issue therefore includes contributions on this topic from leading scholars from China, India, Brazil, Russia, Japan and Turkey. These countries were chosen in order to provide a variety of perspectives and reflect inherent European interests. Europe needs to make sure that its vast neighbourhood is relatively stable and prosperous. In this respect the positions of Russia and Turkey are particularly critical. Moreover, Europe needs to protect its social, labour, food safety and environmental standards that are being undermined by the global trade competition. China, India and Brazil are very crucial in this context. Furthermore, Europe’s role in the global security governance should also be protected and this includes its relations with Japan and the other key regional players that were already mentioned.
EDITORIAL

Each author, with his or her own approaches and emphases, analyses their specific country’s views of Europe and asks how these perceptions are likely to influence the country’s political and economic relations with the EU. Further questions then touch upon the extent to which Europe remains a relevant factor in the country’s global strategic vision. Is Europe perceived to be a normative power, a trading bloc, a super state, a cosmopolitan empire, an intergovernmental organization or an overstretched and declining institutional mess? Will Europe, in the eyes of the powers under study, have a ‘problem-solving capacity’ in global governance, or will it be a major problem in itself?

The stimulating expert chapters of this edition should be of interest to academics, policy-makers, diplomats and the wider public alike. We always had such a broad audience in mind when planning and producing this special issue. In fact, the volume grew out of a large international conference held in Prague in March 2012, which was organised jointly by the Institute of International Relations in Prague, the Czech Diplomatic Academy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Prague in Prague and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). The conference brought together not only the editors and chapter authors but also high level academic commentators and an interested audience of more than a 100 diplomats, politicians, students, professors and civil society representatives. We would like to thank once again all the participants and sponsors of that event, the editorial team of this journal, the excellent language editor, Jan Hrubín, and the anonymous reviewers of the various articles for their indispensable input. Without them we would not have been able to produce this stimulating special issue.

Guest Editors:

Hartmut Mayer (University of Oxford)
and Jan Zielonka (University of Oxford)
Europe as a Global Player:
A View from China

CHEN ZHIMIN

Abstract: Europe in the form of the European Union is seen in China as a major player in global affairs. As a sui generis actor, the EU was seen in general as a progressive force in world affairs in China. Europe’s economic might and normative appeals were also widely acknowledged in China, even though the Chinese on occasions complained of the assertive normative diplomacy of the EU and its member states, which was backed by its economic power. However, as Europe encounters a severe sovereign debt crisis, and China continues its fast growth in terms of economic development and international influence, the Chinese leaders, elites and general public are starting to develop a more realistic view of Europe and scaling down some of their wishful thinking about the ever-growing influence of the EU. Yet, at government level, relations with the EU and its member states are still on the top of China’s foreign policy agenda. By trying to offer a helping hand to the EU, the Chinese government is hoping that the current crisis might turn into a stimulating factor for a closer relationship between China and the EU/member states on both bilateral and global issues.

Keywords: EU, China, sovereign debt crisis, normative power

This article argues that since 2008 and especially in the course of the global financial crisis and the European debt and Euro crises, important changes have taken place with regard to how the global role of the European Union (EU) and its member states is seen in China.

A number of efforts have been made to capture the Chinese views of the EU as a global actor in the pre-crisis years. In their respective contributing chapters, David Shambaugh of George Washington University and Zhu Liqun of China Foreign Affairs University arrived at quite identical findings: the Chinese tend to believe that the EU is becoming more powerful and playing a more important role in the world because of the European integration process; however, there is a fair amount of wishful thinking and cognitive dissonance in Chinese assessments of Europe’s role in world affairs, in the sense that they are often too quick to identify apparent areas of overlapping perspectives, overstate the similarities, and understate or ignore the differences (see Shambaugh, 2008; Zhu, 2008a). These assessments were based on their respective surveys of Chi-
nese research on the EU before 2006. Since then, at least three major developments have unfolded:

1) The Lisbon Treaty, which reorganized the EU foreign policy mechanism, was put into effect in December 2009.

2) The 2008 global financial and economic crisis has exacerbated the power-shift trend in favor of emerging powers: leading western powers, including the United States and the European countries, suffered heavy economic losses in the crisis unleashed by the melting-down of Wall Street from 2008; European countries have been caught in the contagious debt crisis, which put the Euro under serious threat; however, China successfully weathered the global economic crisis, continued its rapid economic growth and, in 2010, overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest national economy.

3) The bilateral relations between the EU and China experienced some setbacks over the past years, as the two sides were not able to move the bilateral relations forward while disputes over trade balance, human rights, Tibet, Darfur and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games popped up, exposing the shallow substance of the high rhetoric of the ‘strategic partnership’.

After the breakout of the Euro-debt crisis, another major effort to study the Chinese views of the EU was undertaken by the University of Nottingham. This project was funded by the EU 7th Framework Programme. The preliminary results, mostly based on the opinion surveys conducted in China in 2010, revealed that while the Chinese public generally favored the EU and its global role, more than half of the Chinese respondents under survey perceived a conflict of values between China and the EU, and the growing importance of the key EU member states in developing China-EU relations.  

For this author, to present a fuller, in-depth and updated account of Chinese views of the EU as a global player, it was necessary to make use of all kinds of existing research findings, survey results, and views expressed through media reports, scholarly publications, and official documents, and to trace the attitudinal changes against the backdrop of major recent developments within Europe, around the world and between China and the EU.

Specifically, the article will look into Chinese views on four aspects of the EU as a global player. The first section will analyze the Chinese views of the EU as a sui generis actor, one which can act as a single actor for its member states in certain policy areas and has to work with its member states in other policy areas. The second section will show how Chinese views of the EU as a global economic power have changed in the aftermath of the Euro debt crisis, and how the Chinese appreciation of the EU as a global normative power varies in different dimensions. To proceed further, the third section will discuss the role of the EU in China’s strategic and foreign policy thinking, and it will attempt to present an overview of the continuity and
change in this area since 2008. The final section will then identify the Chinese expectations of the EU in global governance.

AN UNEASY POST-MODERN PLAYER IN A STILL MODERN WORLD

THE EU AS A SUI GENERIS ACTOR

Since China established diplomatic relations with the EC in 1975, China has developed an ever growing interest in understanding the nature of the EC/EU’s international actorness. Surely, there are no Chinese who believe that the EC/EU has turned itself into a new super-state, as the Chinese acknowledge the limits of European integration, particularly in the political aspects. Like the Europeans themselves, the Chinese tend to think that ‘the state of European integration has far surpassed the usual international organizations, but at same time the EU has not reached the level of a sovereign state’ (Wu et al., 2011: 18). Chinese scholars believe that the EU has developed a unique, increasingly strong and progressive political and economic system and a unique, increasingly strong and progressive international actorness. With regard to the EU as a unique international actor, Zhu Liqun regards the EU as a ‘sub-international system’, a ‘party with a thousand faces’ for other actors, and ‘a very complicated, multi-faced and difficult actor to deal with’ (Zhu, 2008b: 89–90). Another attempt to understand the EU’s unique character as an international actor argues that the EU needs to be comprehended through its three different aspects: 1) the EU as an ‘asymmetrical multi-pillar actor’, an economic superpower, an important political power and, at the same time, a nascent military power; 2) the EU as a ‘multi-mechanism complex actor’, with intergovernmentalism prevailing in the foreign, security and defense policy, and supranationalism functioning in those areas of its external relations falling under the competences of the European Community; and 3) the EU as a ‘post-modern multi-headed actor’, with multiple entities engaging in the conduct of its foreign relations, causing immense difficulties in policy coordination and consistency – these conflicts are vertical when they are between the Union level institutions and individual member states and horizontal when they are among various EU level institutions, like the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament (Chen–Geeraerts, 2003: 319–349).

While Chinese Europe watchers have developed a quite sophisticated view of the EU, they also tend to believe that the EU has been constantly strengthening its capacity to act in international affairs. Since the late 1990s, the research focus in China clearly shifted towards EU level institutions, their policy making processes and their policy output. At the same time research on EU member states became increasingly marginalized. During the first decade of the 21st century, the study of the foreign relations of EU member states no longer found a place for itself in the mainstream of
European international relations studies in China. Instead research on the EU’s foreign policy dominated the field and the discourse (Zhang, 2011: 45).

There are a number of factors to explain the boom in EU studies and the shrinking interests in the member states in China. For one thing, the sizable grants from the European Commission clearly played an important role. As Dai Bingran, a veteran EU watcher in China, notes, the Commission grant through the EU–China Higher Education Cooperation Programme (1998–2001) was then the largest amount of foreign aid to China’s higher education, and its support for research and mobility attracted an ever-larger number of people – faculty and students alike – from more than 50 universities. Later on, the EU-China European Studies Centers Programme (2004–2007) played a similar role (Dai, 2008: 108). On the other hand, the progressive development of the Sino-EU relations during that period, from a comprehensive partnership in 1998 to a strategic partnership in 2003, and the seemingly unstoppable forward momentum of European integration since the end of the Cold War both helped to turn Chinese attention to the Union level, among both academics and policy makers.

This trend was also manifested in China’s policy towards Europe. Since China established diplomatic relations with the EC in 1975 the China-Europe relations had been mainly dominated by bilateral relations between China and EU member states in the area of foreign and security policy, while the economic relations gradually shifted towards the Community level. As the relationship with the EU level picked up its pace after the launching of the CFSP, China shifted a great deal of its diplomatic attention onto the EU level, with a proliferation of China-EU dialogue mechanisms and the raising of its head of the delegation to the EU to the vice ministerial level, which made him on par with the ambassadors to the UK, France or Germany. In October 2003, the Chinese government issued its first ever policy paper regarding a country or a region of the EU to demonstrate the great importance it attached to the EU. As the policy paper put it, ‘the EU is now a strong and the most integrated community in the world... the European integration process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs’ (Foreign Affairs Ministry of China, 2003). Even after the 2005 setbacks in the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty, Chinese authors still expressed their optimism about the further advancement of the European political integration (Fang, 2009: 316).

**CHINA’S GROWING UNEASINESS**

After China experienced two major EU-related setbacks in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century – in its efforts to remove the EU’s arms embargo against it and obtain from the EU a market economy status, China and the EU also launched an ambitious attempt to negotiate a comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2007, aiming to provide a single legal basis for the relation-
ship. However, that effort has so far failed to make significant progress after years of negotiation. At the member states level, China ran into problems with Germany (in 2007) and France (in 2008) because the ways in which the leaders of these countries arranged meetings with the exiled Dalai Lama were perceived in China as encouraging the separatist movement in Tibet. Premier Wen Jiabao even canceled his scheduled EU-China summit meeting with the French president in December 2008 in connection with these events. With these developments, China became increasingly puzzled in its dealings with the EU.

The growing difficulties in the China-EU relations pushed the Chinese side to rethink the sanguine views about the EU that they had during the past years and to pay increasing attention to its complicated nature. As China’s former ambassador to Germany later commented, ‘we Chinese gradually realize that we have overestimated and been too optimistic about the EU and its attitude towards China; there are many “bubbles” in there in the terms of economics’ (Mei, 2009: 18).

Chinese thinkers’ reflections generate a number of more realistic assessments of the EU. First, some try to differentiate the Union from the member states. As China’s former ambassador to the United Kingdom Ma Zhenggang cautioned, ‘If there are problems arising between China and a member state, even if that country is an influential member in the EU, that does not mean the China-EU relations are running into problems; in turn, if a certain problem arises in the China-EU relations, that does not mean China has problems with all European countries’ (Ma, 2009: 12). Second, the EU’s rhetoric needs to be differentiated from its reality. Given the intergovernmental nature of the EU’s CFSP mechanism, it is not a reality-based approach to depict the EU as a full-fledged strategic actor in regard to security and contentious issues. ‘Therefore, EU should be understood as what it is, rather than what it claims to be’ (Chen, 2008: 272).

Third, in some views, more emphasis is put on individual member states than on the EU itself. Feng Zhongping, director of the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a Beijing-based major official think tank, argues that there are actually two EUs, ‘a developed EU’ and a ‘developing EU’: the former refers to the EU’s foreign trade policy and its Monetary Union, to which the Community method is applied; the latter refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), with a process of political integration at its initial stage. In Feng’s view, although substantial progress has been achieved since the end of the Cold War, turning the ‘developing EU’ into a ‘developed EU’ would take a long and complicated process due to the difficulties in coordinating the three big member states, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Xiao-Sun, 2008: 145). At some point, Feng goes even further to argue the paramount importance of the member states. As he argues, in dealings with the EU, China has to remember member states first and EU
institutions second. The relationship between the member states and EU institutions can be characterized as follows: it may be very difficult to achieve anything without the EU institutions, but without the member states, nothing could be achieved (Feng, 2009: 66–67).

Fourth, the Chinese are increasingly concerned with the EU’s lack of ability to form an internal consensus in its policy towards China, which renders the EU not able to deliver what China has expected from a more fruitful partnership with it. With the reform of the Lisbon Treaty, Chinese observers raised some hope that a seemingly strengthened EU, at least by judging from the treaty text, could solve some of the delivery problems of the EU. Regarding the European anxiety over China’s success in playing a divide-and-rule strategy through its relationships with individual member states (Fox–Godement, 2009), Chinese observers tend to argue that individual EU member states pursuing different foreign policies is mainly a European fact, and not a fault on the Chinese side. As a retired Chinese senior diplomat frankly claimed, ‘China rather hopes that the EU would coordinate internally with regard to its China policy, instead of using internal differences as an excuse to shed off responsibilities and run around’ (Ding, 2009: 32).

The complicated nature of the EU’s actorness also confused the general Chinese public. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2008, the Chinese public thought that out of all the major international players, the country they best understood was the United States, as 70.3% of the surveyed said that they understood it very well or fairly well. Japan and Russia ranked second and third (59.3% and 46.1% respectively) in the same poll. In contrast, only 31.2% of the Chinese respondents said they understood the EU very well or fairly well. The Chinese researchers identified two main reasons that explain this lack of understanding of the EU. Firstly, they believe that supranational integration is a post-modern phenomenon, and the EU is a non-traditional international actor, while the political ideas of the Chinese people are still in the stage of the modern nation-state, as China remains in the process of modernization. Secondly, the EU institutional design and decision-making mechanism are very complicated and non-professionals would feel that it is very difficult to sort it out (Zhou et al., 2009: 111–112).

A NORMATIVE ECONOMIC POWER UNDER CHALLENGE
THE EU AS AN ECONOMIC GIANT IN TROUBLE
The EU is seen by the Chinese first and foremost as an economic superpower. For decades, the EU was seen as a success story of how Europe has managed to integrate economically and make itself once again a leading economic superpower on par with the United States. As Wang He argued in 2008, in terms of population,
GDP, trade flows and financial size, the EU is a global economic power matching the United States. After its introduction, the euro has rapidly become the second most important international currency behind the US dollar, a major new pillar in the international monetary system and an important pole of stability for the world economy. Based on its economic strength, the EU, through its common policy on trade and development assistance and as a champion of multilateralism, became one of the formulators of international economic regulations. In addition, the EU’s economic integration model and social economic model also act as examples for the world economy (Wang, 2008). Other scholars also point out the disproportionally larger power the EU or its member countries enjoy in global economic institutions; for example, the EU countries have a combined share of 32% of all the total quotas of the IMF and had 40% of the voting rights in the IMF Executive Board in 2008 (Wang, 2011).

For China, this means that economic cooperation with EU countries is of outstanding importance for its economic modernization efforts. In 2004, the EU became China’s biggest trading partner, and in 2007, the EU surpassed the United States to become China’s biggest export market. The EU is also the major foreign investor in China, having poured in FDI worth more than 70 billion US dollars. European investors also tend to bring in bigger, higher value-added and high-tech projects, which are not as numerous as smaller projects, and such projects produced a ‘catalytic impact’ on China’s development (Barysch et al., 2005: 38).

However, after the 2008 global economic crisis extended from the United States to Europe and detonated the debt crisis in the weak southern member states, like Ireland, Portugal and Greece, the Chinese rosy views of the EU economic power started to totter.

After the financial crisis, although a small number of Chinese observers still maintain their faith in the vitality of the EU economy, the majority of them are starting to question the economic status of the EU in the global economic system. The European economy is characterized by a considerable and long-lasting deterioration, a slow recovery, a high unemployment rate, a series of social problems and an outstanding sovereign debt crisis. The causes underlying these problems include the external strike by the US sub-prime crisis, the defects and unbalanced transition of the EU’s industrial structures and of the social market economy ideas and practice, the rigidity of the labor market, the imperfect institutional design and practice of the European integration process and some other long-term structural problems (Ding, 2010).

As the European debt and the Euro crisis deepen and spread, the Chinese media has paid great attention to the unfolding developments in Europe. It is surprising to the Chinese that Europe, which was once a kind of model on many fronts, is now becoming a source of problems. For the Chinese, it seems that, for a period of time, European leaders will be overwhelmed in dealing with questions such as ‘Is Greece...
worthy of being bailed out?’, ‘Is it possible to bail out Italy?’ and ‘Are the other Euro-zone countries willing to save those countries?’ (Wu, 2011).

Although China still exports more to the EU than the EU does to China, this author also noticed that, according to EU trade data, the value of EU exports to China rose from 48.4 billion euros in 2004 to 113.1 billion euros in 2011, while EU exports to the US, its largest trading partner, stagnated at about 240 billion euros in the same period. In addition, 33,000 EU firms operating in China registered total sales worth 190 billion euros in China’s domestic market in 2009. Most of all, it is in matters financial that the relationship is very much reversed. The current euro crisis, triggered by the debt crisis of the southern EU countries, has erupted at a time when other major developed economies, such as the US and Japan, are in financial strife. China, in pledging not to divest euro assets and committing a US$93 billion capital injection into the IMF, has acted as a major outside supporter for the EU in managing its Euro debt crisis. Under such circumstances, ‘it is probably safe to say that the exposure of European financial vulnerability and a certain kind of European financial dependence on China have made the economic relationship between the two sides a symmetrical one for the first time in several decades’ (Chen, 2011).

THE BLESSING AND THE NON-BLESSING OF THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER

A growing number of works of scholarly literature in China investigate the nature of EU power in the normative dimension. Chinese researchers tend to acknowledge that the EU, with its successful internal development, has commanded a substantial soft and/or normative power through its attractive model, its welfare state, its balanced distribution of wealth, its environment-friendly development model, its regional integration, which makes wars among European states inconceivable, and its norm diffusion strategies, like public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and enlargement. Using another concept, Song Xining described the EU as a ‘social power’ which is able to provide various models (such as the European integration model, the neighborhood policy model, the multilateralism model, the development assistance model and social welfare models) for international politics, as well as domestic political and social development for other countries (Song, 2011: 238–239).

Qin Yaqing and his colleagues identified three dimensions of the EU’s soft power. In the cultural dimension, the EU has established a culture of peace, cooperation and community. At the institutional level, the EU has built a set of legalized, networked and effective internal institutions. With regard to the policy dimension, Qin and his colleagues argue that when they judge the EU’s internal policy according to their three criteria, legitimacy, reciprocity and effectiveness, they give it a very high mark. They think the EU thus possesses a very high amount of soft power in this regard and that it can influence and change behaviors of other actors in the international soci-
ety through its power of attraction; through their study of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), they also come to the conclusion that the EU has developed some distinctive features, like its willingness to compromise with, respect and consider the interests of the other parties, and its opposition to the use of force or threats of using force. Such a ‘policy style of seeking peace and win-win solutions through cooperation’ greatly enhances the EU’s image on the international stage, as well as its soft power (Qin, 2008).

Other Chinese scholars embraced the concept of ‘normative power’, which was first developed by Ian Manners in his 2002 article (Manners, 2002: 236–237). In accordance with the concept, they believe that ‘by taking advantage of its biggest market in the world, the EU is reinforcing its narrative and rule-making power over global issues like environment, sustainable development and human rights, and it is moving gradually towards a new type of international “normative power”’ (Cui, 2007: 54). The EU is also seen as having developed a normative power strategy with the following aims: to play the role of a regional normative power so as to build a springboard for being a global normative power; to make use of its normative power in order to maintain its competitiveness in the global market; and to shape a global order favorable to European values and interests (ibid.: 57–58).

In general, Chinese observers give very positive assessments of certain aspects of the EU’s soft/normative power. One scholar argued that the EU’s normative power reflects the Europeans’ inheritance and further development of their value tradition, which offered ideational support to the European integration and can possibly provide experiences and references for other states, other regions and the development of future international relations. Therefore, ‘such an exploration rightfully deserves our respect’ (Hong, 2010: 63). More specifically, the Chinese positive view of the European normative power mostly centers on the attractive achievement that the EU has made in its internal construction. As Qin and his colleagues argue, among the three main aspects of the EU’s soft power, the EU’s advantage in the cultural and institutional dimensions is larger than its advantage in the policy dimension; and within the policy dimension, the EU’s soft power in its internal policy is larger than that in its foreign policy (Qin, 2008: 21).

While the EU’s internal achievements are seen as generally positive, Chinese academics expressed strong reservations about the expansive propensity of the EU’s soft/normative power. The values that the EU promotes are seen as ‘western, post-modern and post-sovereign’, the objective of the EU’s soft/normative power is perceived as being to ‘diffuse the European values and norms to the rest of the world’, and it is thought that at least compared to China, in its use of its soft/normative power, the EU is more willing to ‘use coercive measures to promote its values and norms around the world’ (Song–Chen, 2011: 51–53). In the aftermath of the societal unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, the EU and its member states were
quick to intervene and encourage the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes in the region, as in the case of Libya, where some European countries launched a military intervention operation in the name of the protection of civilians but then forced a regime change. The EU also put economic sanctions on Syria with a clear aim of regime change there.

Four problems are raised in the Chinese discourse in this regard. First, Chinese observers have strong reservations about the universality of EU norms. They tend to argue that the European norms are not necessarily genuinely ‘universal’, but rather ‘Europe-centric’ (Qin, 2008: 249–259). Second, they tend to quickly point out that these norms are actually a reflection of European material interests. European efforts to raise environment and labor standards and to promote better protection of intellectual property rights are seen as a means to ‘establish a better legal environment for European business’ (Cui, 2007: 58). The third problem concerns the EU’s double standard in its exercise of normative power. The EU’s refusal to recognize the democratically-elected Hamas government in Palestine, for example, was quickly exposed as a case contradicting the EU’s professed support for democracy (Huang, 2005). Such a double standard compromises the legitimacy of the EU’s soft/normative power. A further problem that was discussed is the EU’s insufficient capacity to pursue its normative power. In the EU’s relations with China, when the EU’s normative agenda, such as human rights, conflicts with more material ‘economic and strategic interests’ of the key member states, like, for example, in the case of human rights, ‘pragmatic diplomacy most often prevails’ (Hong, 2010: 62). Nevertheless, compared with the situation some years ago, it seems that more recently the EU and some of its member states have raised the profile of normative diplomacy in their relations with China, particularly in 2007 and 2008.

With the arrival of the Euro debt crisis, the internal model of European governance has been questioned in China. Even Qiu Yuanlun, a long-time optimistic observer of European affairs, thinks that Europeans have made three mistakes in the past two decades: there was too much welfare with sluggish economic growth and an overdependence on public debt; there were too many rules and regulations while wealth creation was ignored; and the integration was hasty in terms of widening and deepening, causing short- and mid-term problems (Qiu, 2012). According to BBC polls, the Chinese general public generally holds positive views about the EU’s international influence. However, the positive rating of the EU in these polls climbed down from 62% in 2008 to 46% in 2012, while the negative rating rose from 16% to 26% during the same period (BBC World Service Poll, 2008, 2012). The Pew Research Center asked a more general question in their multi-year poll project which sought to find the overall favorability of various states and international organizations. In 2007, in the context of this project, 40% of the Chinese respondents said they held a favorable view of the EU, while another 40% responded negatively to the same
question. In 2012, the positive ratings among the Chinese respondents dropped to 33%, while the negative ones rose to 50% (Pew Research Center, 2012).

THE EU’S PLACE IN CHINA’S GLOBAL STRATEGY: LASTING IMPORTANCE AMID BEWILDERMENT
THE EU IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY THINKING DURING THE ‘HONEYM OON PERIOD’
Since China adopted its reform and opening-up policy at the end of the 1970s, its foreign policy has been dominated by its new economic and geopolitical interests. Economically, China aims to develop economic cooperations with countries around the world, to obtain foreign investments, market access, technology and resources, which would assist its export-oriented development strategy. Geopolitically, China’s overall objective is to safeguard its territorial integrity and secure a peaceful external environment for its domestic economic development. As a result of its economic success, China has become a major player in the world political economy, and it is currently obliged to develop a more outward-looking foreign strategy than the one it had in the past; China has made several attempts to articulate its foreign strategy, with the rising of its official discourse of ‘peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious world’.

In a major article that was intended to explain the Chinese foreign policy and its intentions, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the central figure in charge of China’s foreign policy, offered his personal view about the three fundamental elements of China’s ‘core interest’ which underlie China’s foreign policy: ‘First, China’s form of government and political system and their stability, namely the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the socialist system and socialism with Chinese characteristics. Second, China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. Third, the basic guarantee for sustainable economic and social development of China.’ Besides these, it could be argued that there are two additional concerns in Dai’s mind: preventing countries from teaming up to ‘keep off, contain or harm China’ or ganging up ‘under various pretexts in quest of dominance of world affairs’; and that China should cooperate with other countries to deal with the ‘increasing risks and challenges’ in the world.

Starting from these interest considerations, Mr. Dai also elaborated that peaceful development is about how China is to realize its development and revitalize itself; specifically, it means that China would develop itself in peaceful, cooperative ways. The commitment to the path of peaceful development serves as the basis and prerequisite of building a harmonious world, while the harmonious world vision tells what kind of world and international order China is committed to building (Dai, 2010).

How has the EU been featured in China’s foreign policy thinking against this background?
Clearly, the EU occupied a very central place in China’s foreign policy during the honeymoon period between 1995 and 2005. For a decade, the bilateral relations were progressing constantly, as the EU adopted a more constructive China policy of engagement. From the Chinese perspective, the EU had become China’s largest trading partner and a key source of foreign investment and technology, and hence it was economically crucial for China’s development. Compared to the United States, the EU was more willing to develop a relationship based on mutual respect with China, especially after the EU stopped sponsoring or co-sponsoring any resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission condemning China’s human rights record in 1998, and also after its decision to develop a ‘comprehensive partnership’ with China and launch an annual EU-China summit in the same year. The EU also followed the ‘one-China policy’ more strictly, stopped the arms sales to Taiwan, and made it so that Taiwan would never again be a major thorny issue in the EU-China relations. The economic relations grew dramatically, and the two sides signed an agreement to facilitate China’s accession to the WTO in 2000. Therefore, the 2003 China EU Policy Paper could proclaim that ‘[t]here is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other’ (Foreign Affairs Ministry of China, 2003). Globally, the EU was seen as a possible collaborator in the push for a more multi-polar world where the United States’ intention to construct a unipolar world would be checked and balanced. Besides, in dealing with the multiple challenges the world confronts collectively – e.g. the resources scarcity, climate change, nuclear proliferation, poverty, epidemic diseases, or organized crime, the Chinese see themselves as being more in line with Europe than with the US. Europe is also seen by the Chinese as having a farsighted vision of the problems, and also as having developed viable measures for tackling these problems within Europe and for the world at large.

This seemingly ever-growing relationship led the Chinese leadership to see the EU as a key ‘comprehensive strategic partner’. In Premier Wen Jiabao’s words, ‘comprehensive’ in this phrase means that the cooperation should be all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered, covering economic, scientific, technological, political and cultural fields, at both bilateral and multilateral levels, and involving both governments and non-governmental groups; ‘strategic’ means that the cooperation should be long-term and stable and transcend the differences in ideology and social systems; ‘partnership’ means that the cooperation should be equal-footed, mutually beneficial, and win-win, and that the two sides should seek a common ground on the major issues while shelving their differences on the minor ones (Wen, 2004).

However, later developments did not live up to this high hope and rhetoric. No breakthroughs of crucial importance have been achieved over the past few years – although one such breakthrough would be Europe lifting the arms embargo against
China, which it previously promised to do. The two sides had to confront each other in areas of cooperation in the past, like when they confronted each other in regard to the rising trade imbalance in China’s favor. They also found themselves in dispute over new issues in the relationship, like China’s growing presence in Africa. Moreover, some disputes which were contained in the past have resurfaced in the bilateral relations, with the perception on the Chinese side that Europe was increasingly meddling in China’s domestic issues – for example, there were more high-level meetings between European leaders and the Dalai Lama, who, in the view of the Chinese side, had been championing a course of Tibetan independence from China (Chen et al., 2011: 9–10). The rise of new difficulties led the Chinese government to realize at the end of 2007 that the bilateral relations had acquired a new feature: ‘deepening cooperation amid rising disputes’. As Wang Hongjian, deputy director of the European Affairs Department in China’s Foreign Ministry, explained, the EU and China are two rapidly rising powers, and in the process of their rapid rise, it is inevitable that they would have conflicting interests as well as converging interests (Xiao–Sun, 2008: 148).

HAS ANYTHING CHANGED SINCE 2008?
If China believed that Europe was still a rising power before 2008, with the arrival of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the Euro crisis in 2009, such a view became less persuasive in China. Pessimistic views about the EU become more vocal among the Chinese elites, and today, they are echoed in the general public.

Yang Jiemian, a Chinese expert on the United States and the head of an influential think tank in China, the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, offered a broad remapping of the power shift in the world with his ‘Four Groups’ theory in early 2010. Yang argued that after the 2008 global financial crisis, the co-relation of international forces is evolving in favor of developing countries with emerging powers as their representatives, which is unprecedentedly shaking the Western powers’ dominance of world affairs. The regrouping of international forces is forming the Four Groups of gaining, defending, losing and weak forces. Specifically, in Yang’s view, the Gaining Group is comprised by major emerging countries, like China; the Defending Group includes the United States, which has lost its ‘dominating’ status; the Weak Group is formed by those developing countries which are currently having difficulties; the EU, along with Japan and Russia, belongs to the Losing Group, with the EU gradually losing its ‘No. 2’ status in the world and having to ‘transfer’ some of its power and interests to other actors in the IMF and the World Bank (Yang, 2010: 5–6). However, China’s Europe watchers, though they are very much in agreement that the EU is experiencing a relative decline, tend not to make such bold and straightforward assertions as that the EU belongs to the Losing Group.
The Most Influential Bilateral Relationships as Viewed by the Chinese: 2006–2011

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<tr>
<td>China-US</td>
<td>78.0</td>
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<td>75.6</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>76.8</td>
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<td>China-Japan</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>China-Russia</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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<td>21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>China-Europe</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>China-Africa</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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Source: *Global Times* Public Opinion Poll Center, 2011 and 2012. The figures from 2006 to 2010 were available at http://poll.huanqiu.com/dc/2011-01/1395647_3.html. The figures for 2011 were obtained from the center by the author.

Note: The people under survey were allowed to select the two bilateral relationships that they perceived as the most important.

While Yang’s view might overly underestimate the importance of the EU in international affairs today, it does reflect a noticeable attitude change in China regarding Europe. In January 2011, China’s newspaper *Global Times*, which is affiliated with the official newspaper *People’s Daily*, released its 2010 annual survey of Chinese attitudes towards the outside world. The newspaper had conducted such surveys in the previous four consecutive years as well. In 2009, the China-Europe relationship was seen as a much less influential bilateral relationship compared with the China-US relationship, but it was still perceived as being on par with China’s relationships with Japan and Russia. Nevertheless, between 2009 and 2010, the importance of the relations with Europe suffered a dramatic fall in the eyes of the Chinese, as the corresponding figure in the poll fell from 19.9% down to 7.3%. According to the 2011 unpublished survey, the Chinese rating of Europe’s importance improved slightly – to 8% – in 2011, but this figure was still significantly lower than the corresponding figure for 2006.

At the government level, the change in China’s assessment of the EU’s global role is more delicate. On the one hand, governmental officials are shifting their focus from the rising strength of the EU to its weakness, and also from the growing cooperation with the EU to bilateral problems. As Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying told *Der Spiegel* in August 2011, ‘the west is in trouble at the moment’ and China is ‘indeed worried about the economic difficulties of the west.’ She said that in a discussion with her colleagues about the future of the EU, her colleagues basically believed that if the European countries can not join hands to solve the problems, ‘the Euro zone might collapse’ (Spiegel Online International, 2011). Although Chinese officials thought that the China-EU relationship was much better than the
China-Japan and China-US relationships, most of them complained that in making international policy decisions, the EU or its member states took little or no account of the interests of China, and a fairly large number of them said they were unhappy about the EU’s China policy (Dong, 2011: 4).

On the other hand, a more realistic and somehow pessimistic view of the EU does not imply that the EU is becoming marginalized in China’s foreign policy thinking. Chinese leaders continue to stress on every occasion that relations with the EU are still a key priority for China. The EU is still seen as an ‘important strategic power in promoting world peace and development’, and ‘even if the current world political and economic situation has been undergoing a major shift, China would not change the strategic position of the China-EU relations’ (Wen, 2011). When the international media played up the US-China G2 concept in 2009 as President Obama developed a cozy relationship with China, Premier Wen Jiabao intentionally voiced his rejection of this concept in the EU-China summit held in Prague in May 2009. Wen emphatically said, ‘Some say that world affairs will be managed solely by China and the United States. I think that view is baseless and wrong.’ For Premier Wen, ‘It is impossible for a couple of countries or a group of big powers to resolve all global issues. Multipolarization and multilateralism represent the larger trend and the will of the people’ (CCTV.com, 2009).

Moreover, the Chinese government actually sees the current difficulties that the EU faces as new opportunities to advance the China-EU relationship. The Chinese government voiced its verbal support of the Euro and its confidence in the ability of the EU to overcome its temporary difficulties and made a number of purchases of government bonds from crisis-hit EU member states. It also upgraded its dialogue level with the EU through acts such as the creation of a strategic dialogue mechanism between the Chinese state councilor Dai Bingguo and the EU High Representative Lady Ashton in 2009, and more frequent visits to European countries by top Chinese leaders. China received Mr. Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, in May 2011, and this was his first official bilateral visit outside of Europe. On the EU side, Chinese researchers noticed that under the new system after the Lisbon reform, both the European Council President and the High Representative have been making serious efforts in developing a more coherent China policy. In September 2010, a special EU summit was organized to frame the EU’s foreign strategy, and China was enlisted as one of the EU’s three most prioritized strategic partners along with the United States and Russia. Lady Ashton then presented her progress report to the December 2010 EU summit on relations with China. The report was interpreted as generally positive in China, because it lifted China’s strategic importance in the EU’s foreign policy, it was more pragmatic with its focus on economic relations and it put more emphasis on the need to cooperate with China (Feng, 2011: 2). These efforts from both sides contributed to a successful EU-China
summit in Beijing on 14th February 2012. The Joint Press Communiqué released after the summit set a very positive tone for the relationship by mentioning the two sides’ ‘determination to set a good example for international cooperation in the 21st century, fully contributing to the cause of making this century one of peace, cooperation and development’ (Council of the European Union, 2012).

Obviously, in recent times, China has scaled down its rosy assessment of the EU as an ever growing power and its high hope of the critical importance of the EU-China collaboration. The EU may not once again become a proactive partner in China’s efforts to resist the hegemonic behavior of the United States, as it appeared to be such a partner during the height of the EU-China ‘honeymoon’ in 2003 and 2004. However, the EU and its member states are still regarded as key global economic and political actors that are important for China’s economic development and management of various regional and global challenges. As the United States recovered from its economic crisis by the middle of 2010, the Obama administration’s China policy quickly shifted from full embrace to renewed hedging, with the setting up of an American military and economic ‘pivot’ toward Asia, a strategy many interpret as ‘a bid to counteract China’s influence in the region’ (China Daily, 2012). Under such circumstances, even if Europe could not be counted on as a supportive partner of China, China still would benefit from a Europe that does not side with the new assertive American policy towards China. At a time when the Euro crisis exposes European weakness, China also sees that there could be more possibilities for the EU and its member states to adopt a more pragmatic policy towards China, allowing for more room to base the EU-China relations on mutual respect, equal footing, and less meddling in Chinese domestic affairs from the European side, and to expand their collaboration in global affairs.

**A GLOBAL PARTNER TO BE CULTIVATED**

As a main pillar of today’s global system, the EU and its key member states are central players in global affairs. Though not fully prepared, China has been pushed to assume its global role out of its growing world-wide interests and rising international expectations. In an increasingly multipolar world, cooperation is of necessity for China and the EU, and both sides called for an expansion of their cooperation beyond bilateral relations. The record of China-EU cooperation in global affairs over the past decade is quite mixed. They are not natural global partners in a number of issue areas. Nevertheless, through a bumpy learning process, both sides are adapting themselves to the other side’s divergent views and seeking possible convergences.

The reform of the international financial system surely features as the top agenda for the EU-China global cooperation. This reform involves two sub-issues in regard to which the EU-China cooperation can be highly important. One is the reform of the currency system, particularly the question of how the EU and China can pro-
mote a more balanced currency system which would be less dominated by the US dollar and allow other currencies and the SDR to play a bigger role in the system. The US fiscal situation is under great strain with the mounting debt, and the US monetary policy, like the two phases of the quantitative easing, is seen by both Europe and China as irresponsible, as it shifts the burden of economic adjustment towards the rest of the world by exploiting the dominant position of the US dollar as the chief reserve currency. In that context, China’s support of the Euro, the second largest reserve currency, could serve as ‘one way to constrain the American government’s ability to profit from money-printing at the expense of others’ (Zhao, 2011: 14). To support countries in financial crisis, especially those in the Eurozone, China contributed $50 billion to strengthening the lending capacity of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2009. In the G20 summit meeting of June 2012, China announced its decision to participate in the second round of the IMF resource boost with a pledge of 43 billion dollars (People’s Bank of China, 2012).

The other sub-issue is the reform of the key international financial institutions. After an irresponsible Wall Street dragged Europe into economic recession in 2008, it was the European Commission and French President Sarkozy who initiated the idea of the G20 summit mechanism, which included China and other emerging states as equal participants and later became the central global institute in coordinating economic policies. After China contributed 50 billion US dollars to the IMF, the European countries agreed to reduce their quota share in the IMF and thus allowed China to substantially increase its quota and hence also its voting rights in the IMF. In the future, Europe and China need to work with each other to ensure that the 2010 IMF reform will be fully implemented, and push for further reforms in the IMF to strengthen its regulating capacity while enhancing the representativeness of developing countries. Moreover, such reforms should also start in the World Bank.

In addition, as two of the top three trading powers, the EU and China should work much harder to move forward the process of the Doha Round multilateral trade liberalization. Over the past years, the EU-China trade dialogue focused too much on bilateral economic issues, like China’s market economy status. In the future, these bilateral dialogues need to incorporate the global dimension. China is seeking the EU for the recognition of its full market economy status, while the EU is demanding a bigger market opening offer from the Chinese side than China is prepared to make. China can wait till 2016 to obtain that status unconditionally, according to China’s bilateral WTO accession agreement with the EU, which was reached in 2001. Nevertheless, to boost the prospect of a new global trade liberalization deal in the Doha Round, China making a bigger and wider offer to open its market, coupled with the EU’s granting of MES and other market opening offers, such as lowering the hurdles for high-tech exports to China and a better investment environment for China’s direct investment in Europe, would not only lay a much more solid basis for the bi-
lateral economic relations, but at the same time, through the extensions of these market opening offers to other WTO members, could add important momentum to revitalizing the stalled Doha round.

The China-EU collision in the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference was an unfortunate episode. The two sides had been working together extremely well in the previous multilateral fora. China supported the Kyoto regime, which was established mainly due to the EU’s leadership, and the two sides also worked closely together in their efforts to bring the US back into the UNFCC framework (Bo–Chen, 2009). However, when the Obama administration returned to the UNFCC framework, it seemed that the EU adopted a strategy of focusing on pressing China to accept ambitious EU emission reduction targets. The resulting EU-China confrontation led China to turn to other emerging countries and even the US to come up with the so-called ‘Copenhagen Accord’, and it left EU leaders on the sideline. After this bitter experience in Copenhagen, both China and the EU adopted more pragmatic approaches, and the Cancun conference of late 2010 produced more substantial results. In the December 2011 climate change conference in South Africa, a more pragmatic EU committed itself to a prolonged period of the Kyoto protocol, and in return China was flexible enough to commit itself to a future legally binding global pact. The Durban conference could then finally deliver positive results.

The EU and China also need to cooperate better in coping with the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Apart from enhancing their coordination in the 6-nation contact group in coping with the Iranian nuclear issue, they now need to work through the UN Security Council in helping to stabilize the volatile situation in Iran. China supported the UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which imposed sanctions on the Gaddafist regime in Libya, and its abstention on Resolution 1973 allowed the European countries to launch a military intervention in Libya. However, China became increasingly uneasy with the fact that the Chinese accommodation in the Libya case opened the door for Europeans to orchestrate a regime change in Libya that was well beyond the authorization to launch a civilian protection mission. As China still regards itself a proponent of state sovereignty and non-interference into domestic affairs, the Libya experience prompted China to cast three vetoes (October 2011, February 2012, and July 2012) on three similar UN Security Council Resolutions that were made in regard to Syria. From a Chinese perspective, these resolutions, sponsored by European and other countries, could lead to another forced regime change in Syria. Therefore, a widening policy gap between the more intrusive Europe and the retrenched sovereigntist China can be observed in their approaches to handling the volatile situation in the Middle East. It demands that the two sides work much harder to bridge their differences in the future.

Beyond these more pressing issues, two other areas have potentials for enhanced cooperation between the EU and China: peacekeeping and development cooper-
Although China is a late comer in international peacekeeping, it is currently a major donor of the UN peace-keeping budget, contributing about 4% of the annual UN peace-keeping costs. China also contributes about 2000 military personnel to the ongoing UN-led peacekeeping operations. In addition, China deploys navy ships to fight pirates off the coast of Somalia. Therefore, the two sides have to cooperate when the missions are to be authorized by the UN Security Council (here the cooperation is carried out by the two sides’ diplomats), and also when the missions are conducted on the ground (here the cooperation is between the militaries of the two sides), like in the anti-pirate operations in the Gulf of Aden.

In the field of development cooperation, both the EU and China are major donors to the developing countries, especially those in Africa. While the EU-China relations in this area are mostly viewed as competitive by European media, Chinese observers tend to acknowledge Europe’s role as the leading donor to the developing countries while at the same time being critical of Europe’s increasingly conditional development policy. Chinese policy makers and observers were not aware of the spill-over impacts of China’s engagement in Africa on the European countries in the past. But after the EU made Africa a major issue in the China-EU relations in 2006, Chinese observers also called for the two sides to develop a cooperation in this regard but emphasized that ‘the two sides shall start from a few experimental projects to explore possible cooperation channels and models in development cooperation’ (Chen, 2010: 13). During the 12th EU-China summit, leaders from the two sides ‘agreed to explore appropriate areas for cooperation’ in development cooperation (Council of the European Union, 2009).

**CONCLUSION**

Since the end of the Cold war, the Chinese policy makers, observers and general public have developed a quite positive and optimistic view about the European Union. The smooth development of the bilateral relations, the rapid advancement of European integration, and perceived convergences on key foreign policy issues, like multilateralism, peaceful resolution of conflict, the central role of the UN, and sustainable development, all contributed to this development. However, over the past few years, Chinese observers have started to realize that there were some elements of wishful thinking in their sanguine views of the EU and its global role. They began to complain about the difficulties of dealing with the EU and the surfacing of various disputes in the bilateral relationship and with regard to global issues, and became anxious at the prospect of an EU that would be in relative decline after the 2008 financial and economic crisis. This shifting trend in the perception can be inferred from the analysis of the writings of Chinese observers and the changing public opinion in China. Nevertheless, while the Chinese side may become more realistic in their views about the EU, the Chinese government still accredits high importance to the relationship with the EU and its member states. From the Chinese perspective,
the EU is still China’s biggest trading partner, constitutes the biggest group of developed countries and is able to exert its international influence through common policies as well as the individual policies of the 27 member states. Yet, as it is now able to conduct relations with Europe from a stronger position than previously, China is seeing a better chance to improve its relationships with the EU institutions and the EU member states on issues bilateral as well as global.

ENDNOTES

1 Various publications of the 7th Framework Programme project on ‘Disaggregating Chinese Perception of the EU and Implications for the EU’s China Policy’, headed by the China Policy Institute of the University of Nottingham. Online: www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/research/funded-projects/chinese-eu/research-outputs.asp.

2 This concept was embraced by Chinese leaders from late 2003 until early 2004, but it was later replaced by the concept of ‘peaceful development’ due to concerns that the word ‘rise’ may exacerbate anxieties in other countries about China’s fast development. However, the initial promoter of this concept, Mr. Zheng Bijian, the then vice president of China’s Central Party School, argued in September 2004 that the two concepts shared the same meaning. See Zheng, 2005: 63.

3 This concept was initially put forward by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2005. In an updated version, he mentioned the 5 components of ‘harmonious world’: China and its partners should respect each other politically, seek win-win progress economically, respect diversity culturally, work together to safeguard peace and stability in the area of security, and cooperate to protect the Earth environmentally (Hu, 2007).

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EUROPE AS A GLOBAL PLAYER: A VIEW FROM CHINA


The European Union as a Global Power: Indian Perceptions

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Abstract: With the end of the Cold War, Europe's importance in India's foreign policy calculus increased enormously as the West was deemed vital as a market for foreign direct investment and advanced technology as well as defence equipment and civil nuclear cooperation. However, despite a strategic partnership between them, India and the European Union have not been able to transform their shared values into shared interests because of a big disconnect in their world-views, mindsets and practical agendas.

The Indian elite's perception of Europe has been essentially conditioned by the Anglo-Saxon media, which has tended to reinforce and sustain traditional stereotypical images and clichés. Indian political, business and media elites regard the EU as a global economic giant which does not act as an independent and decisive actor in foreign policy. Furthermore, the recent Eurozone crisis has tended to reinforce images of a declining Europe in India. Also, Indian stakeholders tend to perceive Europe as a conservative force and a staunch defender of the present order. Nevertheless, postmodernist Europe is increasingly perceived as a proactive norms entrepreneur and exporter in India.

Cooperative relations between India and Europe will incrementally grow despite their differences over specific issues. There is considerable mutual long-term interest in areas like scientific and technological cooperation, movement of skilled persons, and widening and deepening of civil society dialogue. However, the two sides' disparate priorities and lack of shared interests and priorities will continue to limit their cooperation on many political and security issues.

Keywords: India, European Union, elite perceptions, global governance

INTRODUCTION

The Indian encounter with Europe has been unique as European ideas and values profoundly influenced India's English-educated elites, its political leadership, Indian political life and India's freedom struggle during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Indians sought to emulate the West by trying to adopt and adapt Western value systems and Western institutions to the Indian milieu. At the same time, though, they asserted the importance of basic Indian values, criticised the arrogance of the
Western rulers, and passionately questioned Western analyses and assessments of India’s history and intellectual heritage as well as its cultural and religious identity (Dixit, 2000: 75–76; Damodaran, 2000). For Indian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru Europe had for several centuries been ‘the centre of international politics dominating the Earth’s surface and controlling world affairs to a large extent’ (Nehru, 1957: 226).

During the Cold War, Indian foreign policy was conditioned by its inherited legacy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, opposition to military blocs, the leadership of the non-aligned movement, commitment to state socialism and a de facto alliance with the Soviet Union. As a result, India was perhaps ‘the only democracy that stood against the West’ on most political issues during the Cold War (Raja Mohan, 2003: 58). Europe was not central to Indian priorities despite several centuries of historical, ideological and intellectual proximity to the West. India rather displayed a pre-occupation with domestic and subcontinental problems and its US-centric concerns (Ram, 2002: 2). The Indians have been historically close to the Anglo-Saxons but not to other European nationalities. As a result, India was not able to relate to Europe as a whole since it historically had only limited interaction with Continental Europe, and its interaction with Continental Europe remains rather thin even today. The Anglo-Saxon relationship has also been built on the Indian diaspora, which was strong in the Anglo-Saxon parts of Europe but never significant in the other parts. This also explains the lack of relations with Continental Europe.

India’s initial requests for infrastructural technologies, steel, armaments, and defence technology were made to the West, but given the Cold War divisions, Europe found India ‘inconvenient, objectionable and not necessary’ (Dixit, 2000: 79). With no positive response from the West, India turned to the Soviet Union as a partner in economic and industrial cooperation.

India recognized the importance of the nascent European Economic Community (EEC) and was among the first developing countries to establish diplomatic relations with it in March 1962. New Delhi, however, had concerns that the Common Market might transform itself into a ‘rich man’s club’. For several decades, India tended to look upon the EEC as another trading area and not as a collective diplomatic centre for Western Europe. Subsequently, in the broader context of the North-South dialogue, EEC Member States were perceived as creating hurdles for the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

Until the détente made gains in the early 1970s, Europe was perceived as the region most vulnerable to incidents and misperceptions which could spark global tensions. In the 1980s, the EEC was described as ‘a major economic force’, ‘a voice in the management of the world economy’, and ‘an important factor’ in world affairs (Ministry of External Affairs, 1988: 32–33). By the end of the 1980s, the Community was seen as having acquired greater power, which gave it ‘a dynamic political ca-
Japan and the European Community were perceived as the emerging ‘new centres of political and economic power’ in a world increasingly characterised by regionalisation and the globalisation of commodities and financial and money markets (Solanki, 1992: 104).

Against the background of Europe’s quest for a distinct political identity and an independent role in the management of world affairs (anchored around France and, to some extent, Britain and Germany), a stalemate in Indo-US relations and the perceived over-dependence on the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is said to have regarded Europe as a ‘third option’ (Ram, 2002: 2). At the turn of the millennium, a former Indian Ambassador to the EU argued that Europe still continued to be India’s ‘third option’. While it was not a ‘third option’ in the choice between the Soviet Union and the United States anymore, a united Europe was now the ‘third option’ in the choice between the United States and China (Ram, 2004: 92–93). Most Indian analysts, however, feel that Europe was never really an option vis-à-vis the United States. It had always been ‘the dependent variable’ and never ‘a real independent variable’ in global strategic affairs, and Europe was not going to really make a difference to the strategic concerns of India (Raja Mohan, 2002: 62).

**CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

Since the 1990s, a key element of Indian foreign policy has been a multidirectional engagement of all the major powers, with a special emphasis on ‘rebuilding relationships’ with the Western world (Raja Mohan, 2002: 59–60). With the launch of India’s economic reforms in 1991 and its keen desire to integrate into the world economy, Europe became increasingly important in the Indian foreign policy calculus as the West was deemed vital as a source for foreign direct investment, advanced technology, and access to markets. The priority given to economic diplomacy reflected India’s adaptation to the new economic multilateralism, ‘the first manifestation’ of which was Europe (Kapur, 2009: 308). With a more pragmatic foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, India rejected its ‘anti-Western’ mode of thinking and the decades-old anti-Western approaches to foreign policies (Raja Mohan, 2006: 2).

India was somewhat slow to make an overall politico-economic assessment of the ‘new’ Europe and assess the implications of the changing landscape in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The traditional bonhomie and the special relationship had clearly disappeared. India therefore had to forge closer political ties from scratch with the new elites in most of the new member states, who were engrossed in making a success of their integration with the European Union (see Jain, 2004a, 2004b). The eastward enlargement had erased ‘the vertical fault-
lines that divided the European continent for over a half century’, and the Union was perceived as emerging as ‘a politically influential, economically powerful and demographically diverse regional entity in the world’ (Singh, 2004).

The evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the adoption of the Euro by the EU Member States were viewed as ‘significant pointers’ to the emergence of a ‘European identity’ and a potentially more important role for Europe in international affairs (Ministry of External Affairs, 1999: 58–59). However, this was likely to happen only ‘when the European Union [could] have a convergence of views’ on economic, political and strategic matters which are globally important; only then would the EU perhaps be ‘a counterbalancing force’ in the international global situation (Sinha, 2002; Ministry of External Affairs, 2008: ix, 69, 80–81).

With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the enhanced competences of EU institutions and the expansion of the EU’s ‘sphere of authority’, the Indian Foreign Office felt that cooperation between India and the EU on ‘a wider gamut of issues of bilateral, regional and global importance for the two sides’ would ‘naturally’ increase (Ministry of External Affairs, 2011: 86). Many stakeholders, however, remain skeptical whether the institutional improvements of the Lisbon Treaty will result in any quantum leap in terms of how the EU functions and reaches decisions and doubt whether the External Action Service will necessarily revolutionise the world.

INDIAN ELITES’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Indian elites’ perceptions of the EU have been and continue to be essentially conditioned by the Anglo-Saxon media. This has resulted in a rather fragmented and partial view of Europe and its culture since it tended to reinforce and sustain traditional stereotypical images and clichés. It also impedes a more nuanced understanding of the processes and dynamics of European integration as well as the intricacies and roles of EU institutions (Jain, 2009a, 2009b).

The EU is widely acknowledged in India as an economic superpower and a formidable negotiator in multilateral trade negotiations. For the great majority of Indians, however, most of Europe is a strange land, an exotic place for tourism to which only a privileged layer of society has had access. Europe, according to a former diplomat, is ‘a politically fantastically rich museum with an immense collection of diverse specimens’ (Dasgupta, 2004: 43). For one leading observer, Europe is like ‘the dowdy old lady’ which has been known for over four centuries, but there is ‘no excitement, no passion of ideas’ between India and Europe (Raja Mohan, 2002: 62).

Many of the historical and cultural bonds and terms of reference which traditionally linked India with Britain and, in turn, Europe, including globalisation and the growing influence of American television and Hollywood, have cosiderably with-
eroded away with time. A wired-in middle class is no longer greatly interested in European history, art or society.

In recent years, most educated Indians have tended to feel that Europe confronts social and political difficulties in dealing with its diversity of cultures, that multiculturalism does not seem to be working in Europe, and that European societies have not been able to meaningfully integrate non-Western ethnic minorities, especially Muslims. The EU’s admission of Turkey is considered by India to be a real litmus test for the secular and pluralistic credentials of Europe. If it turned out that Turkey was considered ineligible for EU membership even after it abided by the admission norms just because it is a Muslim country, it would send ‘a very wrong signal’.

One of the major findings of a series of semi-structured face-to-face interviews of 38 Indian stakeholders during the period 1 January–30 June 2010 in New Delhi was that irrespective of their political affiliation, all of them refrained from specifying the relative importance of the EU in relation to other countries/regions. The business elites acknowledged the importance of the EU to India, although many of them declared the United States to be the most important partner for India. They, however, also claimed the EU to be a better economic partner than China. Meanwhile, the civil society elites considered the United States to be more important than the EU as the U.S. plays a more vital role in Indian foreign policy. They also highlighted the importance of other countries such as China, Japan and Russia and felt that a more intense engagement was evident in India’s bilateral relations with individual EU Member States than in those with the Union as a collective.

The elites across all the cohorts declared the EU to be a formidable economic actor on the international scene. Many of them, however, felt that the Union tended to toe the American line on global political, military and security matters. Some elites described the EU as a major player in terms of agenda-setting and regulating the norms of international behaviour. Some even felt that the EU was still at an ‘experimental level’ while others considered it as an ‘emerging power’. The EU was believed to have the potential to emerge as a leader in international politics. The elites described the Union as a unique and desirable/positive experiment but felt that it lacked cohesion and adequate political will, as was evident during the Iraq war as well as during the Copenhagen climate negotiations. It was surmised that the EU would continue to be regarded as a ‘big player in a great game but not the leader’. However, some ‘elites’ recognised the EU as a leader in international politics. They cited the Union’s contribution in Afghanistan and its efforts to improve relations with Iraq as well as its role in the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe.

‘Elites’ across all the categories invariably expressed the view that economic issues continued to be crucial in defining EU-India relations. The business elites also felt that China’s exchange rate and burgeoning trade surplus was a cause of common concern for both the EU and India.
The ‘elites’ were also asked to rate both the present and the future importance of the EU to India. There was a uniform increase across all the categories from the present to the future. The business ‘elites’ were the most optimistic about the present as well as the future in this respect and seemed confident of a robust growth in India-EU trade relations. Conversely, the media elites were the most hesitant in acknowledging the importance of the EU in areas other than trade and climate change negotiations.

The ‘elites’ painted an overwhelmingly positive picture when asked about the three spontaneous images that came to their mind when thinking about the EU, even if there were a few negative comments made by one or two elites across all the categories. The dominant EU-related images of all the ‘elites’ were clearly the Euro, the Schengen visa, borderlessness, the brotherhood and unity that emerged after the Second World War and the idea of the EU being a unique experiment. There were only a handful of negative notions about the Union. The elites in general were skeptical about the political strength of the EU as an actor and about its relative significance and strength compared to the United States. The negative images of the EU presented by the ‘elites’ were the following: the belief that the EU is economically strong and politically weak, the lack of cultural engagement between India and the EU, the TRIPS agreement, seizures of generic pharmaceutical products, the EU’s arrogance about its prosperity and stability and also about human rights, the view that the EU is not very understanding about the compulsions of the other parts of the world, and political questions regarding Turkish membership of the EU.

It was the United States, not the EU, which was considered in India to be the most important international actor. The EU is neither perceived as a major factor of consequence in South Asia nor considered critical to the security and economic discourses within the region.

**A MULTIPOLAR WORLD**

India regards Europe as ‘a key pole in the evolving multi-polar international system’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2007: vii–viii, 79, 94–96, 160) and sees itself and Europe as ‘indispensable poles in the emerging multi-polar structures’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2009: ii, x, 79, 91–92). Indians, however, feel that it is going to be a long, long way before Europe is going to act as a pole. Indian analysts as well as the upper and decision-making classes do not see the EU as a counterweight to the United States, but as ‘a building process and a construct’ that could be able to deliver long-term gains for the Indian subcontinent, while maintaining intact the diverse range of Indian bilateral relations with specific European countries (Ruet et al., 2004: 105–106).

Since India is neither a major determinant of the international system nor likely to be one for several years to come, it is not really in a position to make a choice about
whether it would strive for a multi-polar world or a unipolar world. New Delhi will continue to be guided by the pursuit of its national interests in foreign policy rather than ‘picking or choosing between worlds’ (Menon, 2007: 9).

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global governance in the contemporary world has become a complex and difficult challenge because of the emergence of emerging major powers like India, China, Brazil and South Africa. They are, according to former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, ‘premature powers’ because they continue to be classified as developing countries, in terms of their per capita income levels, the continuing though declining incidence of poverty, disease and illiteracy. This leads to considerable ambivalence as these countries aspire to a role for themselves in the emerging architecture of global governance. They need to contribute to global public goods but they also feel entitled to non-reciprocal benefits from global regimes to help deal with their still considerable developmental challenges. In this respect, they represent a different breed of major powers compared to the historical norm. (Saran, 2012: 8)

Emerging powers like India argue that the structures of global governance must be more democratic, representative and legitimate by increasing the participation of developing countries. In recent years, while there has been ‘a steady, even though limited, democratization of the global economic architecture, there has been virtually no change in the political and security architecture. The UN Security Council continues to reflect the power pattern that emerged from the Second World War and has remained frozen in time’ (ibid.: 9).

Postmodernist Europe has increasingly become a norms entrepreneur which engages in a kind of ‘regulatory imperialism’ through ‘unilateral regulatory globalization’ (Bradford, 2011). It seems to propagate and reflexively impose social, economic and ideological norms as global public goods that have been highly successful in Europe at the global level irrespective of other countries’ stages of development, historical backgrounds, and social and cultural peculiarities. There is a basic contestation about the content, value and scope of norms because efforts by developing countries to play a role in the framing of rules, standards and norms for their participation in global trade and financial markets achieved only marginal results. Both in political and economic terms, all the cards continued to be in the hands of the developed mature economies of the West, led by the United States. There was little incentive to respond to the impassioned plea from the developing world for a voice in global governance /.../ While es-
posing liberal democracy and free markets as universal principles, the Western powers adopted an increasingly prescriptive approach at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, which they now dominated both because of the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as due to their own emergence as their main source of funding. (Saran, 2012: 12, 22)

While Europe does acknowledge the need to restructure international institutions and give more voice and seats to emerging powers in the World Bank and the IMF, ‘the assumption is that the rising powers will simply be accommodated within the existing system – a small adjustment here, a tweak there and everything will be fine again. Missing is a willingness to see this as a transformational moment that demands we look at the world entirely fresh’ (Steven, 2008). Shyam Saran put it even more candidly:

...the role of the emerging economies was seen more in terms of co-opting them in a largely Western dominated system, ensuring that they played by the rules already established by the dominant players. If the global economic architecture was undergoing change in response to the transformation of the global economy, the change was still driven by the Western, industrialized economies with little by way of agenda setting by the emerging economies. The existing architecture was sought to be retained even while accommodating new players. More tenants occupied the building, but the landlord, who set the house rules, remained the same. (Saran, 2012: 25–26, emphasis added)

India is therefore determined to play an active interest in the framing of new rules, which should reflect the needs and aspirations of one sixth of humanity.

INDIA AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS

India has been acutely concerned about the spillover effects of the financial and banking crisis in the Eurozone, which has been followed by the grave sovereign debt crisis. EU Member States, especially Germany and France, were perceived as resorting to various ‘Band-Aid solutions’ (Saran, 2011) in dealing with the crises such as bailout packages for Ireland, Greece and Portugal and keeping things on hold for the next few years. The repeated attempts to sort out the problems of the Eurozone in high profile summits has not resulted in any lasting solution but only raised expectations and made things worse (Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, 2012: 2).

The global slowdown due to the unfolding of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has, inter alia, impacted the Indian economy through the deceleration in exports, the
widening of the trade and current account deficit, the decline in capital flows, the fall in the value of the Indian Rupee, the stock market decline and lower economic growth (Moneycontrol.com, 2012; The Times of India, 2012). The European debt crisis, according to the Reserve Bank of India, posed a major downside risk to the country’s overall growth outlook, and the continuing uncertainty there could ‘adversely affect Indian growth through trade, finance and confidence channels’ (Suba Rao, 2012: 10).

India was a ‘victim’ of the Eurozone crisis, which was hurting export growth despite the diversification of both destinations and products in recent years. It has led to a sharp decline in FII inflows, which, in turn, led to a sharp fall in Indian stock markets.

The Eurozone crisis was likely to have a limited impact on Indian banks since they had no presence in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. None of the Indian banks had any exposure to bonds issued by Portugal, Greece and Spain, while their exposure to Italian bonds was negligible. The funding dependence of overseas branches of Indian banks on European entities, except for the UK, was also not very significant. However, the exposure of European banks to India was said to be as high as 14–15 percent of the GDP, amounting to approximately $220–225 billion (Indian Express, 2012). European financial institutions reportedly accounted for about half of the expansion of India’s external debt of $350 billion since 2005 (Sharma, 2012).

A survey (August 2011) conducted by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) of Indian companies doing business and/or investments in Europe concluded that the economic turmoil had led to a loss in terms of business generation, and nearly a third of the companies had begun to look beyond Europe and geographically diversify in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Over a quarter of the companies pointed out that instead of facilitating foreign investments and business, European governments were imposing a lot of policy and regulatory impediments to business practices (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 2011). However, many Indian companies were still on the lookout to enhance their investments in the EU since the fundamental reasons to invest in the EU had not changed. To maximise their benefits and to alleviate their business losses in terms of the reduced demands in European markets, Indian manufacturers were aggressively pursuing new business plans (including increased imports of high-end machinery and technology from Europe due to the highly competitive prices being offered by European exporters) (ibid.).

No timeframe, Indian policymakers felt, could be prescribed to resolve the Eurozone crisis, and there could not be any quick-fix methods. They tended to be somewhat skeptical as to whether a fiscal union would eventually materialise, though the then current path would continue for some years. The choices that EU
leaders made were to essentially be political, but the consequences would undoubtedly be economic. There was a fear that ‘the vision of unification still holds a dream but the other route may only take the Euro economies further apart’ (Anand et al., 2012).

CONCLUSIONS
Most stakeholders in India regard the European Union not merely as an economic and trading partner but as a global actor with a growing profile and presence in international politics. To them, however, the EU displays a lack of geopolitical coherence and has not yet shown signs of acting as a credible power (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006: 5). On many foreign policy issues, Europe is not a single voice, but multiple voices competing for attention. Indians thus feel that it is going to be a long, long way before Europe is going to act as a coherent foreign policy actor. Indian analysts do not believe the EU can function as a counterweight or play the role of a ‘balancer’ to the United States (Subrahmanyam, 2006: 315). There is also skepticism in India as to whether Europe can acquire a mature military identity. The Union continues to be dependent on the United States, and its political will to exercise its military capability remains to be seen. Plus, given the disparate priorities and the mismatch of the security context, concerns and goals, the EU does not perceive India as a genuine security ‘partner’ from halfway around the globe. For Europe, India’s security role is ‘a matter of complete disinterest’. Europe’s security interests are in North Africa, the Caucasus and Russia – that is, ‘outside even India’s desired sphere of influence’ (Chaudhuri, 2011b).

To most Indians, postmodern Europe seems to be a lonely power in what is basically a Westphalian world with pre-modern and modern mindsets. India’s natural reference-frame is that of hard power, and to the Indian elite, soft power means no power. Postmodernism is not only ‘alien but baffling for the Indiansystem’ (Chaudhuri, 2011a).

India and the European Union have many common interests, but the goal of transforming them into coordinated policies has been rather elusive. A major reason why we have not been able to forge a more cooperative relationship is that apart from a normative disconnect, there is a big disconnect in our world-views, mindsets and practical agendas. India believes in strengthening multilateral institutions and mechanisms for addressing global challenges such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS. But Indian and EU perceptions differ on the restructuring of international institutions, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change, the International Criminal Court, etc.

The European Union is increasingly perceived by India as ‘a key strategic partner’ in meeting its development needs.10 This offers considerable opportunities for enhancing mutual cooperation. A worsening demographic profile with a graying pop-
ulation is compelling the European Union to address the problems and opportunities of in-sourcing highly skilled immigrants or outsourcing services. There is considerable potential for India and Europe to increasingly move towards partnership in cutting-edge technologies in a manner which would combine India’s strengths with European capabilities. The growing trade and the rise of Indian multinationals are creating constituencies in Europe which will be further strengthened by the conclusion of the India-EU trade and investment agreement.

Europeans have to revise their mental maps about the emerging powers. In many ways, as Robert Kappel remarks, ‘Europe is succumbing to the belief that it can continue without adapting. /.../ It will have to learn to act and solve global problems with the regional powers in the context of a mutual (not a unilateral, one-sided) discourse on global obligations’ (Kappel, 2007: 7).

ENDNOTES
4 Of these, eight were former or present members of the Lok Sabha and/or the Rajya Sabha as well as former ministers, ten were affiliated to big business, ten belonged to civil society, and the remaining ten were media elites. The questionnaire was comprised of 18 questions (16 open-ended and two closed-ended questions) and produced rich discursive comments.
5 This section draws on Jain and Pandey (2010) and Jain and Pandey (2013).
6 Written reply by Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee to the Rajya Sabha, 21 May 2012.
7 Statement by Pranab Mukherjee while inaugurating the India International Trade Fair, New Delhi, 26 November 2011.
8 EU-27 exports to India during January–June 2012 were 6 percent lower than those for January–June 2011, and EU-27 imports from India decreased by 11 percent during the same period (January 2011–June 2012) – one of the largest falls among the EU’s major trading partners (Eurostat, 2012).
10 Ruchir Sharma is Managing Director and Head of the Emerging Markets Equity Team, Morgan Stanley Investment Management.
Prime Minister Singh’s opening statement at the joint press interaction after the India-EU summit, 10 December 2010.

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Brazil’s Strategies and Partnerships: The Place of the European Union

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Abstract: How has Brazil’s diplomatic corps perceived the international order since the beginning of the century? What position has Europe held in Brazil’s foreign policy in the period? How is Europe perceived by Brazilian foreign policymakers? Based on the understanding that Brazil is building up its regional leadership and its role as a global player, the article presents the role of the European Union in Brazilian foreign policy and the perceptions of Brazilian foreign policy makers regarding the Strategic Partnership signed with the EU. The aim of the article is set out the ideas that underpinned Brazilian foreign policy making during the Lula da Silva (2003–2010) years and analyse the characteristics of the foreign policy actually implemented during Lula’s government while focusing on the place Europe holds amongst Brazil’s strategies and partnerships in the context of a world order in times of crisis. Finally, some features of the Brazilian foreign policy towards the EU implemented by the Dilma Rousseff government are also pointed out in the article. The ideas of foreign policy makers are given special weight throughout the analysis.

Keywords: Brazilian foreign policy, European Union, Brazil’s rise, international order, perceptions and foreign policy

Since the 1990s, Brazil’s foreign policy has pursued two parallel and interrelated objectives: a greater projection of Brazil as a global player on the international stage, and regional leadership in South America. Both these initiatives have been articulated with the use of foreign policy as a mechanism for leveraging national development. Since the Lula da Silva government, the strategies designed to attain these goals have achieved better results than in the previous administrations.

In 2003, when Lula da Silva’s first term began, the international climate was already different from the homogeneous, globalised world order of the 1990s. The attack on the World Trade Center on 11th September 2001 created the potential for greater fragmentation, with a shift in the relative influence of the different players in the establishment of the rules of play. The financial crisis of 2008 consolidated this new configuration. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the century, the power of liberalism in South America started to show certain limitations, and anti-liberal govern-
men tswere elected there, reinforcing the trend towards change. This regional scenario helped Brazil adjust its behaviour towards the continent.

When President Lula came in, he effected major changes inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus making a new group of politicians more influential in foreign policy making. These new players who took over the top positions introduced reforms to the country’s foreign strategy, making it more assertive and effectively expanding the country’s projection on the political arena and its presence in South America. Within the framework of this process, Brazil signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the European Union in 2007.

How has Brazil’s diplomatic corps perceived the international order since 2003? What position has the European Union held in Brazil’s foreign policy in the period? How is the EU perceived by Brazilian foreign policymakers? This article presents the position that the EU occupies in Brazilian foreign policy and the perceptions of Brazilian diplomacy regarding its relationship with the EU.

We should begin by making it clear that Brazil’s perceptions of the EU have not always been clear. The EU has three distinct channels for mediating its relations with Brazil: EU–Brazil; the bilateral relations between Brazil and individual member states; and EU–Mercosur. According to Brazil’s realist tradition of diplomacy, some EU member states, especially Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal, are considered important partners for Brazil, but the EU as a whole is seen as systematically creating difficulties for trade with Brazil. In general, when negotiating complex issues the European Commission has limited room for manoeuvre that restricts its foreign partners’ possibilities of negotiations. The perception of the EU as an international political player – which is what interests us here – has not been clearly defined in Brazil, and in political terms the country’s diplomacy clearly favours intergovernmental relations. Although this article centres around the place of the EU in Brazilian foreign policy, issues relating to Brazil’s interaction with member states and inter-regional initiatives will also be introduced to support the analysis.

The article first sets out the debate between continuity and change in Brazil’s foreign policy and presents the ideas that underpinned Brazilian foreign policy making during the Lula da Silva (2003–2010) years. The second section then introduces the characteristics of the foreign policy actually implemented during the Lula and Rousseff governments, followed by a part that focuses on the place Europe holds amongst Brazil’s strategies and partnerships in the context of a world order in a state of flux. Finally, there is a discussion of the behaviour of the Rousseff administration towards the EU since Rousseff came to office.

The research underpinning this article drew on several different kinds of sources. The primary sources that had the most weight were the speeches and interviews posted on the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. The debates held at
events involving academics and foreign policy practitioners were also important for identifying the latter’s perceptions. The literature covering the topic is limited, but there is more literature on the related areas of Brazilian foreign policy in general and the rise of emerging countries in the international scenario, and such works provided some inputs for the analysis.

CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE IDEAS THAT HAVE MARKED BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Generally speaking, Brazil’s foreign policy tends towards continuity. This is sustained by a political discourse that defends continuity, and also by certain beliefs that have been instrumental in its development over the years: autonomy, universalism of action and, underlying both ideas, the belief that the country is destined to greater things in the context of international politics. Here, universalism is meant to express the idea of receptiveness towards all countries, independent of their geographical location, regime or economic policy, and could be equated with the idea of acting as a global player. Autonomy can be seen as the amount of manoeuvring space a country has in its dealings with other states and in international politics. Meanwhile, over the years, Brazilian foreign policy makers shared the idea that Brazil is destined to become a major power, and allusions to this idea have been made since the early 1900s (Silva, 1998). The highly concentrated foreign policymaking process traditionally seen in Brazil, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its specialised bureau, has contributed to Brazil having a more consistent behaviour founded on longer-term principles.

Even so, this commitment to continuity has on occasion been disrupted. These disruptions have included adopting more multipolar strategies or strategies designed to obtain relative advantage on the international scene; opting for a more autonomous approach or greater alignment with partners; and positioning the country as a stakeholder or reviewer of international institutions. The concept of autonomy has been approached differently in recent years, with the various approaches being adapted to the prevailing international context, the national development strategy, and certain calculations made by foreign policymakers, which have varied according to the political stance and perception of these players about what is in the nation’s interest, the nature of the international context, and other, more specific variables.

From the 1990s onwards, explains Lima (2000), as the foreign policy agenda started to gain space in the realm of public policies and attract the interest of different spheres of civil society, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ monopoly over policymaking started to wane. The opening up of the economy was one factor behind the politicisation of foreign policy as a function of the unequal distribution of its
costs and gains, while the consolidation of democracy led to discussions in society and different opinions being voiced about what should be on the international agenda. These two processes made room for a consolidation of different schools of thought within the ministry. Since the 1990s, Brazilian diplomacy has basically been divided into two schools of thought, the autonomist and the pragmatic institutionalist school, which hold different views about the dynamics of the international order, national interests and the best strategy for attaining the overall goals of autonomy and economic growth for the country. These two currents have been in tune with the views of political players during the period.5

Despite their differences, these groups share a common realist perspective. Merke (2008) has identified two traditions of realism in Brazilian foreign policy in the twentieth century: liberal realism and developmentalist realism. Both, according to the author, view the international system as anarchic and support the pursuit of increased regional and/or global prestige and efforts to maintain foreign policy over and above any domestic disruptions. The liberal realists were previously keen to forge an alliance with the USA, and more recently, they also wanted to forge an alliance with other western countries in a bid to attain the country’s goals, while the developmentalist realists saw greater autonomy in the international sphere as the best way forward for the country’s development. In this case, this latter tradition comes closer to the ideas of diversification of foreign relations and therefore also to the ideas of universalism.

During the Cardoso years, the pragmatic institutionalists came to have the biggest influence in shaping the country’s foreign policy thinking and action. In economics, they were in favour of a ‘limited liberalisation’ of the economy6 while in the political sphere their most natural allies were the Brazilian Social Democratic Party. The pragmatic institutionalists were particularly in favour of Brazil’s providing support for the international regimes that already existed. The regulation of international relations was regarded as a good way forward for Brazil in terms of pursuing its economic development. They also defended the idea that the country’s international stance should be based on a new view of the concepts of sovereignty and autonomy, in which universal values should be defended by all. In this case, the idea of autonomy still encompassed the idea of integrating the country with the prevailing world order, and pursuing its projects in the forums available in the existing multilateral institutions.

Within this perspective, the concept of sovereignty was reviewed, giving rise to the notion of ‘shared sovereignty’. This envisaged a world where countries were ‘in harmony’, sharing a common discourse in defence of universal values, and there was a trend towards forming regimes to guarantee these values (Fonseca Jr., 1999: 32). This context opened up new opportunities for Brazil – which was active in its pursuit of greater international influence – to adopt a position that would not be
fully aligned with the USA while at the same time enhancing its presence in international institutions. This position was first oriented by the realisation that the scenario had changed, and that multiple alignments were now the norm. The idea of autonomy could be upheld, but its content would change: the definition of ‘autonomy through integration’ took hold, to the detriment of the previous concept of autonomy that saw the country as self-sufficient and disengaged.7

The pragmatic institutionalists’ view of the EU and Europeans was linked both to Brazil’s rapprochement with the reigning values in the international order and to the need for the US to accept sharing its leadership with lesser powers. In this situation, a partnership between Brazil and the European nations could have an important role. From the pragmatic institutionalists’ point of view, while the EU was identified as an important economic bloc and a player that upheld the prevailing international values, individual European nations were seen more clearly as potential allies for Brazil’s foreign projection and a reform of the world order.

However, these efforts did not bear fruit, or, as Ayllón Pino–Saraiva (2010) describe it, they yielded an odd mixture of expectation and frustration. The Cardoso government came to a close without seeing any great progress in Brazil’s quest for greater rapprochement with the EU and the European countries on an individual basis. Although Brazil’s decision to support international regimes could have strengthened a strategic EU-Brazil alliance, the European priority was geared, at that moment, towards inter-regionalism instead.

When Lula da Silva came into power, the pragmatic institutionalists of Cardoso’s government handed over their role in formulating and implementing foreign policy to the group of autonomists: the latter gained ground within the ministry, and since that time it has become the main foreign policymaking group in Brazil. Above all, they defend a more autonomous and active projection for the country in the international arena. As part of this, the autonomists are in favour of reforming international institutions so as to open up a broader international platform for Brazil. Adopting a type of behaviour that was defined by Lima as soft revisionism,8 they have political and strategic concerns regarding north-south problems and forge links with other so-called emerging countries with similar traits to Brazil. Thus the main goals for Brazil are to build up its regional leadership and be seen as a global power.9

The autonomists are largely an offshoot from economic developmentalism. They favour a model which encourages development, with a stronger state that is actively involved in industrial policy and more committed to the external projection of national industries. They see integration as a way of gaining access to foreign markets and strengthening the country’s bargaining position in international economic relations.

However, the Lula government also brought changes to the foreign policy making process. The group of autonomists coexisted with another group that had its
own foreign policy proposals but scant historic ties with the diplomatic classes. This group, during the Lula administration and in the process of including new players in foreign policymaking, set up an important dialogue with the diplomats and exerted some influence on foreign policy decisions. This force comprised scholars and political leaders, mostly from the Workers’ Party. The party traditionally had an internationalist facet, and its manifesto in 2003 also highlighted the country’s contribution towards reducing international tensions and building a more balanced world. In regard to regional integration, they were in favour of having Brazil make itself available to cover a good part of the costs of South American integration. Lula effectively opened up new spaces for this group to influence policy making.

The group’s position was influential amongst autonomists, as it contributed to Brazil taking a more proactive stance in its cooperation with its neighbours and African countries, with a corresponding cooling of its advances towards the core western countries. The strong presidential diplomacy of President Lula and his involvement in foreign policymaking ensured an active voice for thinkers from his party.

The autonomists at the heart of the foreign policy making, in conjunction with the influence of the president’s party and the president himself, broke the continuity in Brazil’s world view and strategies, leading it towards a far more proactive international stance as a global player.

**THE RISE OF BRAZIL**

The new Brazilian foreign policy approach was not the outcome of a sudden break with what had gone before, but was brought in little by little over the two terms. Vigevani–Cepaluni (2007: 282) suggest that there was a ‘change of tone and emphasis (adjustments) in its foreign policy, seeking out new ways for the country to position itself internationally (changes of programme)’. While there was continuity in Brazil’s pursuit of greater global prominence and its preference for using foreign policy as a means of fostering the economic growth, a discontinuity was introduced by the autonomists in their world view and strategies. They saw the international context as shifting and in transition, giving the larger southern countries the chance to grow, while their strategy for bolstering economic growth was to seek out the broadest diversity of foreign partners possible. So it was that Brazil reoriented its behaviour towards a valuing of its autonomy in foreign actions, the reinforcement of universalism through South-South cooperation and multilateral entities, and the strengthening of its proactive role in international politics.

In the sphere of international politics, the Lula government found the international scenario favourable to its success. With globalisation and a post-9/11 international system where the poles of power had multiplied with the emergence of new players, Brazil was presented with new opportunities to expand its international pres-
ence. The financial crisis of 2008 hit the central economies the hardest, giving ‘emerging’ nations, which had suffered less, a chance to shine economically. In South America in the 2000s, the rise of new anti-liberal governments with plans to reformulate their political regimes reduced the alignment of Brazil’s neighbours with the USA and gave it freer rein in the region. In these times of building a new world order, Brazil became more assertive in its involvement in international issues, favouring anti-hegemonic and multi-polar positions (see Gratius, 2011), while also structuring a leadership base in its region. The clear goals were to obtain regional leadership and become a global player by reorganising international institutions along more inclusive lines.

To roll out this project, Brazil’s diplomats were deployed on multiple fronts and in different kinds of partnerships. On the multilateral dimension, the Lula government adopted a proactive strategy at the World Trade Organisation through joint action with other developing countries. The first G-20, made up of southern nations, became an important channel for Brazilian strategy. It managed to link the outcome of the Doha Round to agricultural negotiations. The IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) Forum was created with a view to discussing issues affecting the world order, the United Nations and technologies, with Brazil seeing the other two countries as its primary allies in a bid to reformulate the international order. Politically speaking, Brazil’s biggest goal was to reform the United Nations, and in so doing to get Brazil accepted as a permanent member of the Security Council. Brazil also took part in other multilateral forums, such as talks on climate change (through the BASIC ministerial meetings) and energy. Lula also harnessed his own diplomatic kudos to project Brazil’s image in other circles, including those of the Middle East.

The designation of the BRICS group of nations and this group’s consolidation as a channel for articulating diplomatic efforts gave Brazil new leverage in its efforts to procure more alignments between emerging countries, which involved not only the topics discussed at the IBSA Forum, but also attempts to organise capital flows. In this process, China emerged as Brazil’s leading trade partner. In both forums, Brazil’s aspirations for political and economic reform walked hand in hand, with other emerging countries being seen as similar to Brazil and therefore as its natural strategic allies in a changing world by its foreign policymakers.

The importance given to smaller partners and the effort to include them in a more global strategy were clear. Through the South-South cooperation, the Brazilian government forged stronger bilateral ties with South American and African countries, and priority was given to technical and financial cooperation and ‘non-indifference’. Brazil’s diplomatic hope was that these partnerships would yield support in its international initiatives. The idea of bringing other emerging or poorer southern countries on board to counterbalance the might of traditional western powers served as the basis for the country’s international actions. When it came to the United States,
the more autonomous position taken by Brazil heightened the friction with North American diplomacy, but any disagreements in the matter were dealt with away from the public eye.

Alongside its international ambitions, Brazil also made achieving regional leadership in South America a priority. Indeed, its parallel efforts in these two arenas were seen by many Brazilian policymakers as mutually beneficial. Its proximity to its regional neighbours was seen by many diplomats involved in policymaking as helpful for the country’s development and instrumental in the formation of a bloc with greater international influence. Brazil’s leadership of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, commanding troops from different countries in the region, was seen as a stepping stone for the country to claim a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. According to Flemes (2011), as it rises in the more multipolar world order, Brazil will need regional clout to add weight to its global bargaining position, but not to the point of being bound by some regional institutionalism that might limit its autonomy.

However, when it comes to its relationship with its neighbours, Brazil’s global projection raises a degree of mistrust. Other countries in South America do not see Brazil’s initiative as bringing any benefits for the region, but just as serving its own interests. This mistrust has put a higher premium on Brazil’s regional leadership, which has itself been contested repeatedly by its neighbours in extra-regional forums.12 This articulation between global projection and the structuring of regional leadership was influenced by President Lula’s political will, and by a pro-integration epistemic community that included political actors from the Workers’ Party and academics who support regional integration.

Lula came to power at a time of stability and economic growth, which only went toward exacerbating the asymmetry between Brazil and its neighbours. In this context, and in a bid to respond to this new regional equilibrium, the government’s foreign policy focused on structuring South American relations under Brazilian leadership, with Brazil as the lynchpin for developing integration and regionalisation processes. In order to ensure that the country’s global manoeuvres would not be fettered, the Brazilian government sought to articulate a process of regional cooperation with a minimum of institutionalisation and room for bilateral agreements, with the Unasur (Union of South American Nations) being seen as the best mechanism with which to meet these goals. Gradually, the Brazilian government also accepted that the country would have to be the region’s paymaster, covering some of the costs of integration, and introduced cooperation with some of the neighbouring countries.13

When it came to Mercosur, while only sluggish progress was made towards trade integration, the bloc as a whole underwent a change of profile. Cooperation between different government departments (related to education, culture, energy, and labour) grew, and the creation of the Mercosur Parliament gave the institu-
tionalisation of the integration process a new boost. Meanwhile, the construction of the autonomous Brazilian leadership in the region and the growing asymmetry between Brazil and Argentina, both economically and in terms of their regional influence, eroded Argentina’s standing as a strategic partner for Brazil. Brazil’s increasing international presence yielded new opportunities for its diplomats to operate in different multilateral forums without bringing any benefits for Mercosur. Nevertheless, the bilateral dialogue on a political level was maintained and the development of regional infrastructure projects enabled both countries to work together.

Dilma Rousseff came into power in 2011. In its first eighteen months, the Rousseff administration has maintained the foreign policy strategies of its predecessor: expressing a revisionary stance towards international institutions, acting as a spokesman for southern nations, and taking regional leadership. References to continuity have been recurrent in the diplomatic discourse. Overall, the autonomists have held onto their majority in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite giving way to a younger generation. The economic strategy with its developmentalist traits has been boosted. And the expansion of the number of government agencies participating in foreign policy initiatives – as in technological cooperation and investments – has lent the policy greater stability.

Even so, although there has been continuity in the way foreign policy has been handled to obtain inputs for economic growth and also in the country’s world view and revisionary strategy, the Rousseff government has introduced a certain change of emphasis and style that may initially have raised some expectations amongst its foreign partners.

When it comes to how foreign policy is made and implemented, the ministry has taken back the reins, pushing out the group identified here for its Workers’ Party affiliation. There is less emphasis on presidential action in diplomatic circles or on the role of the president in conciliating different foreign policy views, as seen with Lula. This has reduced the room for different positions and perceptions to coexist.

With this change in foreign policy focus and the coexistence of initiatives to boost global and regional projection, some priorities have also been modified: the goal of building up regional leadership has taken second place to the construction of a different, broader kind of leadership, with Brazil focusing its efforts on boosting its standing on a bigger stage – amongst South American and African countries with lesser resources. Meanwhile, when it comes to the relative importance of global and regional projection, global projection has taken priority. As political leaders that support integration and anti-liberal governments reduced their capacity to influence Brazil’s actions outside its borders, its action in the region has become more pragmatic and taken a lower profile. Even so, the articulation between the countries of South America and the bilateral ties with Brazil’s neighbours for technical and fi-
financial cooperation remain in place, and the progress towards regional integration achieved under President Lula is being continued, albeit with less vigour.

**BRAZIL’S VIEW ON EUROPE**

In this context, Brazilian diplomacy’s perception of the EU reached a turning point. Brazilian diplomacy kept up contact with European countries in its bid to make Brazil a global player, while ruling out any kind of alliance with the United States. Initially, Brazil maintained the idea that the EU and its member states could be important allies in a review of the world order led by the USA. The EU shared certain values with Brazil in areas such as development, democracy, international peace and the defence of multilateralism in international politics and appreciated that Brazil was a civil power with no nuclear weapons (Gratius, 2011: 4). Even so, it quickly became clear to Brazil’s diplomatic corps that the two sides’ conceptions of these topics or the best way to attain the broader goals were not always in tune with one another. Meanwhile, the huge power imbalance that had historically marked the relations between the two parties was gradually chipped away as Brazil earned a greater international political standing (Ayllón Pino–Saraiva, 2011: 59).

However, in this new scenario the EU approached Brazil to get involved in initiatives such as the participation of Brazilian representatives in meetings with Europeans with a view to discussing subjects pertaining to international economic talks. In 2007, this was crowned by the signing of a strategic partnership agreement (an instrument used by the EU to administrate its relationships with emerging countries, among other things) between the EU and Brazil outside the ambit of Mercosur.

This partnership formally included the strengthening of multilateralism and the quest for joint action in the fields of human rights, poverty, environmental issues, energy, Mercosur and stability in South America. The reasons behind the initiative, as far as the Europeans were concerned, included Brazil’s active participation in international topics, especially the Doha Round, the EU’s quest for emerging partners, and the inertia of political dialogue between the EU and Mercosur after Venezuela joined the bloc. Brazilian foreign policymakers saw the partnership with the EU as having the potential to provide greater international prestige and recognition for the country, and they also saw it as an important channel for bringing Brazil closer to European countries. Thus hopes of increased investments and technology transfers were celebrated in Brazil.

As regards the agreement between the EU and Mercosur, when the strategic partnership agreement was signed, the negotiations were still underway but with negligible results, and it implicitly undermined the interregional effort and, consequently, the EU–Mercosur relations as the default forum for political dialogue and cooperation. Talks for an EU–Mercosur association agreement were halted at the end of 2004 and tied in with progress in the Doha Round. They were only restarted at the
end of Lula’s second term, thanks to the support of the Spanish presidency of the bloc at the time. Meanwhile, in Argentina, Kirchner’s neo-developmentalalist economic policy erected protectionist barriers that further slowed the progress of the talks.

By the end of the Lula administration the concrete results of this strategic partnership were limited. The annual summits established as part of the agreement proved most successful in obtaining greater cooperation in alternative energy and climate change (Gratius, 2011: 2). But even so, the environment is a tricky topic for the Brazilian government, which faces stiff domestic opposition to any concessions in this area. The resumption of trade talks in 2010 was also favoured by the EU-Brazil partnership. In the field of international cooperation, in 2008 a Joint Action Plan was signed by the EU and Brazil for triangular initiatives involving countries with fewer resources.

One key area where there was an alignment of values and interests was South America. During the Lula government, Brazil’s presence in the region grew considerably in terms of technical cooperation and investments, and also in terms of its capacity to foster political alignment. In this context, both the EU and Brazil defended multilateralism in the continent, the defence of democratic political regimes, social cohesion, and the fight against poverty. From the EU perspective, Brazil came to be seen as a potential leader of South American countries, capable of buffering any actions taken by Chávez and helping to make the region more stable (Gratius, 2008: 116). According to Ayllón Pino–Saraiva, there was an unspoken interest on the EU’s part in strengthening Brazil to counterbalance Bolivarian socialism in the region, and in boosting the Brazilian leadership to support the ‘Brazilian way for Latin American development that conciliates the market and the state, generating growth and promoting social inclusion’ (Ayllón Pino–Saraiva, 2011: 59).

However, the possible convergences mentioned above did not yield any significant results. Although the expectations may have been aligned, for the Brazilian government, joint action in the region was neither necessary nor desirable. Brazil’s interaction with its neighbours had a degree of autonomy, and any tacit alliance with the EU could awaken mistrust and hamper its attempts to build its leadership in the region. During the Lula administration, the aforementioned thinkers aligned with the Workers’ Party with influence in foreign policymaking – especially in South America – sought greater coordination with the region’s anti-liberal governments.

In terms of international multilateralism, Brazil also had trouble finding like minds. While European countries were identified as important allies in a review of international institutions, it became clear that a common approach to other important topics was a different matter. Gratius (2011: 4) cites the different voting patterns of Brazil and the European countries at the United Nations on the agreement with the Iranian government about the nuclear issue in 2010 and the expansion of the Se-
There were also differences at the International Monetary Fund, where Brazil pressed to have its quota share increased, alongside the shares of the other countries in the BRICS group. Plus, in a proposed nuclear disarmament process, Brazil’s diplomats took a different stance to that held by France and the UK (the only countries in the EU with nuclear weapons). As for human rights, during the Lula government the issue was sidelined in the name of priority partnerships with emerging countries.

Brazil’s projection on the international scene was based on the principles of autonomy and oriented towards the defence of a greater multipolarisation of international decisions, with its diplomatic corps making every effort to depict the country as an individual leader of southern nations on the international level. While there was a common interest in the defence of multilateralism as a form of international political organisation, the Europeans were clearly more interested in maintaining the status quo of international institutions. According to Gratius (2012: 12), each side has global power aspirations of a different kind: while European countries seek to conserve their traditional predominance in multilateral organisations, Brazil seeks to increase its influence and global presence. Thus, efforts to review international institutions found more support from other emerging countries than from Brazil.

As such, the place of the EU in Brazil’s assertive, revisionist foreign policy implemented by the autonomists has become somewhat ambiguous. While a strategic partnership has been signed, the initial perceptions of Brazilian policymakers about the EU as a potential partner in reviewing international institutions have given way to a more sceptical outlook, envisaging few areas for shared action, and consolidating the view that the emerging countries from the southern hemisphere should be the country’s main allies. Inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the pragmatist institutionalists have become a clear minority.

NEW GOVERNMENT BUT LITTLE NEWS
The election of Dilma Rousseff did not open up many prospects for a multifaceted partnership between Brazil and the EU. The soft-power strategy for a review of international institutions has remained in place, as have the prospects for partnerships with other emerging countries.

When it comes to action in global forums, although there was some expectation of change concerning human rights at the beginning, a degree of tension can be noted between Brazil’s respect for certain human rights principles and its respect for the sovereignty of states in its multilateral approach towards crisis situations. Maintaining its autonomy-oriented foreign policy profile, Brazil’s attitude towards the main position held by Europe in its direct action in Libya and Syria continues to hold true to the principle of non-intervention and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, which is firmly embedded at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its shift away from prin-
principles traditionally held by European countries can also be seen when it comes to the ‘responsibility to protect’. Without denying the importance of this principle, Brazilian diplomacy has tended to support a slightly different yet related idea – ‘responsibility while protecting’ – as a more appropriate strategy for assuring protection for individuals.\textsuperscript{18} As far as the creation of a Palestinian State is concerned, the perceptions of and therefore the choices made by the two parties here have not coincided either.

The defence of multilateralism is another cause for concern, in that there is no overlap between the beliefs the respective sides hold about what form multilateralism should take. The decentralisation of power cannot of itself be mistaken for a multilateral system, and Brazilian diplomacy has demonstrated a preference for a non-hegemonic scenario with fewer binding rules. As the gap between the two sides gradually widens, the difference between Brazil and the EU in their decision-making in international forums is, holds Gratius (2012: 13), partly due to their different power strategies: ‘while the EU tends to adopt a bandwagoning strategy or an alliance with the United States for most global affairs, especially in times of crisis, Brazil prefers a soft balancing with the BRICS to defy Washington’s dominant position in the international system.’

The European financial crisis has also had an impact on the potential for joint action in international economic forums. The EU’s normative role as an economic model has been put on the line, and Europe’s management of the world economic order is starting to be threatened by alternative initiatives being spawned in emerging countries, Brazil included. The idea of creating a development bank for the BRICS is a prime example. Also, in Brazil’s bilateral relations with EU member states, the crisis has dampened the prospects of any growth in European investments, which was one of the main goals of its diplomatic dealings with these countries.

When it comes to South America, Brazil and the EU’s common preferences concerning the region as seen during the Lula administration have remained in place, even if they have still not translated into any kind of combined initiative. Europe’s hopes that the new government will give less support to anti-liberal governments has been offset by Itamaraty’s stronger presence in foreign policymaking with its traditional principles of non-intervention. In times of crisis, the idea that Brazil and the EU might uphold common values towards South America has not been confirmed. Brazil’s reaction to the deposition of the Paraguayan president was tough: it temporarily barred the country from Mercosur meetings and actively sought out a consensual position against the move in Unasur. Meanwhile, the EU followed the more conciliatory position taken by the Organisation of American States, which interpreted the situation as falling within the law.\textsuperscript{19} Plus, Venezuela’s admittance as a full member of Mercosur has also gone towards eroding the EU’s relations with the bloc.
When it comes to the negotiations for a trade association agreement between Mercosur and the EU, the protectionist measures being adopted by the Argentine government and the presence of Venezuela in the bloc have both put a damper on the EU’s interest in its engagement in this matter. The factors hampering the success of the negotiations have raised expectations amongst Brazilian economic players that an agreement may be negotiated just with Brazil. However, this kind of accord would run counter to Brazil’s goals in the short term, as it would breach the terms of the common trade tariff in the bloc, which, despite their limitations, serve as an element of cohesion. Meanwhile, the EU continues to deny Brazil its primary demand – that the EU would open its agricultural market to Brazil – while Europe’s claims in certain sectors of manufactured goods and in the services and tenders sector fall on deaf ears in Brazil.

When it comes to strategic partnerships – and the Joint Action Plan – there is one area where the potential for cooperation may still be realised: international cooperation. During the Lula administration, South-South cooperation grew considerably, mainly involving countries from Africa and South America with lesser means. Brazil is becoming a donor, with several of its ministries and various different Brazilian government agencies being involved in the donor activities. The main areas of cooperation are health, infrastructure, energy and technical cooperation, especially in farming.

Along these lines, certain triangular cooperation projects have been brought in since President Lula’s second term. Some European countries have shown interest in triangular cooperation projects with developing countries, from an instrumental perspective, thanks to the potential they give for learning from experiences in southern countries and attracting the Brazilian government. Triangular cooperation expands the resources for cooperation initiatives while giving their actions a higher international profile. However, as in other cases, this is an area where principles are aligned but strategies are different. The cooperation for development pursued by the European Union and its member countries is guided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, through its Development Assistance Committee, while Brazil’s cooperation policy is presented as an alternative and as part of what Brazil calls South-South cooperation, meaning that it is free of any preconditions. The Brazilian government is seeking to break free from the north-south cooperation pattern, but its foreign policymakers are not all of one mind as to the efficacy of this kind of trilateral initiative. To make matters worse, the European crisis is squeezing the availability of funding for this area.

**CONCLUSION**

During Cardoso’s government – when the pragmatic institutionalists held sway in the foreign ministry – an effort was made to establish closer ties with the EU and EU
countries in the political sphere. At the same time, the EU showed a clear preference for interregional relations, such as those between itself and Mercosur or those between itself, Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, the favouring of relations between the EU and Brazil did not last.

Unlike the Cardoso administration’s foreign policy, the Lula government’s autonomy-oriented diplomatic efforts sought out more direct strategies for boosting the autonomy of Brazilian actions while strengthening universalism through South-South cooperation initiatives and in multilateral forums, reinforcing Brazil’s leadership in South America, and strengthening Brazil’s proactive role in international politics.

The rapprochement between the EU and Brazil during Lula’s presidency was an initiative derived from Brazil’s new activism in the international sphere, as well as its emerging role as a regional power. The new European tendency towards bilateral relations with the region opened up possibilities for this type of partnership. The prospects for Brazilian leadership in a South America marked by anti-liberal governments heightened the EU’s interest in forging stronger links with the country. But the type of leadership sought by Brazilian diplomacy was individualistic, and the country’s role as a global player was strongly rooted in the idea of autonomy upheld by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its vision of the EU was complex: Brazil and the EU held conflicting views on trade, and when it came to political issues involving values and international multilateral institutions, there was very little overlap in their strategy preferences, despite some agreement on the importance of defending such issues.

The new government headed by Dilma Rousseff has not introduced much in the way of change when it comes to the place of the EU in Brazil’s foreign policy. It is a partner with which Brazil shares common principles, and Brazil has reasons to want to be close to it, but the EU is not its main priority, and Brazilian diplomacy has certain differences with the EU when it comes to action strategies and perceptions of the current world order. The financial crisis in the Euro Zone has reduced the asymmetry between the two sides, making it harder for them to see eye-to-eye, and prompted Brazil to devote more energy to its initiatives with the other BRICS countries.

ENDNOTES

1 Susanne Gratius’s work is the most comprehensive work on the topic.
2 The idea of continuity is presented by Brazilian diplomacy as a given, as it is understood that the assurance of continuity can bring a political leverage.
3 According to Vigevani et al. (2008), autonomy and universalism are the two mainstays of Brazilian foreign policy.
4 Autonomy through disengagement, autonomy through participation, autonomy through integration, and autonomy through diversification.
According to Veiga (2002), in the 1990s Brazil experienced a certain clash of ideas about what development strategy should be adopted, between liberal thinking on the one hand and more traditional, nationalist, and developmental thinking on the other. This led to a gradual, discontinuous and often incomplete implementation of the new liberal paradigms. This is what Veiga terms as ‘limited liberalisation’.

‘The times of isolationism and self-sufficiency are over. National sovereignty has ceased to be an argument for behaviours that go against fundamental values.’ ‘Autonomy through integration means supporting international regimes’ (Lampreia, 1998: 8–11).


Here, leadership is understood as a country’s capacity to influence the region’s political and economic trajectory with mechanisms of soft power. Regional power combines the capacity to set the course of integration and regional cooperation.

A term coined by Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim to justify Brazil’s involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries in the region without formally abandoning the principles of non-intervention.

Andrés Malamud (2009) highlights the differing positions of the region’s countries in regard to Brazilian nominations for elected positions in international organisations.

Despite the fact that this is a topic about which consensus is hard to reach internally and which therefore limits the country’s full commitment to the initiative.

According to Ayllón Pino (2006), Europe was seen by the Brazilian government as a ‘strategic ally in order to stop the hegemonic unilateralism of the US’. Fonseca (2005: 7), an ambassador in the Brazilian diplomatic corps, draws attention to the alignment between Europe and Latin America in the defence of multilateralism and highlights the distance separating Latin America and the USA.

Pereira (2011) notes, for instance, that during the Cardoso administration, Brazilian diplomacy put emphasis on democracy as a source of new international standing for Brazil and a standard that should not be strayed from (a position that was nearer to the EU position), while during Lula’s leadership the idea of democratising international relations gained more space in diplomatic discourse.

Interestingly, despite the commitments announced by the Lula administration in international negotiations, in its domestic policy and inside the government there were quite conflicting views about how to deal with climate change and the environment. In this case, thinking of Putnam’s two level game theory (1988), the Brazilian government had limited room for manoeuvre for international negotiations.

The position taken by Brazil in response to Iran was strongly criticised by retired diplomats connected to the pragmatic institutionalists.

In a speech given at the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2011, Dilma Rousseff stated that ‘much is said about the responsibility to protect; little is said about responsibility while protecting.’ Online: www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil/disco suro-na-abertura-do-debate-geral-da-66a-assambleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas-nova-york-eua-21-de-setembro-de-2011-1.

Triangular cooperation is understood here as cooperation between one country with more resources which provides cooperation, one medium-income country that also provides cooperation, and one less-developed country in relative terms that receives cooperation (Gómez Galán–Ayllón Pino–Albarrán Calvo, 2011).

Renato Flores, in a debate about the EU-Brazil strategic partnership: ‘Deepening the Strategic Partnership’, CEPS/CEBRI/FRIDE, Rio de Janeiro, 8 May 2012.

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Europe as Seen from Russia

VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY AND SERGEY UTKIN

Abstract: The article argues that Russia is concerned by the marginal position often ascribed to the country in the European politics. The frustration is fed by the fact that Russia perceives itself as a European country. As the article shows, the liberal part of the Russian political spectrum offers a range of ideas for an EU-Russia alliance that could make each of the allies more competitive in the globalized world. Meanwhile, the conservatives believe that Russia has enough resources to be a self-sufficient centre of power.

The economic potential of the EU, which is Russia’s major trading partner, puts cooperation with the EU on the forefront of the Russian external economic policy. But the only time when the EU becomes practically important for ordinary Russians is when they have to deal with (obtaining) Schengen visas. The state of the visa-related arrangements between Russia and the EU then becomes a major criterion that drives the public assessment of the EU-Russia relations. Visa-free travel and the following increase in people-to-people contacts would eventually provide the necessary level of trust between Russia and the EU.

The authors also argue that the idea of an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee, which was proposed by Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, deserves serious consideration. The article concludes that it is still possible to construct Europe as a global actor which is not limited to the present day EU but also comprises other European countries, with Russia among them.

Keywords: Russia, Europe, EU, Schengen

In this article we offer an overview of the ways in which Russians understand Europe and Europeanness in their daily life. The matter of perceptions is, of course, highly subjective, but still we hope that the statistical data and the presentation of the existing political divergences will let us capture the major traits of the reality. The chosen topic is both very broad, since public opinion and political platforms are influenced by every aspect of human life, and relatively narrow, because perceptions themselves do not necessarily determine and explain either Russia’s place in European politics and economy in general or its relations with a given European country. Furthermore, in this article we are not dealing extensively with how Russia is perceived in Europe – a complementary topic that gives no less food for thought. ¹

Being the largest country in the world with a population which is the biggest among European nations but relatively small in the context of the 21st century, when
China, India and the Islamic world are on the rise, Russia is becoming increasingly concerned about its place in the international landscape of the future.

Since the 18th century, with the reforms of Peter the Great, the Russian elite, followed by the general public, got used to thinking about their country as a great power, one of those that determine the fates of the world – a function which was institutionalised in the form of the Holy Alliance as Napoleon was defeated. In the 20th century this worldview was exacerbated with the Soviet Union becoming a pole of gravity for its allies, who spread all over the planet, as the Soviet Union eventually intended to change the way people live all over the planet. But Europe has been the centerpiece of the country’s worldview throughout these very different times up until the end of the second millennium AD. That was not only because Russian cultural roots lie there but also due to the fact that besides being the main stage of the international power game, Europe was the leading region in terms of social and technological development.

As Europe loses its glitter, though, Russia might become less interested in European affairs – but only if the country keeps its potential to act as a stand-alone globally important decision-making centre. In case it would not, Russia’s only option for retaining its global clout might be an ever-closer union with other European states. Both of these prospects find their ideology-driven champions in Russia. However, the evolution of Russian policies will inevitably take into account a number of more pragmatic considerations that will not let the ideological debate set Russia completely apart from Europe.

LOOKING AT EUROPE FROM INSIDE EUROPE

Nowadays when people speak about Europe, they often mean the European Union. A number of European countries which are not members of the EU thus find themselves in a limbo. Many of them hope to join the EU one day and see no drama in this discrepancy between the geographic and the political Europe. But for Russia the riddle is more complicated.

Few policy-makers in Europe would seriously argue that Russia might become a part of the EU in any foreseeable future. Meanwhile Russia works as an agent that brings European culture to the shores of the Pacific. However, so do the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These four countries also occasionally unite their efforts with those of European states. In such a case, their European background, in fact, appears as a tacit facilitator but it is rarely discussed per se. For a developed country there is no need to spend time and eloquence on arguing about its identity. A prosperous land is like a famous brand in its own right. Its products are popular, and its citizens are perceived as rich and lucky. However, in spite of the remarkable economic growth it demonstrated in the last several years, this is not the case with Russia.
For the mainstream of foreign observers Russia is qualitatively different from what they would describe as a ‘European nation’. A list of differences may start with the Russian Soviet-style bureaucracy (Elder, 2012), the alleged value gap (The Economist, 2010) or the characteristics of the Russian economy and political regime (Bremer–Roubini, 2012). These assessments are often incorrect and disputed (Aris, 2012), but for the purpose of this article we would only take note that the image of Russia as a non-European outdated crumbling power is common. More balanced and nuanced voices in regard to this topic are barely heard in mass media and political debates. The negativist view is, to a large extent, a mere reflection of an internal public discussion about Russia’s present and future which is found in the Russian media. Problems that ignite political fights inside the country, when taken out of context, look like eternal sores that are either deprived of any dynamics or worsening. It is true, however, that in many respects the country indeed has to concentrate on issues that were already resolved in the West, which makes it look retarded when the troublesome history and the territorial and demographic scope are not taken as an excuse.

Russians are, in general, well aware of their image-problem. This affects our self-perception and our understanding of Europe. Russian schools since the tsarist era have had a traditional pantheon of European heritage as the core of their curricula. Russian people gain knowledge about and become interested in the development of European civilisation, while knowing few things, mainly those that have made their way to people’s minds across Europe, about other parts of the world, which seem too far away and too exotic. Russian writers and artists have been taking the verses of ancient Greece and Rome as their inspiration, carefully following the trends that were fashionable in Europe during their lifetime. And that is in spite of their awareness that in other countries of Europe they themselves would rather make it to the list of those strange distant peoples in which only a very limited number of Westerners have a real interest.

The decades of communist rule were damaging for some cultural aspects of Russian Europeanness but strengthened the others. Marxism came from Europe, secularised the society, and was primarily using European history to explain and prove the ideas it stood for. The obsession of Russian revolutionaries with Marxism was, in itself, a result of their persistent search for solutions to Russian problems in the thoughts of European intellectuals.

Culture does not necessarily determine the pace of socio-economic development, though. When Russians discuss their socio-economic conditions they often adopt a model of thinking about ‘us and Europe’ rather than ‘us Europeans’. The gap between the ‘European’ level of life and the quality of living in Russia is still remarkable, even if Russian economic benchmarks are gradually overtaking the poorest of the EU economies. In this respect Europe again plays a major role in the Russian world-
view. The European way of life is used as a reference point, an aim that is virtually undisputed. But this aim, as one may suggest, can be achieved by different methods, and for a number of Russian politicians Europe and the methods European countries have been choosing in order to reach their current stage of development represent a bad example for Russia.

EUROPE IN RUSSIAN PARTY POLITICS

The Russian party system will be evolving rapidly in the coming months. The currently existing political parties are often accused of being no more than a poorly working substitute for the real vivid movements they ought to be (Mäkinen, 2009). However, they can help to single out certain attitudes spread in the society. Foreign policy plays a very limited role in attracting voters, but major parties cannot do without formulating a stance on international affairs.

The dominating ‘United Russia’ party, now led by the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, avoids talking much about Europe. About the only concrete foreign policy proposal to be found in the party’s programme is on the prospects of a Eurasian Union (Yedinaya Rossiya, 2012b). Developments in Europe are assessed by the party’s members as outside observers expressing an opinion concerning something that happens outside their own realm of responsibilities (e.g., Yedinaya Rossiya, 2012b).

Indeed, Russian politicians may have various ideas on Russia optimising its European policy but the fact is that today numerous international discussions on how to fight against the consequences of the economic crisis in the EU go on without a direct involvement of Russia. Absence from decision-making means absence from the minds of the majority of people in power. Russian decision-makers have their own game to play where the EU is not instrumental and any broader understanding of Europe does not make much sense.

This disinterest in Europe contradicts the writings of a man who has been a de facto founder and a long-standing leader of the ‘United Russia’. Vladimir Putin repeatedly spoke in favour of a common European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. His recent statements on the matter can be seen as an attempt to revitalise the EU-Russia ‘road maps’ adopted in 2005 with an aim to build four common spaces – a common economic space, a space of freedom, security and justice, a space of external security, and a space of research, education and culture (European External Action Service, 2011). For Putin these common spaces are not a marginal idea among others; he does not understand ‘how people living in [the European] cultural space will preserve themselves as a respectable hub of international policy and power without joining forces for the benefit of future generations’ (Premier.gov.ru, 2011). The European cultural space for him does not stop at the Urals but spreads up to the Pacific.
This point did not make it into the party’s programme because so far there is nothing in it to sell to the voters. The only notable ‘European’ issue to be publicly discussed in-depth by ‘United Russia’s’ members of parliament, and pressed by Putin personally, is the visa-free regime between the EU and Russia. This, of course, would be an important step towards a common all-European space. Otherwise, ‘United Russia’ is not ready to promise any other achievements on the European track. The Russian political elite is often seen promoting a self-made approach to international relations and history, which is different from the common European pattern (Morozov, 2008). In our view, though, this is no more than a defensive rhetoric which is specific for the current ‘post-Soviet’ generation of the Russian ruling class, who realise that Russia may integrate with the rest of Europe only some time beyond the end of their political careers.

The second largest political party represented in the parliament, the Communists, is traditionally suspicious of the West in general. At the same time, they rarely address their critics in Europe. They can even refer to European standards to claim that there should be more respect for the political rights of the opposition. Meanwhile, a hypothetical implementation of the Communists’ radically leftist programme would inevitably drive Russia further away from the European political mainstream.

The same is true for the veterans of the Russian politics, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party, who fill the niche of radical populists who are supported by the most frustrated part of the population. Called ‘nationalists’ at times, they may flexibly change their rhetoric and voting according to the views of their leader. People who care about European values would hardly be able to vote for the party.

An attempt to create a social-democratic pillar supportive of the government, the ‘Just Russia’ party is a member of the ‘Socialist International’ network of parties and is intended to further develop cooperation with its ideological relatives in Europe. For them a true European experience is one of a working welfare state that would be more successful in ensuring equality than the Russian state of today.

Up until recently the only political party that was putting Europe in the centre of its foreign policy agenda was ‘Yabloko’, a liberal group with social-democratic tendencies, which failed to get into the parliament in the last two legislatures. Voters of the party do care about the gap in standards of living between Russia and the rest of Europe. They support the European understanding of human rights and basic political values. At the 2011 elections the party only managed to gather less than four percent of the votes. However, this number should not be seen as an indicator of the overall public support for the European idea. Under the old party laws that were just barely blocking registrations of new parties ‘Yabloko’ was surviving in a non-competitive climate while being unable to persuade voters of its potential. With the new laws that were approved, the number of parties which share European ideals will increase, and some of these may become more successful over time.
A standing division between liberals and conservatives, which is not fully captured by the existing Russian party system, is probably the most important factor in terms of Russia’s vision of Europe. The liberal part of the political spectrum argues in favor of alliance-type relations with the EU; this would allegedly promote reforms, democracy and market economy in Russia. The conservatives, however, formulate a warning that Russia’s identity might disappear if it were dissolved within the broader European pattern. They believe that Russia has enough resources to be a ‘self-sufficient’ centre of power, a stand-alone civilisation. The most extreme conservative movements (Ingram, 2001) may raise worries in Russia and abroad but, as often happens to radical approaches, they are doomed to stay marginal, leaving it up to the major moderate political forces to determine the country’s future.

**EUROPE IN THE EYES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC**

Parties and politicians may elaborate new ideas but they have to respect the existing mood of their voters. Russian opinion polls rarely deal with a generally understood ‘Europe’ but they can give some relevant hints that reveal Russian thinking about the continent. When Russians are asked if they think people live more happily in small or medium-size countries like Sweden and Switzerland, or in a great power, such as the US, 54% choose the first answer with only 11% answering in favour of the US (Levada Centre, 2011). When asked about what powers Russia should better cooperate with, 18% chose the US, and 48% opted for Western Europe, which is almost the same number as that for the CIS countries and 14% more than the figures for India and China (Levada Centre, 2012a). The EU was viewed positively by 56% of the Russian respondents in January 2012, which is a significant decline from the stable 60–64% in previous polls from 2010–2011 (Ibid.). The decline might be an effect of the economic troubles in the eurozone, which were widely reported by the Russian media. What had been seen as an embodiment of prosperity and comfort is gradually turning (in the minds of people) into an ineffective bureaucracy that impedes free development of European nations.

Nevertheless, the attitude towards a hypothetical EU membership for Russia is still favourable (44% support the move, and 31% speak against it, while 24% have no opinion) (Levada Centre, 2012c). It would not be just to directly compare these figures to the levels of EU support in countries that have a real prospect of accession. In Russia a public discussion on EU membership has never really started, and the understanding of rights and responsibilities of member states is poor.

Russia’s public perceptions of certain European countries vary depending on the state of the given country’s bilateral relations with Russia. Among Russia’s friends people name Germany, France, Italy, and Bulgaria, along with the European members of the CIS. ‘Unfriendly’ countries, as people believe, include the Baltic republics,
Poland and the UK (Levada Centre, 2012b). The well-known division between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’ is pretty much settled in Russian minds.

The mainstream of politics in any country is inevitably local in nature. This means that Europe will hardly make it to the centre of Russian political debates unless people see a prospect for the European context to play a role in the resolution of their everyday problems. European culture is good to have but hard to instrumentalise politically. Information on the Europe beyond the Russian borders comes from the media or tourist trips and often remains as nothing more than an abstract knowledge or a personal experience. This experience may work as an incentive for internal reforms in Russia that would correspond to European samples but the reforms would be a consequence of a comparative analysis rather than a result of feeling ourselves a part of the united Europe. Putin’s words on a possible synergy, an added value of a common European space, do not resonate within the society. However, this can change with further economic development of Europe.

THE MEANING OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY FOR RUSSIA

The turnover with the EU makes up around 50% of Russian foreign trade. The turnover with the European members of the CIS makes up another 10.5%, and that with Turkey makes up 4% (Customs.ru, 2012). The Russian place in the world economy is therefore firmly linked to the rest of Europe. But this linkage does not bring more public interest to the European affairs.

Around 80% of Russian exports to the EU are fuels (European Commission, 2012), which are delivered by a limited number of the biggest fuel companies. Energy supply is so crucially important for the economy that differences in political and economic institutions, and in values, between a producer and a client are set aside for the sake of basic necessities. Whatever the state of relations between the European countries, save for some catastrophic change, the energy routes will keep working.

Thus, the majority of Russian businessmen are not involved in European trade. At the same time, though, they have money and, often, an inclination to travel around Europe. During their travels, they note numerous cases where Russia is lagging behind in terms of technologies, business climate and comfort of living. As one of Russia’s well-known billionaires, Alexander Mamut, puts it, ‘we [in Russia] have an acute deficit of civilisation. That is why Europe, which is suffocating inside its borders, has an interest in sharing its own [civilisation] with us. Our main resource – the territory, a huge one, of which only a tiny percentage is cultivated. We need good experts, scientists, engineers, to create an environment’ (Mamut, 2011). The same intention of bridging the gap was evident in the presidential programme of one of the wealthiest Russian businessmen, Mikhail Prokhorov. He called for an adoption of EU stan-
dards by default, as well as economic integration with the EU and, eventually, the creation of a common space that would include the EU and Russia and have a common currency (Prokhorov, 2012). At the 2012 presidential elections Prokhorov came in third, gathering almost 8% of the votes.

The businessmen’s devotion to Europe is already changing Russia. As they develop their companies, it is usually easier for them to borrow desirable foreign technologies and methods from the places where they are normally used – and those places are generally in Europe. Investments from abroad also help this to happen, and around 75% of the foreign direct investments in Russia come from the EU (European Commission, 2012).

So far, the attitude of many Russians to the EU and Europe might be called ‘consumerist’. For them Europe is about goods that can be bought in European countries and the leisure time they can spend there. It takes an effort to ask why Europe has had all those advantages in quality of products and life, and some Russian opinion-makers actually make that effort. It is not only about standards and technologies. A favourable economic environment for such advantages is created by a firmly established rule of law, unequivocal respect for private property, and a limited role of the state in the economy. Russia has a set of principles in its Constitution and laws which fully corresponds European standards, but there is still a road ahead to implementing them in full.

The EU-Russia ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ initiative, launched in 2010, is supposed to help those economic and civil society actors from both sides that are ready to contribute to the progressive development of the economic environment. The addressees have barely noticed the initiative, which was running at a slow bureaucratic pace, until recently, when it has gotten ready to offer some real funding opportunities to EU-Russia joint ventures. The ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ is meant to leave an impression that modernisation will go both ways, making the EU and Russia apt to compete with the world’s leading economic centres.

The exemplary character of the European economic organisation has been highly devaluated due to the economic crisis. And the crisis is often judged as more than merely an economic one. As one of the leading Russian experts on European economy and the eurozone, Olga Butorina, puts it, ‘The EU’s biggest problem today is the loss of the European idea and the vagueness of European self-identity’ (Butorina, 2011). As it happens elsewhere, in Russia the usual image of Europe as a prosperity area is paradoxically combined with an image of a troubled continent which is close to losing its stance in the world economy.

**RUSSIA IN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS**

Many times Russia voiced its support for a Europe which would be free from dividing lines and able to take decisions as a whole (i.e. all the member states would take
the decisions together). This approach is officially set in the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia (Kremlin.ru, 2008). The best available institution that might help to achieve this goal seems to be the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which comprises 56 states, uniting all of the Euro-Atlantic area and Central Asia. Meanwhile, however, Russia’s official attitude to the OSCE has been lukewarm at best.

The Russian government accuses the OSCE of being too focused on election observation in post-Soviet states while forgetting the rest of its duties. All in all, Russia is worried about the fact that while OSCE mechanisms are easily instrumentalised by some of its members, which is possible because of the OSCE’s shaky institutional nature, the organisation does not have a legally binding charter that would determine what can and cannot be done. Russian appeals for the OSCE to adopt such a charter have not gained sufficient support from other OSCE members. On the other hand, if the organisation is used successfully by some of its members so that it provides for their interests, it can also be used this way by Russia. Russian international affairs experts Mark Entin and Andrei Zagorsky argue that Russia could gain from taking a more proactive approach to the OSCE (Entin–Zagorsky, 2008). But Russian policies do not go this way yet.

Russia takes a notably more favourable attitude towards the Council of Europe (CoE). In spite of the irritation produced in the CoE structures at times by critics of the human rights situation in Russia, the significance of the CoE in building a common European space is not compromised. Among the ideas coined by Russian diplomats was the one of a strengthened compatibility of the CoE and the OSCE (Grushko, 2010).

Russia makes an emphasis on organisations where it is a full participant. But the overall impact of these organisations is limited. The most important European issues are discussed inside institutions where Russia has no say, which are inevitably seen by the country as those institutions which have significant interests that are different from those of Russia. First and foremost this is the case of the EU and NATO.

The European members of NATO are often judged in Russia as unable to influence the United States as the major power centre of the Alliance. When they prove their ability to exert influence, though, it is regarded as an exception rather than the rule. This also means that responsibility for NATO’s actions, in the Russian eyes, lies on the other side of the Atlantic. When politics of European states and Russia’s relations with them are discussed, though, NATO membership is rarely remembered. It does not change anything for a tourist or a businessman, unlike participation in the EU. However, disagreements with NATO may well worsen the mood in Russia’s bilateral talks with the Alliance’s members.

Bridging the gap between Russia’s and NATO’s worldview and making them work together has been the purpose of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), created in 2002.
The original idea, according to the declaration establishing the NRC, was to have all the NRC members acting ‘in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations’ (NATO and the Russian Federation, 2002). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly insists that there must be more respect for the first part of this formula, meaning that NATO should not decide on its position on issues discussed at the NRC prior to its joint meetings with Russia. The NRC has indeed created new opportunities for Russia and NATO to act jointly but there is still a serious distrust between the partners, which is mainly caused by the transatlantic nature of the Alliance and the attitudes of certain European countries which are the most critical to Russia.

In its relations with the EU Russia has the advantage of operating in the absence of the US in the decision-making process. Russian ministers can regularly meet with the EU officials in the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council. However, the level of synergy achieved here so far may be assessed as even lower than the level of synergy achieved with NATO. Where the NRC has a system of working groups ensuring day-to-day cooperation, and a competence for joint decision-making, the EU and Russia rely on more conventional series of negotiations that sometimes lack regularity and normally require additional negotiations with each of the EU members to approve decisions in accordance with their national procedures.

Thus, the NRC model eventually appears as a more ‘workable’ solution to the problem of Russia needing to work with an organisation which it is not aspiring to become a member of. Hence there is the similarity of the NRC model and a proposal for the EU-Russia relations made in a memorandum adopted by the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Meseberg in June 2010 (Russianmission.eu, 2010). The idea was to create an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee (ER PSC) on the ministerial level that would serve the cooperation in crisis management and ensure foreign policy coordination. The memorandum contained a reference to the Transnistria conflict as the first conflict where progress should be achieved. This has been interpreted by other European governments as a precondition for the establishment of the ER PSC. Russia, however, rather sees Transnistria as one of the cases that the Committee should deal with when its work starts. The Meseberg proposal has gotten locked in a stalemate but the ER PSC or a similar institution may see the light if and when Russia and the EU find the political will to move the level of their relations upwards.

Closer cooperation between Russia and the EU, in the view of a Russian high-level expert group led by Sergey Karaganov, might lead to an ‘Alliance of Europe’ (Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 2010). Along with a common economic space, the idea involves building a single energy complex and the creation of a common security space that ‘would complement NATO’. This qualitative leap is expected to be a result of an intensified EU-Russia cooperation in every
field where common interests exist. The ‘Alliance of Europe’ concept seems to be the only idea produced by the Russian community of foreign policy experts which was quoted and supported by Putin in his pre-election article on foreign policy priorities (Putin, 2012).  

For a number of European countries any ‘alliance’ with Russia that would alienate them from the United States is out of question. Therefore, a quest for an ‘alliance’ should go in hand with a gradual resolution of the issues that exist in the wider Euro-Atlantic area. This has been the task of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, a group of experts supported at the top political level which has proved that the US, Russia and the rest of Europe have good reasons to act together and the available instruments for doing so.  

European institutions reflect, in a way, the ambiguous character of the Russian presence in and outside Europe. Neither the Russian government nor the EU and NATO will be ready to discuss Russia’s full integration in these organisations in the foreseeable future. As proved by the OSCE, there can be no solution in bringing all the European states together in a single institution under minimal conditions of participation. The hope for a more united Europe lies within EU-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation. But making these formats work properly would require a better understanding and coherence between Russia and the members of those major European organisations.

**A BILATERAL EUROPE**

A widely spread standing suspicion is that Russia is favouring bilateral relations with other European states in order to break the solidarity of those alliances where Russia is not present. This vision was highlighted in a famous report by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu from the European Council on Foreign Relations, where the EU members were divided into five groups – from ‘Trojan Horses’ to ‘Cold Warriors’ – according to their relations with Russia (Leonard–Popescu, 2007). The ECFR experts conclude that ‘[b]ilateral agreements with Russia have undermined the EU’s ability to secure key policy goals’ (Ibid.: 16). The differences between the EU members in their attitude to a country outside the bloc are nothing unusual, though. Moreover, they do not necessarily contradict the coherence of the EU policies, which are multilevel. The level of autonomously acting member states is the core that is using communitarian mechanisms to acquire some added value, and not to replace national decision-making.

Russia has never tried to ignore the EU’s attempts to forge a single policy out of many. This is confirmed by the Russian leaders’ persistent participation in the EU-Russia summits two times a year, which is a more frequent participation than that of any other strategic partner of the Union. Ministers of the Russian government regularly meet with their peers from the European Commission. Russia’s bilateral coopera-
tion with the EU members comes in parallel with and not at the expense of the EU, with due respect to the division of competences laid down in the founding treaties of the Union. If the number of issues decided jointly by the EU and then negotiated at EU-Russia fora is judged insufficient, this is not a reproach to Russia but to the EU leaders’ stance on the transfer of powers to the supranational level.

The state of bilateral ties between Russia and other European countries is best exposed by economic indicators. When it comes to foreign trade, the Netherlands and Germany are by far ahead of the other countries as Russia’s major trading partners (respectively 10.2% and 9.1% of the Russian foreign trade turnover) with Italy, Poland and France coming next (5.2, 3.5, and 3.1% respectively – all figures for the first half of 2012) (Customs.ru, 2012). The latter group shows results similar to those of Russia’s main European partners outside the EU, which are Ukraine (5.4%), Belarus (4.4%) and Turkey (4.0%). The trade flows stipulate that whatever the political climate is, Russia’s relations with these countries must not compromise the mutually beneficial profits.

By all the political and economic considerations, as well as by the subjective inclination of Russian leaders, Germany can be named Russia’s most important partner in Europe. Germany is the EU member most often remembered as ‘the closest friend, an ally of Russia’, in opinion polls, where it is overtaken only by Belarus and Kazakhstan (Levada Centre, 2012b). This attitude is kept in spite of the serious reservations regarding the nature of the Russian political regime and the prospects of an engagement strategy in relations with Russia which are often expressed by German intellectuals and experts (e.g., Holm, 2012; Adomeit, 2012).

The supporters of the incumbent Russian government normally see critical remarks towards Russia from other European states as an ever-present Western grumbling that does not deserve serious attention. For the opposition these remarks are no more than a weak voice of support that echoes their own views, which are expressed and discussed in the Russian press and on the Internet. No one really expects the critical comments to reach a level where they could damage the most important economic relations.

Russian leaders see the relations with Germany as a good example for others. When meeting the recently elected French President François Hollande, Vladimir Putin underlined the striking underperformance of the Russian-French economic cooperation in comparison to the Russian-German one (Kremlin.ru, 2012). This is where the necessity to modernise comes to the front. If they were based on energy exports, Russia’s relations with all but a couple of the biggest importers in Europe would remain constrained. Russia and France are starting to talk more about a high-tech cooperation, including in the most sensitive military industries, which might show the way to more mutual trust and to the engagement of Russia in the European world on a more solid and long-term basis than that of natural resources.
The advantages and downsides of a resource-oriented economy determine the essence of the relationship between Russia and most of the European states. But for a number of countries other considerations – such as divergent views on history and on the European geopolitics of today – take the lead. Latvia and Estonia are the states most heavily criticised by the Russian authorities and media. The Russian-speaking minorities in these countries, who lived there at the time when the countries’ independence was regained, have not received automatic rights of citizenship and were only given the status of ‘non-citizens’ or ‘aliens’, thus raising human rights concerns. Cases in which the Baltic states’ nationals who served in the Nazi regiments at the time of World War II are praised as freedom-fighters complicate the countries’ relationship with Russia even further. These controversies will certainly become less acute with time but for the next several years they will still play a role, creating unnecessary limitations for both Russia’s bilateral relations with the Baltic states and the EU-Russia cooperation.

The possibility to overcome a long-lasting suspicion and move towards a more constructive relationship was recently demonstrated by the developments between Russia and Poland. The improvement took place when both countries’ leading politicians found the political will to leave history to the historians. The idea was not to forget about the past but to make it ever more transparent through the opening of archives and an intensified dialogue.

A state’s membership in the EU or NATO may not always determine the foreign policy of the state but it does settle the principal geopolitical positioning of the state. This positioning is less certain for the European countries that constitute the ‘common neighbourhood’ of the EU and Russia. Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine have chosen remarkably different paths of development but in Russia they are still most often viewed as parts of a single post-Soviet Russian-speaking space that may be reunited on a new basis of an ever closer integration. Both the EU and Russia suspect each other of playing an outdated ‘sphere of influence’ game with these states while both insist that their own vision for the future is that of a mutually beneficial common European space that nobody should be afraid of.

By speaking to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, which all happen to be facing harsh economic conditions, Russia is trying to simultaneously secure its day-to-day profits and a favourable strategic orientation on the part of these states. These goals do not come together easily, while Russia’s partners are unwilling to pay the prices demanded by the Russian energy giants and are no less unwilling to increase their dependence on Russia. A common European area with a clear set of rules, including in the energy market, could indeed bring a solution but for now the stereotypes of the past prevail in the ‘common neighbourhood’.

The bilateral track of contacts and cooperation will not disappear – neither from the Russian view nor from the view of any other foreign policy actor that cares about
Europe. Even in a federation policies and legislations of constituent states must be taken into account, and the EU is still far from the time when ‘a federation’ would be the right name for it. The EU has proved, though, that the European diversity does not necessarily multiply barriers that complicate people’s lives. Nevertheless a number of important hurdles remain in force for European countries outside the EU, greatly influencing their vision of Europe.

**A PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EUROPE**

A common space means people’s mobility. Paradoxically, Russia, while being a European country, has bigger problems with Europe in this regard than with other parts of the world. The ID that every Russian gets as a citizen at the age of 14 is sufficient for travelling to Belarus and Ukraine, as well as to some states of Central Asia. For the rest of the world an ‘international’ passport is necessary, and only some 20% of all Russians have applied for it so far (Novyi Izvestiya, 2012). These Russians with ‘international’ passports can visit a growing number of countries, including all of South America except Paraguay and Surinam, many Central American countries, 29 African states, and some 36 states in Asia either without a visa or on the condition that they will receive a visa at an airport. In Europe, however, visa-free travel for Russians is limited to the post-Soviet space and the Balkan countries until they join the EU.

Schengen agreements are often referred to in Russia as the reason for visa barriers. To a certain extent they are the reason, since no one could expect bilateral visa-free travel deals between Russia and some EU members to come before all states of the Schengen area agree to do the same. On the other hand, frequent travelers definitely find their life simplified by the ability to travel to different countries with one visa, which is possible because of the Schengen area. The existing visa procedures are in many respects inadequate, though. For years they were binding Russian citizens’ travels to Europe with humiliation and senseless bureaucracy. However, this is slowly changing with the current spread of multi-entry long-term visas and the introduction of commercial visa-centres that (for a price) significantly reduce the discomfort of the application procedure. Nevertheless the visa hurdle still means that the overwhelming majority of Russians may not think of going to other European countries without complex preparations that often include a requirement to travel to Moscow or one of those few regional capitals where EU consulates reside.

However, given the limited number of Russians who travel abroad at all, European countries are still among the leading destinations that Russians choose. While Russian tourists prefer the visa-free Turkey, China (which is visa-free for tourist groups from Russia) and the visa-free Egypt as vacation destinations (RATA news, 2012), the leader in terms of the overall number of visits from Russians, which include business and family trips, is Finland, followed by Turkey, China, Estonia, Egypt, Germany, Thailand, Spain, Lithuania, Italy, Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic, the United
Arab Emirates, France, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Israel, Latvia, the UK and Austria (Federal State Statistics Service, 2011). The Russians’ overall preference for visits to European countries is thus evident, even if they might prefer some Asian countries over some European ones.

Many Russians believe that the ongoing visa dialogue between Russia and the EU will never bring the possibility to travel to Europe without visas. This is something that has never happened in their lifetime and seems too good to believe in. Such an opinion is technically and logically wrong, though, since the biometric technologies and readmission agreements along with the narrowing gap in economic development between Russia and the EU members will soon allow the parties to ensure a visa-free migration control, which will be more efficient than the visa regime of today.

Russians have a humiliating feeling of belonging to a second class in Europe, not only because of the visa problems. They are, in fact, discriminated against by many other bureaucratic procedures that are already simplified for the citizens of the EU. A future visa-free travel agreement with the Schengen states would not give the Russians a right to work in the EU, not to mention eliminating passport controls and customs. Problems in the recognition of qualifications received in Russian universities can also add to the complexity of living in a broader Europe.

The most dynamic of Russia’s young people show their ability to overcome the obstacles but the fact is that for the majority of Russians, the environment they live in is far less internationalised than that of the rest of the people on the continent. In comparison to other non-EU states, geographic distances exacerbate the effect more in the case of Russia. As Russian people rarely have to communicate with foreigners, they pay only slight attention to foreign languages, as 84% of all Russians do not speak a foreign language (Levada Centre, 2008). When Russians do have an ability to communicate with non-Russian speaking people, they do it primarily in the European languages most taught in schools, which are English, German and, to a much lesser extent, French. It is through education, media and technologies that Europe reaches every corner of Russia.

There are many ways to facilitate people-to-people communication on the youth level, as well as among businessmen and professionals. A generation ago these channels could not work properly for Russia because of the ‘Iron Curtain’. Though they are incomparably more efficient today, they are still constricted by the bureaucratic legacy and the limited number of people involved. The intensity of Russian involvement in Europe on this basic individual level will be rising but at a slow pace, and it will take years for the continent to feel the changes.

CONCLUSION

Europe means a lot for the Russian culture but much less for the current Russian political life. However, for Russia Europe is much more than a collection of cultural her-
Russian economic ties are essentially European. The quality of life and the political system of Russia must eventually manage to keep up with the economy. European examples will inevitably play a role in this process. Russia is still interested in European politics, even as Europe is losing weight in comparison with other global centres of power.

Europe may become less important globally but Russia is becoming less important globally too. This is the rationale behind the promising idea to bring the EU, Russia and other European states together in a broader alliance that might boost the economic development and lead them to act together politically. Under the current conditions, though, this sounds much more like a dream than a reality. Russia needs to modernise first, while the EU will need time to agree that more Russia in Europe will not compromise the European values and well-being. In both cases the hoped for positive result may not come out of a single decision made once. The process leading up to the result will be a difficult one made up of numerous small but important steps. The smallest and the most urgent of them are already being taken or might be taken from now on.

ENDNOTES

1 Among the recent publications reflecting the vision formed in the EU vis-à-vis Russia is Judah–Kobzova–Popescu (2011).
2 Every European country, inside or outside the EU, is unique and the way to attaining the goal of the EU membership is long and difficult. Still, the endeavour is easier when the strategic course is promptly determined. The kind of uncertainty experienced by Russia in this regard is shared by Turkey and the states of the South Caucasus that may also be considered as being both in and outside Europe.
3 Most notably this happens through NATO mechanisms when military might is required, e.g. in Afghanistan.
4 On the other hand, as the considerations of the prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev showed two decades after the 1917 October Revolution, the mechanisms behind religious beliefs were used by the communists to spread their ideas and help them settle. (Berdyaev, 1937)
5 At the last parliamentary elections in December 2011 only seven political parties were registered and eligible to run. Nevertheless, some new legislation that was introduced after the elections allows parties to be registered much more easily, and this might lead to dozens of new parties getting their chance at the nation-wide elections for the first time in 2016.
6 The history of the idea can be tracked back to the time of Charles de Gaulle or earlier but its current iteration comes from an article by Putin (Putin, 2010).
7 The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization. Online: formodernization.com/en/.
8 A recent Russian official assessment of the state of affairs in the OSCE was provided by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko (Grushko, 2012).
9 The term ‘Alliance of Europe’ comes from the English edition of the report by S. Karaganov’s group. If it were literally translated from the Russian, the term would be the ‘Union of Europe’.

The course was set by Prime Minister Donald Tusk inviting Vladimir Putin to come to Poland to commemorate the beginning of World War II, and also by Putin’s article published in Gazeta Wyborcza (Putin, 2009).

A view skeptical of Russia in this regard is in Adomeit (2011). An example of Russian criticism of the EU is in EUObserver (2009).

For a list of countries with visa-free or simplified entry for Russian citizens, see: www.travel.ru/formalities/visa/visafree/.

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Europe as Seen from Turkey: From a Strategic Goal to an Instrumental Partnership?

ATILA ERALP AND ZERRIN TORUN

Abstract: This article explores whether Turkish preferences regarding the relationship with the EU have moved away from seeing the EU accession as a strategic goal towards seeking an instrumental partnership in foreign and security policy during the Justice and Development Party’s tenure in government since 2002. While the analysis tries to cover the opinions of different segments of the Turkish elite, particular emphasis is put on how current policy-makers define their strategic vision and the EU’s role in it as well as their foreign policy goals, including the accession to the EU. It finds out that as citizens of an EU candidate country, a majority of the Turkish elite define the EU as a transformative but unfair institution. However, seeing Turkey as an emerging regional power and a European actor, current Turkish policy-makers define the EU as an unaware and reticent partner which may face decline in the future. The final section explores the prospects of an improved strategic cooperation between Turkey and the EU.

Keywords: Turkey, EU, perceptions, foreign and security policy

INTRODUCTION
This article analyses Turkish elite perceptions of the EU by asking whether Turkey now prefers an instrumental partnership with the EU, while before, it saw cooperation and integration with Europe as a strategic goal which the Turkish policy-makers, civil society and public all shared. The answer to this question is highly relevant and interesting for both academics and policy-makers, as Europe goes through a financial crisis while Turkey’s economy seems to be doing well; as Europe’s ability to act as an actor in the realm of foreign and security policy is still being discussed, Turkey is increasingly being defined as a ‘regional’ or ‘rising’ power both in the West and in the current geopolitical vision promoted by the current foreign policy-makers. The answer is also important in assessing the possibilities for an improved strategic cooperation between Turkey and the EU as Turkey’s accession negotiations have been stalled since 2010 and the issue of how to sustain the relationship is high on the agenda of informed analysts. The analysis here relies on opinions of different segments of Turkish politics and society, such as politicians, diplomats, academics...
and journalists, in order to answer the question. As the definition of Turkey as a ‘regional power’ comes during the period of the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) tenure in government, which also represents the rise of a new elite, particular attention is paid to how current foreign policy-makers and opinion leaders define Turkey’s foreign policy goals, the EU’s role in international relations and Turkey’s relationship with it.

For the sake of analytical clarity, the article begins with a section on perceptions of the EU within the framework of Turkey’s EU membership goal. This section demonstrates that a majority of the Turkish elite, including academics, politicians from different parts of the political spectrum and opinion leaders, see the EU as a transformative actor. On the other hand, the current policy-makers’ perception of the stagnation in the accession negotiations and of the reasons behind it highlights the EU as an unfair organization. Moreover, this perspective seems to be shared by a majority of the public, given the decreasing level of trust towards the EU as shown by the results of recent public opinion polls.

The second section focuses on Turkey’s strategic vision as defined by its current policy-makers and explores the definition of Turkey as a regional power, which is another analytical category accompanying that of Turkey as an EU candidate country. It becomes apparent that in this new vision the EU membership is still defined as a strategic goal. However, for the current policy-makers or opinion leaders, and for Turkey as a regional power, given the enhanced prospects of power or fields of engagement in other areas of international relations, the finalité of the EU accession process seems to be more important for the EU than for Turkey. In such a context, the EU accession happens to be yet another pillar of a multi-dimensional foreign policy, albeit it is still important and beneficial for various purposes, such as signifying an alliance of civilizations. This section also presents critical perspectives on the EU in view of the financial crisis, globalization and developments within its member states. While these critical perspectives do not seem to be undermining the significance of the EU membership as a strategic goal for Turkey, they do seem to exacerbate the perception that the EU is not particularly successful in terms of problem-solving or enacting a strategic vision. Thus the image of the EU through the lens of Turkey as a regional power, which is promoted by current Turkish foreign policy-makers, can be summarized by saying that it is an image of the EU as an unaware and reticent partner which may face decline. The final section then investigates possible avenues for improved relations and cooperation in foreign and security policies between the two sides and finds that the prospects do not seem positive. It concludes that despite Turkey’s expressed support for improved cooperation, attempts to improve the strategic cooperation between Turkey and the EU are highly likely to fall victim to the problems that haunt the Turkish EU accession negotiations, un-
less a major change occurs in the positions of the parties due to a crisis or change of government.

**TURKEY AS AN EU CANDIDATE COUNTRY: THE EU AS A TRANSFORMATIVE BUT UNFAIR INSTITUTION**

The Turkish perception of the European Union is naturally filtered through the history of Turkey’s aim and attempts to become an EC/EU member state. A big majority of Turkish analysts, opinion leaders and politicians from both the right and the left side of the political spectrum agree on the benefits of the process of candidacy and accession negotiations as well as the importance of the continuation of this process. In this sense, the EU appears as a transformative actor which has a crucial role in consolidating democracy, human rights and rule of law in the country with positive implications for foreign policy as well. The Europeanization of Turkey is seen as bringing important benefits to all segments of the society in political, economic and social areas of life. To illustrate, for Yaşar Yakış, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first JDP government, the Turkish EU membership is Turkey’s second biggest modernization project after the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Yakış, 2010: 304). Another former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin, from the left side of the political spectrum, also defines the goal of the EU membership as a modernization project (Çetin, 2010: 93). For Cengiz Çandar, a liberal journalist, the EU functions as the engine of transformation in Turkey and it is useful for setting specific goals towards this transformation (Çandar, 2010: 123). Ali Babacan, another former Minister of Foreign Affairs from the JDP, uses a slightly different wording, defining the steps taken during the process of the EU accession negotiations for improved democratization, human rights and rule of law as ‘a silent revolution’. For Babacan, these steps are all part of what increases Turkish soft power, since even the start of the accession negotiations per se has made Turkey a center of attraction for international investment and facilitated high economic growth rates (Babacan, 2008). For another observer, a ‘Turkish spring’ with increased democratization, individual freedoms and economic development has started taking place long ago due to the harmonization process with the EU (Keneş, 2011).

Thus, the process is seen to have important implications for Turkish foreign policy and for what Turkey is in the international arena. In other words, for a majority of the Turkish elite, the process of accession to the EU and the modernization or Westernization which precedes it provide the country with its unique identity. For instance, Zeynep Daği, an academic and a former JDP MP, highlights that the EU has contributed to Turkey’s foreign policy by facilitating the restructuring of its economy, politics and legal system (Daği, 2010: 130). For Şaban Çalış, another academic,
if Turkey is today a prestigious country in the Arab world, this is closely related with its being an EU candidate. Furthermore, for Çalış, the pursuit of the EU membership is not a tactical policy; it reflects a strategy on the part of Turkey which goes back almost 150 years (Çalış, 2010: 84–85). In addition, for a significant majority of academics, journalists and politicians interviewed by the International Strategic Research Organization of Turkey in 2010, development of relations with other countries or regions, such as the Central Asian Republics, Middle Eastern countries, Russia or China, would not constitute an alternative to Turkish EU membership. The process of accession to the EU is first and foremost beneficial for the Turkish people and Turkey’s democracy, and it strengthens Turkey’s standing in the world. While increased cooperation with other countries and regions is desirable and necessary, this and the Turkish EU accession process are complementary to one another. To sum up, the fact that Turkey is both an active actor in the Middle East and a democratic, economically developed and secular country with a predominantly Muslim population has positive implications for its relations with both the EU and the USA. What makes Turkey strong and different is its ability to balance all of these relations and identities (Altunışık, 2010: 7–8).

However, accompanying this majority view on the necessity and benefits of the EU accession process is an equally widespread acknowledgement of the problems in the relations. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the current minority position of the nationalists, which are mostly represented by the Nationalist Action Party, although nationalism cuts across party politics in Turkey. To illustrate this line of thought, according to Ümit Özdağ, an academic and a nationalist politician, the history of the Turkey-EU relations since the establishment of the Customs Union can be summarized as ‘Turkish subordinative politics in response to the EU’s policies based on double standards, unethical politics and violations of pacta sund servanda.’ For Özdağ, in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit in 1999, which accorded Turkey candidacy status, the EU has ‘started the process of interference in Turkey’ in order to control it and succeeded in doing so by utilizing a ‘virtual’ full membership policy which is ‘open-ended’ (Özdağ, 2010: 207). Özdağ thinks that the EU membership is theoretically possible for Turkey if the EU decides to continue as a confederation of nation-states. However, there is a need to situate the Turkish relations with the EU outside the membership context. According to Özdağ, the Customs Union, which is an expression of the EU’s exploitation policy, should be annulled and a healthier economic partnership should be established. In addition, political reforms in the name of the EU membership have to stop, as the EU never stops adding new requirements while the open-endedness remains as a constant in the relations (Özdağ, 2010: 211–112).

Thus, one major problem which most Eurosceptics cite as evidence that the extent of the reforms Turkey undertakes is not relevant for the finalité of the negotia-
tions is the EU’s official emphasis on the open-ended nature of the process since 2005. Another related and commonly observed problem in the country is the fact that the issue of Turkish EU membership has increasingly become part of the EU member states’ domestic politics and subject to opposition on the grounds of essentialist (culturalist/religious) definitions of identities. Calls for arrangements short of full membership, i.e. calling for a privileged partnership or the incorporation of opposition to Turkish membership into the political campaigns against the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in Austria and France in 2005, increased the level of the Turkish elite’s distrust towards the EU. The French government and the former President Sarkozy later on decided to block the accession negotiations in chapters which they believed would put Turkey in line for full membership, arguing that the EU should offer Turkey an arrangement short of full membership, i.e. a privileged partnership. A further complication in the Turkish-EU relations has emerged after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU without the resolution of the conflict on the island. This was because the EU subsequently insisted on the opening of Turkish ports and airports to ships and aircraft from Cyprus in order to expand the Customs Union to cover all the new EU member states (implementation of the expanded Additional Protocol). The Turkish government, in response, asked for a reciprocal start of direct trade between the EU and Northern Cyprus (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) in line with the previous EU decision to end the isolation of Northern Cypriots. However, the EU could not come to an agreement that would enable engagement in direct trade with Northern Cyprus despite the Commission’s attempts to realize such an agreement. Moreover, in 2006 the European Council decided to suspend eight chapters in the Turkish accession negotiations which had direct relevance to the issue and agreed not to provisionally close any chapters until the Commission had confirmed that Turkey expanded the implementation of the Additional Protocol fully. Finally, Cyprus decided to unilaterally block an additional five chapters in 2009, which caused further mistrust towards the EU in Turkey.

From the perspective of Turkish decision-makers and opinion-leaders, during this process, first and foremost the EU reneged on its principle to require resolutions of conflicts before a candidate country becomes a member and ceased to be a neutral party able to exert influence on both parties on the island. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots were rewarded with the EU membership although they rejected the United Nations’ Annan Plan (2004) for the resolution of the conflict, and the EU pledge for direct trade with Northern Cyprus never materialized. Therefore, according to a widespread view, this issue is another example of the unfair treatment of Turks on the part of the EU. A good summary of the official response to both the Cypriot issue and the proposals for an EU-Turkish relationship short of full membership, i.e. a privileged partnership, is the following statement by Egemen Bağış, the
Minister for European Union Affairs and Chief Negotiator, which is worth quoting at length:

‘The decision of Turkey and the EU to have a common future is a mutual commitment based on existing treaties, agreements and unanimous EU decisions... It was Turkish Cypriots who gave an equivocal “yes” to the Annan Plan to reunite the island, while Greek Cypriots, abusing their EU membership, chose to say “no”... Despite some disappointing voices from European leaders and the unfair approach to the Cyprus issue, we are not giving up. We expect the EU to stand firm on its commitments, just as we are doing, without backtracking from our mutual commitments. As for any reference to “privileged partnership”, it is clear to us that such a relation has no place in EU law and cannot be sustained economically or politically because it is not based on the balance of four fundamental freedoms and equal membership rights. It is neither a privilege nor partnership for any side. Therefore, we consider such an unacceptable offer as an insult. The question is not if, but when and how we should make Turkey a full member of the EU to the benefit of all’ (Bağış, 2010: 18).

Although confirmations that Turkey is not going to back down on its goal of EU membership abound at the governmental level, so do the expressions of frustration. For instance, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that blocking accession negotiations ‘is turning into the sort of byzantine political intrigue that no candidate country has experienced previously’ (Erdoğan, 2011a). He reportedly also argued that ‘the behind-the-scenes reason was obvious to all’, and added that ‘we know this, but we do not think it right to voice this. I tell them openly: If you are not a Christian club, you are obliged to accept Turkey. For the only thing that can express that you are not a Christian club is having Turkey there, as a country with a Muslim public.’ Moreover, according to Erdoğan, ‘today, we are a country that is compatible with the EU acquis in a way that cannot even be compared to the compatibility of the last 10 countries accepted.’ Therefore, for him, the decision is ‘political’ (Today’s Zaman, 2010; Anatolian Agency, 2011b). The image of an unfair EU is also confirmed by a statement by the Prime Minister’s chief advisor, İbrahim Kalın: ‘Turkey will press ahead with its bid to join the European Union despite frustrations with delays it sees in part as a byproduct of anti-Muslim prejudice’. In this interpretation, the EU has laid out certain principles at the beginning of the game and Turkey has accepted these, but ‘now in the middle of the soccer game’, they are ‘changing the penalty rules’ (Birnbaum, 2011: 8). The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, on the other hand, points to the ongoing debate on Turkey’s European vocation despite the passing of fifty years since the start of the contractual relationship between Turkey and the EU and argues that this disregards Turkey’s well
established place in European history since ‘both the transformers in the Ottoman Empire and the founding fathers of modern Turkey were influenced by the cornerstones of European history like the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and the French Revolution.’ For Davutoğlu, ‘the next stop in this journey of transformation and modernization is Turkey’s membership in the EU.’ In parallel with the majority view on the issue, for Davutoğlu, the EU membership is ‘Turkey’s strategic objective’ and ‘one of the most important projects of the Republican era’ (Davutoğlu, 2009: 15, 13).

To conclude this section, there is a consensus among the Turkish elite, including academics, politicians from different parts of the political spectrum and opinion leaders, on the image of the EU as a transformative actor. On the other hand, particularly the current policy-makers’ perspective of the stagnation in the accession negotiations and of the reasons behind it highlights the EU as an unfair organization, and this perspective is no doubt shared by the majority of the public. The following section will present in detail the contours of the current Turkish government’s strategic vision of itself as a regional power and the role of the EU in this by focusing on the policy-makers’ perspectives.

**TURKEY AS A REGIONAL POWER AND EUROPEAN ACTOR: THE EU AS AN UNAWARE OR RETICENT PARTNER WHICH MAY FACE DECLINE**

Recent years saw incidents in Turkish foreign policy which led to questions about whether Turkey is turning East and pursuing Neo-Ottomanism or what went wrong in Turkey’s relations with the West. Turkish-Israeli relations faced a crisis after Israel’s attacks on Gaza in 2009, the subsequent blockade of Gaza and the intervention against the Turkish flotilla in the international humanitarian convoy to Gaza, which resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens in May 2010. Turkish policy makers have also engaged in dialogue with Hamas, which was labelled as a terrorist organization by the West, worked for Palestinian unity and embraced a position in favour of recognition of Palestinian statehood. Furthermore, together with Brazil, the Turkish government tried to secure an agreement on the issue of Iranian nuclear capabilities, and when the UN Security Council found this agreement unsatisfactory and decided to increase sanctions on Iran, Turkey did not vote in favour of these sanctions. This section will first try to show how these events reflect the new thinking behind the recent Turkish foreign policy, and then it will focus on the EU’s role in this new thinking or strategic vision.

For current Turkish policy makers, peace in the Middle East requires the ‘normalization of Israel as a nation-state’. This includes Israel accepting its accountability for its intervention in the high seas, which are free to everyone by law, and lifting the
blockade which causes the suffering of 1.5 million people in Gaza (which is defined by the JDP’s members as an open-air prison due to this blockade). As for Iran, the issue here is about preventing another costly intervention in a neighboring country with which Turkey has an enormous economic and energetic interdependency – as has been the case with Iraq in 2003. Iran is Turkey’s land corridor to Asia and it is the second source of energy for the country. Moreover, for Turkish policy-makers in the JDP governments, the world should be totally free of nuclear weapons, but at the same time every country should be free to develop capabilities for nuclear energy (Fletcher–Erdem, 2010: 1, 4; Davutoğlu, 2010b). As can be seen, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and other foreign policy-makers think that Turkish foreign policy should actively seek to shape the regional order around the country. For them, Turkey has a unique strategic depth which it has failed to utilize in the past.

In Davutoğlu’s conceptualization, which he published in a book as an academic in 2001, long before he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a long-lasting and comprehensive strategy for any country should draw on the intersection of two pillars, the historical depth and the geographical depth. For Turkey, the issue is the political will and planning that is going to enable an effective use of the opportunities presented by its history and geography, and maximizing its economic, military and technological capacity (Davutoğlu, 2001: 552–553). Moreover, Turkey needs to improve its self-confidence in order, for instance, to ward off the pressures of exclusion that emerged after the Cold War. Such pressures come from, for example, the integration of those countries who were the losers of the Cold War with the EU, the risk of NATO becoming hollow or Turkey being presented as responsible for genocide (Davutoğlu, 2001: 559). Turkey, as a country that was established on the basis of the Ottoman experience, should be able to weave together different geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural features and use these to increase its regional and global role (Davutoğlu, 2001: 556). This can change Turkey’s position from that of a flank country to that of a central (core) country (Davutoğlu, 2001: 563). For Davutoğlu, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the vision for Turkey in 2023 is also about reaping the benefits of the implementation of this thinking. In his words, ‘the Turkey of 2023 is part of the EU as a member who completed the requirements for this, is integrated with neighbouring countries in common security and economic spaces, is able to have taken an order-instituting role in areas where Turkish interests are directly affected, is active in the global arena, is playing a significant role in international organizations, has become one of the first ten economies of the world and became just as important as the other nine countries, and makes authentic contributions to the global culture; it is a Turkey which is strong and respected’ (Davutoğlu, 2010a).

The resulting policy is multi-dimensional, including social, cultural and economic sectors, and directed at increasing interaction and cooperation with different re-
regions, such as the Balkans, Eurasia, including the Middle East, and Africa. The goal is to be the ‘locomotive’ that works for development of ‘peace, stability and democracy as well as regional economic development and integration’ (Babacan, 2008). A distinct way to put this perspective into action has been to work through High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils, where the prime ministers, 10–12 ministers and top bureaucrats of Turkey and the neighboring countries get together and work on as numerous as 50 agreements on topics such as health, education, culture, trade, transportation and energy. This has been accomplished to a certain extent with Iraq and Syria, as well as Russia and Greece. An instrument for realizing these goals is facilitation of visa-free travel, and agreements for this have been completed with 61 countries as of January 2011 (Erdoğan, 2011a). Complementary to this instrument is the establishment of free-trade zones, as has been agreed upon between Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon in 2010. The same goal is pursued in the Economic Cooperation Organization with a focus on projects for constructing different railway routes to ease trade between its members, including Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Utilizing Turkey’s geography as a transit country and turning it into an energy hub, with an increasing number of pipeline projects across different regions and routes, is another instrument of this foreign policy.

Increased development assistance and aid through the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) and within the framework of international organizations is another highlighted aspect of the way this foreign policy is put into action. In line with this, in the areas where Turkey is part of a crisis management mission or expeditionary operation, investments to build and operate schools and hospitals accompany this activity, as has been the case in Lebanon and Afghanistan. In the diplomatic sphere, other activities include increasing the number of embassies and consulates throughout the world, but particularly in Africa, acting as a host for international summits in order to increase the country’s visibility, and taking on facilitator or mediation roles in regional conflicts, as Turkey took on such roles in the 2008 conflict between Syria and Israel, in the 2009 conflict between Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and, as was mentioned above, in the Iranian uranium swap agreement in 2010 (Traub, 2011: 32). Seeking new venues for increasing interaction and cooperation either by establishing the venues or by participating in existing regional institutions is another instrument that Turkey utilizes. Thus, a strategic dialogue mechanism was launched with the Gulf Cooperation Council; the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum was created in 2007 together with its economic, parliamentarian and media forums; and finally a strategic partnership between Turkey and the African Union was initiated in 2008.

One may argue that the underlying motive of this activism in Turkish foreign policy is seeking new markets, expanding the trade volume and attracting new
foreign direct investment, and these activities are necessitated by reasons of realpolitik at a time when the European market is contracting. Besides, Turkish foreign policy has traditionally sought stability and security through establishing regional mechanisms, which is exemplified by the institution of the Balkan Pact or the Sadabad Pact in the early days of the Republic or the opening towards Central Asia in the 1990s. However, framing and accompanying these wide-ranging activities, which may be seen as realpolitik, is a new discourse which claims to raise Turkey’s voice in calling for justice and eliminating inequalities and prejudice in the world. Despite the inconsistencies in practice, such as the government’s uncritical attitude towards the Sudanese leader Omar Al-Bashir, who has been widely accused of genocide, a notable example of this new discourse in the Turkish foreign policy is the position against associating ‘terrorism’ with the Islamic belief, which has been rampant after the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. The promotion of the idea that ‘Islam, secularism and democracy can coexist’ in Egypt and Libya, though, particularly after the autocratic regimes in these countries have been toppled, is another example. The lead Turkey took together with Spain for organizing the Forum on Alliance of Civilizations under the framework of the United Nations since 2005 is another illustration of this overall idea of calling for justice for the disadvantaged, be they the Muslims or underdeveloped countries. Calls for reforming the international organizations such as the UN so that they would be more legitimate, effective and representative, the recent aid campaigns to Somalia and Myanmar, and the 2011 economic and technical cooperation package for the Least Developed Countries all help build up the government’s claim to being the ‘voice of conscience’ or representing a ‘wise country’ (Davutoğlu, 2010b).

With the emphasis on the need for a more inclusionary politics at regional and international levels, the Turkish EU membership remains a strategic objective, and its realization is not only desirable but also necessary in this outlook. Turkish policymakers have traditionally pointed out that the Muslim world is closely following Turkey’s efforts to join the EU and that it is anxious to see whether the EU will accept Turkey as one of its own. But for Davutoğlu and other current foreign policy-makers, the Turkish EU membership is not only important for both Turkey and Europe in the sense that it would make them stronger and more effective, but it is also important for enacting an alliance of civilizations in today’s world. In other words, for the new ruling elite who define themselves as conservative democrats and who are widely defined by others as representatives of political Islam, the EU has the capacity and opportunity to enact multiculturalism and answer a need in this sense. In Davutoğlu’s words, ‘If we are to eradicate all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or creed, to promote a democratic and equitable international order, to obtain robust economic growth and to achieve sustainable development,
then Turkey’s membership in the EU will only help render the latter a leading global player in the 21st century’ (Davutoğlu, 2009: 14).12

On another level, for policy-makers, this surge of Turkish activism (particularly towards the Middle East), together with Turkey’s domestic democratization process, which acts as a ‘source of inspiration’ in different countries, has also been about ‘promoting Western values in a region largely governed by authoritarian regimes.’ In addition, ‘Turkey’s engagement allows it to act as mediator and messenger in an area generally hostile to the West’ (Fletcher–Erdem, 2010). In the words of an academic, Turkey does not pursue policies in its region that would compete with the EU; on the contrary, Turkey acts with ‘the maturity of a full EU member state’, and in a way, ‘without becoming a full EU member, it transmits the EU culture’ to its neighbourhood (Laçiner, 2010: 10). A peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the integration of the Balkans with the Euro-Atlantic community, enhancing the energy supply and security for Europe and strengthening security in Afghanistan and South Asia are all goals shared by the EU and Turkey. Turkey and Europe seek to use similar instruments with a vision of solidarity and increased cooperation ‘as a response to the multifold challenges such as the financial crisis, energy security, illegal migration, epidemic diseases, climate change, organized crime, cross cultural and religious intolerance, extremism and terrorism’ (Davutoğlu, 2009: 14). Therefore, according to İbrahim Kalın (2010), the chief policy advisor to the Prime Minister, the ‘new Turkish foreign policy’ as defined by Turkish policy-makers and recent activism rests on a ‘new geopolitical imagination’, which ‘no longer thinks in terms of oppositional identities and binary oppositions.’ In this view, there is not a ‘contradiction between Turkey’s aspiration to become a full member in the European Union and increasing trade and diplomatic ties with our eastern and southern neighbours’ (ibid.). Kalın also states that just as Europeans enact their neighbourhood policy, ‘we seek to minimize problems and maximize cooperation with all of our neighbours from Bulgaria and Greece to Iran, Iraq and Syria.’ (ibid.)

As a corollary to this strategic vision which informs recent foreign policy activism, a new argument on the Turkey-EU relations has been increasingly expressed at the official level in 2011. In this view, ‘the European Union’s need for Turkey has been increasing day by day while Turkey’s need for the European Union has been decreasing’ (Anatolian Agency, 2011a). In the words of Prime Minister Erdoğan, ‘In the past, Turkey’s EU vocation was purely economic... We are no more a country that would wait at the EU’s door like a docile supplicant. Some claim that Turkey has no real alternative to Europe. This argument might be fair enough when taking into account the level of economic integration between Turkey and the EU – and, in particular, the fact that a liberal and democratic Europe has always been an anchor for reform in Turkey. However, the opposite is just as valid. Europe has no real alterna-
tive to Turkey. Especially in a global order where the balance of power is shifting, the EU needs Turkey to become an ever stronger, richer, more inclusive, and more secure Union. I hope it will not be too late before our European friends discover this fact (Erdoğan, 2011a).

Thus, notably since 2011, members of the Turkish government have started speaking with greater confidence on the issue of Turkish EU membership due to several indicators. From the perspective of current policy-makers, Turkey has become the sixth biggest economy of Europe and one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Turkey and Europe’s relations in trade, investment and industry are more or less well-functioning. The younger generation of the Turkish people offers the dynamic demographic element that Europe will need. However, the fact that thousands of Turks have returned to Turkey as a result of Turkey’s fast economic growth while the EU is going through a financial crisis seems to refute the arguments that Turkish EU membership will result in a Turkish immigration wave to Europe. Coupled with these assets, Turkey has the biggest army of Europe and strong relations with the Islamic world. As stated by Egemen Bağış, the Minister for EU Affairs, ‘Turkey offers Europe the opportunity to increase its influence and perform a stronger role globally.’ Since it is advantageous for countries to come together, and ‘the EU is a success story of partnerships overcoming differences’, the call from Turkey is for ‘our European partners to continue Turkish accession negotiations in sincerity and work together to realize the vision of ‘a more open, tolerant, dynamic and better-off Europe’ (Bağış, 2011).

A more critical opinion on the European Union can also be observed in the Turkish views of the financial crisis Europe is going through. In the opinion of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Europe is increasingly facing a democracy test which involves a choice between ‘technocratic governments’, which are to deal with the economic requirements, and ‘democratically elected governments’, which will answer ‘the demands of their people’. In such a context, the question of who is going to pay for the problems resulting from the economic crisis is a major concern, since if this economic crisis deepens and widens and a new wave of xenophobia spreads, European values will be undermined (Davutoğlu, 2011). Similarly, for Ihsan Bal (2012), an academic and a member of the Council’s Scientific Committee of the International Strategic Research Organization, the economic crisis in the EU, which the EU seems unable to overcome, brings in a political deadlock as well and results in some of the EU member states seeking refuge in ‘othering policies’. Bal argues that the wave of racist killings in Germany, the increased xenophobia and the fact that some mainstream political parties are adopting the discourses of the extreme right, such as in France, is a reflection of Europe’s crisis. From this perspective, Europe seems to be defending insults against the prophet of Islam in the name of freedom of expression while trying to outlaw the discussion of the Armenian issue even when it is carried...
out by historians, as in France. For Bal, these acts undermine the understanding of plurality and integration in Europe and show that Europe is unable to come up with solutions to its problems.

Leaving aside the images that are reflected in the European Union mostly as a result of problems within individual member states, there seem to be genuine doubts about the viability of the Union in the face of globalization and problems in economic and political integration. According to İlhan Uzgel, an academic, one should question whether in the age of globalization there is a need to head towards ‘a single state logic’. Therefore, the problems within the EU may be bigger than the problems that Turkey faces in its relations with the EU, since European societies need to decide on what kind of a Union they want (Uzgel, 2010: 287–288). On the other hand, Kerem Aydin, the deputy secretary general of TUSKON, a recently established confederation of Turkish businessmen and industrialists, thinks that in the future, Turkish businesses will be indifferent to whether Turkey is an EU member or not, since their European markets are stagnating and there exist more opportunities for growth in the countries to the east and south (Hill, 2011: 1). The counter-argument to these arguments is advanced by another academic, Gökhan Çetinsaya, who is currently the head of the Higher Education Council in Turkey. Çetinsaya argues that Turkey ‘has already fully embraced liberal economy; it is completely open to the whole world with its media and civil society and under the attack of constant globalization any way’. For Çetinsaya, under these conditions, it is wiser to go through this process ‘under the umbrella of the EU’ in order to ‘reap the benefits of globalization’ (Çetinsaya, 2010: 113).

To conclude this section, the benefits of the current economic relations with the EU are not disputed by the majority of people in Turkey, whereas no significant segment of the Turkish elite or society appears to be a major supporter of changing the Turkish position on Cyprus in order to gain a breathing space in the accession negotiations with the EU. In addition, with regard to political reforms in the country, such as those related to the Kurdish issue, civil-military relations or constitutional changes, a significant decoupling from the EU accession process can be observed. These reforms are not advanced in the name of the EU membership goal, as has been the case with the reforms of the previous governing parties in the 1990s. Nonetheless, both the governing and the opposition political parties still seem to be sensitive to opinions on the state of democracy in Turkey which come from the European Commission and the European Parliament, whereas the issue of enhanced strategic cooperation with the EU does not seem to be high on the agenda of any segment of the Turkish political spectrum. Overall, although the EU membership is still defined as a strategic goal in this new geopolitical vision, from the perspective of current policy-makers or opinion leaders, for Turkey as an emerging regional power, the finalité of the EU accession process does not seem to be more important
for Turkey than it is for the EU. In such a context, the EU accession becomes just one of the pillars of a big foreign policy world, albeit it is still important and beneficial for both Turkey and the EU, even if it serves a different purpose for each side. Turkish critical perspectives do not seem to be undermining the significance of the EU membership as a strategic goal for Turkey, but they do exacerbate the perception that the EU is not that successful in terms of problem-solving or enacting a strategic vision. Thus, the image of the EU through the lens of Turkey as a regional power can be summarized by stating that the EU is an unaware and reticent partner which may face decline. The final section investigates possible avenues for improving the relations in foreign and security policies in light of the findings of the previous sections.

**IMPROVED STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND EUROPE**

Recent Turkish foreign policy activism suggests that improved strategic cooperation would be beneficial for both the EU and Turkey since it would at least decrease potential divergence and make them more effective in this policy area. As the visions, methods, values and concerns seem to be overlapping, it should be easy to increase cooperation in foreign and security policies. Nonetheless, currently, continuing the political or strategic dialogue mechanism established after the Lisbon Treaty, which consists of a few high-level meetings a year, mainly for exchanges of opinions between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the High Representative of the EU, seems to be the only venue for realizing this increase in cooperation. Otherwise, any communication around the same table between the EU member states and Turkey faces vetoes. As Turkish policy-makers frequently underline, Turkey used to be invited to European summits before 2004, whereas this has not been the case after Cyprus became an EU member. In addition, when the High Representative initially explored the idea of inviting the Turkish Minister to brief the EU Ministers about developments in Syria, Cyprus reportedly blocked the corresponding plans (Rettmann, 2011). Since even the accession chapters on foreign policy and energy are blocked, the establishment of more structural but still informal strategic dialogue mechanisms between Turkey and the EU on foreign and security policy (which is being called for) does not seem feasible in the near future. It is hard to think that an informal mechanism would reassure Turkey and make it more cooperative, even if those countries who block these accession chapters agreed to it. Moreover, informal schemes can hardly secure a convergence of EU positions and those of a country that is anything but a candidate when even the EU’s members do not seem to hesitate in overriding the EU in foreign and security policies.

Therefore, a mechanism which will be formal and give a sense of respect to Turkish policy-makers and society seems more important and desirable. This is why fa-
cilitating a permanent structured or enhanced cooperation mechanism between the EU and a candidate country can be a more promising alternative. Such an arrangement would offer the candidate country much needed reassurance that its membership remains on the agenda and act as an incentive for more convergence in foreign and security policies. However, this scheme or any other dialogue mechanism, regardless of its official status, still requires unanimity within the EU in order to proceed, which means that the Union might as well consider what it can do to decrease the impact of the conflict in Cyprus on Turkish accession negotiations.

From a Turkish perspective, the fact that Turkey is firmly situated in the West for security purposes and did its best to defend Western values during the Cold War and its aftermath is under-appreciated by the EU, which affirms its lack of strategic vision as much as its unfairness (Laçiner, 2010: 19). Furthermore, as the EU diplomats also acknowledge, Turkey has been significantly contributing to the EU crisis management missions. In the view of Turkish diplomats, this has been done despite the fact that Turkey is being kept ‘in the dark during the planning phases of operations because it is not an EU member’. In the words of one senior Turkish diplomat, ‘the EU can’t continue to expect to have access to the biggest military in Europe and to treat us as a second-class citizen’ (Bilefsky, 2007: 3).

In this context, Turkish policy-makers attribute more importance to the relations with the USA and NATO, where they have a seat at the table for advancing cooperation in foreign and security policies with their Western partners. The expectations of current Turkish policy-makers in regard to the EU focus on principles in three areas, which are mostly about the way the Turkish EU accession process is conducted: the EU should ‘abide by the principle of pacta sunt servanda’, it ‘should not allow bilateral issues to hold back the accession negotiations’ and ‘it should not let Turkey’s accession process be manipulated for domestic politics’ (Davutoğlu, 2009: 16). There are also more specific expectations, such as a visa liberalization for Turkey, as a visa liberalization has been accomplished in the cases of other candidate countries. In addition, the EU is expected to engage in direct trade with Northern Cyprus so that Turkey can open its ports and airports to (Southern) Cyprus and implement the Additional Protocol fully, as requested by the EU (Anatolian Agency, 2010a; Anatolian Agency, 2010b). In short, policy-makers and opinion leaders, while acknowledging the need for Turkey to continue its reform process in line with the EU acquis, argue that ‘the EU should do more to preserve the credibility and consistency of political Europe’ (Davutoğlu, 2009: 16).

Therefore, the prospects for an improved strategic cooperation do not seem high. In view of the analysis above, it appears that despite Turkish expressions in favour of improved cooperation, attempts to improve the strategic cooperation between Turkey and the EU are highly likely to fall victim to the problems that haunt the Turkish EU accession negotiations, unless a major change occurs in the positions of the
parties. Such a change could lead to the possibility of establishing a permanent structured cooperation or an enhanced cooperation mechanism between the EU and a candidate country in areas where increased cooperation is needed and desirable for both parties. However, this requires a big mental leap on the part of the EU, which means that the EU would have to become more open to differentiated integration not only among its current members, but also between itself and the candidate countries, or possibly other third countries.

(All the translations in the text were carried out by the authors.)

ENDNOTES

1 This is not to say that there are no criticisms of the reforms required by the EU accession process. Outbursts of criticisms against the EU by the Turkish nationalists can be observed on issues related to minority rights or democratization. In the view of these groups of people, the EU does not understand the risks of territorial disintegration and/or political regime change that Turkey faces if it fully implements the demands of the EU.

2 According to the Transatlantic Trends Survey, in 2011 48% of the Turkish population thought that the EU membership is ‘a good thing’, reflecting a slight increase from 38% in 2010. However, given the fact that 73% of the Turkish population thought that the EU membership is ‘a good thing’ in 2004, the results of 2011 still mark a downward trend in public opinion towards the EU (German Marshall Fund of the US, 2011: 37).

3 This was a decision which was thought up as a safeguard against the failure of the 2004 referendum on the United Nations’ Annan Plan to resolve the Cypriot issue, in case one of the communities on the island rejected it.

4 As a result of these, there are only 3 chapters left (public procurement, competition, and social policy and employment), which can theoretically be opened. However, there are big costs associated with reforms in these areas which made previous negotiating countries wait until the EU membership prospect was closer. For instance, with regard to the chapter on competition policy, Turkey failed to fulfil the opening benchmark on the transparency of its state aids system, whereas the social policy and employment chapter requires a complete transformation of the Turkish public personnel regime. As a result, Turkey currently has no chapters to work on since 2010.

5 Thomas Friedman appears to be the most ‘vocal’ commentator on this issue; in 2010 he stated that he found ‘Turkey’s Islamist government seemingly focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab League – no, scratch that, on joining the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel’ (Friedman, 2010). See also Kanter (2010). For examples of similar kinds of questioning in Turkey, see Tınç (2009), Eksi (2009) and Yetkin (2010).

6 The reader should take into account that the authors are interested in outlining the geopolitical vision and discourses of the current policy-makers and opinion leaders in Turkey – which signify the emergence of new elite – and the implications of these for the Turkish-EU relationship, particularly in terms of foreign policy. The article is not an analysis of how successful the Turkish foreign policy, which is shaped by this new vision, has been or can be in practice.
7 For a comprehensive analysis of this change in the Turkish approach towards the Middle East see Kirişçi et al. (2010).
8 The situation has, of course, changed with regard to Syria since the Turkish government’s firm support to the opposition in Syria during the ongoing civil war.
9 The new approach to foreign policy led to a definition of Turkey as the ‘trading state’. See Kirişçi (2009).
10 See Erdoğan (2010 and 2011b).
11 The UN-backed Alliance of Civilizations, a joint initiative of Turkey and Spain, brings together numerous countries and international organizations. The initiative, which aims to spread multiculturalism, also adopted the principle of establishing strategies for diffusion of universal values at different regional levels.
12 For a similar argument on the importance of tolerance towards other cultures for great powers, see the comments in Bimbaum (2011).
13 See Eeekelen (2009), Grabbe and Ülgen (2010) and Barysch (2010).

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A Japanese View of the EU

RYO OSHIBA

Abstract: Do the Japanese see the EU as a global power? How do they see the causes of the financial crisis in the euro zone, and are they changing their perception of the EU because of the Euro crisis? Regulatory power is defined as a country’s or an international organization’s power to set up its national or regional rules and standards as global rules and standards. Do the Japanese see the EU’s ‘regulatory power’ as strong, and do they think the EU’s ‘regulatory power’ declined because of the financial crisis in the euro zone? This paper presents the results of an analysis of questionnaire data as well as an investigation of newspaper articles in order to examine the Japanese perception of the EU empirically, and it also discusses academic works that relate to the result of the empirical analysis. The October 2012 questionnaire results show that the Japanese public has an impression that the EU is a global power rather than a regional power. In Japan, both business elites and university students generally think that the EU has strong power in the area of economics. However, the Japanese business elites feel that the EU’s power is declining because of the financial crisis. The Euro crisis has thus negatively affected the EU’s regulatory power. Even so, as the October 2012 questionnaire results show, more than 40% of Japanese business elites believe that the regulatory power of the EU has not declined even after the beginning of the Euro crisis. However, Japanese business elites continue to be anxious about the EU’s regulatory power.

Keywords: EU, global power, Euro crisis, regulatory power, Japan

INTRODUCTION

Do the Japanese see the EU as a global power? The strong opposition to the US by France and Germany in the outbreak of the Iraq War strongly impressed the Japanese people. Do we still have this impression of the EU in spite of the power shift in international relations, e.g. the emerging power of the BRICS, particularly China? How do the Japanese see the causes of the financial crisis in the euro zone and are the Japanese changing their perception of the EU because of the Euro crisis? Do the Japanese see the EU’s ‘regulatory power’ as strong and do we think the EU’s ‘regulatory power’ declined because of the financial crisis in the euro zone?

This paper will examine these questions. It will present the results of an analysis of questionnaire data as well as an investigation of newspaper articles in order to examine the Japanese perception of the EU empirically, and it will also discuss academic works that relate to the result of the empirical analysis.
Let me briefly explain what is meant by ‘the regulatory power of the EU’. Ken Endo and Kazuto Suzuki (2012) and a Hokkaido University project proposed the idea of EU power in regulatory governance. Regulatory power is defined as a country’s or an international organization’s power to set up its national or regional rules and standards as global rules and standards. Countries are to develop their arguments on their rules/standards, which, in turn, are to be seen as impartial as well as universally accepted global rules/standards. In this way, national standards become regional and global standards (Suzuki, 2012: 23–25).

According to Endo and Suzuki, the EU first negotiated the setting up of rules/standards within itself, and this achievement aided the EU’s argument through which it set up its rules/standards as global ones. The EU’s regional rules are an outcome of multilateral negotiations within the EU region, where European countries have already examined the impartiality and universality of the rules and standards in multilateral negotiations within the EU.

The EU provides non-EU countries with the access to the EU market when they accept the EU rules/standards (Suzuki, 2012: 27–28). The EU has a bigger market in terms of GDP than the US, and the EU market is very attractive to the non-EU countries.

**Table 1: Fukui’s Study of Elite Perceptions of the EU in Japan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: ‘In which area do you think the EU is a great power?’</th>
<th>Elites in politics</th>
<th>Business elites</th>
<th>Elites in civil society</th>
<th>Elites in the media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Issues</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Issues</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Norms’</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Formulations of Standards’</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) The question was given to those respondents who saw the EU as a great power.

(2) The table was made by the author based on Fukui’s article although Fukui himself does not display the results of his interviews in tables.

Are the Japanese changing their perception of the EU’s regulatory power because the financial crisis in the euro zone may decrease the attractiveness of the EU market? This paper will examine this puzzle as well.

Eijiro Fukui (2008) also clarified that the Japanese elites are much concerned with the EU regulatory power. He conducted a series of elite interviews to investigate
the Japanese elites’ perception of the EU in May–October 2007. Fukui surveyed 38 members of the elite – 8 from the sphere of politics (members of parliament and staff members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), 10 from the business sphere (senior management), 10 from civil society (interest groups and environmental and human rights NGOs), and 10 from the media.

When Fukui asked the elites the question ‘In which issue-area do you think the EU is a great power – for example, military, economics, diplomacy or norms?’, some respondents thought that by ‘EU power in the issue-area of “norms”’, he meant EU power in norm-related acts and the actual policies in the area of human rights, while others thought he meant EU power in the formulations of environmental standards and accounting system standards. As a result, Fukui labeled the latter as ‘Formulations of Standards’ (Fukui, 2008: 123).

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALYZING THE JAPANESE PERCEPTION OF THE EU

Does the Japanese perception of the EU power matter in international relations? Yes, the analysis of the Japanese perception is important for the following reasons. First, the Japanese government should have an important role in the resolution of the financial crisis in the euro zone because Japan still holds the second largest voting power in the IMF and is one of the key countries in the G8/G20. Meanwhile, the Japanese government is sensitive to the opinion of the Japanese business community and newspapers as well as to general public opinion.

Second, it is important to analyze the Japanese perception of the EU power, its hard power as well as its ‘regulatory power’, in order to see what kind of policy Japan should take towards the EU.

Third, the analysis of the Japanese perception of the EU power reveals how the Japanese people see the power shift in world politics and the global economy. Is the EU still a global power even after the financial crisis in the euro zone? It also clarifies how the Japanese evaluate the regional governance of the euro countries. Should the EU promote the movement from monetary integration to the next stage, that of financial integration? Is the 27 country size of the EU appropriate for promoting integration? Is a dissolution of the EU into a few groups likely?

ANALYTICAL METHODS

This paper will empirically analyze the Japanese perspectives of the EU through an analysis of survey data and by an investigation of Japanese newspapers. The argument developed among the academic scholars will be discussed with reference to the analytical results of the analysis of the survey data and newspapers.

First, the paper will analyze the data of two surveys on the EU conducted among the Japanese. One data set is that of the data collected for the Asian Barometer from 2003.
to 2007 to see the general public’s attitude toward the EU before the financial crisis in the euro zone.1 The other is that of data obtained from a questionnaire survey. This survey was conducted in October 2012 to get a view of the Japanese perception of the EU after the financial crisis in the eurozone. The samples were made up of elites, mainly those in the business community (a sample of 69), and university students (a sample of 204). These samples were selected mainly from three groups: business elites who graduated from Hitotsubashi University, one of the top universities in the field of business, staff members of the Office of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren [Nihon Keizai Dantai Rengokai]), the largest and most prestigious business community in Japan, and university students enrolled in an international relations course at Hitotsubashi University. The respondents of the questionnaire were classified into two categories: business elites (the Hitotsubashi alumni and the Keidanren staff) and university students. A simple calculation of the respondents will be used.

The paper will compare the Japanese perception of the EU before and after the financial crisis in the euro zone although the samples used in the two surveys are different from each other so it is not appropriate to simply compare the results of the two surveys without considering this fact.

Second, this paper will investigate and examine newspaper articles on the EU. These articles will be from the Asahi Shimbun, the most representative Japanese newspaper, which deals with overall topics, and the Nikkei Shimbun, a newspaper specifically dealing with business like the Financial Times. The paper will examine what kind of profile the EU has in Japanese newspapers. To do this, it will start by simply showing the frequency of the mentions of the EU in the headlines and articles of the newspapers. It will also present the results of a frequency analysis of major topics like security, economics, human rights, environmental issues, etc. for 2008 and 2012 to compare the data before and after the Eurocrisis. This paper will also examine the change of the EU’s regulatory power to set up global standards through a frequency analysis of the articles on this topic from 2008 and 2012. Finally, it will investigate the contents of the newspaper articles which discuss the EU’s regulatory power in economic areas, mainly after the financial crisis in the euro zone.

Third, this paper will examine the argument developed among the academic scholars about the impact of the Euro crisis on EU power, particularly the EU’s regulatory power, with reference to the results of the analyses of the survey data and newspapers.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA

OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE EU BEFORE THE EURO-CRISIS

Let us present an overview of the Japanese perception of the EU before the Euro crisis by using the data of the ‘Asian Barometer’ project. This project has created a database
of public opinion in Asian countries for the years 2003–2007. The project conducted a questionnaire survey on the perceived influence on the respondents’ countries of a few major countries or international organizations, such as the European Union, the US, and China. In the context of this survey, Japanese people were asked how they perceive the ‘the European Union, the US, and China’s influence on Japan’ (Table 2).

Table 2: Japanese Perception of ‘Major Powers’ Influence on Japan’ before the Euro-crisis (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Good Influence</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Influence</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Good nor Bad</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Influence</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Bad Influence</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asian Barometer Survey Data.

The simply calculated results of the Asia Barometer data are shown in Table 2. The following scores were assigned to each individual answer category to measure each power’s strength of influence and subsequently added up: very good influence: 2; good influence: 1; neither good nor bad influence: 0; bad influence: 1; very bad influence: 2.

Then to measure how favorable the influence of each power is, the following scores were also assigned to each individual answer category and then added up: very good influence: 2; good influence: 1; neither good nor bad influence: 0; bad influence: -1; very bad influence: -2. The results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: How strong and favorable the major powers’ influence on Japan was before the Euro-crisis (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Influence</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorability of Influence</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>-20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 clearly demonstrates that Japanese people perceive the EU as having a good influence on Japan but also as having a weak influence on it. In the category of ‘Favorability of Influence’, the EU received a score of 23.8, which was much higher
than those of the US and China. However, when it came to the EU’s ‘strength of influence over Japan’, the EU received a score of 31.4, which was far lower than those of the US (71.1) and China (65.8).

Let us compare the Japanese perception with the perception of the Asian people as a whole (Tables 4 and 5). The survey data were calculated for the Asian countries (Table 4) and then transformed in the same way as in Table 2 and Table 3.

**Table 4: Asian People’s Perception of Major Powers’ Influence on Their Respective Countries (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Good Influence</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Influence</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Good nor Bad</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Influence</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Bad Influence</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asian Barometer Survey Data.

**Table 5: Major Powers’ Strength of Influence and the Favorability of Their Influence in the Asian Countries before the Euro-Crisis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Influence</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorability of Influence</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 clarifies that the perceived influence of the EU in Asia corresponded to a score of 58, which is far lower than the scores of the US (98.5), China (92.7) and Japan (97.6). Table 5 also demonstrates that China has a very good reputation in Asia in contrast to its poor reputation in Japan. In Asia, the favorability of influence of China is much higher than those of the EU and the US, and China’s perceived strength of influence is almost the same as that of the US.

Japan’s perceived strength of influence in Asia is a bit smaller (97.6) than that of the US (98.5). Nevertheless, Japan is seen as highly favorable and influential in Asia, and its ‘degree of favorability’ figure is 61, which is the highest ‘favorability’ figure for the group of major powers and a much higher figure than the second highest one.
In sum, the EU is not seen as a strongly influential power in Asia, unlike the US, China and Japan. Will the EU lose its influence as a global power as the Asian region increases its clout in the world political economy in the near future?

THE OCTOBER 2012 QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

Let us now examine the results of the questionnaires ‘The EU as a Global Power?’, ‘The Impact of the Euro-Crisis’ and ‘The EU as a Regulatory Power’. The number of business elites in the sample is 69 and that of university students is 204. All the figures in the graphs represent the percentages of respondents who chose the given answer to the question.

THE EU AS A GLOBAL POWER?

This survey asked the following questions to reveal the Japanese perceptions of whether the EU is a global power.

Table 6: Question: ‘Do you think of the EU as a global power or a regional power?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is a global power</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a regional power</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is neither a global nor a regional power</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Question: ‘In which area(s) does the EU have strong power?’ (multiple answer) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military/security</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping/peacebuilding</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics (trade and finance)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of these questions can be summarized as follows: The Japanese public has an impression that the EU is a global power (Table 6). This view is strongly shared
by more business elites than university students because business elites usually see the EU in the context of the field of business.

The EU is seen as influential in economics by both the business elites and the university students (Table 7). It is also perceived as influential in environmental protection. Furthermore, both the business elites and the university students do not see the EU as being important in military and security issues. However, the business elites and the university students evaluate EU activity in peacekeeping issues differently: while many of the business elites (45%) see the EU as influential in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, relatively few students (19%) see the EU as having a high profile in these issues.

Table 8: Question: ‘In which areas does the EU have more advantages than Japan?’ (multiple answer)

Question: ‘In which areas should Japan intensify its cooperation with the EU?’ (multiple answer) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More advantages</td>
<td>Should cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/security</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping and peacebuilding</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics (trade, finance and investment)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the business elites and the university students see the EU as having strong power in economics (Table 7), but in this sphere, one third of the business elites see the EU as having more advantages than Japan while few university students share this view (Table 8). Even so, large numbers of both the business elites and the university students feel that Japan should cooperate with the EU in economics as well as in peacekeeping and environmental issues.

In sum, the business elites see the EU as more influential than Japan in more comprehensive issues, with the exception of military and security issues. The EU is a kind of model for Japan in dealing with peacekeeping and environment issues, which are also the areas in which Japan should make more commitments to cooperation with the EU according to the respondents. The Japanese also feel that Japan should cooperate with the EU in economics, but Japan has confidence in this area, and thus it sees the EU as a rival as well as a cooperative partner here.
THE IMPACT OF THE EURO-CRISIS

The following questions were asked to find out how the Japanese perceive the impact of the Euro-crisis on the power and role of the EU.

Table 9: Question: ‘Has the EU lost some of its power because of the Euro-crisis?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students (N=60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, it has lost some of its power</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, it is the same as before</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, its power is increasing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Question: ‘How much time does the EU need to overcome the financial crisis?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than three years</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not know + Did not answer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Question: ‘Will the EU overcome its crisis by itself?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not know + Did not answer</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Question: ‘Will Germany increase its power by coping with the financial crisis?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. It will be the same as before</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will increase the anti-Germany sentiment*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multiple answers were accepted.

To summarize the results of the questionnaire, most of the Japanese business elites (71% of the business elites) feel that the EU’s power is declining because of the...
financial crisis while half of the university students believe that the EU’s power is not declining (Table 10). Most of the respondents from among the business elites (77% of the business elites) feel the EU will need more than three years to overcome the financial crisis (Table 10). In other words, the EU will suffer from its declining power in a couple of years as it continues to cope with the Euro financial crisis.

The Japanese respondents are divided about whether or not the EU will be able to overcome the financial crisis by itself (Table 11). The numbers of respondents (36% of the business elites, 20% of the university students) who feel the EU can manage this problem by itself are close to the numbers of respondents (35% of the business elites and 30% of the students) who believe that the EU needs external assistance in dealing with the financial crisis.

Even if the EU needs external assistance, the EU should be the first to take responsibility to cope with the crisis. The Japanese respondents perceive that Germany will play an important role in coping with the problem, and many of them (64% of the business elites and 38% of the students) feel that German power will be expanded by dealing with the financial crisis (Table 12). A few respondents are also anxious about how anti-Germany sentiments might be increased in the process.

What caused the financial crisis and how can it be resolved? Our argument is that the excessive policy of deregulation led to weak national governance in Southern Europe, and that precisely this weak governance caused the financial crisis. Other people think that the crisis was caused by the EU becoming too big, though. Also, a few people said it was the lack of a common foreign policy corresponding to the monetary integration which caused the crisis, and therefore the EU should focus its approach on financial integration based on a functional ideal instead. The following three questions were asked to find out how the Japanese perceive the European integration in the context of dealing with the financial crisis.

Table 13: Question: ‘Is the number of EU member states too great for promoting European integration?’ (%)
Table 14: Question: ‘Is the introduction of the Euro desirable for the citizens of the countries which join the Euro?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desirable</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not desirable</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer + Did not know</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Question: ‘Should the EU promote its integration so that it would lead from a monetary to a financial integration?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It should promote integration</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should not</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer + Did not know</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Japanese business elites and the university students responded to these questions differently. The business elites (67%) mostly feel that the introduction of the euro is desirable for EU citizens (Table 14), but over half of the business elites (55%) answered that the EU is too big to cope with various tasks (Table 13). Even so, many of the business elites believe that the EU has no alternative but to promote integration further (46% of the business elites): this means that it should advance from monetary integration to financial integration in order to cope with the Euro crisis (Table 15). This potentially suggests that a fragmentation of the EU should be avoided. The students, however, are more skeptical about further integration.

REGULATORY POWER OF THE EU

Table 16: Question: ‘Do you think the EU has a strong power to set up global standards?’ (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites</th>
<th>University Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer + Did not know</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: Question: ‘Is the EU power to set up global standards decreasing because of the financial crisis?’ (posed only to those who replied ‘Yes’ to the Question for Table 16) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites (N=40)</th>
<th>University Students (N=64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is declining</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no change in it</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is increasing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Question: ‘In which area does the EU have power to set up global standards even after the financial crisis?’ (asking for a response only from those who replied ‘Yes’ to the Question for Table 16) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Elites (N=40)</th>
<th>University Students (N=64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military/security</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping/peacebuilding</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics (trade and finance)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the Japanese business elites (58%) believe that the EU regulatory power to set up global standards is generally strong (Table 16). The EU power to set up global standards is a type of soft power, and hard power generally affects soft power. However, many of the business elites (55%) and university students (59%) who answered ‘yes’ to Question 16 see EU regulatory power as declining because of the financial crisis, but a few (43% and 33% respectively) do not share this perception (Table 17): they see the EU as still holding regulatory power in spite of the financial crisis. Also, large numbers of the Japanese business elites and the university students see the EU as still being influential in economics and environmental restrictions even after the financial crisis (Table 18).

That relatively few of the business elites (28%) see the influence of the EU in the area of human rights issues suggests that EU standards of human rights do not strongly affect Japan’s business competitiveness.
PERCEPTION OF THE EU IN JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS
GENERAL PATTERN OF FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
The EU has a high profile in Japanese newspapers, as Paul Bacon argued in two of his papers (Bacon, 2012; Bacon and Kato, 2013).

The EU has been mentioned in the headlines of Japanese newspapers about as frequently as the US between 2010 and 2012, while China was mentioned in the headlines roughly five times as much (Table 19).5

Table 19: Frequency of ‘the EU’ in the headlines (The Asahi Shimbun)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The EU</th>
<th>The US</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>2371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>2705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>3301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU has been reported on in two or three articles almost every day during the examined period though the weights of the EU in the articles are varied (Figure 1). We counted the number of articles which refer to the EU in different issue-areas to create a rough sketch of the Japanese newspapers’ concerns (Table 20), although the method is admittedly too simple for a more detailed analysis and the numbers are not stable: if we used other synonyms for the EU, we might have different numbers.

Figure 1: The numbers of articles which refer to the EU (The Asahi Shimbun)
Comparing the data for 2008 and 2012, we found that *The Asahi Shimbun* was highly concerned with the EU’s economics (finance, trade and investment) and environmental policy during both of the years (Table 20). In 2008, the number of articles on environmental issues was higher than the number of articles on the EU’s finances or trade. However, in 2012, the newspaper clearly shifted its concern from environmental issues to finances, or, to be precise, the financial crisis. Also, the number of articles on environmental issues decreased greatly from 2008 to 2012.

The number of articles on military and security issues is relatively high for 2008; only the number of articles on finance, trade and investment is higher for this year. However, the number of the articles about military and security issues decreased significantly from 2008 to 2012. *The Asahi Shimbun* may see that the EU can play a certain role in the area of military/security issues but as the urgent military/security issues decreased and the financial crisis became more and more serious, *The Asahi Shimbun* became less concerned with the role of the EU in military/security issues.

**Table 20: The numbers of articles which refer to the EU by issue-area (*The Asahi Shimbun*)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>In 2008</th>
<th>In 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kikuzo (Database of The Asahi Shimbun).

The newspaper mainly leans towards articles on finance, trade, investment and the environment when it comes to discussing the EU, which closely corresponds to the views of the business elites in the questionnaires.
The numbers of articles which directly deal with the EU setting global standards are shown in Figure 2. The numbers were relatively high in 1996 and 1997 (seven and three articles respectively) and in 2006 and 2007 (six and four articles respectively). In 1997, *The Asahi Shimbun* argued that the EU had an advantage in terms of the number of votes at the ISO (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 17 May 1997). Furthermore, it introduced the news that the Ministry of Industry and Trade (at that time) sought a revision of ISO rules which were only common to the EU (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 20 September 1997). It also introduced the news of the MITI’s tactics of cooperating with China in the politics of setting the global standards for manufacturing goods (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 17 May 1997). These articles suggest that the Japanese government and the Japanese newspaper felt that there still remained some room for recovering Japan’s power in setting up the global standards for business in 1997 although the newspaper argued that the EU was more advanced in setting up those rules than the ISO. The Japanese newspaper thus saw the EU as a rival to Japan.

However, after 2006, the newspaper argued the necessity of following the EU standards to increase the competitiveness of Japanese companies. *The Asahi Shimbun* suggested an idea of why the EU had developed its regulatory power. It argued that the deregulation of market activities led to free competition in various sectors, taking the civil aviation sector as an example (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 15 August 2007). The deregulation contributed to an increase in the number of passengers, but it also
led to an increase in the number of accidents and troubles in civil aviation. In such cases, we need information and criteria for ‘safety’. Thus, the EU found a space in which it could take leadership in setting up a global standard, particularly from the viewpoint of environmental protection and safety.

**AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE EURO-CRISIS: IN 2010**

In 2010 there still appeared newspaper articles which argued about the EU regulatory power. First, *The Asahi Shimbun* introduced the EU’s active policy in setting environmental restrictions and their impact on Japanese business. This included the EU’s regulation of chemical materials in manufactured goods (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 25 December 2010). The newspaper also reported on the dependence of Japanese corporations on the EU market: for example, NEC, a computer company, highly depended on the EU market at the time. The newspaper argued that Japanese corporations have no alternative to following the EU rules for marketing. It also assumed that the EU’s regulatory power depends on its power as a big market.

*The Asahi Shimbun* also introduced the case of the emission trading market (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 9 March 2010): the EU and the US adopted the system of regulating the whole amount of emissions while the Japanese Ministry of Environment accepted the idea of similarly regulating the whole amount of emissions, but the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the business community insisted on the regulation of the emissions against the production output. The newspaper warned that Japanese corporations would be in a disadvantageous position in the future because of this. It argued that we should perceive the situation not as ‘either environmental protection or business’ but as ‘both environmental protection and business’.

Plus, *The Asahi Shimbun* emphasized the leadership of the EU in setting up global standards in 2010. It argued that the EU took the initiative in chemical risk reduction, and that the other countries followed in establishing their domestic legal systems in accordance with this initiative (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 7 October 2010). The newspaper also said that the EU is more advanced than the ISO. This is likely because the number of member states of the ISO is 164, which is much more than the number of EU members, and thus it is more difficult to make an agreement in the ISO.


In 2012, *The Nikkei Shimbun* argued that the EU spoiled Greece by accepting it as a member. *The Nikkei Shimbun* mentioned that the EU (then the EC) accepted Greece in 1981 because of a Cold War strategy: Greece was geographically located in a strategic area for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, and Greece’s Christianity is Eastern Orthodox, the same as Russia’s, so it was possible that it might be prone to Soviet influence. For these reasons, the EC accepted Greece as a member at the time in spite of its poor management of democracy and low economic level. Furthermore, even after joining the EU,
Greece was spoiled by the EC/EU in the sense that it was treated overly well by it in spite of its deep corruption and overpaid civil servants (The Nikkei Shimbun, 17 June, 2012).

Shoji Katsuhiro wrote a column in The Nikkei Shimbun in which he stated that the EU has a rule that the financial deficit rate (the financial deficit as a percentage of the GDP) should be less than 3%, and those countries whose deficit rate is more than 3% are required to improve their financial situations within a certain period (Shoji, 2012a). However, exceptions to the rule are also approved in practice under certain conditions.

A deficit rate of 12.7% was reported in Greece after the election of 2009. The Nikkei Shimbun argued that other Euro members had been reluctant to find fault with Greece in this matter because those countries also avoided a rigorous application of the rule (Nikkei Veritas, June 17, 2012).

Both The Asahi Shimbun and The Nikkei Shimbun have warned about the strong regulatory power of the EU, but the financial crisis gave cause for mistrust of the management of the regulations by the EU. It actually decreased the credibility of the EU regulatory power.

The Nikkei Shimbun, when reporting on a seminar on the European economy held in Tokyo on 13 October 2012, reported that Italy and the EU are seeking to create a bank union which would aim to set up a unified scheme for supervision of bank management and promote financial policy integration, which would lead to a political union (The Nikkei Shimbun, 14 October 2012). The Nikkei Shimbun also reported on German Finance Minister Schaeuble’s proposal to strengthen the role of the European commissioner for monetary and currency affairs (The Nikkei Shimbun, 17 October 2012). However, The Nikkei Shimbun also pointed out the possibility of a split in the EU: the southern European countries are basically averse to a stronger supervision of finance by the EU, and the non-Euro members in turn seem reluctant to be subject to a European Parliament composed of 17 Euro member states (The Nikkei Shimbun, 17 October 2012). The Asahi Shimbun also reported that the non-Euro members are worrying about their non-commitment to the important decisions (The Asahi Shimbun, 13 October 2012).

Furthermore, The Asahi Shimbun reported that the UK will not join the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for banks in the eurozone, but British banks developed their activities in the eurozone in such a way that the UK is worrying about how the ECB decision will affect British government supervision over its banks (The Asahi Shimbun, 19 October 2012).

Finally, The Nikkei Shimbun discussed a Financial Times report which stated that Berlin became a de facto ‘capital’ of the EU partly because most of the important decisions related to the EU are made between Merkel and the German parliament. The Nikkei Shimbun also said that Germany would request the deficit countries to accept the rules made in Berlin as a prerequisite to German financial assistance (The Nikkei Shimbun, 24 October 2012).
As the general overview of the articles from The Nikkei Shimbun and The Asahi Shimbun shows, the Euro crisis has negatively affected the EU regulatory power. The EU has been good at setting up regional standards which would then become global standards. However, the newspapers reported that there have been exceptions made to the rules and management. The EU was also very loose when monitoring the deficits of individual countries. The deficits were not limited to Greece but also appeared in France and Germany in 2002 and 2003. It should also be mentioned here that the decision to accept Greece as a member of the EC was made out of political considerations.

However, EU regulatory power basically depends on the attractiveness of the market. The EU shows signs of starting the financial integration process. The EU will face a lot of difficulties in financial integration, and it might cause a split within the EU and between the Euro members and the non-Euro members, as was reported. Such a split would decrease the attractiveness of the EU as a market. But when the EU succeeds in promoting financial integration, it contributes to the attractiveness of its market, which leads to an increase in EU regulatory power, although this process is not as simple as this account would suggest.

The Nikkei Shimbun’s editors believe that an FTA with the EU is the most important topic for Japan in this regard, and they strongly encourage the Japanese government to promote an FTA with the EU as soon as possible (The Nikkei Shimbun, 28 July 2012). They argue that the EU has a very large market, as large as that of the US, and an FTA with the EU would highly contribute to the revival of the Japanese economy. The FTA with the US is often discussed as the problem with Japan’s participation in the TPP, but fewer people are concerned about an FTA with the EU. The editorial’s authors would thus like to demonstrate that an FTA with the EU is just as important as one with the US.

However, another Nikkei Shimbun editorial also raises a warning about the negotiation of an FTA with the EU. It states that if it were to happen, the EU would demand the removal of the non-tariff barriers in Japan: the safety criteria of goods; the standards for manufacturing goods, foods, and medical goods; and the business custom and competition law/rules (The Nikkei Shimbun, 2 October 2011). The editorial argues that the EU also has a strong influence in formulating these standards, regulations, and rules.

EXAMINING ACADEMIC WORKS
At this point, I will examine some Japanese academic works that relate to the results of the questionnaire data and the investigation of the newspaper articles.

IS THE EU’S GLOBAL PRESTIGE DECLINING?
The October 2012 questionnaire results show that large numbers of both Japanese business elites (72%) and university students (45%) see the EU as a global power
rather than a regional power (Table 6), and both groups also believe that the EU has a strong power in economic areas. The EU is basically seen as an economic giant. In addition, the Japanese people believe that the EU has taken an important role in conflict resolution, e.g. in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and in environmental protection. The EU has also had a high profile in the Japanese newspapers. But do Japanese academics share the perception of the EU that was found among the Japanese people in general and the Japanese newspapers?

Japanese academics tend to argue about the EU’s prestige in the context of US-European relations. Hirotaka Watanabe (forthcoming), specializing in French foreign policy, argues that while the US is an allied country of both Europe and Japan, the two relations are different in character: the US sees Europe as an ‘equal’ partner, and Europe expects to share its leadership with the US, which explains why the US and Europe often struggle over ‘sharing leadership’ in foreign policy. The US does not have a willingness to share its responsibility with Japan in managing the US-Japan security alliance, however.

The US under the George W. Bush administration sought for a unilateral foreign policy, which caused a lot of criticism. The anti-Americanism that was connected with this peaked at the time of the Iraq War. Hence, The Empire by Michael Hart and Antonio Negri was highly discussed among Japanese international relations scholars, and the use of the term ‘empire’ to describe the US gained popularity among Japanese academics.

Watanabe (2005) published a book in which he argues that both the US and France are ‘empires’ seeking universalism in world politics. However, the US under President Bush was oriented toward unilateralism while France emphasizes the importance of multiculturalism. Bush’s unilateralism caused a lot of criticism around the outbreak of the Iraq War. Correspondingly, France and the EU were expected to constrain the American unilateral behaviour. The EU was seen as a global actor by Japanese academics, and under these circumstances, Watanabe’s argument was well accepted in Japan.

Japanese academics decreased their expectation that the EU would constrain the US when Obama took his presidency, however. They also shifted their concern to the rise of the BRICs, particularly China. The EU had a proposal for the Post-Kyoto Protocol at the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change in December 2009. However, Watanabe (forthcoming) argues that the EU failed to take leadership in managing the conference and in adopting its proposal (even when it came to the environmental issues) because the US and China, the two largest CO2 producing countries, were reluctant to support the EU proposal. This gave the impression that the G-20, the US and China would lead world politics.

Meanwhile, China proposed to provide support for the Greek financial crisis in the ASEM in 2010. This came as a shock to the EU (Watanabe, forthcoming).
THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Japanese academics have changed their expectations of Europe since the outbreak of the financial crisis of Greece and the problem of the Euro. According to Watanabe, these problems decreased the attractiveness of the EU market (Watanabe, forthcoming).

In the following section, I would like to examine the Japanese academics’ discussion of the Euro-crisis in relation to several points.

THE GREEK CRISIS AND ITS SPILLOVER TO SPAIN AND ITALY

The Nikkei Shimbun argued that the EU had accepted Greece as a member based on the political considerations in the Cold War period in spite of its ineligibility. Japanese economists and political scientists provide pieces of evidence to support this idea.

The economists also generally stress the importance of financial regulation, the corruption, and the moral hazard problems of Greece. Eiji Ogawa emphasizes that the lack of financial regulation directly caused the Greek financial crisis under the backdrop of the world-wide recession (Ogawa, 2012b: 6): the US economic recession was caused by the subprime mortgage crisis, and the subprime mortgage crisis has made an impact on European financial corporations as well (Ogawa, 2012b: 7–9). He also refers to the argument that the disconnect between monetary integration and financial integration was a cause of the Greek crisis, but he stresses that the main reason was found in the lack of Greek financial regulation.

So ko Tanaka mentions that it was a big mistake when the Euro members allowed Greece to join the Euro (Tanaka, 2012: 30). Greece had much corruption, and Tanaka also states that the lack of an independent statistical department in the government was decisive (Tanaka, 2012: 28).

Will Greece withdraw from Euro membership? Of course, Greece is believed to want to remain a Euro member because it found that its best interests lie in being a member of the Euro (Tanaka, 2012: 30). Thus the victory of the New Democracy Party, a party that supports the austerity budget policy, in this year’s second election seems natural for many Japanese academics. Ken Endo gives an interesting interpretation of this: the Greek people demonstrated their anger about the meddling of the Euro countries in their domestic financial policy in the first election, but then they showed their fear of being kicked out of the Euro area in the second election (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 70). This explains the reason why the Greek people elected the party that insisted on the austerity budget policy. Matsubara Ryuichiro, a Japanese economist, says that the victory of the austerity budget party is amazing because the Euro countries’ meddling in Greece’s fiscal policy is decisively important, and it has been within the parameters of national sovereignty (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 68). It might have sparked a war if it was discussed a few
years ago, but the Greek people showed their willingness to tolerate it in the election. It was actually a great achievement of the EU (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 68).

It is generally seen that the Greek crisis has spilled over into other countries like Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. However, academics point out a variety of reasons for why it spilled over into each individual country. Ogawa, for example, argues that the crises of Portugal and Ireland may be understood as financial crises rather than sovereign crises while those of Greece and Italy are sovereign crises (Ogawa, 2012a: 19).

Whatever the reason, the financial and sovereign crises have spread within the Euro member countries. Their impact is totally different from that of the Greek crisis because the total GDP of the PIIGS makes up 35% of the total GDP of the Euro members, and it is a problem for the Euro members to cope with. Matsubara warns that the crises in Spain and Italy might increase the possibility of the collapse of the Euro itself, although this is unthinkable (Matsubara, Yoshizaki and Endo, 2012: 71). Endo is negative about the possibility of the withdrawal of Spain and Italy from the Euro because German and French financial corporations are major creditors of these countries (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 71). At the same time, Endo is also anxious about a possible insufficiency of resources for Italy when the financial assistance will also be given to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 71).

**REGIONAL GOVERNANCE**

The Euro members have a system of how to cope with countries with financial deficits, and it even has a penalty system. Why has the system not been applied in practice, though? Japanese newspapers are critical of the loose application of the system to Greece. What kind of arguments have been developed about the regional governance by Japanese academic scholars in this respect?

Endo mentions that the Euro members did not develop a mechanism/vision of coping with financial globalization (Matsubara, Yoshizaki and Endo, 2012: 71). Meanwhile, Sahoko Kaji says that ‘peer pressure alone’ did not work to promote structural reform (Kaji, 2012: 38). The scholars also suggest that there still remains room for development in the system. For example, Katsuhiro Shoji (2012b) relates the story of Germany and France, who once suffered from a financial deficit in 2002–2003. The EU was ready to apply the scheme for dealing with financial deficits to them, but Germany and France rejected the intervention of the EU. Both countries had previously endeavored to establish the system, but they refused an intervention through the system when the system was supposed to apply to them. Shoji thus theoretically suggests that the poor management of regional governance over financial deficit problems is basically caused by the conflict between national sovereignty and the supra-nationality of the EU.
Ken Endo stresses the trend of ‘re-nationalization’ in actually coping with the Euro-crisis (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 69). When the Euro members provided their financial assistance to Greece, the corresponding agreement was made in London under British law in order to protect the creditors (ibid.). The ECB provided money not by the ordinary refinance mechanism but by the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) plan, assuming that the Greek government would take the final responsibility for the debt (ibid.).

The questionnaire results suggest that many Japanese people think that when the EU has 27 member states, it is too many to cope with the problems. However, Endo quotes Paul Krugman by saying ‘The Euro was a mistake but it deserves to be saved’ (ibid.: 74). This sentiment is shared by some Japanese people, as the questionnaire results show that at least a few Japanese think that the EU should promote the financial integration.

THE ROLE OF GERMANY

The October 2012 questionnaire results clarified that the Japanese people feel that Germany has a great responsibility in coping with the Euro crisis. However, a few of the respondents were afraid that a too strong initiative on the part of Germany in this respect would increase the anti-German sentiment. In an editorial of The Nikkei Shim bun, the authors argue that Germany has an ambivalent role in this respect. (The Nikkei Shim bun, 1 February 2012). The EU needs strong leadership from Germany to deal with the financial crisis, but at the same time, an overly strong Germany would lead to the EU member states having an overly high dependence on it. Thus, in the view of the editorial, the EU has a dilemma when coping with the financial crisis.

Let us examine the academics’ arguments in regard to this. Kohama, an economist, argues that neither the US nor Japan could take a strong initiative to deal with the Euro crisis (Kohama, 2012: 32), and it is thus up to Germany to cope with it. Kohama also argues that Germany made the decision to join the Euro because of the political interest of creating the ‘Euro’ (ibid.: 31). Kohama thus thinks that Germany has a great responsibility in coping with the Euro crisis.

Furthermore, it is said that the financial deficit countries like Greece should strengthen their financial regulation and their national governance, but Soko Tanaka argues that the prospect of a penalty imposed by Germany should be avoided (Tanaka, 2012: 36).

Meanwhile, Endo, a political scientist, stresses that Germany is reluctant to provide resources for resolving the financial crisis (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 74). In his view, this is evident in the reluctant German attitude towards the Bank Union framework discussed at the G20 (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 74).

The Euro crisis also raised a question about the way of life in Greece and Spain. For Greece and Spain, the EU is seen as a movement which leads to deregulation.

**HOW TO RESOLVE THE EURO CRISIS?**

Kaji argues that an emergent necessity is to stabilize the market and stimulate the economy in the long run (Kaji, 2012: 42). But who will take the leadership in promoting world-wide economic growth? China and India do not have enough power to lead the global economy in spite of the power shift (Endo in Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 76).

In this context, the EU is expected to promote financial policy integration to align monetary integration with financial policy integration. In fact, the Japanese newspapers reported on some trial procedures for promoting financial policy integration in the EU. However, as the October 2012 questionnaire results clarified, the Japanese people are split in their opinions as to whether or not the EU should promote changing its integration from a monetary to a financial integration: in our survey, 46% of the business elites supported the idea of promoting the financial integration and the change from a monetary to a financial integration while 39% of the university students were opposed to it (Table 15).

Reflecting this split of opinions among the Japanese, Yoshizaki states that financial integration is often mentioned when dealing with this sort of financial crisis but he points out a difficulty in this kind of thinking: it assumes an integration of taxation, and if a country fails to collect enough tax revenue, is Germany allowed to intervene in the poorly managed government to get the taxes that are due (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 74)?

**THE ROLE OF JAPAN**

Japanese academics are concerned with the fact that the Euro crisis reminds the Japanese of their experiences of coping with the burst of the bubble economy in Japan, and with the Korean and Asian financial crises. Matsubara mentions a major difference between Japan and the Euro countries, however: Japan could deal with the burst of the bubble economy just by working with the Japanese yen, but the Euro members should deal with the problem of the economic crisis by moving beyond their own national sovereignty. Matsubara also raises the question as to whether Greece could conduct a drastic reform just as Korea did after it accepted the conditions of the IMF (Matsubara–Yoshizaki–Endo, 2012: 70).

Kaji warns that while it does not seem urgent for the Asian countries to reform their governance when they, unlike Greece, are enjoying their economic growth, the economic growth will not last forever, and when it stops (possibly in the near future), those countries will face the problem of reforming their national governance (Kaji, 2012: 44).
CONCLUSION
The October 2012 questionnaire results show that the Japanese public has an impression that the EU is a global power rather than a regional power. Both business elites and university students generally think that the EU has strong power in the area of economics. However, the Japanese business elites feel that EU power is declining because of the financial crisis.

The EU has a high profile in Japanese newspapers. Meanwhile, Japanese academics see the EU as a global actor. However, Japanese newspapers and academics are shifting their concern from EU regulatory power to the urgent topic of the Euro financial crisis.

EU regulatory power is partly based on the process through which the EU countries negotiate and set up a regional standard. Thanks to the negotiation process, the EU regional standard may be well accepted as a global standard. However, the Euro financial crisis demonstrated the conflict and difficulties of the negotiations of how to resolve the crisis, and it also demonstrated a split among the Euro member countries about who should pay the cost. In addition, the Euro crisis clarified that even though the Euro member states developed the regulation mechanism, they did not apply it rigidly in practice. Thus the Euro crisis raises a suspicion of the EU’s management of its regulation policy and damages the credibility of the EU regulatory power. The Euro crisis has thus negatively affected the EU regulatory power.

Even so, as the October 2012 questionnaire results show, more than 40% of Japanese business elites believe that the regulatory power of the EU has not declined even after the beginning of the Euro crisis (Table 17). However, Japanese business elites continue to be anxious about the EU regulatory power.

ENDNOTES
1 The author would like to thank the Asian Barometer project, which allowed the author to use the survey data. The Asian Barometer project is managed by Professor Takashi Inoguchi, President of Niigata Prefecture University. Online: www.asiabarometer.org/en/profile.
2 We have a problem when conducting a study of the perception of the EU in Japan. What the general public think about what the ‘European Union’ is when questions about it are asked is not certain (Nakamura, Tamio, 2005: 281–282). Some people may think of the EU as the EU in Brussels, and others might see the EU as a group of individual member countries.
3 The Asian Barometer survey data includes data for the following countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
4 The newspaper databases Nikkei Telecom and Kikuzo (associated with the Asahi Shimbun) were used in the writing of this paper.
The counted keywords were ‘EU’ and ‘Oushu’ (which means ‘Europe’), ‘America’ and ‘Beikoku’ (which means ‘the USA’), and ‘China’.

For this paper, I just counted the number of articles which included the phrases ‘the EU’ and ‘international standard’ to get a rough sketch of the topic’s frequency, although this method could admittedly be seen as too simple.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The reviewed book was written by a research team of the Department of Political Science at Comenius University (Faculty of Arts) in Bratislava. The overall subject of the book – the national preference formation in the ten Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states of the European Union (EU) related to the European integration process – represents a field in which only very few comparative analyses are currently available.

The book’s introduction establishes three main research goals: 1) to identify the national preferences and strategies of the CEE member states; 2) to identify policy areas in which these states have either supported further integration, tended to support intergovernmental cooperation, or preferred to resort to purely national action; and 3) to determine the factors which condition the preferences and strategies of the CEE member states. The research team used four different sources to uncover the preferences of the individual countries: 1) official documents of political actors and the information available in the media; 2) approximately 100 interviews with direct participants; 3) an expert survey; and 4) the patterns of voting in the EU Council. In determining the potential explanatory factors, the authors point to four specific categories of these factors: 1) domestic political factors; 2) economic factors; 3) institutional and organizational factors; and 4) external factors.

The core of the book consists of five chapters. Three of them examine the national preferences of the CEE member states in the following areas of EU policy-making: 1) the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); 2) energy policy; and 3) foreign and security policy. The other two chapters provide a general analysis of voting in the EU Council and an analysis of the administrative capacity of the CEE member states in EU affairs. While commonalities among the preferences of the analyzed countries essentially appear to prevail in the three examined areas, the authors also identify various existing differences between the countries. The explanation provided by the analysis is most systematically carried out in the chapters on EU Council voting, the EMU, and foreign and security policy. These chapters reach the following main conclusions: 1) none of the explanatory factors examined in the book have a decisive impact over the pattern of voting in the EU Council; 2) the variation in the plans for the Eurozone accession is highly affected not only by economic, but also by political factors; 3) the CEE member states’ attitudes in foreign and security policy are crucially determined by their historical legacies.

The concluding chapter concentrates on evaluating the analyzed countries in terms of their political culture and policy style in regard to European integration. It
emphasizes that 1) these countries are largely marked by a pro-integration political culture, and 2) their policy style in EU affairs is rather reactive.

The reviewed book has two particularly great virtues. First, it provides systematic information on the preferences of the ten CEE member states in various fields of the EU’s activity. It is necessary to appreciate that the authors went beyond an analysis of only a single country or a few countries and carried out a comparative analysis of all the CEE member states. This effort yielded some very unique and valuable findings. In this respect, we can only regret that the individual chapters do not contain more extensive tables which would more straightforwardly display the positions of the individual countries on the specific subjects.

Second, the analysis is firmly grounded in the existing state of the art on the national preferences and strategies in EU affairs as well as in the existing theoretical knowledge. Again, one has to appreciate that the authors did not end up just identifying the preferences, but also offered explanations for the patterns they discovered. Here, the book successfully escapes the risk of premature conclusions and highlights the well-substantiated observations. The general findings about the role of the underlying pro-integration but reactive stance of the CEE countries, as well as the explanations provided in the individual chapters, stand on the ground and can be regarded as correct. It should only be pointed out that the authors would even further increase the relevance of their analysis if they used, in a more considerable manner, some standard comparative methods. All in all, the book should be highly recommended to all people with an interest in European integration and the political development in Central and Eastern Europe.

Jan Karlas
This book is definitely a ‘must read’ in today’s globalized world and it needed to be written as the author, Stephen G. Brooks, fills a gap by examining a subject area that many scholars and political scientists have pondered upon but avoided at the same time. Despite the prominence of the view that international commerce significantly influences security relations, up until the 1990s essentially no empirical analysis of this issue existed, as scholars such as Richard Rosecrance and Kenneth Waltz continued the centuries-old debate on the effects of commerce on peace, but the writings were confined to the level of theory (Brooks, 2007: 2). Brooks’ aim was to isolate one independent variable, follow its rising influence and draw attention to the powerful implications it projects for security affairs. The common belief has been that trade has a dynamic systematic effect on the shape of the security environment, and so it influences the behavior of states and policymakers as well. Brooks boils down the disparate arguments into three general mechanisms: changing capabilities, incentives, and the nature of the actors. The primary focus is upon one of the constituent parts of the economic globalization, the geographic dispersion of MNC production, and its stabilizing effect for great power stability, while the book takes into account how the mechanisms transform the global security environment.

As researchers noticed that trading strategies evolve over time, it made sense to adopt an overarching focus on trade in the past in order to reach a more general consensus, and the decision was justifiable. Brooks takes on a more specific approach, however. A cross-border dispersion of production stands out as a phenomenal key feature and thereby can be distinguished from international trade and financial markets. As Waltz stated, the issue of economic interdependence has become more integrated in recent decades. The closer the social bonds, the more extreme the effect becomes, and one cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others’ interests into account, which leads to a country treating another country’s acts as events within its own policy and attempting to control them (Waltz, 2000: 11). It leads to a greater power stability as one country keeps an eye on another country’s actions. The important point to bear in mind is that these strategies of spreading over a wide area gained their value only in particular sectors with rapidly changing technologies and high entry costs, such as microelectronics, computers and telecommunications (Brooks, 2007: 84). It is, however, fair to assume that the validity of this argument decreases with respect to other sectors. Its applicability is also being challenged. According to Jonathan Kirshner’s analysis, the globalization of production only has a
limited applicability for security relations (Kirshner, 2007: 585). Although the dispersion is not happening equally among various sectors, the development of military and civilian-commercial technology emerged simultaneously. Thus it has been illustrated that the recent revolution in trends was decisive in terms of the emergence of international subcontracting, interfirm alliances and the high opportunity costs involved (Brooks, 2007: 31). These shifts carry out an immense impulse for the changing behavior of states. It is vital that they react. Being cut off from the complexity of these qualitative changes poses troublesome repercussions because when a state wishes to play a viable role in the world order and has a desire to stay competitive, its isolation from these by-products of the globalization of production and, more specifically, the foreign direct investments results in its economic decline and increasing technological backwardness. It places the country in a disadvantageous position.

The structural arrangements of MNCs have an impact on the formulation of their activities abroad. They constitute a pushing mechanism on the security relations. The argument is that the dramatic shrinkage of space gives the MNCs a comparative advantage of specialization, and they thus use a great number of suppliers to lower the overall costs through the economies of scale. It was land that used to be the major factor of production, so when an army conquered a territory, it gained control over the economic assets, and this made up for any lack of political power. Yet such a conquest means that a state has to defend a greater amount of land, and since the globalization of production involves a dispersion of suppliers, which is a very recent trend, the likelihood of economic gain from conquest is not as high as might be expected. It is especially the case when considering the developed and developing countries with an unequal concentration of knowledge-based economies. From the security perspective, these factors that make up for recent trends in globalization also form the underlying causes of stability. On the other hand, the effects on developing countries are rather questionable in respect to their ability to attract FDI. The dilemma that might arise could be related to the exploitation of the low-cost labour in developing countries, as this is arguably the case in certain cases. The incentives involved are mixed. The uneven effects of interdependence, with some parties to it gaining more, and others gaining less, are obscured by the substitution of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s term ‘asymmetric interdependence’ for relations of dependence and independence among states (Waltz, 2000: 12). This finding is enhanced by the fact that the economic benefits of conquest are not worth it anymore ever since World War II. The diversity of a country’s economy makes it highly improbable that the conquerors would get their hands on the entire economic structure that builds the true value of the country. However, developing countries can be deprived of these trends. Brooks’ empirical analysis can be roughly linked to produced theory but it engages quite effectively on the basis of observations and attempting to find its place.
The IR theory provides and generally shares the view that when a change of this proportion occurs in the global economy, as we could have witnessed, it will inevitably lead to shifts in the interests of states; thereby the security environment will also have to adapt and re-shape itself to meet the current needs and challenges of the system. The internationalization of markets has commonly been associated with wide-ranging changes in domestic politics in the past two decades (Garrett–Lange, 1995: 627). When it was placed within the theoretical concept, one of the first views that arose to explain this change was that of transnationalists. The standpoint they argue for addresses these changes. The link they make is that MNCs are replacing states as the key actors in world politics. It is important to note, though, that even if the extent of the ability of MNCs to influence decision-makers increases, the sovereignty of states does not fade away. In the foreseeable future, though, the MNCs’ ability to influence decision-makers could gain more relevance as the MNCs are becoming more influential and have a tendency to stay in close contact with the government personnel, and thereby they can have a considerable effect on the policy agenda as their interests could be at stake. A different view takes place in the constructivist theory in respect to the pursuit of regional economic integration. The growing willingness of governments to open up their national economies to market forces has been recorded as one of the most critical developments of the past three decades and it has been suggested that it reflects the governments’ searching for appropriate models of economic policy in order to adapt their security environment to the forces of markets (Simmons–Elkins, 2004: 171). It is a comprehensive response by states to the challenge of how they should alter their position toward the latest movements. This response enables them to recognize the change of course, hold on to the status of a major actor in the game and act responsibly.

Keeping up with military and technological competitiveness is crucial for states as they operate in an anarchic system and depend on their own security; therefore, in order to have an access to military weaponry and stay on the cutting edge in this respect, a state must incline toward internationalization. The equipment can consist of hundreds of components, and states can start to lag behind unless they change their defence production strategy from an autarkic strategy to a strategy of cooperation. They cannot simply go alone anymore. In the case of the Soviet Union and its centralized government, not having access to the West’s technology caused the Soviets to be absent from the advances that placed them into a declining position. With regard to the regional economic integration supposedly offering a better understanding of the collective interests, it has been pointed out that even such rivals as Brazil and Argentina are able to come to an agreement when seeking a similar end, and so the collective interest turns into an advantage, whereas in the case of the Soviets, as the Eastern bloc was under the direct influence of Moscow, the collective interest was misperceived as it relied on the enormous but fixed bureaucratic
structures. It is critical to highlight the implications this forecasts for great power relations. The globalization of production has led to shifts in the structures of the most advanced states that would prevent their conqueror from effectively extracting economic gains from the vanquished territory (Brooks, 2007: 161). These mechanisms need to be incorporated in the security policies.

In the realm of security relations, this book is of great importance as it draws attention to recent changes and suggests that states have to be on top of these developments. Through the prism of state behaviour, as states are major actors in the international arena with no overarching authority, it must be noted that the dispersion of multinational corporations can play a powerful role. The author, Stephen G. Brooks, traces the development of these shifts and quite often sheds light on the topic by using examples from the two World Wars. The point being made is fairly clear as the particular change under study is distinct from globalization. It has not been present for such a long time but toward the end of the Cold War, it started to emerge as a trend that states had to be conscious about. This is especially the case as after 1989, states adopted security policies that were more relaxed as compared with those of the Cold War era. In some regards the change can be viewed as a potential threat. If a state is not aware of it, the dispersion of multinational corporations can create a variety of constraints under which the state will have to operate. In the case of the Soviet Union it proved to be fateful. Brooks follows a logical flow of observations that decisively fit within the context.

The argument Brooks raises is well-established and brings a profound insight into an area which has not been scrutinized to a particularly great extent: the effects of geographic dispersion of MNCs upon the changing behaviour of states. It has been convincingly demonstrated that this subject’s significance rises over time, especially with the end of the Cold War era. However, as the conflict is now over, the question remains how the role of MNCs will influence the state behaviour. It is clear that states cannot get away from the powerful tools MNCs possess. One of them can be linked to the foreign direct investment which gives the states an opportunity to get their hands on the recent technology and capital and can generally boost up the economy. MNCs cannot operate on their own, though. Within the international system, arguably a set of rules has to be followed, and these rules to some extent dictate the possible effects MNCs can have on a state. A state can be both a recipient and a donor. Meanwhile, MNCs will be only interested in places which fall within certain conditions. In such places, the potential for enrichment is visible if the requirements of political and economic prerequisites are met. In any other case the MNCs’ involvement in the given state would not have to pay off. With regard to the scenario, developed countries will have a greater credibility of commitment and there will be more at stake. Meanwhile, developing countries will have a hard time presenting themselves as prestigious recipients. At the same time, even if the two conditions are
met but the recipient state is in the sphere of influence of a developed country, it might not have the capability to be a recipient because it would be against the interests of the one state that has the power to pull the strings.

Jakub Tomášek

BIBLIOGRAPHY


By using a constructivist approach and constructivist ideas, Lindemann disproves the generally accepted ideas dealing with the rational choice theory on the grounds that they disregard ‘the role of emotions in the development of international crises’ and underestimate ‘the difficulty that political decision makers have in justifying and legitimatising wars carried out for purely material motives’ (Lindemann, 2010). Thus his argument gives us new lenses through which it is possible to observe conflicts in a more complex and deeper way.

The book is simply structured: it is divided into two parts, and such a segmentation facilitates an understanding of the topic for the reader. The first part deals with the theoretical framework of recognition and its connection to international relations and social conflicts in the universal sense. The general thesis presented in the book is based on the assumption that non-recognition of actors ‘can be as much a cause of war as [...] security concerns or profits in terms of power or wealth’ (Lindemann, 2010). According to this assumption, Lindemann has created four hypotheses on the origins of inter-state war; these are defended throughout the book. The first two hypotheses are focused on the constitution of security interests by the political unit’s identities and deal with the issue of the state’s identity as a significant factor of non-recognition (‘[h]ubristic identities are possible causes of war’ and ‘the propensity for armed aggression between political actors is higher when there is no positive link between them’). The other two hypotheses are founded on the premise ‘that non-recognition of accepted norms of a state’s dignity etc. cannot be easily ignored if one supposes that political units aspire to survive’ (Lindemann, 2010).

The second part of the book analyses the validity of these four hypotheses by applying them on two empirical case studies. Lindemann affirms the relationship between the stability of the international system and the frequency of inter-state conflicts in the first case study, which is examined in Chapter Three. The second case study – in Chapter Four, focuses on the outcomes of four international crises (the Six Day War of 1967, the Iraq war of 2003, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the U.S.-Libyan crisis from 1986 to 2004) and their links with the presence or absence of political recognition and its role in ending these crises with war or peace.

Lindemann is thus offering a really excellent view inside the conflicts and their causes by using analyses based not only on analyses of the states, but on social analyses of individuals in general and on the government level. In spite of its relatively narrow range (176 pages) this publication offers a complex and very integrated per-
perspective on conflicts. Such a new approach would be very interesting if it were applied to the current conflicts, e.g. those in the Middle East area.

Eva Petrlová
YUNING GAO: CHINA AS THE WORKSHOP OF THE WORLD


Yuning Gao’s book *China as the Workshop of the World: An Analysis at the National and Industry Level of China in the International Division of Labor* discusses China’s position in the global economy. The principal question of the text is ‘Does China deserve to be called the “world workshop”?’ The question is posed by means of a historical comparison of China with the UK after the Industrial Revolution and the U.S. in the mid-20th century. The author’s interest focuses on the questions of industrial output and leaves aside the other aspects of the global economy such as financial markets or currency flows. In the following chapters, he discusses the different dimensions of the ‘world workshop’: its scale, its sophistication and its competitiveness, respectively. Then in the last chapter, he presents case studies of three of China’s industries in the global division of labor.

The text is packed with data to the extent that sometimes it is almost just a juxtaposition of numbers, charts and tables, which are often presented without any further interpretation apart from brief comments concerning the adequacy of some indexes or ratios. It may be troublesome for those who would expect more in terms of the discursive and narrative organization of the text; on the other hand, though, it allows the readers to draw their own conclusions. Furthermore, it may be convenient to have such a range of data gathered in one book. However, this approach is not used in the last part, which is a case study of three of China’s industrial branches: those of the ceramic, steel and solar photovoltaic industries. The author scrutinizes the evolution of the industries, names the biggest players and describes their positions regarding their global competitors.

The answer to the core question – whether China may be acknowledged as the ‘world workshop’ or not – is ‘it depends’, which is not surprising given the complexity of the question. On the one hand, China has emerged as one of the most serious players in the global economy with a view to surpass the United States and become the largest economy in the world in a few decades. On the other hand, China remains at the low end of the global value chain. Why is the question about the ‘world workshop’ label significant? First of all, it is a starting point for a historical comparison between former industrial output hubs and contemporary China. It is thus a question of historical continuity. Secondly, it displays the unique situation of China, which has reached its current position in the global market despite being relatively undeveloped, especially in comparison with the UK during the Industrial Revolution and the U.S. in the mid-20th century. The uniqueness of China is also based on a strikingly high ratio of state-owned enterprises among its biggest companies. The author presents not only the current position of China, but also the most sig-
significant trends and forecasts that are related to it. He analyses the weaknesses and strengths of China’s economy as well as its competitiveness. Unfortunately, the concluding part lacks a discussion about the consequences of China’s position for the rest of the world. China is big and growing bigger but what is at stake for the world in this matter?

Lukasz Ponikiewski
BROOKE A. ACKERLY, MARIA STERN AND JACQUI TRUE (EDS): FEMINIST METHODOLOGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


The book can be viewed as an impressive attempt to highlight the importance of feminist perspectives of methodology in the field of international relations, and academic input into this field or area. It is put together collectively by scholars with various academic backgrounds. They present the main debates about the feminist methodology as well as theoretical perspectives.

The volume, which consists of twelve articles, includes a comprehensive and thorough introduction by the editors. The book is then divided into three parts all of them finely complementing each other. The conceptions of ontology, epistemology and research methods are discussed throughout the chapters. All the articles introduce challenges, marvellous insights and practices from experienced feminist scholars in the field of international relations.

The first part engages discussions of feminist and non-feminist approaches to international relations by examining the development of feminist methodologies. The authors explore the difficulties related to implementing feminist perspectives in the field of international relation. The chapters also explore the meaning and place of feminist methodology in international relations. The second part of the book includes some interesting case studies that shed some light into the challenges of carrying out various methods from feminist perspectives in a practical research field linked to security, states, global order and the impact of institutions. In the third part, the methodologies that are discussed reach beyond conventional frameworks by providing alternative ways of looking at IR and offering a range of new and elaborate methodologies for feminist IR (e.g. forms of art).

The edition can be seen as a guiding textbook for methodological issues and gender scholarship in international relations. It stands out for its thorough and self-reflexive approach and excellent theoretical and methodological accounts. The primary audience of this book would be both scholars of IR and undergraduate or graduate students from the fields of international relations and feminist studies. Thus, the overview of the scholars’ unique experiences and practical insights which it provides would be a valuable source of knowledge for understanding global politics and feminism.

Katri Vaaks
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