
Chapter 20

The Development Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy

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YEAR OF THE DEVELOPMENT ENTRAPPED BY MIGRATION¹

For the first time since 1983, when the European Community established the tradition of thematic years, this year was committed to the external operations of the European Union.² The choice of the European Year for Development 2015 was related to the symbolic milestone of the end of validity of the development objectives of the millennium. At the same time, it foreshadowed gradual interconnection of the separate agendas of the global and sustainable developments within the United Nations as a unified framework of the social and economic development within the planetary boundaries. Their merger culminated in September in New York, where the General Assembly of the UN approved the Agenda 2030 and its seventeen Objectives of sustainable development representing a huge challenge for the development and other policies of the countries of the global North and South. In this spirit, the European Year for Development was also initiated with the slogan “*Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future*”.³ It stood in a peculiar contrast to the closer and rather technical nature of the covering national topic of the “*interconnection of activities of non-governmental, private and public sectors in the official foreign development co-operation*”.⁴

The chapter of this book series from the last year stated that the foreign development co-operation (ZRS) in the role of one of the tools of foreign policy “*remained unused as a possible answer to the worries and concerns of the Czech citizens and citizenship*”, especially with respect to the armed conflicts in southern and eastern neighbourhood of the European Union and the resulting migration pressures.⁵ The chapter was closed with a question if, thanks to the increased attention, the global development and climatic agenda in 2015 “*would manage to fill that space at least a bit*”.⁶ The answer is inconsistent. The following overview and evaluation show that there were no significant changes of the characteristics of the declining *polarization* and high *technocratization* in the area of the development co-operation in the said year. On the contrary, since 2007, which is covered by this book series, its current *politicizing* has been strengthened unprecedentedly, centred around the thesis of “help on

site” as a preventive measure against refugeehood and migration from the source and transit countries.

On the Union level, pursuant to the analytical framework of this book, it was not, however, so much a proactive conduct of Czech foreign policy but rather a response to nearly consensual rejection of the Czech political representatives to receive potential refugees and migrants in the Czech Republic in a bigger than symbolic quantity and as an apparent alternative solution of the European refugee crisis (due to the focus on the long-term causes instead of the current problems). At the same time, the domestic framing of migration as a fundamental security threat pushed out the previous debate about the human right dimension of Czech foreign policy from the previous year.

The current designation of the development policy as more politicized and, at the same time, not less technocratic may seem contradictory. However, it makes sense because it took place on different levels. Purposeful securitization or, in other words, security framing of the development co-operation and humanitarian aid within the political space “did not drop down” to the practice of the foreign development co-operation or just in a very limited and differentiated way in individual tools. The year 2015, like the year 2014, only brought a small increase in the volume of funds of the foreign development co-operation, practically only in its component of the humanitarian aid within the competence of the MFA. The indicator of the official development aid (ODA) was increased, however, by more than half-a-billion CZK, which represented, pursuant to the preliminary figures, a real increase by more than one-tenth, of which one-half in the form of tied contributions to international organizations and regional funds and the rest, also thanks to the accounting addition of the costs for receiving refugees especially in the Czech detention facilities.⁷ However, it is crucial that an overwhelming majority of the newly mobilized financial resources of aid abroad falls, by the resolution of the government, under the new *Programme of the Ministry of Interior for Assistance to Refugees within the Regions of the Origin and Prevention of Big Migration Movements*, anchoring and strengthening its current programme MEDEVAC and other *ad hoc* contributions initiated by the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic (MI) and not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Therefore, the major news of 2015 is represented by the sudden launch of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic headed by the Vice-Chairman of ČSSD Milan Chovanec to the originally foreign policy area, which enabled politicizing of the aid as a tool of ensuring the internal security. This change stands at least against the spirit of the current wording of the *Act on Foreign Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid*, according to which the MI “provides humanitarian aid to the member states of the European Union and other states forming the European Economic Area” (EEA) and the MFA “provides humanitarian aid to the states outside of the European Union and European Economic Area and decides about its range and form” and the MFA shall only operate in co-operation with the Ministry of Interior in case of material and rescue aid and the contributions to the international organizations and integration groups are the comprehensively defined forms of humanitarian and development aid and, therefore, the division of labour set out by the law should apply to them.⁸

The objective of this chapter is not to find causes of the dominance of the internal security approach of the MI over the foreign policy approach of the MFA by the analysis of the governmental or even intraparty arrangement, especially because a similar analysis would not enable correct evaluation of the role of individual actors without deep knowledge of wide decision-making processes not only on the governmental but also intergovernmental and European levels and without comparison with other states of the Union. Instead, the chapter can serve as a basis for the follow-up research concerning the identification of boundaries between internal policies and foreign policy in Czechia and between the policy of righteousness and internal matters on one side and foreign matters and security policy on the other side in the European Union. However, it does not change anything in the fact that the actor that managed to immediately mobilize a nearly consensual political discourse of the “help on the spot” for obtaining unprecedented additional funds within its own competence is still the MI, while the MFA only managed, at the end of the year, to obtain a promise of an increase of the volume of the development co-operation in the following years. In both cases, the further realization of the aid took place technocratically and without a bigger interest of the politicians, public, and media, like in the typical case of the foreign development co-operation. Other events and conceptual changes of the year 2015, including the approval of the Agenda 2030, took place in the shadows of the perceived threat of migration.

THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Concept of the foreign policy

As a climax of the political changes in the MFA after the Parliamentary elections in 2013, which were discussed in the chapter from the last year, the government approved a new *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic*.⁹ It concerned a result of a relatively participative intra-ministerial process, which also included representatives of the academic sphere and non-governmental sector. Generally, contrary to the previous concepts, it is a considerably more complex document so that it does not enable a direct comparison with the past. At least, the new concept reflects a fundamentally greater obviousness and degree of completion of the foreign development co-operation because the mantra repeated from 1995 about ZRS as “*an integral part of foreign policy of the Czech Republic [that] contributed to the achievement of its objectives*”.¹⁰ On the contrary, the development co-operation figures as a nearly multi-functional tool of the achievement of more objectives of foreign policy, namely prosperity and sustainable development at first, secondly human dignity and human rights and partially also security (here specifically as a tool of the stabilization and prevention of international terrorism and organized crime by creating more dignified living conditions).¹¹ Nevertheless, it is missing in the part dedicated to the promotion of the good name abroad, which is surely facilitated not only in the priority but, thanks to small local projects at the offices, in non-priority countries to some extent.

No matter how much the economic diplomacy, the objectives of which include the subordinated “*support of economic sustainability of the projects of development co-operation*”, is named in the area of prosperity and sustainable development as the first one of the tools, the concept also identifies, among the ZRS objectives, several progressive items of the concept of the Objectives of sustainable development: primary objective of poverty eradication, reduction of global inequalities, limitation of climate changes or confirmation of the support of the collective commitment of the EU in the share of the official development aid to the gross domestic product (ODA/GDP) at the level of 0.7%. Last but not least, it newly includes key efforts in the area of coherence of policies as “*unity between the foreign development co-operation and other governmental policies, which can have an impact on the target countries*”.¹² In the area of human dignity and human rights, the foreign development co-operation also occupies the second spot behind the policy of the protection of human rights and democracy, saying that the support of democracy, human rights, and transformation is traditionally specified not only as its sector priority but also in the form of cross-sectional principles as due administration of public matters, environmental friendliness, climatic considerations and respect for human rights. It also understands “*poverty eradication*” and “*fight with inequalities*” as parts of a new concept of the sustainable development as a tool for the achievement of human dignity like the humanitarian aid. Unprecedented space is provided to it, too, by the document, which fills the concept of humanitarian aid in the spirit of the current direction of the MFA.¹³

The development co-operation is also discussed by mentions in several specific countries or regions. Generally, the development co-operation has been spread out in the new concept nearly as a cross-sectional tool of Czech foreign policy, which is defined in itself in the spirit of continuity, but already within the new wider context of the Agenda 2030. Therefore, the adaptations of ZRS to the challenges are up to the follow-up strategy of the *Concept of Foreign Development Co-operation of the Czech Republic for the Period 2010–2017* in the competence of the MFA and the strategic document *The Czech Republic 2030* in the competence of the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, the preparation of which will be discussed, due to the core of the work, in a chapter of this book series for the year 2016.¹⁴ With respect to the mid-term nature of the approved plans of ZRS (already in 2015, the government approved the perspective allocations for the years 2016–2018, therefore beyond the boundaries of validity of the current concept of ZRS); however, already in the meeting of the heads of the DPs in August 2015, the Department of development co-operation and humanitarian aid (ORS) submitted a preliminary, relatively consensual table of priority countries and sectors, which, at the same time, followed up similarly consensual mid-term evaluation of the concept.¹⁵

Security strategy, migration policy strategy and Concept of the Ministry of Interior for assistance to refugees and states under strong migration pressures

The *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015* approved in February only updated the strategy from 2011; it did not touch the areas concerning the development beyond the framework of the formulation changes and it does not elaborate the so-

called security development nexus in greater details. Like the foreign policy strategy, it only understands poverty marginally as one of the causes of instability, radicalization and, therefore, also as a security risk.¹⁶ The new strategy, nevertheless, left a mention about the support “*of the mutually advantageous economic relations with states rich in raw materials, including the utilization of the projects of development co-operation*”, which did not have support in other documents.¹⁷ Even with respect to the unprecedented entry of the MI to the foreign development co-operation, the most important conceptual document of the year 2015 still seems to be the *Strategy of Migration Policy of the Czech Republic* approved by the government at the end of July, i.e. even after the *January Programme of the Ministry of Interior for Assistance to Refugees within the Regions of Origin and Prevention of Big Migration Movements*, which became *ex ante* one of its tools.¹⁸

The migration strategy sets out, as one of seven points of its summary, the strengthening of activities “*with the objective to help refugees abroad, and therefore related prevention of other migration flows, including the support of the development of the countries when dealing with the migration crisis*”.¹⁹ In the introduction, it pledges to “*actively perform the external dimension of the migration policies, including help to refugees and support of the security stabilization and socially-economic development of source and transit countries of the migration*” and this point is further elaborated in article IV, in which on the bilateral level it also refers to the migration program of the MI and its coherence “*with other sector policies*” of the Czech Republic and the EU, “*including the development and humanitarian aspects*”.²⁰ In the following list of partial objectives on the national level, it explicitly states the development and humanitarian, trade and security policy as “*other sector policies*”, which showed that despite the indisputable nature of the humanitarian and development aid, the migration strategy perceives itself as differing from the foreign development co-operation.²¹

However, the strategy explicitly classifies the support of “*social-economic development of the countries and regions of the origin and transit*” among the objectives on the national level, which equalled the objectives of ZRS, and in addition to the actual new programme, it also puts the deployment of the programme MEDEVAC among the actual tools as well as “*strengthening the humanitarian aid abroad with emphasis on the provision of aid to refugees and internally displaced persons as a result of conflicts and catastrophes of a huge measure*”, which was, in the EU and EEA, according to the Act on ZRS in the competence of the MFA, like the “*update of the Plan of bilateral foreign development co-operation of the Czech Republic and utilization of the current tools for strengthening the coherence of the migration and development policy*”. In terms of the content, however, the strategy does not touch the issue of coherence of the development and migration policy for example in the matter of a brain drain at all, so that its framing could be labelled as “*coherence of policies for migration prevention*”. As the first of its tools, the strategy also identifies “*strengthening and deeper interconnection of the current mechanisms ensuring the co-ordination in the area of external dimension of the migration policy on the level of the Coordination body for control of protection of state borders and migration or, as the case may*

be, other operation groups in this area (for example Council for Foreign Development Co-operation)”.²²

Contrary to the Council for ZRS, which is presided over by the MFA and which should theoretically meet on the deputy but, more frequently, it meets on the directorial or clerk level, the so-called Coordination body of the MI meets, however, according to the concept as well as in reality “*on the expert level and newly also on the governmental level*”, hence also in the attendance of the Ministers and Ministresses themselves, which also reflects its considerable decision-making power in practice.²³ In November, with respect to the migration programme the Government also adopted the *Concept of the Ministry of Interior for assistance to refugees and states under strong migration pressures*, which served as the basis of the distribution of 100 or, as the case may be, 150 million CZK in 2015 or, as the case may be, 2016.²⁴ Even if this concept is not subjected to any confidentiality mode, neither the government nor the MI published this concept and, therefore, it is only available to the state administration. Hence, after the Ministry of Interior created, against the spirit of the Act on ZRS, with the consent of the government, its parallel programme of humanitarian and development aid oriented primarily on the countries outside of the EU countries, it strategically secured its position in the migration strategy and concept of its programme of assistance to the aid.

THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: AGENDA AND EVENTS

Wide political support of “help on the spot” as a manner of a solution of causes of the European refugee crisis...

In 2015, the development co-operation and humanitarian aid were mentioned in the political space especially as a tool for the solution of the causes of migration to Europe from the Near East and Africa. Its political function was to provide an alternative answer to the proposals of the European Commission concerning solidarity sharing of refugees during the European refugee crisis, which broke out in full after a series of the tragic ship sinking events in April 2015 and which resulted in thousands of drowned victims in the Mediterranean. In compliance with the opposition, the Czech Government refused mandatory quotas for re-distribution of asylum seekers from other member states and on 21 September it and several other countries of Central and Eastern Europe were outvoted in the EU Council.²⁵ Refusing help to the refugees “at home” and their discouragement for example by systematic violation of rights by the state, as was mentioned by the ombudsman and the UN, opened the space, in the strong political and social atmosphere influenced by xenophobia and Islamophobia, to the discourse about “help on the spot”, which was used by the Czech political representation both internally and externally as a way of refusing the accusations of the lack of solidarity.²⁶ As the Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka declared in October: “*Unless we help on the spot, those people would come to Europe, which was not*

prepared for it” and added that “Czechia could be more solidary than some bigger European states and tried to help in the way, which would stop or at least slow down the migration flow to Europe”.²⁷

In this area, the attitude of the coalition government was consistent because already in October of the previous year the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lubomír Zaorálek declared on the occasion of the Berlin conference about help to the Syrian refugees, where Germany pledged to spend half-a-billion EUR in the following three years, that Czechia did not count on “*extensive receiving of civil war refugees*” also due to a security risk and added that in 2014 Czechia contributed 20 million CZK to help to refugees and in the previous year 120 million CZK.²⁸ The MFA stated that within humanitarian aid to the Syrians within the whole region, it provided 70.5 million CZK within its sphere in 2012–2014 and other funds were transferred through the MI. From the long-term perspective, the development aid, the deputy for the management of the department of non-European countries, economic and development co-operation Martin Tlapa noted: “*We think that for the future, it should be an advantage of our help. Helping build capacities in the developing countries so that there is employment there, people stay there and the countries remain stable, which is the prevention to migration pressures occurring in such countries.*”²⁹ In his blog, the director of the Czech Development Agency (ČRA) Michal Kaplan also promoted “*the development as the best prevention*”. Although it is considered proven in the migration studies that the economic development generally up to a relatively high income through strengthening the human capital increases the migration pressures, on the contrary in the case of conflicts, the stabilization and humanitarian aid reduce the migration pressures of course. Nevertheless, in the argumentation of the MFA and ČRA, only limiting and not supporting impacts of the development on migration from the countries of origin appeared.

During the September debate about the government information “*about the migration problems*” in the Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister supported, on behalf of the Visegrad Group (V4), “*the focus of the development aid on the countries, with which we need to conclude return readmission agreements*” on the Union level too and therewith he indirectly supported the idea of conditionality of the aid.³⁰ However, in addition to the Prime Minister, the MFA and its organizations, also the right-wing opposition, namely the MP and Vice-Chairperson of TOP 09 H. Langšádlová agreed on the “*help on the spot*”: “*Therefore, I have to appreciate, as an opposition politician [sic], the opinion of our government, which was for a long time, and it was right – let us help those people in the places where they live, so that they could live in dignity.*”³¹ However, Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Zaorálek was not spared from the criticism of the ODS chairman Petr Fiala, who reprehended the government that it did not respect the commitment of ODA/GDP at the amount of 0.33% (which had been adopted, however, by the Czech Republic already in 2005 and it should have been achieved in 2015).³² ODS would allegedly also “*gladly support*” such a budget increase for ZRS – it would be in terms of billions.³³ Only a bit fresher statement of the prime ministers of the Visegrad Group as a whole signed up for “*the full utilization of the potential of the foreign development co-operation in the area of migration*”

stating that “*the countries of the Visegrad Group would explore the possibilities of further increasing of bilateral development aid for the countries of origin and transit countries in the period 2016/17*”.³⁴ In the November Valletta Summit of the V4 countries, they symbolically increased their contribution to the Trust Fund for Africa by 400 thousand to 3 million EUR.³⁵

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continuously tried to utilize this argument for increasing the budget of ZRS with respect to other decisive actors and already on the occasion of the preparatory meeting for the winter meeting of the Constitutional actors in July, minister L. Zaorálek proposed the topic of the development and humanitarian aid as “*an efficient tool for the provision of aid in third countries with the objective to face the causes of uncontrolled influx of migrants*”.³⁶ The actual meeting took place at the end of the monitored year, on 16. 12. 2015, and in addition to the usual participation of the President, Prime Minister, both Chairmen of the Chambers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence Martin Stropnický and Minister of Interior Milan Chovanec also met at the Castle. At the conclusion, they issued a rather extensive statement including the following passages: “*The Constitutional actors are of the opinion that it is necessary to stop the long-term declining expenditures for the development and humanitarian activities. On the contrary, it is obvious that the financial means for the development co-operation, and especially for the humanitarian aid, will have to be increased further on in 2016 and the following years in connection with the migration crisis. It is in the interest and within the possibilities of the Czech Republic, a developed democratic country with high economic growth, to contribute to the stabilization of selected countries of the developing world. For efficient and purposeful spending of such finances, it is also necessary to strengthen personnel and administrative capacities. Therefore, the highest Constitutional actors have been acquainted with the schedule of preparation of the new concept of foreign development co-operation after 2017 and confirmed that the development policy should represent one of the efficient tools of the stabilization of the selected source countries of migration further on.*”³⁷ Thanks to the migration arguments, a declaration of political will was expressed for a system-wise, though limited increase of the budget of ZRS and capacities for its administration in 2016.

... and its realization, especially within the competence of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic

Already in the middle of January 2015, i.e. before the actual outbreak of the European refugee crisis, when especially the Mediterranean countries paid media, public, and political attention to the increasing number of refugees, the government established a new *Program of the Ministry of Interior for Assistance to Refugees within the Regions of Origin and Prevention of Huge Migration Moves*.³⁸ Pursuant to the submission report, the stimulus for its foundation came in the session of the Committee for the EU on the governmental level as late as on 1. 12. 2014 and the Ministry of Interior asked the Prime Minister in mid-December for an exception from the inter-ministerial comment procedure. Afterwards, two informal meetings took place very quickly during the Christmas time, the first one on the deputy level, and already on 14 Janu-

ary, the governmental material was approved. It established its budget at the level of 100 million CZK in 2015 from the governmental budget reserve and for the following years it ordered to reserve that amount during the compilation of the budget for the following year. Later on, the Ministry of Interior also stated that in 2016 it should be increased by further 50 million CZK together with 35 million CZK of other extraordinary donations.³⁹ For the sake of comparison, in 2013 and 2014 this support from the MI reached altogether 47.5 million CZK, again in connection with Syria.⁴⁰ Donations to international organizations, regional funds or other governments from the programme were approved by the government by means of individual resolutions within the year. Specifically, it granted 65 million CZK to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the purpose of electrification of the Jordan camp Zaatari and building of 200 shelters in the Ashti camp in Iraq, 20 million CZK for the support of migration systems of Serbia and Turkey and the remaining 15 million CZK for co-financing the regional programmes of the EU for the Near East and North Africa (RDPP).⁴¹ Depending on the choice of the destination countries, 100% of the costs should be accountable as ODA; nevertheless, the submission report stated that *“the defined help should only concern the areas, which were within the competence of the Ministry of Interior and were realized within the area of justice and internal matters”*. Later on, the government labelled the program as a *“solidarity measure of the Czech Republic towards third countries”*.⁴²

In the competence of the MI, there was already an increase in the programme MEDEVAC in 2014, within which the Czech doctors provided care during the humanitarian crises, by means of two resolutions of the government, the first of which acknowledged the already budgeted 10 million CZK at first and after just one week, the government decided about a further increase by 8.5 million CZK.⁴³ For 2015, it increased MEDEVAC to 50 million CZK and in November it decided to establish it as a permanent programme with the budget of 60 million CZK per year from the sources of the MI.⁴⁴ The positive is that the core of MEDEVAC has been shifting gradually from the transfers to the Czech hospitals and back to the country of origin to a more efficient provision of healthcare directly on the spot. At the same time, it is necessary to point out, however, that increasing MEDEVAC by 40 million CZK was also reflected in an extension to countries, such as Cambodia and Kenya, therefore outside of the context of the Syrian conflict, such as to Jordan and Iraq Kurdistan.⁴⁵ Both countries are not a source of mass migration to Europe and in the case of Kenya, not even a priority country of the development co-operation, which testifies of the further emancipation of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic. In general, such unprecedented decisions were surely also facilitated by the manner of decision-making because the Coordination body for control of protection of the state borders and migration meets on the level of ministers with respect to migration. For example, the November meeting was attended, in addition to the Prime Minister, also by the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade and Justice.⁴⁶ In connection with the programme concept, the MI was also supposed to create, for the purpose of identification of yearly priorities, an inter-ministerial work group consisting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Ministry of Industry and Trade of

the Czech Republic, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic and Office of the Government of the Czech Republic.⁴⁷

With respect to the topic of migration in the competence of the MFA and ČRA, identifications of three bilateral projects were realized in the standard way with the focus on building the migration consulting and solution of social impacts of the migration and re-integration in Moldavia, support of sustainable sources of livelihood and ensuring health and social care for internally displaced in Georgia and also the support of collective centres for internally displaced inhabitants in Ukraine realized by non-governmental non-profitable organizations.⁴⁸ It is peculiar that post-conflict Georgia or, as the case may be, conflict Ukraine were included in the past among the priority or, as the case may be, target countries of ZRS by the assignment of extraordinary development aid on the basis of a resolution of the government still in the competence of the MFA. The contributions to the Trust Fund of the European Union for Syria and Western Balkan (MADAD) and to the Trust Fund of the European Union for Africa on the basis of the negotiations between the EU and African countries in La Valletta at the amount of 105 million CZK in 2015 and 68 million CZK in 2016 already went through the MFA, however, and a majority thereof was financed in the first year by apparently spared social benefits of the section of the MI.⁴⁹ The government also approved a small scholarship program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic with the name New Elites for Syria for 20 young Syrian men and women.⁵⁰ The MFA also tried to emphasize the positive aspects of migration by means of setting up a position of a special envoy for migration.⁵¹ In the Czernin Palace, it also co-organized the conference of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) focused on the relation of migration and development.⁵² The MFA did not obtain additional funds in direct connection with the refugee crisis in 2015 for its sphere of humanitarian aid. The Deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Tlapa justified the June absence of an increase in the overall budget of ZRS for the year 2016 and the perspective for the following years by the absence of the approval of the Minister of Finance of the Czech Republic.⁵³

Adopting the Agenda 2030 and other events on the global level and in the European Union

The Czech opinion about the so-called Agenda post-2015, which became officially the Agenda 2030, was practically prepared already in 2014.⁵⁴ Therefore, it was also discussed in the chapter of the last year.⁵⁵ However, the actual adopting of the Objectives of sustainable development (also Global objectives, SDGs) in September was not the only important event on the level of the UN because in 2015 three important conferences took place. However, their preparation was also under way. In early July in New York, the preparatory High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development took place, in which Deputy M. Tlapa supported the common opinion of the European Union and, in addition to it, he highlighted monitoring of objectives and avoiding the institutional duplication in the area of sustainable development as important topics. He also used his speech as a part of the election campaign to the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC).⁵⁶ There the Czech Republic was elected for the years

2016–2018 and in the following year, it will successfully stand for the vice-presidency position with the perspective of presidency in the following period. The platform of non-governmental non-profitable organizations FoRS – Czech Forum for Development Co-operation put a bigger emphasis in its comment on the so-called *zero draft* for example on the human right approach and women's rights.

In May 2015, during his business trip to the USA, Minister of Finance Andrej Babiš met the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, who appealed to him that the Czech Government should ensure the highest representation in the second key event, the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, which took place from 13. to 16. 7. 2015 in Ethiopian Addis Ababa, on the level of the President, Prime Minister or Minister of Finance.⁵⁷ Ban Ki-moon also appealed to Czechia to comply with the commitments in the provision of ODA. The actual conference was finally attended by Deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Tlapa again and the level of representation of the Czech Republic was worse than for example in the case of Slovakia and Poland that sent the ministers.⁵⁸ FoRS with its member think tank Glropolis also lobbied unsuccessfully for a higher representation by a letter to the Prime Minister, media brief and breakfast with journalists or online video. They criticized especially the absence of any representative of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, although one of the main topics of the conference concerned tax evasions as the strong domestic political topic of the Minister of Finance for the ANO movement A. Babiš.⁵⁹ The main disputed point of the conference between the global North and South became the issue of the provision of the Intergovernmental panel on tax issues at the UN. The European Union stood against the proposal and managed to preserve the key international tax agenda in the competence of the exclusive club of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, in which an overwhelming majority of countries of the South did not have their representation. However, the speech of M. Tlapa was more helpful, contrary to the Union mainstream, and he stated in his speech: *"I share the need to work more on the international tax reforms on the global level."*⁶⁰ However, the topic was not too attractive to the public or media and for example the number of views of the video focused on this target group did not exceed 250.⁶¹

Neither the media coverage and public interest, nor the actual Summit on the sustainable development, which took place from 25. to 27. 9. 2015, exceeded the limit of the compilation of the agency reports without a follow-up analysis of the importance for Czechia.⁶² As often in the case of the development agenda, the medialization took place through "important persons", for example, Pope Francis.⁶³ The Czech Republic was represented by Deputy Prime Minister for the Science, Research and Innovation Pavel Bělobrádek, Slovakia also by the Deputy Prime Minister, Poland by the President of the republic.⁶⁴ In the governmental line, Bělobrádek put an emphasis on *"efficient financing mechanisms"* and monitoring of achievement as a part of the membership campaign in ECOSOC. He focused a part on science and research as the agenda in his portfolio, *"establishment"* of the Government Council for Sustainable Development (RVUR) (in fact, this body was only restored) and the topic of human rights as the *"Czech touch"*.⁶⁵ The last key meeting of this year was the so-

called Climatic Summit, more accurately the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris. Prime Minister B. Sobotka announced there that Czechia “*would search for possibilities of further increasing*” of funding for the purpose of limiting climate changes and adapting to them, which were included in ODA.⁶⁶

In addition to the actual preparation for the aforesaid global conferences, on the Union level during the presidency of Latvia and Luxembourg, a public consultation was launched with the title *Towards a New Partnership between the EU and the ACP Countries (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific regions) after 2020*. At the Council for the ZRS in December, Deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Tlapa challenged the members to get involved in the agenda, in which there was a huge interest from the side of the MFA.⁶⁷ Thanks to the funding from the European Commission, activities of the European Year for Development, the topic of which opened this chapter, also took place. For the period of the year, the MFA published its own *Bulletin* and deputy Tlapa presented it to the journalists on the occasion of its start. In addition to the project outputs, however the media interest in the European Year for Development was low despite the fact that some pieces of news were released in media in the form of a commercial statement.⁶⁸ M. Tlapa, who as the chairman of the Council for ZRS has for example the development agenda within his sphere of competence, represented Czechia in the October informal Council of development ministers and ministresses, which was already fully focused on migration. Even here, he emphasized the Czech approach “*help on the spot*” and also highlighted the role of the trade policy and the need for innovative tools of financing, including the private sector, as a source of stability of the countries of origin.⁶⁹ In November, the Valletta Summit on Migration also took place on the Union level together with the African statesmen; it was attended by the Prime Minister and the Trust Fund for Africa was established where.⁷⁰ He also attended the meeting in Luxemburg at the conclusion of the European Year for Development.⁷¹ The previous May informal meeting for the preparation for the Agenda post-2015 was attended by then Deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Petr Drulák.

Tools of foreign development co-operation and their financing

A summarized overview about the department, tool, sector and territorial allocation shall be provided by the *Information on Foreign Development Co-operation of the Czech Republic in 2015*, which was submitted by the MFA to the Government on 22. 6. 2016.⁷² As it was already emphasized in the introduction of this chapter, a considerable increase of bilateral ODA by 446 million CZK can be attributed especially to the tied contributions of the so-called bi-multilateral aid especially in the competence of the MI by a quarter-a-billion CZK and inclusion of aid to the refugees in the first year of the stay, which achieved 360 million CZK in 2015.⁷³ The increase of the multilateral aid reached 108 million CZK in particular thanks to the contributions to the UN system. Although it concerns a statistic indicator, which does not include necessarily real expenditures of ZRS from the public budget, the ratio ODA/GDP was increased from 0.11% in 2014 to 0.12%. The tools of ZRS, in which changes occurred traditionally, include humanitarian aid.

Originally it was budgeted pursuant to the *Operation Strategy of Humanitarian Aid of the Czech Republic* for 2015 to 73 million CZK.⁷⁴ The budget was increased by unspent expenditures for Ukraine and extraordinary 10 million CZK for a fight with Ebola from the governmental reserves.⁷⁵ Even with a smaller aid to refugees in the transit countries, the humanitarian aid reached altogether 90 million CZK. Not only that the increase is negligible in comparison with the aid provided by the MI, but four-fifths of the humanitarian aid in the competence of the MFA are heading to the problems related to displacement in the Near East, Ukraine or sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, it is probable that the migration pushes out other costs for long-term crises and prevention of catastrophes. More pieces of information can be found in the report *Humanitarian Aid of the Czech Republic Provided Abroad in 2015*.⁷⁶ As for other tools, a new tool of co-financing the transformation co-operation (TRANS) is worth mentioning. In May 2015, the MFA published a call for the submission of applications for co-financing of successful transformation projects from the TRANS funds, especially in the competitions of the European tool for democracy and human rights (EIDHR).⁷⁷ For the first time, the ministry opened the financial support call for more than one platform of the NNO active in the TRANS area.⁷⁸ In 2015, the government also approved the program New Elites for Syria – scholarship programme of the Government of the Czech Republic for Syrian refugees. It included the provision of 18 scholarships amounting to 1.55 million CZK.⁷⁹

The tool “B2B”, or more accurately the Program of the Development Partnership for the Private Sector, was transferred in 2015 from the MFA to ČRA and it funded altogether 14 projects with the amount of 3.6 million CZK. In 2015, the tool called Sending Experts was also realized for the first time, thanks to which 13 experts were sent to Moldova, Georgia, and Serbia for 2 million CZK. Contrary to the plan, however, this flexible tool concerned the knowledge of a technical nature rather than the intended transformation experience.⁸⁰ In relation to migration, it is also worth mentioning the security program of the MI, which only drew 3.9 million from 6 million CZK, but it drew the whole 3 million CZK from that amount for one project of training in Bosnia and Hercegovina and six countries shared the remaining small amount. Finally, on the verge of the bilateral and multilateral aid, the Czech Trust Fund of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) continued in its activity. It also supported, in addition to the more usual study tours to Czechia, sending out experts at the costs exceeding 800 thousand USD.⁸¹

Efficiency of foreign development co-operation

On a different level, positive steps to increasing efficiency of the bilateral development co-operation are represented by the Sector programmes of development co-operation for agriculture in Ethiopia and for water and sanitary facilities in Moldavia. The first one includes objectively verifiable indicators, for example the number of trained farmers or reduction of the size of erosions within that particular region by 300 hectares.⁸² Nevertheless, the sector evaluation of four projects within that particular sector in Moldavia pointed out that without specific objectives and indicators, which were not included in the second sector program, successfulness of the Czech development

interventions could not be assessed.⁸³ Otherwise, the sector evaluation monitored the typical path of evaluation of the Czech projects: better results in terms of relevance, impacts, and effectiveness, worse in terms of efficiency and sustainability. It also highlights worse communication of the Czech actors and interconnection of the projects and recommends presence of a project worker of ČRA directly on the spot. In 2015, an independent evaluation of the project of cancer prevention of women in Serbia also took place, which appreciated clear results in the form of saved lives, but pointed out the sustainability of financing and shortcomings of the Serbian healthcare policy especially towards the Romani women.⁸⁴ Finally, the otherwise positive evaluation of two projects of the global development education criticized the small number of supported teachers and its recommendations were focused especially on the integration in the common instructions from the side of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic (MEYS).⁸⁵ Beyond the framework of common evaluation in 2015, an inspection of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) also took place, which was focused for the period 2012–2014 not only on the MFA and ČRA but also on the realizing parties, including a check on the spot in Moldavia.⁸⁶ It stated compliance with the Act on ZRS, with the established priorities of the follow-up concept and with the Act on public procurement and other applicable regulations. However, it described some randomly chosen objectives of the projects as “*hardly assessable*”, elsewhere the project activities were identified “*only generally without objectively measured indicators*”, in the realization of some projects, monitoring was not realized or some activities were not even finished yet. The SAO also, in compliance with the common evaluations, highlighted the problem of project sustainability.⁸⁷ However, the inspection described the system as “*functional*” in general. In relation to the foreign partners, the SAO recommended using especially the legally binding documents instead of unenforceable memoranda on co-operation.⁸⁸ ČRA welcomed the finding of SAO and it promises the improvement of the identified problems especially through sending its staff to foreign branches, the long-term unresolved problem of ZRS.⁸⁹

From the perspective of other aspects of efficiency, the Czech Republic has not signed up for the International Aid Transparency Initiative IATI. Furthermore, in its evaluation it is only focused on big donors and, therefore, it has not published any evaluation about Czechia since 2015.⁹⁰ In addition to that, the not-committed nature of the Czech aid declined from 40% to 32% and it is well below the average of the Committee for Development Co-operation of the OECD, which is 81%.⁹¹

THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: IDENTIFYING AND CHARACTERISTICS OF KEY ACTORS

Government and President

For the sake of a comparison of the approach of the actors and beyond the framework of the agenda analysed above, B. Sobotka highlighted, in the traditional speech of the Prime Minister to the diplomatic corps, “*a suitable choice of the development and human right projects*” as one of the tools of the social dimension of foreign pol-

icy unrelated to migration.⁹² In another context with migration, he emphasized, however, “*own programmes for assistance to refugees in third countries*” of the MI, but also a good news, economic development and limitation of climate changes and their impacts as a tool of its prevention: “*As only when the countries of origin of migration are able to protect lives and property of their citizens and offer a perspective of a dignified life to them, the migrants might stop risking death in deserts or at sea.*” Also, even before the December meeting of the Constitutional actors, he promoted the “*efforts*” to increase the budget: “*At the same time, it is obvious that the problems, which are perceived primarily as a security threat, such as migration or terrorism, cannot be resolved only by force. Therefore, it is important to strive not only for increasing the defence expenditures but also the development capacities in the area of foreign development co-operation and humanitarian aid.*”⁹³ He also mentioned the development co-operation in connection with the transformation of the Balkans. Contrary to his predecessors, he put unprecedentedly higher emphasis on ZRS and in a wider context, therefore at a comparable level to its presence in the foreign policy concept. For example, on the occasion of the opening of the Conference to the 70th anniversary of the UN foundation, he declared that Czechia “*was not, would not be and actually had never been a remote island situated outside of the impact of global trends*” and that “*a loss or damages to one country would be transformed into a loss of all in the global conditions*”.⁹⁴

In contrast to the Prime Minister, President Miloš Zeman did not care about the topic of the development co-operation like in the previous year according to the public sources. The main topic of his speech to the Ambassadors and Ambassadors was economic diplomacy. He did not come close to the Governmental concept of “*help on the spot*” and he framed the topic of migration repressively – how to “*prevent*” it.⁹⁵ On the opportunity of the speech to the 70th General Assembly of the UN and the Summit on Global Objectives, he was focused only and exclusively on terrorism.⁹⁶

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Council for Foreign Development Co-operation and Czech Development Agency

In the MFA, there were no significant organizational or personnel changes in the managerial positions concerning ZRS. The Council for ZRS met five times as usual.⁹⁷ As for the implementation of aid, the information will be provided in detail by the *Report about activity and economic management of Czech Development Agency for 2015*.⁹⁸ In 2015, the Czech Development Agency realized 145 projects for 436 million CZK and its absorption capacities were also improved: it did not draw mere 10 million CZK. The development co-operation is concentrated in a rather imbalanced way. In terms of sectors, it is dominated by agriculture and water with sanitation accounting for more than one-half and only the sectors of energy and other social infrastructure and services exceed 10% of the budget. Similarly, the budgeted amount over 50 million CZK is only reached by Moldavia, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Ethiopia. Cambodia and Zambia as newly considered programme countries only accounted for 17 or, as the case may be, 12 million CZK. A budget measure was used for the implementation of 18% of aid, which reflected a high ratio of public administration as an implement-

ing party; the rest falls equally within subsidies and public orders, which also more or less copied the division between the implementing parties from non-governmental non-profitable organizations and from the private sector.

Under the current management, the Czech Development Agency generally seems to be a dynamic organization, which monitors the contemporary trends in the field; nevertheless, it is still hindered by limited staff capacities. Therefore, it prepared a *Mid-term Vision of Strengthening Capacities of the Czech Development Agency in the Context of Finalizing the Transformation of the System of Foreign Development Co-operation* for the government.⁹⁹ Like traditionally in the inter-ministerial comment process, disputes appeared between the MFA and the MF about the area of the level of funding and systemization; however, the MF finally approved the increase by five positions in ČRA from 2016. ČRA originally required further increasing of capacities from 2017, but it was postponed to the connection with the new concept, i.e. earliest to 2018. Similarly, a less ambitious plan of opening branches or, as the case may be, offices of ČRA was adapted. The project staff of ČRA abroad will probably have a diplomatic status, but the final decision will be made pursuant to the legislative analysis and possible inclusion of ČRA under the Civil Service Act. Otherwise, ČRA co-operated with the partner agencies from Israel, Germany, Austria, Sweden, and USA. ČRA also considerably increased its visibility and organized the Czech Development Day attended by the minister at Prague Kampa on 17. 9. 2015. From November 2015, wages were increased to ČRA employees as well as to other employees of the state administration by the decision of the government.¹⁰⁰

Non-governmental non-profitable organizations, private sector, and local self-governments

Although the main national topic of the European Year for Development was the so-called inter-institutional co-operation, the most interesting fruit of it became paradoxically the joint publication of the advocacy brochure *Czech Aid Is Not Expenditure but Investment – We Can Handle More*, which was initiated by the Czech Development Agency and published together with the non-governmental, business and self-government platform outside of the sources of funding of the European Year.¹⁰¹ The publication, which was also used for lobbying at the Chamber of Deputies, summarizes the reasons for increasing the development aid, while also leaning on the “migration” logic. Among the four reasons identified in the first place, it states that “*the Czech aid improves lives of people in their countries and weakens the pressures on migration*”, then it argues with solidarity and good name, export of jobs and opening the markets to Czech firms and conflict prevention.¹⁰² On the interface of the governmental and non-governmental sectors, the MFA organized a round table about the inter-sector co-operation within EyD2015.¹⁰³ The MFA also supported events for a higher inclusion of Czech non-governmental subjects in drawing the European funds for the development co-operation.¹⁰⁴ The co-operation of the MFA, MEYS, ČRA and FoRS with the National Institute for Education, National Institute for Further Education in the organization of the conference on global development education can be called a result of inter-sector and also inter-ministerial co-operation within EyD2015.¹⁰⁵

Within the non-governmental development sector, its platform FoRS issued the traditional shadow report about ZRS called *AidWatch*.¹⁰⁶ Its main recommendations concerned, as usual, the stagnating budget, but also the creation of a new strategic framework of sustainable development, the preparation of which will be summarized by the annual book for 2016. Furthermore, the recommendations concerned the implementation of commitments from Pusan, focusing ZRS on extreme poverty and on completion of the agenda of coherence of the policies for development with their wider framework. In August, FoRS organized a meeting of member organizations with respect to migration, however without follow-up outputs. In FoRS, an internal debate also took place about the inclusion of the private sector in ZRS. The conference on inclusion of towns and municipalities within EyD2015 was organized by the Union of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic in partnership with Charita ČR.¹⁰⁷ Finally, the Business platform for foreign development cooperation (PPZRS) organized a number of round tables focused on the infrastructure and industrialization, intellectual ownership, transfer of technologies and some other sectors, again especially within the European Year for Development.¹⁰⁸ The Association of Social Responsibility A-CSR, hosting organization of the National network Global Compact of the Czech Republic, unifying nearly 150 especially corporate members, has become active in the development area recently.

Parliament of the Czech Republic

In addition to the debate about migration analysed in the previous parts of the chapter in the Chamber of Deputies, the development co-operation and humanitarian aid did not appear on the agenda of the Parliament more often than in the previous years. The exception consisted of the non-public advocate seminar, which was organized by FoRS under the sponsorship of the chairman of the Sub-committee for Development Co-operation Karel Rais.¹⁰⁹ K. Rais, as a member of the Foreign Committee too, spread the brochure *Czech Aid Is Not Expenditure but Investment – We Can Handle More* and invited his colleagues to increase the budget for ZRS within the chapter 306; nevertheless, he did not submit any proposal for a resolution of the committee in the matter. In his visit to the committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Zaorálek emphasized again that “*the effort to be engaged in the problematic areas was more efficient than solving the follow-up integration*” and announced that he was preparing “*a major debate at the government*” for the “*re-evaluation*” of financing ZRS.¹¹⁰ The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate did not address the topic for the whole year. The development aid was only touched indirectly by the informal platform of independent senators, again in connection with migration.¹¹¹ The chairman of the Senate disavowed himself from this platform officially.¹¹²

THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF CZECH FOREIGN POLICY IN MEDIA AND PUBLIC SPACE

Although the European refugee crisis has resulted practically in an unprecedented increasing of humanitarian and development aid and occupied both the public space and

media as the main topic approximately since June 2015, it does not mean that the main actors, the MFA and the MI, would greatly support the medialization of “help on the spot”. For example, the Ministry of Interior supported the electrification of the camp on Jordan Zaatari, where over 80,000 refugees were living, within its programme with an amount representing 10% of the annual budget of the Czech Development Agency. Nevertheless, when the camp was visited in September 2015 by Prime Minister B. Sobotka, he himself expressed criticism that “*the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior really communicated the aid, which was provided by us, just a little*”.¹¹³ The actual launch in July of the following year was attended by the Czech Ambassador to Amman but the MFA only informed about it with a link to the information from the Embassy. It was just taken over in Czechia by the initiative HateFree. However, the Embassy stated that the “*whole event took place under massive media coverage, including pan-Arab television Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, AFP agency and Jordan mass media*”.¹¹⁴ In the effort to support “help on the spot”, misleading data appeared too, however: pursuant to a part of the press release of the MFA, which was not taken over by media, nevertheless, in 2015 707 million CZK were supposed to be transferred to migration, of which 70 million CZK to humanitarian aid and 547 million CZK from ZRS, where, however, the MFA probably included the costs of ČRA from 69%, which headed to the transit countries or countries of origin of the migration, regardless of the place where the aid actually headed.¹¹⁵ Examples of extremely low medialization of “help on the spot” or, on the contrary, its exaggeration return us back to the beginning and reflect the secondary nature of the argument “help on the spot” and the fact that neither the old, nor the new actors had a particularly strong need to emphasize this rhetoric figure to the public, but they also used it as an argument for increasing the budget within their own competence.

Of course, like in the past years the media and public space was also filled most often by traditional contributions to the charity concept. A song and music video of the Jihlava hip-hop group Pio Squad in Czech and Bengali with guest local rappers for the Čalantika Centre, which is located in one Dhaka slum and is supported by the non-governmental organization ADRA, is worth a special mention. In terms of the Czech charity advertisement, this fairly non-stereotypical video had more than quarter-million views on YouTube and, therefore, it reached the target group of young people probably more than the whole campaign EyD2015.¹¹⁶ For the Internet and printed media it was also typical to take over ČTK news without further context.¹¹⁷ An interesting media case consists of the story of the considered deportation of the Palestinian cardiologist Ahmad Zohoor, who works in the hospital in Karlovy Vary, which was covered by the media. Originally, he was supposed to leave Czechia because he violated the rules of government scholarship holders, who were supposed to leave for the country of origin, after completing their studies paid from the funds of the foreign development co-operation, and support its development there. Finally, the Czech Republic extended his stay.¹¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS: “HELP ON THE SPOT” AS A SOURCE OF POLITICIZING AND FRAGMENTATION

In sum, the chapters of this book edition dedicated to the development dimension of Czech foreign policy appreciated already eight times in the past increasing institutionalization, conceptualization and efficiency of foreign development co-operation but, at the same time, criticized its depoliticizing, which resulted in a shortage of impulses for increasing the budget and compliance of other governmental policies with the development policy. The key statistic indicator ODA/GDP is the same in 2015 as nine years ago, in 2006, and reaches 0.12%.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the Czech Republic is far from its commitments concerning the volume of provided aid amounting to 0.17% in 2010 and 0.33% in 2015. Even though the gross domestic product of Czechia grew from 2009 to 2015 by nearly one-fifth, the budget of the foreign development co-operation remained practically the same. In 2009, the planned volume was 860 million CZK and the amount of 807 million CZK was drawn.¹²⁰ In 2015, the plan was 855 million CZK and the amount of 804 million CZK was implemented.¹²¹ It is obvious that the actual keeping of the ratio ODA/GDP does not depend so much on the basic budget of ZRS as on the expenditures, ranging from the mandatory or virtually mandatory contributions to the European Union and international organizations up to the expenditures from other budget chapters, which can be accounted as official development co-operation and which would be spent regardless of the existence of ZRS. Within the same period, the activities in the area of coherence of policies for the development were shown to be fortuitous, one-off and unsustainable. Without the European and international comparison and without mutual comparison with other dimensions of Czech foreign policy, this quantitative stagnation cannot be assessed thoroughly. It is difficult to establish if the cause of this stagnation was rather the technocratic focus and close nature of the development constituency or the lack of interest of the policies, public, and media. Already the last year's chapter stated that the *“long-term technocratic approach, which characterized the foreign development co-operation, could surely lead, like in that specific policy, to stability, continuity, and efficiency of the system, independent of the political cycle. However, politicizing need not necessarily mean polarization and opposing opinions about the purpose of a particular policy because the political debate can only concern the tools for achieving the objectives, concerning which there can be agreement throughout the political scene.”*¹²² The events of 2015 confirm this diagnosis; however, they rather point out to closeness and technicality of the development co-operation. The unprecedentedly strong, across the political spectrum shared story of “help on the spot” concerning the development dimension as a response to the refugee crisis represented a huge opportunity for the foreign development co-operation. Even with consideration of the plan of ZRS for 2017 and the following years, it seems, however, that this opportunity was not utilized fully.

“Help on the spot”, in other words “(anti) migration aid” can be understood in two ways. Either as a part of foreign policy, which falls, according to the Act on ZRS, to the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or as a part of the internal policy, which falls within the competence of the Ministry of Interior. The fact is that in 2015,

humanitarian aid and the development co-operation were included by the political actors much more in the security framework than in the framework of global responsibility and, at the same time, even with respect to the processes of creation of the Union policy, it happened that it was the Ministry of Interior and not the department of foreign affairs that managed to mobilize unprecedented political support for the creation of own programme of aid in the countries of origin and transit of migrants and against the spirit of the Act on ZRS. Regardless of the fact if securitization of migration is justified or not, it was it and thereto related humanitarian aid and development co-operation, which enabled unprecedented mobilization of the sources reported as ODA “from the top”, at least since the period of joining the OECD and the European Union (even if common advocate activities of ČRA, FoRS, PPZRS and SMO of the Czech Republic “from the bottom” should not be forgotten for 2015 either).

At the same time, we cannot say at the moment if this fragmentation of aid is good or bad. On one hand, after the so-called transformation, which centralized the system of ZRS, in a confrontation with the new programme of the Ministry of Interior with a 100-million budget, questions are asked again concerning worsened coordination between different departments providing help abroad. On the other side, a mobilization of relatively considerable financial means did take place eventually, which should have far greater impact in the target countries even because they were a part of Union, regional or multilateral funds. Nine years ago, the first chapter dedicated to the development dimension of Czech foreign policy stated that “*the transformation [of ZRS] – and it finally applied to the overall transformation of the country in general – required the Czech Republic to find its solid, although very limited place within the development policy of the European Union and international organizations, the agenda of which was extending continuously and reaching more and more for example to the areas of global governance, trade, security, and migration or climate changes*”.¹²³ The events of 2015 related to migration confirm it and show that it did not resolve the problem of the gap between the policy and public on one side and diplomacy and traditional development actors on the other side. However, at the same time, it raises a new, more serious question about the meaning of the transformation of ZRS and concentration of the creation of the policy at the MFA and its implementation by means of ČRA and contracted non-governmental non-profitable organizations and firms instead of the previous system, in which individual departments played the major role and the MFA only coordinated them. The fact is that it does not only concern a proactive formulation of the migration policy by the Ministry of Interior, which wiped out the difference between internal and external policies. It is the Agenda 2030, which was adopted in September 2015 by the General Assembly of the UN without any wider domestic interest and which eliminated the boundaries between internal and external policies of sustainable development in a more fundamental way.

The continuing interconnection on the Union and global levels and strengthening of the policy of sustainable development as a wider framework superior to global development with its specific tools of foreign development co-operation also have a tendency to strengthening external and internal policies of other departments and mobilization of their sources. This trend does not represent a challenge for the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs only but for all actors of the Czech development constituency: politicizing “from the bottom” is the best prevention to politicizing “from the top”, which has a tendency to lead to fragmentation and marginalization.

Endnotes

¹ This chapter is based on publicly available sources. It was not commented by the actors of the foreign development co-operation. The chapter does not express the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and only and exclusively the author shall be responsible for the correctness of the provided information and its evaluation. The author was an external member of the advisory team of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and participated in commenting some conceptual documents.

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⁷ OECD: *Development Co-operation Report 2016: The Sustainable Development Goals as Business Opportunities*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016, p. 107.

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- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- ²² *Ibid.*, p. 15.
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